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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 












DOCKET NO. 43831 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
210 S Parkwood Place 
Coeur D'Alene, ID 83814 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
TROY Y. NELSON 
601 W Riverside Ave, Ste 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
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Date: 2/-12/20"16 First Judiciai District Court - Kootenai County User: LEU 
Time: 10:01 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 5 Case: CV-2014-0008801 Current Judge: Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Christina June Greenfield vs. Ian D Smith 
Christina June Greenfield vs. Ian D Smith 
Date Code User Judge 
12/1/2014 NCOC LEU New Case Filed - Other Claims Lansing L. Haynes 
LEU Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Lansing L. Haynes 
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F and 
H(1) Paid by: Greenfield, Christina June 
(plaintiff) Receipt number: 0047304 Dated: 
12/1/2014 Amount: $221.00 (Cash) For: 
Greenfield, Christina June (plaintiff) 
COMP WOOSLEY Complaint Filed Lansing L. Haynes 
SUMI WOOSLEY Summons Issued Lansing L. Haynes 
12/5/2014 SUMR DEGLMAN Summons Returned/Not Used Lansing L. Haynes 
SUMI DEGLMAN Summons Issued Lansing L. Haynes 
12/8/2014 AMCO DEGLMAN Modified Complaint Filed Lansing L. Haynes 
12/11/2014 AFSV MCCOY Affidavit Of Service - 12/10/14 - IS Lansing L. Haynes 
12/23/2014 MCCOY Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Lansing L. Haynes 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Keith 
Brown Receipt number: 0050042 Dated: 
12/23/2014 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: 
Smith, Ian D (defendant) 
NOAP MCCOY Notice Of Appearance and Jury Demand - Keith Lansing L. Haynes 
Brown obo Ian Smith 
12/31/2014 AFFD SVERDSTEN Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion to Lansing L. Haynes 
Disqualify the Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes 
Per IRCP 40(d)(1) 
MOTN SVERDSTEN Motion to Disqualify the Honorable Judge Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing Haynes Per IRCP 40(d)(1) (by plaintiff) 
1/2/2015 NITD JLEIGH Three Day Notice Of Intent To Take Default And Lansing L. Haynes 
Default Judgment 
1/5/2015 ORDR SVERDSTEN Order of Self Disqualifiction-Judge Haynes Lansing L. Haynes 
DISF SVERDSTEN Disqualification Of Judge Haynes - Self Lansing L. Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Order Assigning Judge Simpson On Voluntary Lansing L. Haynes 
Disqualification 
ANSW HUFFMAN Defendant's Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Benjamin R. Simpson 
Plaintiffs Original and Modified Complaint and 
Jury Demand 
1/6/2015 NOTE HUFFMAN Clerk's Notation-Sent to Judge for review Benjamin R. Simpson 
1/7/2015 HRSC LARSEN Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Benjamin R. Simpson 
02/17/2015 03:00 PM) 
ORDR LARSEN Scheduling Order And Forms Issued Benjamin R. Simpson 
NOHG LARSEN Notice Of Hearing Benjamin R. Simpson 
1/12/2015 RSCN HUFFMAN Response to Status Conference Notice - C.G. Benjamin R. Simpson 
1/14/2015 RSCN DEGLMAN Response to Status Conference Notice- Keith Benjamin R. Simpson 
Brown 
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First judiciai District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0008801 Current Judge: Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Christina June Greenfield vs. Ian D Smith 
Usei: LEU 
Christina June Greenfield vs. Ian D Smith 
Date Code User Judge 
1/21/2015 MISC LUNNEN Plaintiffs First Set Of Requests For Production Of Benjamin R. Simpson 
Documents 
1/28/2015 MISC WOOSLEY Defendant's Motion for Limited Admission of Benjamin R. Simpson 
David A. Kulisch Pro Hae Vice 
2/17/2015 HRVC LARSEN Hearing result for Scheduling Conference Benjamin R. Simpson 
scheduled on 02/17/2015 03:00 PM: Hearing 
Vacated Keith Brown to appear 
telephonic-509-7 4 7-2052 
2/23/2015 NTSV MCKEON Amended Notice Of Service Of Defendant's Benjamin R. Simpson 
Responses To Plaintiffs First Set Of Requests 
For Production 
HRSC LARSEN Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference Benjamin R. Simpson 
12/17/2015 08:00 AM) 
HRSC LARSEN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled Benjamin R. Simpson 
01/19/2016 09:00 AM) 4 day trial 
NOHG LARSEN Notice Of Pre-Trial Conference And Trial Benjamin R. Simpson 
ORDR LARSEN Order For Mediation Benjamin R. Simpson 
NOTC LARSEN Trial Notice Benjamin R. Simpson 
PTOR LARSEN Scheduling Order, Notice Of Trial Setting And Benjamin R. Simpson 
Initial Pre-Trial Order 
2/26/2015 NOTC MCCOY Notice of David A Kulisch's Unavailibility Benjamin R. Simpson 
3/9/2015 NTSV BAXLEY Notice Of Service Of Defendant's Interrogatories Benjamin R. Simpson 
(Nos 1-17) And Requests For Production (Nos 
1-9) To Plaintiff 
3/11/2015 ORDR D!XON Order For Limited Admission Of David A Ku!isch Benjamin R Simpson 
3/18/2015 NTSV MCKEON Notice Of Service Of Defendant's Interrogatories Benjamin R. Simpson 
(No. 18) And Requests For Production (No. 10) 
To Plaintiff 
4/10/2015 NOTO MCKEON Notice Of Intention To Depose Defendant Ian D. Benjamin R. Simpson 
Smith 
NTSV MCKEON Notice Of Service Of Plaintiffs Responses To Benjamin R. Simpson 
Defendant's First Set Of Requests For Production 
5/22/2015 NOTR JLEIGH Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Ian D Benjamin R. Simpson 
Smith, Esq. 
5/26/2015 MOTN CLEVELAND Motion, Affidavit and ORDER to Waive Mediation Benjamin R. Simpson 
- Plaintiff 
5/28/2015 ORDR LARSEN Order Denying Motion To Waive Mediation John P. Luster 
5/29/2015 ADMR VIGIL Administrative assignment of Judge (batch 
process) 
6/5/2015 NOTC MMILLER Notice of Unavailability For Christina Greenfield Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
6/18/2015 NOTR JLEIGH Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Ian D Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Smith 
HRSC LARSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Judgment 09/01/2015 03:00 PM) Kulisch-45 min 
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User: LEU 
Christina June Greenfield vs. Ian D Smith 
Date Code User Judge 
7/7/2015 NTSV JLEIGH Notice Of Service Of Plaintiffs Second Reponse Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
To Defendants Request For Production 
7/27/2015 NOTC CLEVELAND Notice of Unavailability for Christina Greenfield Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
7/29/2015 FILE HUFFMAN New File Created *********** # 2 ****************** Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
FILE HUFFMAN New File********* EXPANDO # 3 ****************** Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
7/30/2015 NOTC HUFFMAN Notice of Association of Counsel Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
MOTN HUFFMAN Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
MEMO HUFFMAN Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
for Summary Judgment 
NOHG HUFFMAN Notice Of Hearing Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
AFFD HUFFMAN Affidavit of Peter Erbland - In Expando # 3 Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
AFFD HUFFMAN Affidavit of Ian Smith Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
AFFD HUFFMAN Affidavit of Troy Y Nelson Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
MISC HUFFMAN Statement of Undisputed Facts Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
8/6/2015 NOTC WOOSLEY Notice of David A Kulisch's Unavailability - Atty Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
for Defendant 
8/18/2015 AFFD DEGLMAN Affidavit Of Christina J Greenfield in Support of Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Plaintiffs Statement of Facts and Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion For 
Summary Judgment 
MISC DEGLMAN Plaintiffs Statement of Facts in Support of Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
MEMS DEGLMAN Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition to Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment 
MISC DEGLMAN Plaintiffs Request For Enlargement of Time to Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
File Response to Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
8/19/2015 ORDR LARSEN Order Re: Plaintiffs Request For Enlargement Of Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Time To File Response To Defendant's Motion 
For Summary Judgment 
FILE LEU New File Created-----#4------CREATED Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
8/20/2015 NOTC LEU Notice Of Compliance Re Defendant's Expert Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Witness Disclosure 
MISC LEU Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
8/24/2015 OBJT WOOSLEY Objection to Greenfield Affidavit and Motion to Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Strike 
DRSB WOOSLEY Defendant's Reply Brief Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
9/1/2015 HRHD LARSEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
scheduled on 09/01/2015 03:00 PM: Hearing 
Held Kulisch-45 min 
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District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 
10/27/2015 03:00 PM) Greenfield-45 min 
Judge 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Affidavit Of Christina J Green Field In Support Of Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Plaintiffs Motion In Further Opposition To 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
Puruant To IRCP 56(f) 
Motion In Further Opposition To Defendants' Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to IRCP 
56(f) 
Notice Of Hearing: Motion In Further Opposition Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
To Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
Pursuant to IRCP 56(f) And Motion To Comple 
Response To Discovery 
Objection To Plaintiffs Motion And Affidavit In 
Further Opposition To Defendants' Motion For 
Summary Judgment And Objection To Exhibits 
1-10, And Motion To Strike 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/27/2015 03:00 
PM) Kulish-motion to strike 
Notice Of Hearing 
New File Created----#5----CREA TED 
Motion To Compel Response To Discovery 
Memorandum Decision And Order Re: 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment 
NO SELF ADDRESSED ST AMPED ENVELOPE 
FOR CHRISTINA GREENFIELD 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Order Granting Motion For Summary Judgment Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
On Behalf Of Defendant Ian Smith 
Civil Disposition entered for: Smith, Ian D, Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Defendant; Greenfield, Christina June, Plaintiff. 
Filing date: 10/22/2015 
Judgment Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Case status changed: Closed pending clerk Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
action 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
on 10/27/2015 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Greenfield-45 min 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
10/27/2015 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Kulish-motion to strike 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
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Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
scheduled on 12/17/2015 08:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
on 01/19/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4 
day trial 
Case status changed: closed Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Motion To Disqualify the Honorable Judge Cyntia Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
K.C. Meyer Per IRCP 40(d)(2) and IRCP 40(d)(5) 
and Accompanying Affidavit 
Affidavit in Support of Motion To Disqualify the Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Honorable Judge Cyntia K.C. Meyer Per IRCP 
40(d)(2) and IRCP 40(d)(5) 
Order Denying Motion To Disqualify Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Greenfield, Christina 
June (plaintiff) Receipt number: 0044836 Dated: 
12/2/2015 Amount: $129.00 (Cash) For: 
Greenfield, Christina June (plaintiff) 
Motion: Re Affidavit Of Christina J. Greenfield In Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Support Of Requesting A Fee Waiver For An 
Appeal 
Appeal Filed In District Court 
Order for Waiver of Fees - For Clerk's Record 
and Transcripts On Appeal 
Defendant's Amended ~v1otion for Limited 
Admission of David A Kulisch Pro Hae Vice 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Amended Order for Limited Admission of David A Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Kulisch 
Amended Notice Of Appeal Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Defendant's Notification of Change of Supervising Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Attorney 
Notice Of Transcript Lodging - 33 pages - Diane Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Bolan 
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Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
Plaintiff Pro Se 




STATE OF IOAHO } 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 155 
FILED: · 
. y~::!])1 
201~ DEC - I PH J: 05 
fflE STATE OF IDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff Christina J. Greenfield (hereafter: ''Greenfield'') for a cause 
of action against the above-named Defendant, Ian D. Smith (hereafter: ''Smith") and hereby complains and 
alleges as follows: 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought forth by the above mentioned Plaintiff for damages caused to Plaintiff through 
willful, intentional, and negligent actions by the Defendant,, wherein Plaintiff asserts a breach of contract, legal 
malpractice, and breach of an attorney-client relationship exists. Such abuse and willful misconduct has caused 
Plaintiff actual and future damages as the result of said conduct by the above named Defendant for failure to 
follow Plaintiff's instructions, failure to file legal documents, failure to file legal motions, failure to acquire 
evidence through discovery, inconsistent statements of fact, failure to investigate, failure to notify Plaintiff of 
modifications, failure to submit a monetary sanction to Plaintiff upon payment of said sanction, failure to follow 
Court orders~ failure to respond to motions, failure to give sufficient notice of withdrawal from representation in 
a civil case, siphoning trust fund money into personal accounts, procrastination in performance of services and / 
or lack of follow-up during the litigation process. 
The failure to provide Plaintiff with competent representation in both her criminal case and civil case is 
the basis fur civil liability under a theory of professional negligence. In a legal malpractice action arising from 
a civil proceeding, the elements are: (1) the duty of the attorney to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as 
members of his or her Pr<?fession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proxhnate 
causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the 
attorney's negligence. See; Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 1194, 1199 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 
COMPl,AINT Pg.1 
(' '1 ,"'l !' '-'': 1 t,,,., ~ ..... 
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25 P.3d 670}), (Budd v. Nixen (197]) 6 Cal.Jd 195, 200 [98 Cal.Rptr. 849, 491P.24433)), (Hecht, Solberg, 
Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley LLP v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 579, 591 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 446]). 
For Greenfield to prevail in a legal malpractice action, Greenfield must establish that, but for the alleged 
malpractice 'trial, settlement.of the underlying lawsuit would have resulted in a better outcome. See; Viner v. 
Sweet, supra, 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1244; ·Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 336, 357 [89 
Cal.Rptr.3d 710]; Lazy Acres Market, Inc. v. Tseng (2007) 152 Cal.App-4th 1431, 1436 [62 Cal.Rptr.3d 378]; 
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 1057; Marshak v. Ballesteros, supta, 72 
Cal.App.4th 1514, 1518; Hinshaw, Wink/.er, Draa, Marsh & Still v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 233, 
239 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 791]; Thompson v. Halvonik. supra, 36 Cal.App.4th 657, 663; Campbell v. Magana (1960) 
184 Cal.App.2d 751, 754 [8 Cal.Rptr. 321) "Thus, a plaintiff who alleges an inadequate settlement in the 
rmderlying action must prove that, if not for the malpractice, she would certainly have received more money in 
settlement or at trial." See; Slovensky v .. Friedman, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1528, italics added. 
The Defendants' actions caused damages to Greenfield including· but not limited· to: loss of past and 
future economic opportunity, loss of civil liberties and freedom, violation of constitutional rights, defamation, 
deprivation of rights, failure to keep from harm, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
On September 15, 2010, Greenfield entered into a contractual representation agreement with Smith as 
her legal counsel in a civil action against her neighbors, the WurroJingers, who had falsely accused Greenfield 
of a crime, wherein Greenfield was arrested and charged with Malicious Injury to Property, four (4) months 
prior, on June 3, 2010, after Greenfield's agent trimmed ten (10) arborvitae shrubs that were located on the 
property line dividing Wurmlinger and Greenfield propeny. Said properties are located in Post Falls, Idaho. 
Smith initially informed Greenfield during a consultation visjt that five thousand dollars ($5000) would 
be sufficient to litigate a civil complaint against the Wurmlingers. When Greenfield was ready to sign on with 
Smith, Smith reneged on the five thousand dollars ($5000) proposal and directed that Greenfield pay a seven 
thousand five hundred dollars ($7500) retaining fee instead. Greenfield agreed to pay Smith two hundred forty 
dollar ($240) an hour up to the agreed retaining fee amount in hope that a settlement would be reached quickly 
due to the overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of Greenfield, along with Idaho State Code, City 
ordinances and neighborhood Cqvenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (hereinafter: "CC&Rs'') that protected 
Greenfield. 
On January 20, 2011, Smith became Greenfield's defense attorney on the criminal matter by replacing 
Anne Taylor, the public defender who was iuitially assigned to represent Greenfield for the bogus Malicious 
Injury to Property charge against Greenfield. Smith, who was already familiar with the case, insisted that 
Greenfield pay an additional seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7500) to defend her throughout the 
remaining criminal litigation proceedings. 
COMFLAINT Pg.2 
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Smith neglected to act on obvious due process violations that the City of Post Falls Municipality and /or 
its agents, as well as the Kootenai County Prosecutor, to maliciously prosecute Greenfield for a spurious crime. 
Smith refused to address several procedural defects during the criminal proceedings. Smith did not address the 
fact that Greenfield had not been read her Miranda warning when she was questioned by law enforcement 
without representation by her attorney, a due process violation of her Fifth Amendment rights. Smith did not 
pursue legal remedy when he was informed that the presiding Judge, Penny Friedlander, was the wife of the 
City of Post Falls Attorney, Jerry Mason, who had assisted in prosecuting Greenfield for the alleged felony. 
Post Falls Police Department (Hereinafter: "PFPD") along with Kootenai County Prosecutor Barry 
McHugh submitted a counterfeit FBI criminal report (NCIC) into evidence, which did not identify Greenfield, 
but another individual with the same first and last name who resided in California, yet Smith never objected or 
responded to said report during the criminal proceedings (Greenfield was unaware of said report until May 
2012, two months after Smith, quit, when said report was discovered by Greenfield). 
The Kootenai County Prosecutor and PFPD commissioned a survey on December 16, 2010, yet never 
produced the findings of said survey during discovery requests. Smith did not follow-up on the survey results 
after Greenfield repeatedly requested Smith to do so with regard to this critical piece of evidence in both the 
criminal and civil proceedings. 
Greenfield was under constant surveillance by the PFPD who had confiscated Greenfield's garbage after 
the neighbor, Eric Wunnlinger, continued to falsely accuse Greenfield of causing additional damage to his 
property. Greenfield repeatedly voiced her concerns to Smith regarding the surveillance and obvious violations 
of privacy, yet Smith refused to address evident violations of the Fourth Amendment, which protects U.S. 
citizens from "unreasonable searches and seizures.'' Smith never addressed the fact that the criminal charge 
against Greenfield should have been considered a civil complaint, per criminal presiding Judge Gibler, who 
dismissed the case nineteen months after it was initiated, claiming it was a property line dispute and should 
ha-ve been a civil issue. Greenfield was acquitted on October 4, 2011, as the prosecutor did not present any 
evidence at trial that Greenfield had committed any crimes. Due to the fact that the criminal trial only lasted 
approximately two (2) hours, Smith agreed to help Greenfield "seal" her cri:r:ninal file at no charge to 
Greenfield. 
When Greenfield met with Smith on November 10, 2011, to start the process to "seal" her case, Smith 
demanded that Greenfield pay him an additional one thousand five hundred dollars ($1500) to do so. 
Greenfield did not have the funds to pay Smith, so Smith's paralegal, Julie Vetter, agreed to draft the paperwork 
needed to Hseal" Greenfield's criminal records at a rate of fifteen dollars ($15) per hour. 
The Court hearing to address the seal:ing of Greenfi.elds criminal file was held in January 2012. Smith, 
who was still considered Greenfield's attorney of record on the criminal matter, appeared in Court -with an 
attitude and requested that Judge Gibler withdraw him from Greenfield's case and allow Greenfield to represent 
COMPl.AJN1' Pg.3 
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herself. The presidmg Judge Gibler mandated that Smith was allowed to wit11draw but insisted that Smith stay 
and assist Greenfield if needed during the proceedings. Smith was apathetic and did not attempt to assist 
Greenfield when it was apparent that Greenfield was struggling with legal theory and tenninology during her 
presentation. 
On February lOi 2014. Smith notified Greenfield that he was ••quitting" his representation from 
Greenfield's civil action against the Wurm.lingers. Smith officially ended his representation on March 9, 2012, 
a few weeks before trial, which was scheduled for May 21, 2012. Greenfield could not :find an attorney nor 
afford one, so Greenfield was forced to continue as a pro-se litigant and defend herself against the Wunnliugers 
three counterclaims'. Greenfield had no legal experience and lost her case. An Amended Final Judgment was 
entered on July 8, 2013 in favor of the Wurmlingers for one hundred and sixty-eight thousand dollars 
($168,000). Greenfield had paid Smith over thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) and an additional fifteen 
thousand dollars {$15,000) in other fees during the criminal and civil litigation proceedings. 
· .. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. 
Venue is proper in that Greenfield and Smith ate both residents of the State of Idaho. 
2. 
All the acts alleged herein occurred in the County of Kootenai, State ofldaho. 
3. 
Defendant Ian D. Smith is a licensed attorney in the State ofldaho and resides in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. 
4. 
This is a legal malpractice action arising out of Smith's misrepresentation of Greenfield's legal rights 
and obligations to appropriately arbitrate two actions, one criminal, and one civil, wherein Greenfield expected 
Smith to fulfill his commitment to represent Greenfield under an attorney-client relationship and the duties 
therein. 
5. 
The above-entitled court has personal jurisdiction over the parties named herein, the Court has subject 
matter jurisdiction over the allegations set forth herein and venue is properly before the court. 
FACTS 
6. 
On June 3, 2010 Greenfield was accused and charged with felony Malicious Injury to Property. 
7. 
On September 15, 2010, Greenfield entered into a contractual representation agreement with Smith as 
her legal counsel in a civil action against her neighbors, the Wunnlingers, who falsely accused Greenfield of 
COMPLAIN1' J'g.4 
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malicious injury to property after Greenfield's agent trimmed ten (l 0) arborvitae shrubs that were located on the 
property line dividing the two properties. 
8. 
Smith represented himself to be an attorney in good standing, licensed to practice law in the State of 
Idaho, was competent., without mental or emotional defect, qualified to perform legal services as an attorney 
and capable of representing Greenfield in the pending civil action. 
9. 
On September 23, 2010, Smith filed a Civil Complaint against the Wurmlingers for Declaratory 
Judgment, Injunctive Relief, including Damages, and Summons on behalf of Greenfield. 
10. 
On October 13, 2010 (Civil Case) Wunnlillgers filed a notice of appearance for attorney Gary 
Amendola. 
11. 
On October 21, 2010 (Civil Case) WunnHngers filed an incomplete "Answer to Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, and Damages" along with three Counter Claims: (a) Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress; (b) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (c) Tortious Interference 
With Prospective Econqmic Advantage. 
12. 
On November 1, 2010 (Civil Case) Smith responded to the claims, wherein Greenfield denied all three 
of Wunnlingers Counter Claims. 
13. 
On December 2, 2010 (Civil Case) Smith requested the "First Set of Production of Documents." 
14. 
On December 16, 2010 (Criminal Case) a survey was commissioned by the Kootenai County 
Prosecutor, Barry McHugh, and City of Post Falls Police Chief Scot Haug on behalf of Wurmlinger to 
determine the location of the arborvitae shrub hedge aforementioned above. 
15. 
On December 27, 2010 (Civil Case) Wurmlingers moved the Court to dismiss their frivolous claim for 
"Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage" and said claim was dismissed with prejudice by 
presiding Judge Haynes on January 26, 2011. 
16. 
On January 20, 2011 (Criminal Case) Greenfield fired Anne Taylor, the public defender who was 
initially assigned to Greenfield by the Court and hired S:mith after his coaxing Greenfield to defend her on the 
COMPLAlNT Pg.5 
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bogus felony charge due to his knowledge of the case at this point. The criminal Trial was scheduled for 
January 25, 2011, then vacated and re-scheduled for June 28, 2011. 
17-
0n February 14, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith filed a "Motion to Compel" and a ''Motion For Order 
Permitting Entry Upon Wurmlingers' Real Property'' to inspect and photograph the interior and exterior of 
Wunnlingers' residence and property, to conduct a survey to locate the property line between Greenfield's and 
Wurmlingers' real property, to locate the easement, and to permit an arborist to inspect the arborvitae shrubbery 
that Wurmlingers claimed Greenfield damaged. 
18. 
On February 15, 2011 (Civil Case) Wunnlingers moved to dismiss their frivolous claim for 1'Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress." Said claim was dismissed with prejudice on March 17, 2011. 
19. 
On February 18, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith missed the deadlines to fil~ a ''Motion for Summary 
Judgment'' and the disclosure of Greenfield's expert witnesses per the Pre-Trial Order. 
20. 
On March 17, 2011 (Civil Case) The Court ordered entry upon the real property of the.Wurmlingers for 
the following purposes: (a) to inspect and photograph the interior of Wurmlingers' residence; (b) to inspect and 
photograph the exterior of Wunnlingers' residence; ( c) to conduct a survey to locate the property line between 
Greenfield's and Wurmlinge:rs' real property to determine the location of certain shrubbery and; (d) to permit an 
arborist to inspect the shrubbery that Wunnlingers claim Greenfield damaged. The Wunnlingers were also 
ordered to comply with Rules 30(c) and 30(d) and respond to Greenfield's "Motion for Production of 
Docoments" and "answer all questions accordingly.'' 
21 
On April 19, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield requested a "Protection Order'' regarding the release of her 
medical records to the Wurmlingers. All discovery was to be completed by May 13, 2011 per the P:re-trial 
Order. Smith did not comply with Greenfield's request. 
22. 
On May 20, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith's paralegal, Julie Vetter. informed Greenfield that Smith was 
billing her criminal holll's under her civil case billable hours. 
23. 
On June 6, 2011 (Civil Case) Gary Amendola, Wunnlingers' attomey submitted a ''Motion for Leave to 
Withdraw as Counsel." 
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24. 
On June 21, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith requested a new trial date as the Wurmlingers had not complied 
with the Court's Order to produce discovery documents. Smith had failed to submit a "Motion for Summary 
Judgment" on behalf of Greenfield who continually reminded Smith of approaching deadlines, did not finish 
Mrs. Wunnlinger's deposition, and missed other pre-trial deadlines. The July 18, 2011, trial date was vacated. 
A new trial was scheduled for May 21, 2012, along with an amended Pre-trial Order. The presiding Judge 
Haynes sanctioned the Wurmlingers and ordered them to :reimburse Greenfield for attorney fees for violating 
the Courts Order for non-production of discovery docwnents. Judge Haynes informed Smith to draft papers for 
''Contempt of Court" against the Wurmlingers for non~compliance. Mr. Smith did not follow through with the 
·'Motion for Contempt" although Greenfield insisted that he do so as the delays were costing Greenfield undue 
financial burden. 
25. 
On June 24) 2011 (Civil Case) Wurmlingers filed a ''Notice of Appearance;, for attorney Douglas 
Martice. 
26. 
On June 24, 2011 (Criminal Case) The Pre-trial hearing was scheduled. The criminal trial had been 
continued for over twelve (12) mo:oths. A third trial date was re-scheduled for October 4, 2011, (approximately 
three months). 'Mr. Smith had not reviewed any of the State's evidence, including their survey, interviewed any 
of Greenfield~s witnesses, including expert witnesses, or followed up on civil tights violations against 
Greenfield. 
27. 
On July 11. 2011 (Criminal Case) Smith's paralegal, Julie Vetter, notified Greenfield that the state 
assistant deputy prosecutor, Amy Borgman, sent documents to Smith that arrived less than twenty~four (24) 
hours before the scheduled hearing on July 12, 2011. Smith had been gone for two weeks on vacation and had 
not reviewed the documents. 
28. 
Ou July 12, 2011 (Criminal Case) The state assistant deputy prosecutor, Amy Borgman, presented an 
amended document to the court. Smith arrived at the hearing unprepared and gave the wrong information to the 
Court. Smith did not discuss the issues contained in said docwnents with Greenfield before the hearing. Stnith 
did not object to the late disclosure of said documents nor did Smith ask the Court for more time to address the 
issues. 
29. 
On July 13, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith informed Greenfield that "'Mr. Marfice (Wurmlingers' attorney) 
called me this morning and asked if you would consider settling the case ... Wurmlingers would make the 
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criminal case go away if you maac the civil case go away ... " Greenfield 1.;fused; Smith demanded another 
fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) from Greenfield to continue as her legal counsel. 
30. 
On August 17, 2011, Greenfield witnessed Post Falls Police Officers Goodwin and Gunderson dump the 
contents of her garbage can into the back of a grey pickup truck. When Greenfield demanded an explanation 
from the PFPD she was informed that Wurmlinger accused Greenfield of another malicious injury to his 
property, and PFPD seized Greenfield's property looking for evidence. Greenfield informed Smith of this civil 
rights violation and instructed Smith to check into the matter. Smith did nothing. 
31. 
On August 29, 2011 (Criminal Hearing) Smith and Greenfield attended a Court hearing in regard to the 
'"missing'' survey. Smith had not compelled the State's evidence on said survey or any additional discovery that 
was uncovered by Greenfield during the criminal proceedings. 
32. 
On September 1, 2011, Douglas Marfice submitted a "Notice of Withdrawal and Substitution of 
Counsel" for attorney John Riseborough, as Wumtl:ingers' third counsel of record. 
33. 
On October 4, 2011 (Criminal Case) Gteenfifld arrived at the Courthouse for her criminal trial and did 
not see Smith in the Courtroom upon her arrival. Greenfield had not been briefed by Smith on what would 
transpire. Greenfield did not see any of her witnesses, including expert witnesses. Smith never interviewed any 
of Greenfield's witnesses prior to trial and did not subpoena any of Greenfield's witnesses including the expert 
witnesses iliat Greenfield herself contacted. Smith was not prepared to go to trial. Greenfield suffered a 
nervous breakdown due to Smith's clear lack of professionalism and preparation, as well as negligence of duties 
and breach of contract in preparation for trial. 
Judge Gibler asked the state assistant prosecuting attorney, Amy Borgman, to proceed with her case. 
Ms. Borgman requested another continuance as the State had no evidence to convict Greenfield of a crime. 
Judge Gibler denied be,: request and dismissed the case, acquitting Greenfield of the bogus felony. Judge Gibler 
stated once again that this was a "civil matter.'' Smith was dumbfounded and incoherent after the verdict. 
34. 
On October 5, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield informed Smith that the pre-trial deadline to set a hearing 
for "Motion for Summary Judgment'' was due by November 22, 2011. Smith informed Greenfield that he 
" ... will start working on it." Smith did not submit the Motion for Summary Judgment and missed the pre~trial 
deadline for a second time. 
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35. 
On October 10, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield notified Smith that Wurmlingers had a survey crew 
rneasuring the property line to determine the location of the arborvitae hedge. Smith never requested a copy of 
the Wunnlingers' survey. Greenfield received a copy of said survey thirteen (13) months later on November 2, 
2012, twenty-four (24) days before the new trial date. Greenfield had no time to prepare for a defense or submit 
an objection to said survey prior to Tri.tl as pre~trial deadlines had passed. 
36. 
On October 14, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield notified Smith that Eric Wurm.linger continued to falsely 
accuse Greenfield of committing vandalism on his property beginning in July 2011 until the present. Greenfield 
informed Smith that a neighbor, Pamela Wallace, contacted Greenfield and confessed to vandalizing the 
Wunnlinger property. Smith did not follow-up on the matter, which led to more civil rights violations against 
Greenfield who was being accused of said -vandalism. Julie Vetter (Smith's paralegal) informed Greenfield that 
Smith had represented Pamela Wallace on prior court cases and that :she is a client of Smith's. Greenfield 
requested that Smith look into the matter and contact the Post Falls Police Department with said information, as 
well as research the data in said vandalism reports as to obvious blatant violations occurring against Greenfield. 
Smith refused and did nothing. Wunnlingers utilized said vandalism reports as trial exhibits against Greenfield, 
which Greenfield believes, said exhibits damaged her case. 
37. 
On October 17, 2011 (Civil Case) Thirteen (13) days after Greenfield's Acquittal of Felony Malicious 
Injury to Property, Wunnlingers submitted a •'Motion to Amend" and added two more counter claims: (a) 
Trespass; and (b) Timber Trespass to their Complaint. Not only were the Counterclaims not "Timely 
Submitted'' they insinuated criminal activity after Greenfield had been cleared of criminal conduct. Smith did 
not object or respond to the counter claims as directed by Greenfield. 
38 .. 
On November 10, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield met with Smith to discuss the Wurmlingers' amended 
counter claims and to add additional claims to her case, including: slander, libel, and abuse of process. 
Greenfield directed Smith to act on several key issues including; Wunnlingers' constant violations and 
contempt of Court Orders and not complying with discovery requests. Greenfield informed Smith that the 
Wur:mlingers' property needed to be inspected, the easement survey was not completed, expert witnesses 
needed to be prepared, witnesses examined, as well as summary judgment issues needed to be addressed. At 
this point Smith had missed crucial pre-trial deadlines and was grossly misrepresenting Greenfield, which 
violated the Idaho Rules of Profession.al Conduct and Idaho rules of Civil Procedure. Smith demanded another 
ten thousand dollars ($10,000) to continue the case, yet did not follow any of Greenfield's directives. 
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39. 
On December 2, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith refused to give Greenfield her .. sanction" check for $1224 that 
was awarded to her by Judge Haynes for Wurmlingers' failure to follow Court Orders. 
40. 
On December 7, 2011 (Civil case)' Smith's paralegal, Julie Vetter, quit and accepted a position as 
paralegal fot Gary Amendola, Wunnlingers' prior attorney. Smith did not hire another paralegal to replace 
Julie. Smith was handling his entire work load exclusively. 
41. 
On December 8, 2011 (Civil Case) Once again Greenfield directed Smith to draft a Protection Order to 
protect her medical records. Smith did not follow through on drafting the protection order. 
42. 
On December 11, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfi~ld met with Smith regarding concerns about missing 
crucial deadlines per the Pre-Trial Order. 
43. 
On December 13, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield entered Smith's office and noticed that all of her 
confidential records were sitting on the conference table utilized by at least four (4) other attorneys and their 
clients, unprotected and visible to anyone. Greenfield directed that Smith conceal her records, to which Smith 
replied "no one can see them ... don't worry about it!" Greenfield was extremely troubled about invasion of 
privacy regarding her medical records and other confidential documents at this point. 
44. 
On December 14, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith departed on vacation to Mt. Hood, Oregon, and was gone 
until January 4~ 2012. Smith missed the Pfe...trial Order deadline to file a Summary Judgment against the 
Wurm.lingers, and to reply on Wurmlingers, two additional counter claims, which responses were due before 
December 22, 2011. Smith failed to disclose expert witnesses and talk to k.no"Ml witnesses. Smith had not 
hired a legal assistant or paralegal to replace Vetter. 
45. 
On January 4, 2012 (Civil Case) Greenfield met with Smith again about her Protection Order regarding 
her medical records. Greenfield noticed that all of her confidential records were still sitting on the conference 
table unprotected and had been visible to the public for approximately the last twenty~three (23) days. 
Green.field was extremely distraught at this point The Wurm.lingers' attomey was scheduled to review and 
copy Greenfield's medical records on January 9, 2012, in Smith's office pet stipulation. 
46. 
On January 9, 2012 (Civil Case) Greenfield had made an appointment with Smith to view her file and 
upon am.val Greenfield noticed that her confidential records were still sitting on the office conference table 
COMPLAINT Pg.10 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 17 of 710
lL/~l/2014 15:28 7193927541 SECURITY PUBLIC LIB PAGE 02/12 
unprotected, while Wurmlingers attorney's paralegal was rummaging through them and copymg said 
documents. Greenfield was appalled as she witnessed the paralegal viewing sensitive documents that were 
subject to attorney client privilege and were not to be exposed to opposing counsel. Greenfield infonned Smith 
immediately about her frustration due to his failure to protect sensiti.ve data from opposing counsel. Smith 
handed Grecrrfield a Protection Order to sign and date just as the paralegal had completed copying Greenfield's 
documents. Smith did not file the protection order until February 17, 2012. Several of Gteenfields un~protected 
medical documents were entered into court ·records due to Smith's incompetence. 
47. 
On January 20, 2012 (Civil Case) Greenfield once again met with Smith to discuss his failures to 
provide adequate legal services that met the required standard of care, skill, and diligence needed to litigate the 
civil action against the Wurrnlingers. Greenfield believed that Smith de:i:ailed the entire case due to his 
negligence and incompetence. Upon arrival to Smith's office, Greenfield noticed that her file was still sprawled 
out on the office table in the conference room. The office receptionist, Amber Melom, mentioned to Greenfield 
« ••• your file has been in the conference room for thirty-nine (39) days and I had to move it to the chairs because 
clients were meeting in the room for the past week!" Greenfield asked Smith "'why were my documents left in 
the conference room in plain sight for all to see?" Smith replied: "Your documents are STILL in the conference 
room and no one cares!" 
48. 
On January 26, 2012 (Civil Case) John Riseborough had missed the "Summary Judgment" Pre-trial -
Order deadline and requested that the Court grant him a "Motion for Leave" on Summary Judgment. Smith did 
not object until February lOt 2012, almost two weeks later, six (6) days before the scheduled hewing set for 
February 17, 2012. At this point it was obvious to Greenfield that Smith did not care about her case. 
49. 
On February 13, 2012 (Civil Case) Smith had ignored all of Greenfield's calls and emails. Greenfield 
confronted Smith in his office and demanded an explanation as to why he botched up her case so badly. Smith 
informed Greenfield that he was going to quit. Greenfield's trial was scheduled fot May 21, 2012. Smith neve:i: 
interviewed any of Greenfield's or Wunnlingers' witnesses, did not respond to the Wunnlingers' counter 
claims, missed Greenfield's Sunnna.ry Judgment, did not respond to Wurmlingers' Motion for Sum:mary 
Judgment, did not complete a survey of Wurmlingers' property to determine the property comers or easement, 
did not inspect the Wunnlingers) residence, did not have an audit of Wurm.lingers' business, did not contact an 
expert witness to analyze Wunnlingers' business records, did not contact an expert arborist for ill), evaluation of 
the arborvitae hedge, did not object to Wu:r.rolingers' Motion for Relief From Pretrial Scheduling Order, and 
never completed Mrs. Wurmlinger's deposition, as well as dispose any ofWurmlingers' expert witnesses. 
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50. 
On February 17, 2012 (Civil Case) Smith announced to the Court that he was quitting during the hearing 
for Wunnlingers' "Motion to Leave" and "Motion for Summary Judgment." 
51. 
On February 27, 2012 (Civil Case) Judge Haynes granted Smith his "Motion For Leave to Withdraw' 
under heavy protest from Greenfield as she was indigent at this point and could not afford another attorney nor 
find one on such short notice prior to trial. 
52. 
On March 29, 2012 (Civil Case) Greenfield submits her Notice of Self Representation. 
53. 
On April 10, 2012 (Civil Case) The May 21, 2012 Trial is vacated and new trial is set fm: November 26, 
2012. The Pre-trial Order did not change. Due to Smith's negligence and incompetent representation, lack of 
skill in preparing documents, failure to file documents, lack of preparation, failure to meet deadlines, failure to 
keep Greenfield from bann by not reporting his client Pamela Wallace to authorities, and failute to act with 
reasonable due diligence, Greenfield was left defenseless in her endeavor to seek justice-and lost her civil case. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR REIJEF: NEGLIGENCE 
54. 
Piaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
55. 
At all times :material hereto, Smith asserted, implied and inf erred that he was acting as an attorney in 
good standing with the Idaho State Bar Association and was eligible, qualified and capable of serving as 
counsel for Greenfield in both her civil and criminal cases. Smith received compensation and accepted the 
responsibility to effectively represent Greenfield regarding the aforementioned cases. 
56. 
Smith was aware that the Kootenai County Prosecutor maintained that the charges against Greenfield 
were factual, yet they were based on fabricated evidence, which had been fraudulently manufactured in order to 
silence Greenfield for reporting violations of the law to local authorities. 
57. 
Smith was aware that Greenfield maintained she was falsely accused of Malicious Injury to Property by 
Wurmlinger. 
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58. 
Smith was aware that Greenfield maintained that the City of Post Falls Mllllicipality and / or its Agents 
and Kootenai County Prosecutor gave false testimony and submitted false evidence in favor of Wunnlinger 
possibly due to a Catholic fraternal affiliation. 
59. 
Smith was aware that Greenfield maintained that Wunnlinger, the City of Post Falls Municipality 
Agents and Kootenai County Prosecutor (Hereinafter: 4'State") conspired to maliciously prosecute Greenfield 
for a crime that she did not commit. 
60. 
Greenfield alleges that even though Smith knew that the State was anxious to convict Greenfield of a 
crime that she did not commit, Smith continued to extort money from Greenfield, rather than put forth an 
accurate, complete, strong and effective defense that likely would have resulted in an earlier dismissal of the 
criminal case. 
61. 
Smith negligently failed to subpoena any of Greenfield's witnesses to her criminal Trial Court. 
62. 
Smith failed to present a theory of defense in his opening statement to the criminal Trial Court. 
63. 
Smith failed to present any ~isting tneaningful exculpatory evidence favoring Greenfield throughout 
the criminal proceedings. 
64. 
Smith failed to study or research information files in order to prepare himself for trial, and was thus 
unaware of fundamental facts critical to the development of Greenfield's defense. 
65. 
Smith failed to study Ol' research the State's evidence in order to prepare himself for trial, and was thus 
unaware of fundamental facts critical to the development of Greenfield's defense. 
66. 
Smith failed to act on the State's exculpatory evidence, which did not correctly identify Greenfield but 
instead identified another person with the same first and last name as Greenfield who resided in California and 
was on probation for a critne. 
67. 
Greenfield alleges that even though Smith knew that the Wunnlingers were violating the neighborhood 
CC&Rs, city ordinances, state law, and were causing hann to Greenfield by falsely accusing her of Malicious 
lnjury to Property, Smith continued to e>!iort money from Greenfield rather than put forth an accurate, 
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complete, strong and effective c&c4hat likely would have resulted in an earl1~ settlement and/ or judgment in 
favor of Greenfield. 
68. 
Smith negligently failed to interview any of Greenfield's or Wunnlingers' wimesses, including expert 
witnesses prior to pre-trial deadlines. 
69. 
Smith negligently failed to complete a survey of the Wurmlingers' property to detennine the location of 
the easement per Court Order. 
70. 
Smith negligently failed to inspect the Wunnlinge:rs' residence per Court Order. 
71. 
Smith negligently failed to contact an expert witness to analyze and/ or audit the Wurmlingers' business 
records. 
72. 
Smith negligently failed to contact an expert arborist for an evaluation of the arborvitae hedge. 
73. 
Smith negligently failed to respond to the Wurm.lingers' amended counter claims for Trespass and 
Timber Trespass. 
74. 
Smith negligently failed to submit a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on behalf of Greenfield 
75. 
Smith negligently failed to respond to the Wunnlingers' ~otion for Sununary Judgment." 
76. 
Smith negligently failed to object to the Wunnlingers' "Motion for Relief From the Pre-trial Scheduling 
Order." 
77. 
Smith negligently faiied to complete Mrs. Wunnlinger's deposition per Court Order. 
78. 
Smith negligently failed to file a "Motion for Contempt" when Wurmlingers violated Court Orde~. 
79. 
Smith negligently failed to follow proper procedure for nondisclosure of said conflict of interest about 
his client Pamela Wallace when Greenfield notified Smith that Ms. Wallace confessed to causing damage to the 
Vvurtnlinger residence, wherein Greenfield was accused of said malicious damage. 
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80. 
Smith failed to follow proper procedure when he filed his ''Motion to Withdraw" just prior to Trial. 
81. 
As a direct and proximate result of Smith's negligence~ Greenfield suffered damages including: loss of 
past and future economic opportunity, loss of civil liberties and freedom, violation of constitutional rights, 
defamation, deprivation of rights, failure to keep frotn harm, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress all because Smith violated the standards of 
legal practice in the community as outlined above. 
82. 
Due to. the actions of the Defendant as alleged herein, Greenfield has suffered iajuries and damages in 
excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
83. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
84. 
Greenfield and Smith had a contract of representation, wherein Smith was obligated to provide effective 
representation to Greenfield on both of her cases. 
85. 
Smith breached that contract of representation by failing to defend Greenfield effectively as described 
above. 
86. 
Greenfield lost her civil case as a result of Smith's breach of contract. which violated the standards of 
legal practice in the community as outlined above, and Greenfield seeks judgment against Smith in an amount 
that will compensate her for her losses and damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
TIDRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF; BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALINGS 
87. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
88. 
Greenfield had an agreement with Smith for effective representation without Smith's regard to concerns 
for his own wellbeing, and that contract contained the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings. 
89. 
Smith breached that contract of representation by failing to represent Greenfield effectively as described 
. above and also breached the covenant of good faith and firir dealings. 
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As a result of Smith's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings, Greenfield suffered 
damages including: loss of past and future economic opportunity, loss of civil liberties and freedom, vfolation 
of constitutional rights, defamation, deprivation of rights, failure to keep from hann, invasion of privacy, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress; all to be proven at a 
trial in this civil case, all because Smith violated the standards of legal practice in the community as outlined 
above, and Greenfield seeks judgment against Smith in an amount that will compensate her for her losses and 
damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: BREACH OF FIDUCIARY Dur¥ 
91. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
92. 
Smith, as an attorney, had fiduciary duties to perform this representation of Greenfield in her best 
interest and according to the highest degree of care so that she would have effective representation. 
93. 
Smith breached his fiduciary duty to Greenfield by self-dealing and failing to disclose his conflict of 
interest ·as described above. 
94. 
As a result of Smith's breach of his respective :fiduciary duties, Greenfield suffered damages including: 
loss of past and future economic opportunity, loss of civil liberties and freedom, violation of constitutional 
rights, defamation, deprivation of rights, failure to keep from harm, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress; all to be proven at a trial in this civil case, all 
because Smith violated the standards of legal practice in the community as outlined above, and Greenfield seeks 
judgment against Smith in an amount that will compensate her for her losses and damages in excess of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD AND DECEPTION 
95. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
96. 
Smith, in his representation of Greenfield,' committed fraud when he knowingly failed to disclose the 
fabricated FBI NCIC Report to Greenfield during the criminal proceedings. 
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97. 
Smith, in his representation of Greenfield, committed fraud when he deceptively failed to disclose his 
professional relationship with Pamela Wallace. Smith refused to report crimes that Ms. Wallace had committed 
on Wunnlinger property for which Greenfield had been accused. Said alleged crimes were utilized as Trial 
Exhibits to disparage Greenfield during civil proceedings. 
98. 
As a result of Smith's fraud and deception. Greenfield suffered damages including: loss of past and 
future economic opportunity, loss of civil liberties and freedom, violation of constitutional rights, defamation, 
deprivation of rights, failure to keep from harm, invasion of privacy, inten~onal infliction of emotional distress, 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress; all to be proven at a trial in tlris civil case, all because Smith 
violated the standards of legal practice in the community as outlined above, and Greenfield seeks judgment 
against Smith in an amount that will compensate her for her losses and damages in excess of Ten Thousand 
Dollars ($10,000). 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE 
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE 
99. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
100. 
Smith committed the torts of breach of :fiduciary duty and fraud with respect to his representation of 
Greenfield as described above. 
101. 
Greenfield was about to rctum to her employment as a Senior Personal Banker with a large Financial 
Institution. 
102. 
As a result of Greenfield's claims, Greenfield's right to pursue her perspective economic advaritage in 
the practice of banking was interfered with by Smith's negligence, and Greenfield suffered damages including: 
loss of past and fixture economic opportunity, loss of civil liberties and freedom, violation of constitutional 
rights, defamation, deprivation of rights, failure to keep frotn hartn, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. and negligent infliction of emotional distress; all to be proven at a trial in this civil case, all 
because Smith violated the standards of legal practice in the community as outlined above, and Greenfield seeks 
judgment against all qefendants in an amount that will compensate her for her losses and damages in excess of 
Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
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SEVENTH CLAJM FOR RELIEF: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION Of' EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
103. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
104. 
At all times material hereto, Smith asserted, implied and inferred that he was acting as an attorney in 
good standing with the Idaho State Bar Association and was eligible1 qualified and capable of serving as 
counsel for Greenfield in both her civil and criminal cases. Smith received compensation and accepted the 
responsibility to effectively represent Greenfield regarding tlie aforementioned cases. 
105. 
Smith failed to act on behalf of Greenfield by allowing her to suffer an additional eleven months while 
waiting for her criminal trial to commence) wherein Smith had viable information and facts that should have 
been exposed in order to dismiss the criminal charge against Greenfield in a more timely manner if Smith had 
acted diligently by submitting said information to the Court. 
106. 
Greenfield is unemployable in the banking fiel<J due to the prolonged period of time that elapsed during 
the criminal proceedings, wherein she suffered financial nrin and filed for bankruptcy. Such financial issues are 
not permitted within the banking profession) thus terminating Greenfield's ''bonding'' viability. 
107. 
Smith failed to represent Greenfield during her civil p:r:oceedings by deliberately missing cmcial pre~trial 
deadlines. Due to Smith's negligence and incompetent representation, lack of skill in preparing documents, 
failing to file documents, lack of preparation, failure to meet deadlines, failure to keep Greenfield from hann by 
not reporting his client Pamela Wallace to the authorities, and failure to act with reasonable due diligence were 
intentional and reckless. 
108. 
Smith failed to represent Greenfield at her civil trial against the Wurmlingers by breaching the 
aforementioned contract just prior to trial, wherein Greenfield lost at trial and the Wurmlingers were awarded 
one hundred sixty eight thousand dollars ($168,000), to be paid by Greenfield. 
109. 
The actions of the Defendant as set forth above are extreme and outrageous. 
110. 
Tue actions of the Defendant as described above have caused Greenfield severe emotional distress. 
111. 
The actions of the Defendant as described herein are the direct and proximate cause of Greenfield's 
emotional distress. 
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112. 
Due to the actions of the Defendant as alleged herein,. Greenfield has suffered injuries and damage$ in 
excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
113. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
114. 
At all times material hereto, Smith asserted, implied and inferred that he was acting as an attorney in 
good standing with the Idaho State Bar Association and was eligible, qualified and capable of serving as 
counsel for Greenfield in both her civil and criminal cases. Smith received compensation and accepted the 
responsibility to effectively represent Greenfield regarding the aforementioned cases. 
115. 
Smith had a duty to abide by the agreements entered into and effectively represent Greenfield. 
116. 
As alleged herein, Smith acted negligently and breached said duties. 
117. 
Due to Smith's negligent breach of his duties to Greenfield, the Plaintiff has suffered physical injuries 
including but not limited to: Stress, anxiety, worry, feru-, depression, loss of sleep, nightmares, panic attacks, 
fatigue, humiliation, hopelessness, · constant outbursts of grief, impairment of ability to work, and mental 
distress. 
118. 
The actions of the Defendant as described herein are the direct and proximate cause of Greenfield's 
injuries. 
119. 
Due to the actions of the Defendant as alleged herein, Greenfield has suffered injuries and damages in 
excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
OPINION AND CONCLUSION 
Greenfield is alleging that Smith through various means of litigation malpractice and negligence 
unraveled her civil case in which she was the Plaintiff. This type of attorney malpractice lawsujt i~ known as a 
"settle and sue11 case, which involves a former client suing after litigation has been settled. In this case, 
Greenfield was denied her due process, was prejudiced, and was denied adequate counsel to defend· her claims 
at trial. The di~atisfied client, Greenfield, was the Plaintiff in the antecedent lawsuit, the basis of the claim is 
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that the settlement was less than it should have been or more than it had to be, by reason of the negligence of the 
party's attorney. Obviously. the manner in which the underlying lawsuit was concluded will often make it 
problematic whether causation and damages can be established.· The various actions by the attorney were below 
the standard of professional care and caused Greenfield to suffer a loss of one hundred sixty eight thousand 
dollars ($168,000) to the Wurmlingers for illegitimate claims, which were never addressed by Smith. 
The evidence in this case is clear that Smith failed to properly work up the case, he failed to properly 
prepare his experts, and he failed to properly represent Greenfield. In the last few remaining days before trial, 
after a :majority of the pre-trial deadlines had elapsed, Smith abandoned Greenfield, stole all of her money, left 
her to find new counsel and get new counsel up to speed, all of which she was unable to do, as all of her funds 
had been exhausted. Crucial pre-trial deadlines had extinguished, leaving key matters unresolved. 
Therefore, (1) there is duty owed to the Plaintiff by the Defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; in general, 
to establish the element of duty, the Plaintiff must prove that an attorney-client relationship existed with respect 
to the matter at issue. With the limited exceptions discussed below, a person who was not a client may not sue 
an attorney for legal malpractice. See; Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S. W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996). The Plaintiff's burden of 
proving the existence of any attorney-client relationship is commonly referred to as the ''privity" requirement. 
The determination of whether an attorney-client relationship exists must be based on au objective standard, not 
on the parties' subjective beliefs. See; SMWNPF Holdir,gs, Inc. v. Devore, 165 F.3d 360, 364-65 (5th Cir. 
1999); (3) that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff injury; and to establish a breach of duty giving rise to 
a claim for legal malpractice, the client must show that the lawyer failed to comply with the applicable standard 
of care. In general terms, an attorney breaches the duty of care when the lawyer does something au ordi:rmrily 
prudent lawyer would not have done, or fails t.o do something an ordinarily prudent lawyer would have done, 
under the same or similar circumstances; ( 4) that damages occurred. As in traditional negligence cases, the 
Plaintiff in a legal malpractice case must prove that the alleged malpractice was the proximate cause of injury. 
See; Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S. W.2d 662, 665 (I'ex. 1989). Proximate cause consists of two elements: (1) 
cause in fact and (2) foreseeability. See; McClure v. Allied Stores of Tex., Inc., 608 S. W2d 901, 903 (lex. 
1980). "Cause in fact means that the act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury and 
without which no hann would have occmred'' The cause in fact requirement has also been referred to as the 
··but for" test, because the Plaintiff must show. that the injury would not have occurred "but for" the alleged 
breach of duty. To qualify as cause in fact the negligence must also have been a substantial factor in bringing 
about the Plaintiff's harm. See; Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S. W.2d 773, 775 (I'ex. 1995). The 
foreseeability element of proximate cause requires proof that the defendant, as a person of ordinary intelligence, 
should have anticipated the danger to others by his negligent act. See; e.g., Dyer v. Shafer, Gilliland, Davis, 
McCollum & Ashley, Inc., 779 S. W.2d 474, 478 (/'ex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied). 
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When the alleged malpractice relates to a claim that was litigated, the Plaintiff must prove that a more 
favorable judgment would have resulted if the case had been handled competently. This is known as the "case 
within a case'" requirement. In ,litigation malpractice cases, 1herefore, the trial of the legal malpractice case 
actually involves proving two cases: 1) the malpractice case against the lawyer, and 2) the hypothetical, 
malpractice-free underlying case. See; Jackson v. Urban, Coolidge, Pennington & Scott, 516 S,W.2d 948 ([ex. 
Civ. App--Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'dn.r.e.}. 
A Plaintiff in a legal malpractice case may seek to recover foreseeable drunages proximately caused by 
the negligent act or omission. In the litigation context, this is usually the amount that the client would have 
collected., or would have avoided paying, if the litigation had been properly handled. See; e.g., Keck, Mahin & 
Cate v. N_arional Union Fire Ins. Co., 20 S.W.3d 692, 703 (Jex. 2000) (damages were to be calculated by 
comparing amount paid to settle case with amount that would have been lost at competently defended trial); 
See; Cosgrove V- Grimes, 774 S. W.2d 662, 666 (J'ex. 1989) (jury should have been asked to determine the 
amount of damages "collectible from StephetzS if the suit !UJd been properly prosecuted"). 
Exemplary damages are only recoverable in a legal malpractice case if the plaintiff proves by "clear and 
convincing evidence" that the hann resulted from fraud, malice or gross negligence. "Malice', means a specific 
intent to cause the Plaintiff substantial injmy or hann. 1'Gross negligence,' means an act or commission 
involving an "extreme degree of risk," carried out with actual, subjective awareness of the risk and conscious 
indifference to the rights, safety or welfare of others. Exemplary damages may be awarded only if the jury was 
unanimous in finding liability for and the amount of exemplary damages. Unless the alleged malpractice also 
constitutes a felony listed in § 41.008(c), exemplary damages are capped at two tunes the economic damages or 
$200,000, whichever is greater. (Additional amounts are aYailable if non-economic damages are recovered). 
As in any other negligence case, however. if there is a genuine issue of material fact about the 
reasonableness and care exercised by the attorney, then the issue must be submitted to the jury fot 
determination. An attorney is still "bound to exercise a reasonable degree of skill and care in all his 
professional undertakings." See; Woodru.ffv. Tomlin, 616 F.ld 924, 930 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying Tennessee 
law). Consequently, an attorney must exercise due care and diligence when pursuing or preparing for a case. 
The attorney must also display a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge when trying a case. See Herston v. 
Whitesell, 348 So.2d 1054, 1057 (Ala. 1977). For example~ an attorney who fails to exercise reasonable skill and 
diligence when investigating the merits of his opponent's position on an issue is not immune from liability. See 
Woodruff. 616 F2d at 933-34 (finding allegations of an attorney1s failure to contact or interview a potentially 
valuable witness to present a question.for a jury). An attorney who is unfamiliar with or disregards controlling 
poiiJ.ts of law when presenting his client's case is also not immune from liability. Id at 934-35 (finding 
allegations of an attorney's failure to bring to the attention of the trial court statutes controlling liability to 
present a question for the jury). 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff seeks judgment against the Defendant as follows: 
1, In the FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE for judgment against Smith for money damages in 
excess of Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) or as determined at trial; 
2. In the SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: BREACH OF CONTRACT for judgment against Smith for 
money damages in excess of Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) or as determined at trial; 
3. In the THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALINGS for judgment against Smith for money damages in excess of Ten Thousand dollars 
($101000) or as determined at trial; 
4. In the FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY for judgment against Smith 
for money damages in excess of Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) or as determjned at trial; 
5. In the FIFTH CLAlM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD AND DECEPTION for judgment against Smith for 
money damages in excess of Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) or as detennined at trial; 
6. In the SIXTII CLAIM FOR RELIEF: TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITII PROSPECTIVE 
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE for judgment against Smith for money damages in excess of Ten 
Thousand dollars ($10,000) or as determined at trial; 
7. In the· SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS for judgment against Smith for money damages in excess of Teo. Thousand dollars 
($10,000) or as determined at trial; 
8. In the EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS for 
judgment against Sru.ith for money damages in excess of Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) or as 
determined at trial; 
9. In all daims, for costs of this action as well as pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by law. 
Dated this 29th Day ofNovember, 2014. 
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VERIFiCA TION 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, Christina J. Greenfield, being first duly swom, deposes and says: 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to befote me this O' ---
Commission Expires on: o '9 ~ ,;) - ~11 
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STATE OF IDAHO / 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
Christina J. Greenfield F"ILEO: 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 zn,~ DEC -5 PH ~= 53 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 ~,Rk' 
Plaintiff Pro Se -1- ) C//l'nvc1~ C9URT \ / ·1;; , (; \ _ lC}'t' di /'\ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 0 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 





) CASE NO. CV-2014- 8801 
) 
) MODIFIED COMPLAINT 
) 
) Category: /+ J4-
) Fee: $ .22./ 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff Christina J. Greenfield (hereafter: 
"Greenfield") for a cause of action against the above-named Defendant, Ian D. Smith (hereafter: 
"Smith") and hereby complains and alleges as follows: 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought forth by the above mentioned Plaintiff for damages caused to 
Plaintiff through willful, intentional, and negligent actions by the Defendant, wherein Plaintiff 
asserts a breach of contract, legal malpractice, and breach of an attorney-client relationship 
exists. Such abuse and willful misconduct has caused Plaintiff actual and future damages as the 
result of said conduct by the above named Defendant for failure to follow Plaintiff's instructions, 
failure to file legal documents, failure to file legal motions, failure to acquire evidence through 
discovery, inconsistent statements of fact, failure to investigate, failure to notify Plaintiff of 
modifications, failure to submit a monetary sanction to Plaintiff upon payment of said sanction, 
failure to follow Court orders, failure to respond to motions, failure to give sufficient notice of 
withdrawal from representation in a civil case, siphoning trust fund money into personal 
accounts, procrastination in performance of services and / or lack of follow-up during the 
litigation process. 
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The failure to provide Plaintiff with competent representation in both her criminal case 
and civil case is the basis for civil liability under a theory of professional negligence. In a legal 
malpractice action arising from a civil proceeding, the elements are: (1) the duty of the attorney 
to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as members of his or her profession commonly possess 
and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the breach and 
the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the attorney's negligence. See; 
Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 1194, 1199 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 25 P.3d 
670}), (Budd v. Nixen (1971) 6 Cal.3d 195, 200 [98 Cal.Rptr. 849, 491 P.2d 433]), (Hecht, 
Solberg, Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley LLP v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 579, 591 
[40 Cal.Rptr.3d 446]). 
For Greenfield to prevail in a legal malpractice action,· Greenfield must establish that, but 
for the alleged malpractice trial, settlement of the underlying lawsuit would have resulted in a 
better outcome. See; Viner v. Sweet, supra, 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1244; Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP 
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 336, 357 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 710]; Lazy Acres Market, Inc. v. Tseng (2007) 
152 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1436 [62 Cal.Rptr.3d 378]; Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe v. Superior 
Court, supra, at p. 1057; Marshak v. Ballesteros, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 1514, 1518; Hinshaw, 
Winkler, Draa, Marsh & Still v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 233, 239 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 
791]; Thompson v. Halvonik, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th 657, 663; Campbell v. Magana (1960) 184 
Cal.App.2d 751, 754 [8 Cal.Rptr. 32]) "Thus, a plaintiff who alleges an inadequate settlement in 
the underlying action must prove that, if not for the malpractice, she would certainly have 
received more money in settlement or at trial." See; Slovensky v. Friedman, supra, 142 
Cal.App.4th 1518, 1528, italics added 
The Defendants' actions caused damages to Greenfield including but not limited to: loss 
of past and future economic opportunity, loss of civil liberties and freedom, violation of 
constitutional rights, defamation, deprivation of rights, failure to keep from harm, invasion of 
privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
On September 15, 2010, Greenfield entered into a contractual representation agreement 
with Smith as her legal counsel in a civil action against her neighbors, the Wurmlingers, who had 
falsely accused Greenfield of a crime, wherein Greenfield was arrested and charged with 
Malicious Injury to Property, four (4) months prior, on June 3, 2010, after Greenfield's agent 
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trimmed ten (10) arborvitae shrubs that were located on the property line dividing Wurm.linger 
and Greenfield property. Said properties are located in Post Falls, Idaho. 
Smith initially informed Greenfield during a consultation visit that five thousand dollars 
($5000) would be sufficient to litigate a civil complaint against the Wurm.lingers. When 
Greenfield was ready to sign on with Smith, Smith reneged on the five thousand dollars ($5000) 
proposal and directed that Greenfield pay a seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7500) 
retaining fee instead. Greenfield agreed to pay Smith two hundred forty dollar ($240) an hour 
up to the agreed retaining fee amount in hope that a settlement would be reached quickly due to 
the overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of Greenfield, along with Idaho State Code, City 
ordinances and neighborhood Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (hereinafter: "CC&Rs") 
that protected Greenfield. 
On January 20, 2011, Smith became Greenfield's defense attorney on the criminal matter 
by replacing Anne Taylor, the public defender who was initially assigned to represent Greenfield 
for the bogus Malicious Injury to Property charge against Greenfield. Smith, who was already 
familiar with the case, insisted that Greenfield pay an additional seven thousand five hundred 
dollars ($7500) to defend her throughout the remaining criminal litigation proceedings. 
Smith neglected to act on obvious due process violations that the City of Post Falls 
Municipality and /or its agents, as well as the Kootenai County Prosecutor, to maliciously 
prosecute Greenfield for a spurious crime. Smith refused to address several procedural defects 
during the criminal proceedings. Smith did not address the fact that Greenfield had not been 
read her Miranda warning when she was questioned by law enforcement without representation 
by her attorney, a due process violation of her Fifth Amendment rights. Smith did not pursue 
legal remedy when he was informed that the presiding Judge, Penny Friedlander, was the wife of 
the City of Post Falls Attorney, Jerry Mason, who had assisted in prosecuting Greenfield for the 
alleged felony. 
Post Falls Police Department (Hereinafter: "PFPD") along with Kootenai County 
Prosecutor Barry McHugh submitted a counterfeit FBI criminal report (NCIC) into evidence, 
which did not identify Greenfield, but another individual with the same first and last name who 
resided in California, yet Smith never objected or responded to said report during the criminal 
proceedings (Greenfield was unaware of said report until May 2012, two months after Smith 
quit, when said report was discovered by Greenfield). 
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The Kootenai County Prosecutor and PFPD commissioned a survey on December 16, 
2010, yet never produced the findings of said survey during discovery requests. Smith did not 
follow-up on the survey results after Greenfield repeatedly requested Smith to do so with regard 
to this critical piece of evidence in both the criminal and civil proceedings. 
Greenfield was under constant surveillance by the PFPD who had confiscated 
Greenfield's garbage after the neighbor, Eric Wurmlinger, continued to falsely accuse Greenfield 
of causing additional damage to his property. Greenfield repeatedly voiced her concerns to 
Smith regarding the surveillance and obvious violations of privacy, yet Smith refused to address 
evident violations of the Fourth Amendment, which protects U.S. citizens from "unreasonable 
searches and seizures." Smith never addressed the fact that the criminal charge against 
Greenfield should have been considered a civil complaint, per criminal presiding Judge Gibler, 
who dismissed the case nineteen months after it was initiated, claiming it was a property line 
dispute and should have been a civil issue. Greenfield was acquitted on October 4, 2011, as the 
prosecutor did not present any evidence at trial that Greenfield had committed any crimes. Due 
to the fact that the criminal trial only lasted approximately two (2) hours, Smith agreed to help 
Greenfield "seal" her criminal file at no charge to Greenfield. 
When Greenfield met with Smith on November 10, 2011, to start the process to "seal" 
her case, Smith demanded that Greenfield pay him an additional one thousand five hundred 
dollars ($1500) to do so. Greenfield did not have the funds to pay Smith, so Smith's paralegal, 
Julie Vetter, agreed to draft the paperwork needed to "seal" Greenfield's criminal records at a 
rate of fifteen dollars ($15) per hour. 
The Court hearing to address the sealing of Greenfields criminal file was held in January 
2012. Smith, who was still considered Greenfield's attorney of record on the criminal matter, 
appeared in Court with an attitude and requested that Judge Gibler withdraw him from 
Greenfield's case and allow Greenfield to represent herself. The presiding Judge Gibler 
mandated that Smith was allowed to withdraw but insisted that Smith stay and assist Greenfield 
if needed during the proceedings. Smith was apathetic and did not attempt to assist Greenfield 
when it was apparent that Greenfield was struggling with legal theory and terminology during 
her presentation. 
On February 10, 2014, Smith notified Greenfield that he was "quitting" his representation 
from Greenfield's civil action against the Wurmlingers. Smith officially ended his 
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representation on March 9, 2012, a few weeks before trial, which was scheduled for May 21, 
2012. Greenfield could not fmd an attorney nor afford one, so Greenfield was forced to continue 
as a pro-se litigant and defend herself against the Wunnlingers three counterclaims. Greenfield 
had no legal experience and lost her case. An Amended Final Judgment was entered on July 8, 
2013 in favor of the Wurmlingers for one hundred and sixty-eight thousand dollars ($168,000). 
Greenfield had paid Smith over thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) and an additional fifteen 
thousand dollars ($15,000) in other fees during the criminal and civil litigation proceedings. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
I. 
Venue is proper in that Greenfield and Smith are both residents of the State of Idaho. 
2. 
All the acts alleged herein occurred in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho. 
3. 
Defendant Ian D. Smith is a licensed attorney in the State of Idaho and resides in Coeur 
d'Alene, Idaho. 
4. 
This is a legal malpractice action arising out of Smith's misrepresentation of Greenfield's 
legal rights and obligations to appropriately arbitrate two actions, one criminal, and one civil, 
wherein Greenfield expected Smith to fulfill his commitment to represent Greenfield under an 
attorney-client relationship and the duties therein. 
5. 
The above-entitled court has personal jurisdiction over the parties named herein, the 
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the allegations set forth herein and venue is properly 
before the court. 
FACTS 
6. 
On June 3, 2010 Greenfield was accused and charged with felony Malicious Injury to 
Property. 
7. 
On September 15, 2010, Greenfield entered into a contractual representation agreement 
with Smith as her legal counsel in a civil action against her neighbors, the Wurmlingers, who 
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falsely accused Greenfield of malicious injury to property after Greenfield's agent trimmed ten 
(10) arborvitae shrubs that were located on the property line dividing the two properties. 
8. 
Smith represented himself to be an attorney in good standing, licensed to practice law in 
the State of Idaho, was competent, without mental or emotional defect, qualified to perform legal 
services as an attorney and capable of representing Greenfield in the pending civil action. 
9. 
On September 23, 2010, Smith filed a Civil Complaint against the Wurmlingers for 
Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, including Damages, and Summons on behalf of 
Greenfield. 
10. 
On October 13, 2010 (Civil Case) Wurmlingers filed a notice of appearance for attorney 
Gary Amendola. 
11. 
On October 21, 2010 (Civil Case) Wurm.lingers filed an incomplete "Answer to 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, and Damages" along with three Counter 
Claims: (a) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (b) Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress; and (c) Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage. 
12. 
On November 1, 2010 ( Civil Case) Smith responded to the claims, wherein Greenfield 
denied all three of Wurmlingers Counter Claims. 
13. 
On December 2, 2010 (Civil Case) Smith requested the "First Set of Production of 
Documents." 
14. 
On December 16, 2010 (Criminal Case) a survey was commissioned by the Kootenai 
County Prosecutor, Barry McHugh, and City of Post Falls Police Chief Scot Haug on behalf of 
Wurmlinger to determine the location of the arborvitae shrub hedge aforementioned above. 
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15. 
On December 27, 2010 (Civil Case) Wurm.lingers moved the Court to dismiss their 
:frivolous claim for "Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage" and said claim 
was dismissed with prejudice by presiding Judge Haynes on January 26, 2011. 
16. 
On January 20, 2011 (Criminal Case) Greenfield fired Anne Taylor, the public defender 
who was initially assigned to Greenfield by the Court and hired Smith after his coaxing 
Greenfield to defend her on the bogus felony charge due to his knowledge of the case at this 
point. The criminal Trial was scheduled for January 25, 2011, then vacated and re-scheduled for 
June 28, 2011. 
17. 
On February 14, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith filed a "Motion to Compel" and a "Motion For 
Order Permitting Entry Upon Wurmlingers' Real Property" to inspect and photograph the 
interior and exterior of Wurm.lingers' residence and property, to conduct a survey to locate the 
property line between Greenfield's and Wurmlingers' real property, to locate the easement, and 
to permit an arborist to inspect the arborvitae shrubbery that Wurmlingers claimed Greenfield 
damaged. 
18. 
On February 15, 2011 (Civil Case) Wurmlingers moved to dismiss their :frivolous claim 
for ''Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress." Said claim was dismissed with prejudice on 
March 17, 2011. 
19. 
On February 18, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith missed the deadlines to file a "Motion for 
Summary Judgment" and the disclosure of Greenfield's expert witnesses per the Pre-Trial Order. 
20. 
On March 17, 2011 (Civil Case) The Court ordered entry upon the real property of the 
Wurm.lingers for the following purposes: (a) to inspect and photograph the interior of 
Wurmlingers' residence; (b) to inspect and photograph the exterior of Wurmlingers' residence; 
(c) to conduct a survey to locate the property line between Greenfield's and Wurmlingers' real 
property to determine the location of certain shrubbery and; ( d) to permit an arborist to inspect 
the shrubbery that Wurmlingers claim Greenfield damaged. The Wurmlingers were also ordered 
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to comply with Rules 30(c) and 30(d) and respond to Greenfield's "Motion for Production of 
Documents" and "answer all questions accordingly." 
21 
On April 19, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield requested a "Protection Order" regarding the 
release of her medical records to the Wurm.lingers. All discovery was to be completed by May 
13, 2011 per the Pre-trial Order. Smith did not comply with Greenfield's request. 
22. 
On May 20, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith's paralegal, Julie Vetter, informed Greenfield that 
Smith was billing her criminal hours under her civil case billable hours. 
23. 
On June 6, 2011 (Civil Case) Gary Amendola, Wurm.lingers' attorney submitted a 
"Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel." 
24. 
On June 21, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith requested a new trial date as the Wurm.lingers had 
not complied with the Court's Order to produce discovery documents. Smith had failed to 
submit a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on behalf of Greenfield who continually reminded 
Smith of approaching deadlines, did not finish Mrs. Wurrnlinger's deposition, and missed other 
pre-trial deadlines. The July 18, 2011, trial date was vacated. A new trial was scheduled for 
May 21, 2012, along with an amended Pre-trial Order. The presiding Judge Haynes sanctioned 
the Wurmlingers and ordered them to reimburse Greenfield for attorney fees for violating the 
Courts Order for non-production of discovery documents. Judge Haynes informed Smith to draft 
papers for "Contempt of Court" against the Wurmlingers for non-compliance. Mr. Smith did not 
follow through with the "Motion for Contempt" although Greenfield insisted that he do so as the 
delays were costing Greenfield undue financial burden. 
25. 
On June 24, 2011 (Civil Case) Wurmlingers filed a "Notice of Appearance" for attorney 
Douglas Marfice. 
26. 
On June 24, 2011 (Criminal Case) The Pre-trial hearing was scheduled. The criminal 
trial had been continued for over twelve (12) months. A third trial date was re-scheduled for 
October 4, 2011, (approximately three months). Mr. Smith had not reviewed any of the State's 
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evidence, including their survey, interviewed any of Greenfield's witnesses, including expert 
witnesses, or followed up on civil rights violations against Greenfield. 
27. 
On July 11, 2011 (Criminal Case) Smith's paralegal, Julie Vetter, notified Greenfield that 
the state assistant deputy prosecutor, Amy Borgman, sent documents to Smith that arrived less 
than twenty-four (24) hours before the scheduled hearing on July 12, 2011. Smith had been gone 
for two weeks on vacation and had not reviewed the documents. 
28. 
On July 12, 2011 (Criminal Case) The state assistant deputy prosecutor, Amy Borgman, 
presented an amended document to the' court. Smith arrived at the hearing unprepared and gave 
the wrong information to the Court. Smith did not discuss the issues contained in said 
documents with Greenfield before the hearing. Smith did not object to the late disclosure of said 
documents nor did Smith ask the Court for more time to address the issues. 
29. 
On July 13, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith informed Greenfield that "Mr. Marfice 
(Wurmlingers' attorney) called me this morning and asked if you would consider settling the 
case ... Wurmlingers would make the criminal case go away if you made the civil case go 
away ... " Greenfield refused; Smith demanded another fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) from 
Greenfield to continue as her legal counsel. 
30. 
On August 17, 2011, Greenfield witnessed Post Falls Police Officers Goodwin and 
Gunderson dump the contents of her garbage can into the back of a grey pickup truck. When 
Greenfield demanded an explanation from the PFPD she was informed that Wurmlinger accused 
Greenfield of another malicious injury to his property, and PFPD seized Greenfield's property 
looking for evidence. Greenfield informed Smith of this civil rights violation and instructed 
Smith to check into the matter. Smith did nothing. 
31. 
On August 29, 2011 (Criminal Hearing) Smith and Greenfield attended a Court hearing 
in regard to the "missing" survey. Smith had not compelled the State's evidence on said survey 
or any additional discovery that was uncovered by Greenfield during the criminal proceedings. 
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32. 
On September 1, 2011, Douglas Marfice submitted. a "Notice of Withdrawal and 
Substitution of Counsel" for attorney John Riseborough, as Wunnlingers' third counsel of 
record. 
33. 
On October 4, 2011 (Criminal Case) Greenfield arrived at the Courthouse for her 
criminal trial and did not see Smith in the Courtroom upon her arrival. Greenfield had not been 
briefed by Smith on what would transpire. Greenfield did not see any of her witnesses, including 
expert witnesses. Smith never interviewed any of Greenfield's witnesses prior to trial and did 
not subpoena any of Greenfield's witnesses including the expert witnesses that Greenfield herself 
contacted. Smith was not prepared to go to trial. Greenfield suffered a nervous breakdown due 
to Smith's clear lack of professionalism and preparation, as well as negligence of duties and 
breach of contract in preparation for trial. 
Judge Gibler asked the state assistant prosecuting attorney, Amy Borgman, to proceed 
with her case. Ms. Borgman requested another continuance as the State had no evidence to 
convict Greenfield of a crime. Judge Gibler denied her request and dismissed the case, 
acquitting Greenfield of the bogus felony. Judge Gibler stated once again that this was a "civil 
matter." Smith was dumbfounded and incoherent after the verdict. 
34. 
On October 5, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield informed Smith that the pre-trial deadline to 
set a hearing for "Motion for Summary Judgment" was due by November 22, 2011. Smith 
informed Greenfield that he " ... will start working on it." Smith did not submit the Motion for 
Summary Judgment and missed the pre-trial deadline for a second time. 
35. 
On October 10, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield notified Smith that Wurmlingers had a 
survey crew measuring the property line to determine the location of the arborvitae hedge. Smith 
never requested a copy of the Wurmlingers' survey. Greenfield received a copy of said survey 
thirteen (13) months later on November 2, 2012, twenty-four (24) days before the new trial date. 
Greenfield had no time to prepare for a defense or submit an objection to said survey prior to 
Trial as pre-trial deadlines had passed. 
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36. 
On October 14, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield notified Smith that Eric Wurmlinger 
continued to falsely accuse Greenfield of committing vandalism on his property beginning in 
July 2011 until the present. Greenfield informed Smith that a neighbor, Pamela Wallace, 
contacted Greenfield and confessed to vandalizing the Wurmlinger property. Smith did not 
follow-up on the matter, which led to more civil rights violations against Greenfield who was 
being accused of said vandalism. Julie Vetter (Smith's paralegal) informed Greenfield that 
Smith had represented Pamela Wallace on prior court cases and that she is a client of Smith's. 
Greenfield requested that Smith look into the matter and contact the Post Falls Police 
Department with said information, as well as research the data in said vandalism reports as to 
obvious blatant violations occurring against Greenfield. Smith refused and did nothing. 
\,Vurmlingers utilized said vandalism reports as trial exhibits against Greenfield, which 
Greenfield believes, said exhibits damaged her case. 
37. 
On October 17, 2011 (Civil Case) Thirteen (13) days after Greenfield's Acquittal of 
Felony Malicious Injury to Property, Wurmlingers submitted a "Motion to Amend" and added 
two more counter claims: (a) Trespass; and (b) Timber Trespass to their Complaint. Not only 
were the Counterclaims not "Timely Submitted" they insinuated criminal activity after 
Greenfield had been cleared of criminal conduct. Smith did not object or respond to the counter 
claims as directed by Greenfield. 
38. 
On November 10, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield met with Smith to discuss the 
Wurmlingers' amended counter claims and to add additional claims to her case, including: 
slander, libel, and abuse of process. Greenfield directed Smith to act on several key issues 
including: Wurmlingers' constant violations and contempt of Court Orders and not complying 
with discovery requests. Greenfield informed Smith that the Wurmlingers' property needed to be 
inspected, the easement survey was not completed, expert witnesses needed to be prepared, 
witnesses examined, as well as summary judgment issues needed to be addressed. At this point 
Smith had missed crucial pre-trial deadlines and was grossly misrepresenting Greenfield, which 
violated the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and Idaho rules of Civil Procedure. Smith 
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demanded another ten thousand dollars ($10,000) to continue the case, yet did not follow any of 
Greenfield's directives. 
39. 
On December 2, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith refused to give Greenfield her "sanction" check 
for $1224 that was awarded to her by Judge Haynes for Wurmlingers' failure to follow Court 
Orders. 
40. 
On December 7, 2011 (Civil case) Smith's paralegal, Julie Vetter, quit and accepted a 
position as paralegal for Gary Amendola, Wurmlingers' prior attorney. Smith did not hire 
another paralegal to replace Julie. Smith was handling his entire work load exclusively. 
41. 
On December 8, 2011 (Civil Case) Once again Greenfield directed Smith to draft a 
Protection Order to protect her medical records. Smith did not follow through on drafting the 
protection order. 
42. 
On December 11, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield met with Smith regarding concerns about 
missing crucial deadlines per the Pre-Trial Order. 
43. 
On December 13, 2011 (Civil Case) Greenfield entered Smith's office and noticed that all 
of her confidential records were sitting on the conference table utilized by at least four ( 4) other 
attorneys and their clients, unprotected and visible to anyone. Greenfield directed that Smith 
conceal her records, to which Smith replied "no one can see them ... don't worry about it!" 
Greenfield was extremely troubled about invasion of privacy regarding her medical records and 
other confidential documents at this point. 
44. 
On December 14, 2011 (Civil Case) Smith departed on vacation to Mt. Hood, Oregon, 
and was gone until January 4, 2012. Smith missed the Pre-trial Order deadline to file a Summary 
Judgment against the Wurmlingers, and to reply on Wurmlingers' two additional counter claims, 
which responses were due before December 22, 2011. Smith failed to disclose expert witnesses 
and talk to known witnesses. Smith had not hired a legal assistant or paralegal to replace Vetter. 
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45. 
On January 4, 2012 (Civil Case) Greenfield met with Smith again about her Protection 
Order regarding her medical records. Greenfield noticed that all of her confidential records were 
still sitting on the conference table unprotected and had been visible to the public for 
approximately the last twenty-three (23) days. Greenfield was extremely distraught at this point. 
The Wurmlingers' attorney was scheduled to review and copy Greenfield's medical records on 
January 9, 2012, in Smith's office per stipulation. 
46. 
On January 9, 2012 (Civil Case) Greenfield had made an appointment with Smith to view 
her file and upon arrival Greenfield noticed that her confidential records were still sitting on the . . . . 
office conference table unprotected, while Wurmlmgers attorney's paralegal. was · rummaging 
through them and copying said documents. Greenfield was appalled as she witnessed the 
paralegal viewing sensitive documents that were subject to attorney client privilege and were not 
to be exposed to opposing counsel. Greenfield informed Smith immediately about her frustration 
due to bis failure to protect sensitive data from opposing counsel. Smith handed Greenfield a 
Protection Order to sign and date just as the paralegal had completed copying Greenfield's 
documents. Smith did not file the protection order until February 17, 2012. Several of 
Greenfields un-protected medical documents were entered into court records due to Smith's 
incompetence. 
47. 
On January 20, 2012 (Civil Case) Greenfield once again met with Smith to discuss bis 
failures to provide adequate legal services that met the required standard of care, skill, and 
diligence needed to litigate the civil action against the Wurmlingers. Greenfield believed that 
Smith derailed the entire case due to his negligence and incompetence. Upon arrival to Smith's 
office, Greenfield noticed that her file was still sprawled out on the office table in the conference 
room. The office receptionist, Amber Melom, mentioned to Greenfield" ... your file has been in 
the conference room for thirty-nine (39) days and I had to move it to the chairs because clients 
were meeting in the room for the past week!" Greenfield asked Smith "why were my documents 
left in the conference room in plain sight for all to see?" Smith replied: "Your documents are 
STILL in the conference room and no one cares!" 
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48. 
On January 26, 2012 (Civil Case) John Riseborough had missed the "Summary 
Judgment" Pre-trial Order deadline and requested that the Court grant him a "Motion for Leave" 
on Summary Judgment. Smith did not object until February 10, 2012, almost two weeks later, 
six (6) days before the scheduled hearing set for February 17, 2012. At this point it was obvious 
to Greenfield that Smith did not care about her case. 
49. 
On February 13, 2012 (Civil Case) Smith had ignored all of Greenfield's calls and 
emails. Greenfield confronted Smith in his office and demanded an explanation as to why he 
botched up her case so badly. Smith informed Greenfield that he was going to quit. Greenfield's 
trial was scheduled for May 21, 2012. Smith never interviewed any of Greenfield's or 
Wurmlingers' witnesses, did not respond to the Wurmlingers' counter claims, missed 
Greenfield's Summary Judgment, did not respond to Wurm.lingers' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, did not complete a survey of Wurmlingers' property to determine the property corners 
or easement, did not inspect the Wurm.lingers' residence, did not have an audit of Wurmlingers' 
business, did not contact an expert witness to analyze Wurmlingers' business records, did not 
contact an expert arborist for an evaluation of the arborvitae hedge, did not object to 
Wurmlingers' Motion for Relief From Pretrial Scheduling Order, and never completed Mrs. 
Wurmlinger's deposition, as well as dispose any of Wurmlingers' expert witnesses. 
50. 
On February 17, 2012 (Civil Case) Smith announced to the Court that he was quitting 
during the hearing for Wurmlingers' "Motion to Leave" and "Motion for Summary Judgment." 
51. 
On February 27, 2012 (Civil Case) Judge Haynes granted Smith his "Motion For Leave 
to Withdraw" under heavy protest from Greenfield as she was indigent at this point and could not 
afford another attorney nor fmd one on such short notice prior to trial. 
52. 
On March 29, 2012 (Civil Case) Greenfield submits her Notice of Self Representation. 
53. 
On April 10, 2012 (Civil Case) The May 21, 2012 Trial is vacated and new trial is set for 
November 26, 2012. The Pre-trial Order did not change. Due to Smith's negligence and 
COMPLAINT Pg.14 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 44 of 710
incompetent representation, lack of skill in preparing documents, failure to file documents, lack 
of preparation, failure to meet deadlines, failure to keep Greenfield from harm by not reporting 
his client Pamela Wallace to authorities, and failure to act with reasonable due diligence, 
Greenfield was left defenseless in her endeavor to seek justice and lost her civil case. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE 
54. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
55. 
At all times material hereto, Smith asserted, implied and inferred that he was acting as an 
attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar Association and was eligible, qualified and 
capable of serving as counsel for Greenfield in both her civil and criminal cases. Smith received 
compensation and accepted the responsibility to effectively represent Greenfield regarding the 
aforementioned cases. 
56. 
Smith was aware that the Kootenai County Prosecutor maintained that the charges against 
Greenfield were factual, yet they were based on fabricated evidence, which had been 
:fraudulently manufactured in order to silence Greenfield for reporting violations of the law to 
local authorities. 
57. 
Smith was aware that Greenfield maintained she was falsely accused of Malicious Injury 
to Property by Wurmlinger. 
58. 
Smith was aware that Greenfield maintained that the City of Post Falls Municipality and/ 
or its Agents and Kootenai County Prosecutor gave false testimony and submitted false evidence 
in favor of Wurmlinger possibly due to a Catholic fraternal affiliation. 
59. 
Smith was aware that Greenfield maintained that Wurmlinger, the City of Post Falls 
Municipality Agents and Kootenai County Prosecutor (Hereinafter: "State") conspired to 
maliciously prosecute Greenfield for a crime that she did not commit. 
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60. 
Greenfield alleges that even though Smith knew that the State was anxious to convict 
Greenfield of a crime that she did not commit, Smith continued to extort money from Greenfield, 
rather than put forth an accurate, complete, strong and effective defense that likely would have 
resulted in an earlier dismissal of the criminal case. 
61. 
Smith negligently failed to subpoena any of Greenfield's witnesses to her criminal Trial 
Court. 
62. 
Smith failed to present a theory of defense in his opening statement to the criminal Trial 
Court. 
63. 
Smith failed to present any existing meaningful exculpatory evidence favoring Greenfield 
throughout the criminal proceedings. 
64. 
Smith failed to study or research information files in order to prepare himself for trial, 
and was thus unaware of fundamental facts critical to the development of Greenfield's defense. 
65. 
Smith failed to study or research the State's evidence in order to prepare himself for trial, 
and was thus unaware of fundamental facts critical to the development of Greenfield's defense. 
66. 
Smith failed to act on the State's exculpatory evidence, which did not correctly identify 
Greenfield but instead identified another person with the same first and last name as Greenfield 
who resided in California and was on probation for a crime. 
67. 
Greenfield alleges that even though Smith knew that the Wurmlingers were violating the 
neighborhood CC&Rs, city ordinances, state law, and were causing harm to Greenfield by 
falsely accusing her of Malicious Injury to Property, Smith continued to extort money from 
Greenfield rather than put forth an accurate, complete, strong and effective case that likely would 
have resulted in an earlier settlement and / or judgment in favor of Greenfield. 
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68. 
Smith negligently failed to interview any of Greenfield's or Wurmlingers' witnesses, 
including expert witnesses prior to pre-trial deadlines. 
69. 
Smith negligently failed to complete a survey of the Wurmlingers' property to determine 
the location of the easement per Court Order. 
70. 
Smith negligently failed to inspect the Wurmlingers' residence per Court Order. 
71. 
Smith negligently failed to contact an expert witness to analyze and / or audit the 
Wurmlingers' business records. 
72. 
Smith negligently failed to contact an expert arborist for an evaluation of the arborvitae 
hedge. 
73. 
Smith negligently failed to respond to the Wurmlingers' amended counter claims for 
Trespass and Timber Trespass. 
74. 
Smith negligently failed to submit a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on behalf of 
Greenfield 
75. 
Smith negligently failed to respond to the Wurmlingers' "Motion for Summary 
Judgment." 
76. 
Smith negligently failed to object to the Wurmlingers' "Motion for Relief From the Pre-
trial Scheduling Order." 
77. 
Smith negligently failed to complete Mrs. Wurmlinger's deposition per Court Order. 
78. 
Smith negligently failed to file a "Motion for Contempt" when Wurmlingers violated 
Court Orders. 
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79. 
Smith negligently failed to follow proper procedure for nondisclosure of said conflict of 
interest about his client Pamela Wallace when Greenfield notified Smith that Ms. Wallace 
confessed to causing damage to the Wurmlinger residence, wherein Greenfield was accused of 
said malicious damage. 
80. 
Smith failed to follow proper procedure when he filed his "Motion to Withdraw'' just 
prior to Trial. 
81. 
As a direct and proximate result of Smith's negligence, Greenfield suffered damages 
including: loss of past and future economic opportunity, loss of civil liberties and freedom, 
violation of constitutional rights, defamation, deprivation of rights, failure to keep from harm, 
invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress all because Smith violated the standards of legal practice in the community as 
outlined above. 
82. 
Due to the actions of the Defendant as alleged herein, Greenfield has suffered injuries 
and damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
83. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
84. 
Greenfield and Smith had a contract of representation, wherein Smith was obligated to 
provide effective representation to Greenfield on both of her cases. 
85. 
Smith breached that contract of representation by failing to defend Greenfield effectively 
as described above. 
86. 
Greenfield lost her civil case as a result of Smith's breach of contract, which violated the 
standards of legal practice in the community as outlined above, and Greenfield seeks judgment 
COMPLAINT Pg.18 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 48 of 710
against Smith in an amount that will compensate her for her losses and damages in excess of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
TIDRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND 
FAIR DEALINGS 
87. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
88. 
Greenfield had an agreement with Smith for effective representation without Smith's 
regard to concerns for his own wellbeing, and that contract contained the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealings. 
89. 
Smith breached that contract of representation by failing to represent Greenfield 
effectively as described above and also breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealings. 
90. 
As a result of Smith's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings, Greenfield 
suffered damages including: loss of past and future economic opportunity, loss of civil liberties 
and freedom, violation of constitutional rights, defamation, deprivation of rights, failure to keep 
from harm, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress; all to be proven at a trial in this civil case, all because Smith 
violated the standards of legal practice in the community as outlined above, and Greenfield seeks 
judgment against Smith in an amount that will compensate her for her losses and damages in 
excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
91. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
92. 
Smith, as an attorney, had fiduciary duties to perform this representation of Greenfield in 
her best interest and according to the highest degree of care so that she would have effective 
representation. 
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93. 
Smith breached his fiduciary duty to Greenfield by self-dealing and failing to disclose his 
conflict of interest as described above. 
94. 
As a result of Smith's breach of his respective fiduciary duties, Greenfield suffered 
damages including: loss of past and future economic opportunity, loss of civil liberties and 
freedom, violation of constitutional rights, defamation, deprivation of rights, failure to keep from 
harm, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress; all to be proven at a trial in this civil case, all because Smith violated the 
standards of legal practice in the community as outlined above, and Greenfield seeks judgment 
against Smith in an amount that will compensate her for her losses and damages in excess of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD AND DECEPTION 
95. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
96. 
Smith, in his representation of Greenfield, committed fraud when he knowingly failed to 
disclose the fabricated FBI NCIC Report to Greenfield during the criminal proceedings. 
97. 
Smith, in his representation of Greenfield, committed fraud when he deceptively failed to 
disclose his professional relationship with Pamela Wallace. Smith refused to report crimes that 
Ms. Wallace had committed on Wurmlinger property for which Greenfield had been accused. 
Said alleged crimes were utilized as Trial Exhibits to disparage Greenfield during civil 
proceedings. 
98. 
As a result of Smith's fraud and deception, Greenfield suffered damages including: loss 
of past and future economic opportunity, loss of civil liberties and freedom, violation of 
constitutional rights, defamation, deprivation of rights, failure to keep from harm, invasion of 
privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress; 
all to be proven at a trial in this civil case, all because Smith violated the standards of legal 
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practice in the community as outlined above, and Greenfield seeks judgment against Smith in an 
amount that will compensate her for her losses and damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000). 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH 
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADV ANT AGE 
99. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
100. 
Smith committed the torts of breach of fiduciary duty and fraud with respect to his 
representation of Greenfield as described above. 
101. 
Greenfield was about to return to her employment as a Senior Personal Banker with a 
large Financial Institution. 
102. 
As a result of Greenfield's claims, Greenfield's right to pursue her perspective economic 
advantage in the practice of banking was interfered with by Smith's negligence, and Greenfield 
suffered damages including: loss of past and future economic opportunity, loss of civil liberties 
and freedom, violation of constitutional rights, defamation, deprivation of rights, failure to keep 
from harm, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress; all to be proven at a trial in this civil case, all because Smith 
violated the standards of legal practice in the comm.unity as outlined above, and Greenfield seeks 
judgment against all defendants in an amount that will compensate her for her losses and 
damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS 
103. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
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104. 
At all times material hereto, Smith asserted, implied and inferred that he was acting as an 
attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar Association and was eligible, qualified and 
capable of serving as counsel for Greenfield in both her civil and criminal cases. Smith received 
compensation and accepted the responsibility to effectively represent Greenfield regarding the 
aforementioned cases. 
105. 
Smith failed to act on behalf of Greenfield by allowing her to suffer an additional eleven 
months while waiting for her criminal trial to commence, wherein Smith had viable information 
and facts that should have been exposed in order to dismiss the criminal charge against 
Greenfield in a more timely manner if Smith had acted diligently by submitting said information 
to the Court. 
106. 
Greenfield is unemployable in the banking field due to the prolonged period of time that 
elapsed during the criminal proceedings, wherein she suffered financial ruin and filed for 
bankruptcy. Such financial issues are not permitted within the banking profession, thus 
terminating Greenfield's "bonding" viability. 
107. 
Smith failed to represent Greenfield during her civil proceedings by deliberately missing 
crucial pre-trial deadlines. Due to Smith's negligence and incompetent representation, lack of 
skill in preparing documents, failing to file documents, lack of preparation, failure to meet 
deadlines, failure to keep Greenfield from harm by not reporting his client Pamela Wallace to the 
authorities, and failure to act with reasonable due diligence were intentional and reckless. 
108. 
Smith failed to represent Greenfield at her civil trial against the Wurmlingers by 
breaching the aforementioned contract just prior to trial, wherein Greenfield lost at trial and the 
Wurmlingers were awarded one hundred sixty eight thousand dollars ($168,000), to be paid by 
Greenfield. 
109. 
The actions of the Defendant as set forth above are extreme and outrageous. 
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110. 
The actions of the Defendant as described above have caused Greenfield severe 
emotional distress. 
111. 
The actions of the Defendant as described herein are the direct and proximate cause of 
Greenfield's emotional distress. 
112. 
Due to the actions of the Defendant as alleged herein, Greenfield has suffered injuries 
and damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS 
113. 
Plaintiff incorporates the prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 
114. 
At all times material hereto, Smith asserted, implied and inferred that he was acting as an 
attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar Association and was eligible, qualified and 
capable of serving as counsel for Greenfield in both her civil and criminal cases. Smith received 
compensation and accepted the responsibility to effectively represent Greenfield regarding the 
aforementioned cases. 
115. 
Smith had a duty to abide by the agreements entered into and effectively represent 
Greenfield. 
116. 
As alleged herein, Smith acted negligently and breached said duties. 
117. 
Due to Smith's negligent breach of his duties to Greenfield, the Plaintiff has suffered 
physical injuries including but not limited to: stress, anxiety, worry, fear, depression, loss of 
sleep, nightmares, panic attacks, fatigue, humiliation, hopelessness, constant outbursts of grief, 
impairment of ability to work, and mental distress. 
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118. 
The actions of the Defendant as described herein are the direct and proximate cause of 
Greenfield's injuries. 
119. 
Due to the actions of the Defendant as alleged herein, Greenfield has suffered injuries 
and damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
OPINION AND CONCLUSION 
Greenfield is alleging that Smith through various means of litigation malpractice and 
negligence unraveled her civil case in which she was the Plaintiff. This type of attorney 
malpractice lawsuit is known as a "settle and sue" case, which involves a former client suing 
after litigation has been settled. In this case, Greenfield was denied her due process, was 
prejudiced, and was denied adequate counsel to defend her claims at trial. The dissatisfied client, 
Greenfield, was the Plaintiff in the antecedent lawsuit, the basis of the claim is that the settlement 
was less than it should have been or more than it had to be, by reason of the negligence of the 
party's attorney. Obviously, the manner in which the underlying lawsuit was concluded will 
often make it problematic whether causation and damages can be established. The various 
actions by the attorney were below the standard of professional care and caused Greenfield to 
suffer a loss of one hundred sixty eight thousand dollars ($168,000) to the Wurmlingers for 
illegitimate claims, which were never addressed by Smith. 
The evidence in this case is clear that Smith failed to properly work up the case, he failed 
to properly prepare his experts, and he failed to properly represent Greenfield. In the last few 
remaining days before trial, after a majority of the pre-trial deadlines had elapsed, Smith 
abandoned Greenfield, stole all of her money, left her to find new counsel and get new counsel 
up to speed, all of which she was unable to do, as all of her funds had been exhausted. Crucial 
pre-trial deadlines had extinguished, leaving key matters unresolved. 
Therefore, (1) there is duty owed to the Plaintiff by the Defendant; (2) a breach of that 
duty; in general, to establish the element of duty, the Plaintiff must prove that an attorney-client 
relationship existed with respect to the matter at issue. With the limited exceptions discussed 
below, a person who was not a client may not sue an attorney for legal malpractice. See; Barcelo 
v. Elliott, 923 S. W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996). The Plaintiff's burden of proving the existence of any 
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attorney-client relationship is commonly referred to as the "privity" requirement. The 
determination of whether an attorney-client relationship exists must be based on an objective 
standard, not on the parties' subjective beliefs. See; SMWNP F Holdings, Inc. v. Devore, 165 
F.3d 360, 364-65 (5th Cir. 1999); (3) that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff injury; and 
to establish a breach of duty giving rise to a claim for legal malpractice, the client must show that 
the lawyer failed to comply with the applicable standard of care. In general terms, an attorney 
breaches the duty of care when the lawyer does something an ordinarily prudent lawyer would 
not have done, or fails to do something an ordinarily prudent lawyer would have done, under the 
same or similar circumstances; ( 4) that damages occurred. As in traditional negligence cases, the 
Plaintiff in a legal malpractice case must prove that the alleged malpractice was the proximate 
cause of injury. See; Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1989). Proximate cause 
consists of two elements: (1) cause in fact and (2) foreseeability. See; McClure v. Allied Stores 
of Tex., Inc., 608 S. W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1980). "Cause in fact means that the act or omission 
was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury and without which no harm would have 
occurred." The cause in fact requirement has also been referred to as the "but for" test, because 
the Plaintiff must show that the injury would not have occurred "but for" the alleged breach of 
duty. To qualify as cause in fact the negligence must also have been a substantial factor in 
bringing about the Plaintiff's harm. See; Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S. W.2d 773, 775 
(Tex. 1995). The foreseeability element of proximate cause requires proof that the defendant, as 
a person of ordinary intelligence, should have anticipated the danger to others by his negligent 
act. See; e.g., Dyer v. Shafer, Gilliland, Davis, McCollum & Ashley, Inc., 779 S. W.2d 474, 478 
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied). 
When the alleged malpractice relates to a claim that was litigated, the Plaintiff must 
prove that a more favorable judgment would have resulted if the case had been handled 
competently. This is known as the "case within a case" requirement. In litigation malpractice 
cases, therefore, the trial of the legal malpractice case actually involves proving two cases: 1) 
the malpractice case against the lawyer, and 2) the hypothetical, malpractice-free underlying 
case. See; Jackson v. Urban, Coolidge, Pennington & Scott, 516 S. W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 
A Plaintiff in a legal malpractice case may seek to recover foreseeable damages 
proximately caused by the negligent act or omission. In the litigation context, this is usually the 
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amount that the client would have collected, or would have avoided paying, if the litigation had 
been properly handled. See; e.g., Keck, Mahin & Cate v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 20 
S. W.3d 692, 703 (I'ex. 2000) (damages were to be calculated by comparing amount paid to settle 
case with amount that would have been lost at competently defended trial); See; Cosgrove v. 
Grimes, 774 S. W2d 662, 666 (I'ex. 1989) (jury should have been asked to determine the amount 
of damages "collectible from Stephens if the suit had been properly prosecuted''). 
Exemplary damages are only recoverable in a legal malpractice case if the plaintiff 
proves by "clear and convincing evidence" that the harm resulted from fraud, malice or gross 
negligence. "Malice" means a specific intent to cause the Plaintiff substantial injury or harm. 
"Gross negligence" means an act or commission involving an "extreme degree of risk," carried 
out with actual, subjective awareness of the risk and conscious indifference to the rights, safety 
or welfare of others. Exemplary damages may be awarded only if the jury was unanimous in 
finding liability for and the amount of exemplary damages. Unless the alleged malpractice also 
constitutes a felony listed in § 41.008(c), exemplary damages are capped at two times the 
economic damages or $200,000, whichever is greater. (Additional amounts are available if non-
economic damages are recovered). 
As in any other negligence case, however, if there is a genuine issue of material fact 
about the reasonableness and care exercised by the attorney, then the issue must be submitted to 
the jury for determination. An attorney is still "bound to exercise a reasonable degree of skill 
and care in all his professional undertakings." See; Woodruffv. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 930 (6th 
Cir. 1980) (applying Tennessee law). Consequently, an attorney must exercise due care and 
diligence when pursuing or preparing for a case. The attorney must also display a reasonable 
degree of skill and knowledge when trying a case. See Herston v. Whitesell, 348 So.2d 1054, 
1057 (Ala.1977). For example, an attorney who fails to exercise reasonable skill and diligence 
when investigating the merits of his opponent's position on an issue is not immune from liability. 
See Woodruff, 616 F.2d at 933-34 (finding allegations of an attorney's failure to contact or 
interview a potentially valuable witness to present a question for a jury). An attorney who is 
unfamiliar with or disregards controlling points of law when presenting his client's case is also 
not immune from liability. Id. at 934-35 (finding allegations of an attorney's failure to bring to 
the attention of the trial court statutes controlling liability to present a question for the jury). 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff seeks judgment against the Defendant as follows: 
1. In the FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENCE for judgment against Smith for 
money damages in excess of Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) or as determined at trial; 
2. In the SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: BREACH OF CONTRACT for judgment 
against Smith for money damages in excess of Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) or as 
determined at trial; 
3. In the THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALINGS for judgment against Smith for money damages in excess of 
Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) or as determined at trial; 
4. In the FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY for 
judgment against Smith for money damages in excess of Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) 
or as determined at trial; 
5. In the FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FRAUD AND DECEPTION for judgment against 
Smith for money damages in excess of Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) or as determined 
at trial; 
6. In the SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH 
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE for judgment against Smith for money 
damages in excess of Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) or as determined at trial; 
7. In the SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS for judgment against Smith for money damages in excess of 
Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000) or as determined at trial; 
8. In the EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS for judgment against Smith for money damages in excess of Ten Thousand 
dollars ($10,000) or as determined at trial; 
9. In all claims, for costs of this action as well as pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as 
allowed by law. 
Dated this 5th Day of December, 2014. 
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) 
VERIFICATION 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, Christina J. Greenfield, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That I am the Plaintiff in the above-named action, and I state the same to be true and 
correct to the best of my knowledge. 
Christina ) . Ci_ryenfield 1 G ' 
J 




State of Idaho •? -z.t-'1....0 
Commission Expires on: _::;, ____ _ 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR STATE OF IOAHO 
RESIDING AT POST FALLS, IOAHO 83854 
t.1Y COMMISSION EXPIRES ON 03/21/2020 
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CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
210 S. PARK WOOD PLACE 
POST FALLS, IDAHO 83854 
(208) 773-0400 
Pro Se Litigant 
STATE OF IOAHO } 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
F!L[G: 
2015 JAN 21 PH 4: 48 
---]IPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 0 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 






) CASE NO: CV-2014-8801 
) 
) PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS 
) FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
) 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, Christina J. Greenfield (Hereafter: "Greenfield"), 
hereby provides notice and submits the following First Set of Request for Production of 
Documents to the above-named Defendant, Ian D. Smith (hereafter: "Smith") and his attorney of 
record, Keith D. Brown. 
DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS APPLICABLE TO EACH REQUEST 
A. In responding to these Requests for Production of Documents and other items of 
evidence, you are required to provide all information asked for, and to furnish all 
documents, items of evidence, and information that is available to you or subject to your 
reasonable inquiry, including all documents, items of evidence, items of information, and 
information in the possession of your attorneys, accountants, advisers, or other persons 
directly or indirectly employed by, or connected with, you or your attorney's and anyone 
else otherwise subject to your control. 
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B. In responding to these Requests for Production of Documents and other items of 
evidence, you must make a diligent search of your records and of other paper and 
materials in your possession or available to you or your attorney's or representatives. 
C. In a request, respond to each part separately and in full, and do not limit your answer to 
the interrogatory or request as a whole. If these requests cannot be answered in full, 
answer to the extent possible, specify the reason for your inability to respond to the 
remainder, and state whatever information and knowledge you have regarding the 
unanswered portion. 
D. These requests for Production of Documents are deemed to be continuing in nature and 
your responses thereto must be supplemented to the maximum extent authorized by law 
and the applicable rules. 
E. "Documents" shall mean all written or graphic matter of every kind or description, 
however, produced or reproduced, whether draft or final, original or reproduction signed 
or unsigned, and regardless of whether approved, signed, sent, received, redrafted, or 
executed, including but not limited to: written communications, letters, correspondence, 
facsimiles, e-mail, memoranda, minutes, notes, films, recordings, of any type, transcripts, 
contracts, agreements, purchase or sales orders, memoranda of telephone conversations 
of personal conversations, diaries, desk calendars, interoffice communications, reports, 
studies, bills, receipts, checks, checkbooks, invoices, requisitions or material similar to 
any of the foregoing however denominated, by whomever prepared, and to whomever 
addressed, which are in your possession, custody or control or to which you have had or 
can obtain access. 
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) 
F. "Person(s)" shall mean and include: A natural person, partnership, firm, or corporation or 
any other kind of business or legal entity, its agents, or employees. In each instance 
where you are asked to identify or list a name of a person, state with respect to each such 
person or persons his name, last known residence, and business addresses, and telephone 
numbers. 
G. "Communications" shall mean all inquiries, discussions, conversations, negotiations, 
agreements, understandings, meetings, telephone conversations, letters, correspondence, 
notes, telegrams, telexes, advertisements, facsimiles, e-mail, or other forms of verbal 
and/or communicative contact. 
H. "You" or "your" refers to Defendant herein and to all other persons acting or purporting 
to act on behalf of Defendant, including agents and employees. 
I. The period of time encompassed by these requests shall be from the date of the attorney 
client relationship begun between Plaintiff and Defendant until the final dissolution of all 
facts and findings. 
J. Every document submitted under this request shall be certified and signed under Rule 
26(a)(l) or (a)(3) and every discovery response, or objection must be signed by at least 
one attorney of record in the attorney's own name or by the party personally, and must 
state the signer's address, e-mail address, and telephone number. By signing, an attorney 
or party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge that the information with 
respect to a disclosure, is complete and correct as of the time it is made. 
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Request for Production No. 1: Do you intend to call any expert witnesses at the trial of this 
case? If so, state as to each such witness the name and business address of the witness, the 
witness's qualifications as an expert, the subject matter upon which the witness is expected to 
testify, the substance of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify, and a 
summary of the grounds for each opinion. Produce all learned treatises (published treatises, 
periodicals, or pamphlets on the subject of history, or other science or art, as defined in rule 803 
(18) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence) upon which any of your expert witness base their opinions, 
or may rely upon in rendering their opinions in this action. Produce all other documents upon 
which any of your expert witnesses base their opinions, or may rely upon in rendering their 
opinions in this action. 
Request for Production No. 2: Produce any written statements, reports or memoranda, 
signed, made by any person which support: 
a. Any and all of your denials to the allegations contained within the Plaintiffs Complaint 
herein; 
b. Any and all of your affirmative defenses to the Plaintiffs claims contained in the 
Plaintiffs complaint herein. 
Request for Production No. 3: List all witnesses that you intend to call at the trial in this 
matter and produce each and every exhibit, document, motion picture, photograph, drawing, 
sketch, diagram or other item that you intend to offer for introduction into evidence or otherwise 
to use for demonstrative purposes at any pre-trial motion or at the trial of this matter. 
Request for Production No. 4: Produce any and all documents containing any notes or 
other writings generated by you which describe: 
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) 
a. Any incident which forms a basis for any of your denials to the allegations contained 
within the Plaintiff's complaint herein. 
Request for Production No. 5: State the name, address, and telephone number of each 
person with personal knowledge regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the events of 
the occurrences referred to in the complaint. 
Request for Production No. 6: Produce, identify, and describe in detail all evidence 
including documents, affidavits, statements, reports, photos, memoranda, or other, utilized in the 
investigation, upon which the Plaintiff was officially charged with Felony Malicious Injury to 
Property on June 3, 2010, that you obtained from the Ann Taylor, Plaintiff's Public Defender and 
I or State Prosecutor's and/ or others in regard to the Plaintiff. 
Request for Production No. 7: Identify and describe all communications you have had with 
any other person regarding the Plaintiff, the subject matter of this litigation, or any individual or 
entity believed by you to be associated with the Plaintiff, and include in your response the date of 
the communication, the method of communication, and the identity of the individual or entity 
who received or sent the communication. 
Request for Production No. 8: Identify any legal claims or lawsuits filed by or against you 
in the last ten (10) years, including the case style, case number, parties, and jurisdiction, agency, 
or other entity in which such claim or suit was filed. 
Request for Production No. 9: Produce any recordings made by or with your involvement 
regarding the Plaintiff, the subject matter of this litigation, or any individual or entity believed by 
you to be associated with the Plaintiff, including, but not limiting your response to the date, 
location and reasons any such recording was made. 
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Request for Production No. 10: If you claim that any statement or document responsive to 
any interrogatory or request for production has been destroyed, deleted, or is otherwise 
unavailable, identify each such statement or document, providing the date such statement or 
document was made or published, the last date that statement or document is known to have 
existed, what happened to that statement or document, and provide a summary of the content and 
meaning of that statement or document. 
Request for Production No. 11: Identify any oral, written, or recorded statements taken by 
you or on your behalf in connection with the claims or defenses raised in this matter, providing 
the identity of anyone who heard or received such statement, the date of any such statement, how 
such statement was made, where each such statement was made, a summary of the content and 
meaning of that statement and the identity of anyone in possession of a copy of each statement. 
Request for Production No. 12: To provide the background of the Defendant including: 
age, date of birth, address, marital status, military status, criminal history, education, church 
affiliation, memberships in any organization, employer and position of employment if an 
individual. If you own a business, to provide the type of business structure, date of formation, 
place of formation and the names and addresses of all partners, owners, managers, shareholders 
or officers. 
Request for Production No. 13: Produce each and every exhibit, document, motion picture, 
photograph, drawing, sketch, diagram, voice recordings, email(s), reports, or any other item in 
your possession during your representation for both the Plaintiff's criminal and civil 
proceedings. 
Request for Production No. 14: Produce any and all emails that were exchanged by you 
and any other persons during the period you represented the Plaintiff or thereafter. 
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) ) 
Request for Production No. 15: Produce any and all documents, written statements, reports 
or memoranda containing all correspondence between you and the Plaintiff during the period you 
represented the Plaintiff or thereafter. 
Request for Production No. 16: Produce any and all photographs, video recordings, audio 
recordings, drawings, charts, diagrams, emails, facsimile, texts, or other, containing 
communication that transpired between you and attorney's Gary Amendola, Douglas Marfice, 
and John Riseborough in regard to the Plaintiff. 
Request for Production No. 17: Produce any and all photographs, video recordings, audio 
recordings, drawings, charts, diagrams, emails, facsimile, texts, or other, containing 
communication that transpired between you and the State Prosecuting Attorney( s ), in regard to 
the Plaintiff 's criminal proceedings. 
Request for Production No. 18: Produce any and all documents, written statements, reports 
or memoranda containing all of your reported and / or documented hours that were charged to 
the Plaintiff on both the criminal and civil proceedings for which you represented and / or 
defended the Plaintiff, including all payments made on behalf of the Plaintiff toward said 
services. 
Request for Production No. 19: Describe your personal and/ or professional relationship 
with Pamela Rilliet Wallace. 
Request for Production No. 20: Produce any and all video recordings, audio recordings, 
drawings, charts, diagrams, emails, facsimile, texts, or other, containing communication that 
transpired between you and the Idaho State Bar Association in regard to the Plaintiff and / or 
Pamela Rilliet Wallace. 
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Regu~st for Production No. 21: Produce any and all dates that you were not available 
during the period from September 2010 through April 2012, due to absences, vacations, and/ or 
out of town excursions while you were representing the Plaintiff. 
Request for Production No. 22: Produce any and all of your business phone records that 
refer to telephone number (208) 765A050, during the period from September 2010 through April 
2012, or thereafter, including conversations between opposing counsel, prosecutors, and yourself 
and / or Julie Vetter, your former paralegal, in regard to phone conversations involving the 
Plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of January, 2015 
C 
Pro Se Litigant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of January, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keith D. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
1500 Bank of America Financial Center 
601 West Riverside A venue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0626 
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[X] U.S. Mail 
~•. /J /} 
(~~~ 
CHRISTINA J~ELD 
Pro Se Litigant 
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Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
Troy Y. Nelson, ISB #5 851 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Telephone: (509) 747-2052 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
No. CV-14-8801 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The defendant moves the Court for an Order for entry of summary judgment 
pursuant to IRCP 56. This motion is based upon the Affidavit of Peter Erbland, 
Affidavit of Ian Smith, Affidavit of Troy Y. Nelson and the Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment, each of which are filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
DATED this -i °\ day of July, 2015. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- I 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
/ , I --
By: ?i ). 1t l.// 
David A. Kulisch 
Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
Troy Y. Nelson, ISB #5851 
Attorneys for Defendant 





























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the L--'"1 day of July, 2015, addressed to the following: 
Plaintiff Pro Se: 
Christina J. Greenfield 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs claims against her former attorney are without merit. Most of the 
claims are barred by the statute of limitations and any remaining claims are likewise ripe 
for summary dismissal. 
II. FACTS 
On September 15, 2010, Plaintiff Greenfield(" Plaintiff') hired attorney Ian 
Smith ("Defendant") on an hourly basis to represent her in a civil suit against her 
neighbors Eric and Rosalynn Wurmlinger ("Wurmlinger"). 
On January 19, 2011, Plaintiff retained Defendant to represent her in a criminal 
case. The underlying criminal and civil cases have a common factual background. 
Those facts are summarized in both the federal civil rights decision by the U.S. District 
Court and the recently issued opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court. Aff. of Troy Y. 
Nelson, Exhibits 1 and 2. The facts laid out by the Idaho Supreme Court are as follows: 
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In 1994, Eric and Rosalynn Wurminger (Defendants) built their home 
in the Park Wood Place subdivision in Post Falls, Idaho, on a lot next to 
the home of Judy Richardson. The Defendants operated a bed and 
breakfast from their home, and they planted a row of arborvitaes near 
the property line between their lot and a lot owned by Ms. Richardson. 
In 2005, Christina Greenfield (Plaintiff) purchased the Richardson 
property. The following year, Plaintiff had an attorney write to the 
Defendants, stating that the operation of their bed-and-breakfast 
violated the subdivision's protective covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions (CC&R's) and at the height of the arborvitaes violated the 
height restrictions on fences contained in the CC& R's and the height 
restrictions on hedges contained in a city ordinance. Therefore, the 
dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants centered on the operation of 
Defendants' bed and breakfast in their home and the height of their 
arborvitaes near the boundary between the two properties. 
On April 12, 2006, Post Falls sent Mr. Wurmlinger a letter stating that 
the city had received a complaint regarding a hedge on his property and 
that the city code required fences and hedges within a side yard setback 
to be no higher than 6 feet. The letter quoted the relevant ordinance and 
asked that the hedge be brought into compliance within 3 0 days. 
Defendants trimmed their arborvitaes to bring them into compliance, 
and in June 2006 the city amended its ordinance to remove the 
limitation on the height of hedges. Thereafter, Defendants allowed their 
arborvitaes to grow taller than six feet. 
By 2010, the arborvitaes had grown to a height of 10 to 12 feet. In 
April 2010, Defendants returned from a vacation and discovered that 
about 4 to 6 feet had been cut from 10 of their arborvitaes. It is 
undisputed that Plaintiff had her agent cut the trees. Plaintiff was 
charged criminally, but the charges were later dismissed.' Thereafter, 
Defendants began experiencing vandalism on their property. Over a 
1 In the criminal matter against Plaintiff, the day before the trial was to begin, on October 3, 2011, the 
deputy prosecuting attorney filed a motion to dismiss the charge without prejudice stating that "the state 
does not yet have an official survey of the property at issue identifying the location of the subject trees." 
Aff. oflan Smith, p. 2. On the morning of trial, October 4, 2011, Defendant Smith argued against the 
motion to dismiss without prejudice. Id. Significantly, the court denied the state's motion to dismiss without 
prejudice. Id. Defendant prepared in order for the court to sign and which was signed by Judge Gibler on 
October 4, 2011. Id. The state was then required to go forward with its evidence. Id. 
However, the state failed to produce any evidence or testimony at trial. Id. As a result, Defendant 
obtained a judgment of acquittal for Plaintiff. Id. It is Mr. Erb land's opinion that Plaintiffs claims against 
Defendant that he breached the applicable standard of care in representing her in this criminal case are 
without merit. Erb land Report, p. 9. Mr. Erb land believes that Defendant's representation of Plaintiff in the 
criminal case was well within the applicable standard of care and that Defendant provided excellent 
representation to Plaintiff in that matter. Id. 
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period of about 18 months, there were 14 incidents of paint being 
splashed or poured on improvements to their property, with the last 
incident occurring about four months before the jury trial in this case. 
On September 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed this action alleging for claims 
against Defendants. First, Plaintiff asked for a declaratory judgment 
that Defendants were violating the CC&R's by operating the bed-and-
breakfast, allowing their arborvitaes to grow higher than 5 feet, and 
obstructing a pedestrian easement across their property. She sought an 
injunction requiring Defendants to cease the alleged violations. Second, 
Plaintiff alleged that the plants and trees on defendants' property that 
blocked her view of the Spokane River constituted a nuisance. She 
sought damages and an order requiring defendants to remove the 
offending foliage. Third, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had agreed to 
maintain their foliage along the common boundary line at a height of 6 
feet; that Plaintiff had the foliage trimmed to the agreed height when 
Defendants breached that agreement; and the Defendants then 
contacted law enforcement which resulted in Plaintiff being charged 
with a misdemeanor. As a result, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants 
intentionally caused her emotional distress, for which she was entitled 
to recover damages. Fourth, Plaintiff alleged that defendants breached 
their agreement with her and made false and defamatory statements 
about her to law enforcement, which negligently caused her emotional 
distress. She requested and awarded damages on that claim. Defendants 
filed a counterclaim seeking damages for negligence or intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, common-law trespass, and timber 
trespass. 2 
Prior to trial, Plaintiffs claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress was dismissed upon defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. 3 Plaintiffs claim for nuisance and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and defendants' claim were tried to a jury. It returned 
a special verdict finding that Plaintiff had failed to prove her claims of 
nuisance and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 4 The jury also 
2 On February 14, 2012, Defendant Smith filed a motion to withdraw from representation of Plaintiff in a 
civil case. The motion demonstrates that the attorney-client relationship had broken down to such an extent 
that it would be impossible for Defendant to continue representing Plaintiff. Erbland Report., Ex. 38. The 
motion to withdraw was later granted on March 8, 2012 by the court and Plaintiff began i:epresenting 
herself on her civil claims against the Wurmlingers. Erbland Report, p. 1 O; A.ff. oflan Smith, Ex. 1. 
3 These claims were dismissed on May 24, 2012. Erbland Report, Ex. 41. 
4 On November 30, 2012, the civil jury returned a ~pecial verdict in favor ofthe Wurmlingers on each of 
Greenfield's claims, and found in favor of the Wum11ingers on their counterclaims. As to Greenfield's 
claims, the jury found that the Wurmlingers' maintenance of the arborvitae and/or operation of the bed-
and-breakfast did not constitute nuisances. Additionally the jury found that the Wurmlingers had not 
inflicted emotional distress upon Greenfield. Erbland Report, Ex. 43. · 
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found that the Defendants had proved their claim of negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, for which it awarded them $52,000 in damages, 
and for their claim of timber trespass, for which it awarded them 
$17,000 in damages. The jury also found that Defendants have proved 
that Plaintiff committed a common-law trespass, but Defendants did 
not prove any damages for that claim. Plaintiffs action for declaratory 
judgment that Defendants were in violation of the CC&R' s was tried to 
the District Court, and it later entered a decision finding that Plaintiff 
had failed to prove that claim. 
The timber trespass damages were trebled to $51,000 pursuant to Idaho 
Code section 6-202, and the court awarded Defendants' court costs and 
a reasonable attorney fee totaling $65,755.37. It entered a judgment 
against Plaintiff in the amount of $168,755.37, and she timely 
appealed. 
Following the verdict, on October 4, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the 
city of Post Falls, its mayor and various administrators and employees (past and present), 
as well as members of the Post Falls Police Department, seeking damages for the 
Defendants' alleged failure to enforce its zoning laws to her detriment. That complaint 
was dismissed with prejudice on April 3, 2014, by Hon. Candy W. Dale, United States 
Magistrate Judge. Aff. of Troy, Y. Nelson, Ex 1. 
On May 21, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the civil court judgment and 
awarded attorney fees and costs against Plaintiff in favor of the Wurmlingers. Aff. of 
Troy Y. Nelson, Ex 2. 
Plaintiff initiated the present civil suit by filing a complaint on December 1, 2014. 
See Complaint. A Modified Complaint was filed on December 4, 2014. See Modified 
Complaint. 
On April 13, 2013, 2015 Plaintiff responded to Defendant's first set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Aff. of Troy Y. Nelson, Ex. 3. 
Plaintiff failed to designate any expe1is in response to Defendant's discovery request to 
identify experts. Id. 
On July 8, 2015, Plaintiff served "Plaintiffs Second Response to Defendants 
Request for Production." Aff. of Troy Y. Nelson, Ex. 4. Here, Plaintiff had a second 
opportunity to identify experts and she did not. Id. 
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Plaintiffs deadline for disclosing experts was July 21, 2015. See Case 
Scheduling Order, p. 4. Defendant was not served with any expert disclosure by Plaintiff. 
Aff. of Troy Y. Nelson. 
Ill. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Summary Judgment Standards 
I.R.C.P. 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." 
· Once the moving party has properly supported motion for summary judgment but 
affidavits, ignitions or depositions, it is incumbent on the moving party to present 
opposing evidence through depositions, discovery responses and affidavits sufficient to 
create a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e). To withstand a motion for summary 
judgment, the nonmoving party's case must consist of more than speculation; it must 
create a genuine issue regarding a material fact. G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 
Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991). A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to 
create a genuine issue. Id. If the evidence presented by the nonmoving party fails to 
raise a genuine issue for trial, summary judgment shall be entered against that party. 
I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
B. Plaintiff has not Demonstrated the Essential Elements of Legal 
Malpractice Action 
The elements required to establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of 
a civil action are: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a 
duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or the standard of care by the 
lawyer; and ( 4) the failure to perform the duty must have been a proximate cause of the 
damages suffered by the client. Maias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13, 813 P.2d 350, 352 
(1991). 
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the attorney has been negligent ot 
has failed to act with proper skill, as well as the burden of showing that the defendant's 
negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs damages. Without proximate cause 
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there is no liability for negligence in a malpractice action. Id. In a legal malpractice 
action arising out of a civil suit, the plaintiff must establish that he or she would have 
"some chance of success" in the underlying action before he or she would be entitled to 
recover from the attorney. Murray v. Faimers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224,227, 796 P.2d 101, 
104 (1990). A plaintiff pursuing a claim oflegal 
malpractice arising from representation of a defendant in a criminal proceeding must 
establish the additional element of actual innocence of the underlying criminal charges. 
Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269,272, 923 P.2d 976, 979 (1996). 
In this case, there is an absence of proof that Mr. Smith breached any applicable 
standard of care. Further, in the event of a breach, there is no proof whatsoever that the 
outcome of the trial would have been any different but for some remote negligence on the 
part of the defendant prior to his withdrawal. 
C. Plaintiff's Professional Negligence Claims are Barred by the Statute 
of Limitations 
An action seeking to recover damages for professional malpractice must be 
commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. Idaho Code sections 5-
210 and 5-219; Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396, 399 (2002). 
1. Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claim is Actually a Claim for 
Professional Malpractice for the Purpose of Calculating the 
Statute of Limitations 
Idaho code section 5-219(4) defines "professional malpractice" as "wrongful acts 
or omissions in the performance of professional services by a person, firm, association, 
entity or corporation licensed to perform such services under the law of the state of 
Idaho." The focus of a professional malpractice claim under Idaho Code section 5-219( 4) 
is "whether the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred in the course of performing 
professional services." Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 589, 51 P.3d 396,403 (2002). 
Put differently, the "appropriate statute oflimitations is determined by the substance, not 
the form, of the action." Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661,662 (1932). 
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Plaintiffs causes of action for negligence, breach of contract, breach of covenant 
of good faith and fair dealings and breach of fiduciary duty are properly characterized as 
professional malpractice claims under Idaho Code section 5-219( 4). Because these 
claims arose out of the provision of professional services as an attorney, Idaho Code 
section 5-219(4) provides the applicable statute oflimitations. See Lapham, 137 Idaho at 
589. 
2. Date of Accrual and Some Damage 
In addition to providing a two year statute of limitation for professional 
malpractice causes of action, Idaho code section 5-219(4) also provides that the cause of 
action accrues at the time of the occurrence, act, or omission complained of. Tingley v. 
Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 867 P.2d 960 (1994). Idaho case law extends the time of the 
accrual to the date when the plaintiff incurs some damage. Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 
228,232, 775 P.2d 120, 124-25 (1989). 
In Tingley, plaintiff/appellant sued his attorney after his personal-injury action 
was dismissed. The Idaho Supreme Court determined, as a matter of law, the latest 
possible date that Tingley's malpractice cause of action accrued under Idaho code section 
5-219 (4) was November 16, 1983, the date the underlying personal injury 
action was dismissed. It was only on that day, following either a far removed, antecedent 
negligent act or the continuing negligence of the respondent, that Tingley was damaged. 
Thus, the Idaho code section 5-219( 4) limitation period applicable to his malpractice 
action expired on November 16, 1985. Tingley,125 Idaho at 89-90. 
D. Plaintiff's Malpractice Causes ofAction are Time Barred 
Mr. Smith obtained an acquittal in the criminal matter of October 4. 2011. Aff. of 
Ian Smith. Thus, even though Plaintiff cannot prove she was innocent of the charges that 
she cut down her neighbor's trees, at the latest any claim for legal malpractice arising out 
of that representation would have needed to be filed by October 4, 2013. See 
Tingley,125 Idaho at 89-90. 
Mr. Smith withdrew from representing Plaintiff in the civil case on March 8, 
2012. Aff. of Ian Smith, Ex. 1. Thus, any acts of negligence would have had to occur 
before that time. Plaintiff proceeded to prosecute her civil lawsuit pro se. Following 
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trial, a verdict was entered against her on November 30, 2012, thus it was on that date, at 
the very latest, and giving the plaintiff every conceived benefit regarding the actual date, 
that plaintiff was damaged. See Tingley, 125 Idaho at 89-90; see also City of McCall v. 
Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 661, 210 P.3d 629, 634 (2009) (objective proof of damage did 
not occur until there was a court decision adverse to the client caused by the attorney's 
negligence). Thus, the Idaho code section 5-219(4) limitation period applicable to 
Plaintiffs present malpractice action expired on November 30, 2014. Consequently, this 
case, which was commenced by filing on December 1, 2014, is time-barred. 
E. Plaintiff's Malpractice Claim Should Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff 
Has Failed to Disclose Any Expert Testimony 
To establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of a civil action, the 
plaintiff must show the attorney's negligence proximately caused the plaintiff to lose the 
right to recover in the underlying case. Murray, 118 Idaho at 227; see also Lamb, 129 
Idaho at 272. 
Unless the breach is obvious, like allowing the statute oflimitations to run, a 
plaintiff must produce expert evidence of negligence and causation of damages to 
establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 273, 731 
P.2d 813, 816 (Ct. App l 986)(Jarman I). Where a defendant attorney moves for 
summary judgment in a malpractice case, the plaintiff must ordinarily provide affidavits 
of expert witnesses to resist the motion. Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 961, 842 P.2d 
288,297 (Ct.App 1992) (Jarman II). The reasons for these requirements, as in 
malpractice actions against other professionals, are that "the factors involved ordinarily 
are not within the knowledge or experience oflaymen composing the jury." Corey v. 
Wilson, 93 Idaho 54, 58, 454 P.2d 951, 955 (1969) 
Here, plaintiff has had two opportunities to respond to affirmative requests for the 
disclosure of expert testimony in her support and she has failed to do so. Additionally, 
Plaintiff has disregarded the court's deadline for the disclosure of expert testimony in her 
support. Plaintiffs failure to produce expert testimony is fatal to her legal malpractice 
claims arid those claims should be dismissed. 
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F. Plaintiffs Fraud Claim Should Be Dismissed Because It Was Not Pied 
With Particularly 
Fraud claims need to be pled with particularity as required by I.R.C.P. 9(b). The 
alleging party must specify what factual circumstances constituted the fraud. I.R.C.P. 
9(b); Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 144 Idaho 829, 833, 172 P.3d 1104, 1108 (2007). Plaintiffs 
fraud claim hinges on the theory that Mr. Smith "committed fraud when he knowingly 
failed to disclose the fabricated FBI NCIC Report" and "committed fraud when he 
deceptively failed to disclose his professional relationship with Pamela Wallace." 
Modified Complaint, page 20, pp. 97. Simply, Plaintiff has not pied any false 
representations by Defendant, rendering the fraud claim fatally defective. See Glaze, 144 
Idaho at 833. 
G. Plaintiff's Remaining Tort Claims Are Barred by the Statute Of 
Limitations 
When the tortious conduct ends, the limitation period begins. Glaze, 144 Idaho at 
833. Here, Mr. Smith withdrew from representing plaintiff in March of 2012. Any 
tortious conduct would have had to have happened prior to that time, thus her claims in 
this regard are also time barred. This would apply to the remaining tort claims of 
tortuous interference with prospective economic advantage and Plaintiffs claims of 
intentional and negligent emotional distress. 
H. The Defense Has Demonstrated That Mr. Smith's Representation of 
Plaintiff Met and Exceeded the Applicable Standard of Care 
In support of his motion, Defendant Mr. Smith has submitted to the court the 
expert report and affidavit of Mr. Pete Erbland. Mr. Erbland set out his qualifications and 
familiarized himself with the applicable standard of care. Erb land Report, pp. 1-5. Mr. 
Erbland then reviewed the court files, court decisions and the files and records relating to 
both the criminal and civil cases at the center of Plaintiffs present lawsuit. Erbland 
Report, pp. 2-3. After considering all of the file materials and applying Mr. Smith 
representation of Plaintiff to the applicable standard of care, Mr. Erbland opined that 
Plaintiffs allegation of professional negligence are without merit and that Mr. Smith's 
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representation of Plaintiff met and exceeded the applicable standard of care. Erbland 
Report, pp. 7-12. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Smith, at all times relevant hereto, met his obligations to his former client by 
exercising the requisite standard of care while defending her from criminal charges and 
prosecuting her civil lawsuit. Additionally, Plaintiffs claims in this lawsuit are either 
improperly pled or time barred. Thus, he is entitled to summary judgment. 
DATED this 1- "\ day of July, 2015. 
RANDALL I DANSKlN, P.S. 
/_/____ -... ' 
J ( /1( .,...-· 
By: ':) ') . //C _/ 
David A. Kulisch 
Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
Troy Y. Nelson, ISB #5851 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
')_ q document on the--~----'----l_day of July, 2015, addressed to the following: 
Plaintiff Pro Se: 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
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David A. Kulisch 
Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
Troy Y. Nelson, ISB #5851 
RANDALL J DANSKIN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Telephone: 509-747-2052 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STAT[ OF /OAHO 
COUNTY or KOOT[NA } ss 
F/LEO: 
20/5 JUL 30 AH 9. 24 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, : 
I 
CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
Plaintiff, I AFFIDAVIT OF PETER ERBLAND 
v. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
I 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Peter Erbland being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1. That I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to be a witness 
in the above-entitled proceeding and not a party thereto; 
2. Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of my report; and 
AFFIDAVIT OF PETER BRELAND - 1 RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 
1500 BANK OF AMERICA FINANCIAL CENTER 
601 WEST RIVERSIDE A VENUE 
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON 99201-0653 
(509) 747-2052 






























3. Each opinion expressed in my report is made on a more probable 
than not basis. 
PETER ERBLAND 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thit:13,_ day of July, 2015. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PETER BRELAND - 2 RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
ATI'ORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 
1500 BANK OF AMERICA FINANCIAL CENTER 
601 WEST RNERSIDE A VENUE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the 7.--'i day of July, 2015, addressed to the following: 
Plaintiff Pro Se: 
Christina J, Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
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RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 
1500 BANK OF AMERICA FINANCIAL CENTER 
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SPOKANE, WASHINGTON 99201-0653 
(509) 747-2052 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDI CAL DISTRICT OF 




IAN D. SMITH, 
DEFENDANT. 
------ ------ -
REPORT OF EXPERT OPINION 
OF 
PETER C. ERBLAND 
JULY 21, 2015 
PREPARED FOR 
LAW OFFICES OF 
RANDALL/DANSKJN PS 
601 W. RIVERSIDE AVE, STE 1500 
SPOKANE, WA 99201-0653 
CASE NO. CV 14-8801 




I have been retained to provide a report and, if required, expert testimony concerning the 
matter of Christina J. Greenfield, Plaintiff v. Ian D. Smith, Defendant, in the District 
Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, In and For the County of 
Kootenai, case no. CV 14-8801. 
.,. 
l.2 ·· PURPOSE 
\ ::· ·\, 
1.3 
I ha~~ been asked to review case docu~ents in two underlying cases: 
1) State ofldaho v. Christina J. Greenfield, case no. CR. 10-10624 in the District Court 
of the First Judicial District of the State ofidaho, In and Forthe County of Kootenai 
( the Criminal Case) and 
2) Christina J. Greenfield v. Eric J. Wurmlinger and Rosalynd D. Wurmlinger, husband 
and wife, Defendants, case no. CV 10-8209 in the District CoUli of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, In and For the County of Kootenai the Civil Case . 
I have also been asked to render one or more opinions relating to the applicable standard 
of care as it relates to Ian D. Smith1s representation of Ms. Greenfield in both the criminal 
and civil cases identified above. 
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 
I have been provided with copies of documents in the following matters: 
• Case of Christina J. Greenfield v. Ian D. Smith including the Complaint, Answer, 
Modified Complaint and Discovery Responses. 
• The files and records ofian D. Smith in both the Criminal and Civil Cases identified 
above. 
I have also reviewed and considered the following documents: 
• The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in the appeal of Greenfield v. Wurmlinger 
issued on May 21, 2015 in the Supreme Court of the State ofidaho Docket No. 
41178-2013. 
• The Memorandum Decision and Order issued by the Honorable Candy W. Dale, 
United States Magistrate Judge in the case of Christina J. Greenfield v. City of Post 
Falls, et al. case no. 2:13-cv-00437-CWD. 
In addition to the documents listed above, I have reviewed the applicable standards and 
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in civil and criminal matters and have used these as well as my own education, 
experience and training for the basis of my opinions. 
1.4 QUALIFICATION 
A copy of my current resume is attached as Exhibit "l . 11 I am a graduate of Saint Bonaverture 
University where I earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in English, graduating with honors in 1975. 
I then attended Gonzaga University where I obtained a Juris Doctor degree with honors in 1978. 
I have over 3 5 years of professional experience in criminal and civil litigation. I held the 
position of deputy proseguting attorney and eventually chief deputy prosecuting attorney for . 
Kootenai County, Idaho from the years of 1980-1987. I then held the position of chief of the· · 
criminal justice division cif the office of the Attorney General from 1987-1989. During the first 
nine years of my career as a lawyer, I worked fulltime as a prosecutor handling hundreds of 
criminal cases. In 1989 I entered piivate practice and began representation of clients in civil and 
criminal matters. In the last approximately ten years, my litigation practice has focused on 
commercial and complex litigation, insurance law and tort claims, including civil rights claims. I 
have also represented attorneys and law firms in the defense of legal malpractice claims. I am 
familiar with the applicable standard of care for Idaho attorneys in the representation of criminal 
and civil cases 
I am admitted to practice in all Idaho State courts, the Idaho Federal District Court, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. I hold an "AV" rating with 
Martindale Hubbell. I have also been peer selected for a listing in "Best Lawyers in America" 
and "Mountain State Super Lawyers" from 2005 to the present. 
1.5 COMPENSATION 
Compensation for work performed in this matter is at the rate of $295.00 per hour, including any 
testimony at deposition or trial. 
1.6 PRIOR TESTIMONY 
I have not testified by deposition or at trial as an expert witness within the past four years. 
1.7 DISCLOSURE 
I am professionally acquainted with Ian Smith, having litigated cases with him on a number of 
occasions over the past approximately 20 years. I briefly represented Mr. Smith in an unrelated 
matter many years ago. I am also the attorney for the defendants in Ms. Greenfield's claim filed 
in the United States Distiict Court for the District ofidaho vs. the City of Post Falls, et al. Those 
claims were dismissed as mentioned above. The dismissal is currently on appeal before the 
Ninth Circuit. Finally, my former partner, John Riseborough, of Paine Hamblen LLP 
represented the Wurrnlingers in the underlying civil case that is the subject of this lawsuit. I 
withdrew from Paine Hamblen LLP effective December 31, 2014. I have not personally 
represented the Wunnlingers. 
3 
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SECTI0N2.0 
STANDARD OF CARE 
In order to reach my opinions and conclusions regarding this matter, I have reviewed the law 
relating to the standard of care for an Idaho attorney in the representation of clients in both 
criminal and civil matters. Attorneys are held to that degree of care, skill, diligence and 
knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prndent attorney. 
Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson and Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 981 P.2d 236 (1999). 
While the rules of professional conduct caimot be used as a basis to impose civil liability, they 
are infonnative of the standard of care that an attorney owes to his or her client. Stephen v. 
Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521,248 P.3d 1256 (2011). 
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct define the contours of the duties owed by an attorney 
to his or her client. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,272 P.3d 1247 (2012). For example, IRCP 
1.1 provides that a lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, sldll, thoroughness and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation. The rules also provide that a lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing the client. IRPC 1.3. And, while the lawyer must 
_____ provide ze.alm1s_adyo_cac¥,-he-or-she-shal-l-n0t-bring-er-defencl-a-pr()ceeding,or-assert-or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not 
frivolous. IRPC 3 .1. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding may nevertheless so 
defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established. Id. 
I have also considered the requirements for establishing a claim oflegal malpractice. The 
elements required to establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of a civil action are: 
(1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the party of the 
lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or of the standard of care by the lawyer; and ( 4) the failure to 
perform the duty must have been a proximate cause of the damages suffered by the client. Lamb 
v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269, 923 P.2d 976 (1996). Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13, 813 
P.2d 350, 352 (1991). Without proximate cause there is no liability for negligence in a 
malpractice action. Id. In a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish that he or she 
would have "some chance of success" in the underlying action before he or she would be entitled 
to recover from the attorney. Id. Additionally, in a criminal proceeding, the person pursuing the 
claim must establish the additional element of achial innocence of the underlying criminal 
charges. Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho at 272. 
I have also considered applicable standards on pleading and proof in a legal malpractice claim. 
Generally, a lay witness does not have the experience, knowledge and wisdom to opinionate on 
the complexities of trial practice, including the verdict that a jury will render. Therefore, as a 
general rule, for a plaintiff to establish aprimafacie case oflegal malpractice at trial, he or she 
must produce expert evidence showing negligence and causation. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 
270, 731 P.2d 813 (Ct.App., 1986). There are exceptions to this rule. For example, where the 
attorney's alleged breach of duty of care is so obvious that it is within the ordinary knowledge 
and experience oflaymen, expert testimony has not been required. Id. Also, where the alleged 
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negligence consists of the failure of an attorney to follow with reasonable promptness and care of 
explicit instructions of his client, expert testimony may not be necessary. Id. Nevertheless, in all 
cases a plaintiff in a legal malpractice claim involving criminal or civil litigation must prove that 
the trial attorney was negligent in the preparation, investigation, or tiial of a case; and that his 
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. See Annot. 14 A.LR.4th 170 (1982). Jarman 
v. Hale, Id. 
SECTION 3.0 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The underlying ciiminal and civil cases have a common factual background. Those facts are 
summaiized in both the federal civil rights decision by the U.S. Distiict Court and the recently 
issued opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court. I will quote from the Supreme Court Decision as 
follows: 
In 1994, Eric and Rosalynn Wunnlinger (Defendants) built their 
home in the Park Wood Place subdivision in Post Falls, Idaho, on a 
lot next to the home of Judy Richardson. The Defendants operated 
a bed and breakfast from their home, and they planted a row of 
ar orvitaes near the property line between their lot and the lot 
owned by Ms. Richardson. In 2005, Christina Greenfield 
(Plaintiff) purchased the Richardson property. The following year, 
Plaintiff had an attorney write to the Defendants, stating that the 
operation of their bed and breakfast violated the subdivision's 
protective covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R's) and 
that the height of the arborvitaes violated the height restrictions on 
fences contained in the CC&R's and the height restrictions on 
hedges contained in a city ordinance. Therefore, the dispute 
between Plaintiff a11d Defendants centered on the operation of 
Defendants' bed and breakfast in their home and the height of their 
arborvitaes near the boundary between the two properties. 
On April 12, 2006, Post Falls sent Mr. Wurmlinger a letter stating 
that the city had received a complaint regarding a hedge on his 
property and that the city code required fences and hedges within a 
side yard setback to be no higher than six feet. The letter quoted 
the relevant ordinance and asked that the hedge be brought into 
compliance within thirty days. Defendants trimmed their 
arborvitaes to bring them into compliance, and in June 2006 the 
city amended its ordinance to remove the limitation on the height 
of hedges. Thereafter, Defendant allowed their arborvitaes to grow 
taller than six feet. 
By 2010, the arborvitaes had grown to a height often to twelve 
feet. In April 2010, Defendants returned from a vacation and 
5 
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discovered that about four to six feet had been cut from ten of their 
arborvitaes. It is undisputed that Plaintiff had her agent cut the 
trees. Plaintiff was charged criminally, but the charges were later 
dismissed. Thereafter, Defendants began experiencing vandalism 
to their prope1iy. Over a period of about eighteen months, there 
were fourteen incidents of paint being splashed or poured on 
improvements to their prope1iy, with the last incident occurring 
about four months before the jury trial in this case. 
On September 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed this action alleging four 
claims against Defendants. First, Plaintiff asked for a declaratory 
judgment that Defendants were violating the CC&R's by operating 
the bed and breakfast, allowing their arborvitaes to grown higher 
than five feet, and obstrncting a pedestrian easement across their 
property. She sought an injunction requiring Defendants to cease 
the alleged violations. Second, Plaintiff alleged that the plants and 
trees on Defendants' property that blocked her view of the 
Spokane River constituted a nuisance. She sought damages and an 
__________ __,,.u...,..~er_r_e_q1iiring..Defendants-to-r@-m0ve--the-0-ffend-ing-foliage:-'Phird-, -----------t-
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had agreed to maintain their 
foliage along the common boundary line at a height of six feet; that 
Plaintiff had the foliage trimmed to the agreed height when 
Defendants breached that agreement; and the Defendants then 
contacted law enforcement which resulted in Plaintiff being 
charged with a misdemeanor. As a result, Plaintiff claimed that 
Defendants intentionally caused her emotional distress, for which 
she was entitled to recover damages. Fourth, Plaintiff alleged that 
Defendants breached their agreement with her and made false and 
defamatory statements about her to law enforcement, which 
negligently caused her emotional distress. She requested an award 
of damages on that claim. Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking 
damages for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, common law trespass, and timber trespass. 
Prior to trial, Plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress was dismissed upon Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. Plaintiffs claim for nuisance and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and Defendants' claim were tried to 
a jury. It returned a special verdict finding that Plaintiff had failed 
to prove her claims of nuisance and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. The jury also found the Defendants had proved 
their claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, for which 
it awarded them $52,000 in damages, and their claim of timber 
trespass, for which it awarded them $17,000 in damages. The jury 
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also found that Defendants have proved that Plaintiff committed a 
common law trespass, but Defendants did not prove any damages 
for that claim. Plaintiff's action for declaratory judgment that 
Defendants were in violation of the CC&R's was tried to the 
district court, and it later entered a decision finding that Plaintiff 
had failed to prove that claim. 
The timber trespass damages were trebled to $51,000 pursuant to 
Idaho Code section 6-202, and the court awarded Defendants court 
costs and a reasonable attorney fee totaling $65,755.37. It entered 
a judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of $168,755.37, and she 
timely appealed. 
SECTION 4.0 
DISCUSSION AND OPINIONS RELATING TO THE CRIMINAL CASE 
On June 3, 2010 Ms. Greenfield was charged with the felony offense of malicious injury to 
property. Exhibit "2." A summons was issued. Id. Ms. Greenfield was represented by the 
Kootenai County public defender. Exhibit "3." On August 10,2010 Judge Penny---=-F-=ri=e=dl""'an"""d""'e,,,_r _____ --i-
disqualified herself. Exhibit "4." On August 12, 2010 Ms. Greenfield, while being represented 
by Deputy Public Defender Anne Taylor, waived her right to a preliminary hearing in writing. 
Exhibit "5." The presiding magistrate, Judge Harden, entered an order holding Ms. Greenfield to 
answer to the charge based upon her waiver of the preliminary hearing. The case was then 
assigned to district judge Fred Gibler. Exhibit "6." A trial was scheduled for January 25, 2011. 
Ms. Greenfield was still represented by the public defender. Exhibit "7." On December 21, 
2010 Ms. Greenfield sent a letter to Judge Gibler asking him to dismiss the charges and 
complaining about the representation provided to her by Deputy Public Defender Taylor. 
Exhibit "8." 
On January 19, 2011 Mr. Smith filed a stipulation substituting as counsel for Ms. Greenfield. 
Exhibit "9." The trial scheduled for January 25, 2011 was reset for April 26,201 L Exhibit "10. 
Thereafter, Mr. Smith instituted a vigorous plan ofdefense including taking the following steps: 
• Filing a Motion to Compel Discovery seeldng all documentation including a survey 
believed to have been conducted by the State. Exhibit 11 11. 11 The issues surrounding the 
survey related to the location of the arborvitae in relation to the property line between 
Ms. Greenfield's and Mr. Wurmlinger's parcels. Mr. Smith recognize that the survey 
was material evidence relative to the guilt or innocence of Ms. Greenfield. Id. 
• The Motion to Compel was preceded by a letter from Mr. Smith to the deputy prosecutor 
dated Febrnary 8, 2011 demanding the same materials. Exhibit "12." 
• Mr. Smith then set a hearing on the Motion to Compel and also sought an order 
permitting inspection of the real property and an order requiring public fimds to be used 
to pay for the defendant's. survey. Exhibits "13"and "14." 
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• Mr. Smith provided discovery to the prosecutor on February 14, 2011 disclosing 
potential trial witnesses including potential experts. Exhibit "15." 
On March 29, 2011 Mr. Smith had a telephone conversation with Ms. Greenfield memorializing 
their fee arrangement. He agreed to take her case at a flat fee of$7,500.00 after estimating that 
what she currently owed and the anticipated trial time would exceed $11,000.00. He advised her 
that the flat fee risk to her was if the prosecutor dismissed the case, he would still earn the entire 
flat fee. Exhibit "16." Their agreement was memorialized in writing. As it turns out, Ian 
Smith's time devoted to the criminal matter exceeded the flat fee amount. However, he charged 
her only the agreed upon of $7,500.00. Exhibit "17." 
On April 4, 2011 Ian Smith successfully obtained an order compelling a response to discovery. 
The court required that the State provide any survey commissioned, accessed by or in possession 
of the State to the. defendant no later than May 15, 2011. The court also ordered that if the State 
had not yet commissioned the survey that it had until May 15, 2011 to obtain such a survey. The 
court also ordered that should the State fail to produce the survey in the time allotted, the 
defendant would be permitted to enter upon the alleged victim's real property to conduct a 
survey. The motion for public funds to pay for the survey was reserved for a later date. Exhibit 
"18." 
A new trial date would need to be set. On June 6, Ms. Greenfield signed a waiver ofright to jury 
trial requesting that the matter be tiied as a court trial before Judge Gibler. Exhibit "19." In the 
meantime, Ian Smith continued a vigorous plan of defense including filing an objection to a 
proposed Amended Information and Motion to Dismiss. Exhibit "20." 
A new trial date was scheduled for September 27, 2011 as a court trial before Judge Gibler. 
Exhibit "21." 
The Motion to Dismiss was heard but denied by the court. Exhibit "22." Ian Smith continued 
with his plan of defense, including seeking a deposition of the State's surveyor. Exhibit "23." 
Mr. Smith continued to provide discovery responses including an additional defense witness, 
residential appraiser John Wilhelm. Exhibit 1124." On September 7, 2011 Judge Gibler entered 
an order allowing the deposition sought by Mr. Smith, and it was scheduled for September 20, 
2011. Exhibit "25." The trial date was moved October 4, 2011. 
The day before the trial was.to begin, on October 3, 2011, the deputy prosecuting attorney filed a 
Motion to Dismiss the charge without prejudice stating that "the State does not yet have an 
official survey of the property at issue identifying the location of the subject trees." On the 
morning of trial, October 4, 2011 Mr. Smith argued against the Motion to Dismiss Without 
Prejudice. Significantly, the court denied the State's Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice. Mr. 
Smith prepared an Order for the court to sign and which was signed by Judge Gibler on October 
4, 2011. Exhibit "26." The State was then required to go forward with this evidence. However, 
the State failed to produce any evidence or testimony at trial. As a result, Mr. Smith obtained a 
judgment of acquittal for Ms. Greenfield. Exhibit "27." A hearing on Ms. Greenfield's Motion 
to Seal the Case was scheduled for February 27, 2012. Exhibit "28." The Idaho repository 
shows that Ms. Greenfield's case has been sealed by court rule or judicial order. Exhibit"29." 
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I have reviewed these exhibits in light of the claims made by Ms. Greenfield against Mr. Smith 
relating to the Criminal Case. In my opinion, Ms. Greenfield's claims that Mr. Smith breached 
the applicable standard of care in representing her in the Criminal Case are without merit. In my 
opinion, Ian Smith's representation of Ms. Greenfield in the Criminal Case was well within the 
applicable standard of care. In my opinion Mr. Smith provided excellent representation to Ms. 
Greenfield in her Criminal Case. Highlights of that representation are as follows: 
• Upon substituting into the case for the public defender, Mr. Smith began aggressively 
pursuing discovery from the prosecutor, focusing upon the critical elements of the 
underlying charge of malicious injury to property. It is evident that Mr. Smith realized 
immediately that the ownership of the property upon which the arborvitae were locating 
was a critical element of the State's case. He properly focused upon the proof of that 
element. 
• When Mr. Smith did not receive satisfactory responses, he vigorously sought to compel 
responsive evidence relating to the survey and included a request to enter upon the 
adjoining property and obtain a survey at public expense as opposed to having Ms. 
Greenfield expend additional funds. 
• When the survey information was not provided, Mr. Smith obtained an order setting a 
·--------cle-ad-1-ine-frorn-the-eourt-:--S-ensing-an-advantage-with-hmmrgthe couftaecicleilie case, rr-e-------i-
obtained a concession from the prosecutor for a waiver of jury trial. Judge Gibler would 
therefore be the sole trier of fact, requiring the State to prove its case to him beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
• Mr. Smith obtained an order for the deposition of the State's witness who perfonned 
survey related work. It is unusual for a deposition to be provided in a criminal case and 
is not a matter of automatic right. Mr. Smith convinced the court that a deposition of this 
State's witness was called for. 
• When the trial date anived and the State sought to dismiss the charges without prejudice, 
Mr. Smith argued that the motion should be denied and the State should be required to go 
forward. In effect, Mr. Smith placed the State in the position of not being able to prove 
its case .. This resulted in a judgment of acquittal, which is equivalent to a finding of not 
guilty. 
The result that Mr. Smith obtained for Ms. Greenfield in the criminal case is remarkably positive 
and rare. Prosecutors have broad discretion in the dismissal of charges and refiling at a later 
date. Idaho Criminal Rule 48 allows for dismissal of a criminal action upon the court's own 
motion or upon the motion of any party. However, an order for dismissal of a criminal action is 
a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense ifit is a misdemeanor, but it is not a bar if the 
offense is a felony. Normally, a prosecutor who finds himself or herself unprepared to proceed 
to trial, can dismiss the charge and refile it as long as it is a felony and it is within the applicable 
statute of limitations. See also Idaho Code§ 19-3506. A dismissal without prejudice does not 
bar the refiling of a felony offense. Id. Indeed, once refiled, the six month speedy trial 
provisions of Idaho Code § 19-3501 is renewed. State v. Horsley, 117 Idaho 920, 792 P .2d 945 
(1990). 
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In summary, even though Ms. Greenfield waived her right to a preliminary hearing while 
represented by prior counsel, Mr. Smith successfully and vigorously defended Ms. Greenfield to 
the point where he convinced the court to deny a motion to dismiss without prejudice and forced 
the State to go to trial without the critical evidence of an element of the offense of malicious 
injury to property. This resulted in Ms. Greenfield being acquitted and found not guilty without 
ever having to present any evidence or testify on her own behalf. 
SECTION 5.0 
DISCUSSION AND OPINIONS RELATING TO THE CIVIL CASE 
On September 15, 2010 Ms. Greenfield hired Ian Smith on an hourly basis to represent herin 
claims she made against the Wurmlingers. Exhibit "30." Mr. Smith immediately began pursuing 
the claims by filing a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages. 
Exhibit 11 31. 11 The Wurmlingers filed an Answer and Counterclaim. Mr. Smith began pursuing 
discovery, including depositions of the plaintiffs. Exhibit 1132. 11 He also filed a Reply to 
Counterclaim. Exhibit 11 3 3 .11 The file also shows that Mr. Smith conducted written discovery 
and a Motion to Compel when he did not receive timely or thorough responses. Exhibit 11 34. 11 As 
a result of one of the discovery motions, Mr. Smith successfully obtained an Order granting 
-----~attome.y_fe_es_and_costs_to-Ms,-Gr:een-field-for-pu,rsui-ng-the-m0ti0n.----E-xhilc,i~~--'-.11'----------------r 
In addition to pursuing discovery, the files demonstrate that Mr. Smith obtained and disclosed 
expert witnesses for the case. Exhibit 11 36. 11 Mr. Smith also obtained a Stipulated Protective 
Order regarding Ms. Greenfield's medical history and records. Exhibit "3 7 .11 
On February 14, 2012 Mr. Smith filed a Motion to Withdraw from representation of Ms. 
Greenfield in the civil case. Exhibit 11 38. 11 The motion demonstrates that the attorney-client 
relationship had broken down to such an extent that it would be impossible for Mr. Smith to 
continue representing Ms. Greenfield. Id. The Motion to Withdraw was later .granted by the 
court and Ms. Greenfield began representing herself on her claims against the Wurmlingers. 
Concerning Mr. Smith's fees, the records show that by October, 2011 the arrangement between 
Mr. Smith and Ms. Greenfield had been converted to a flat fee going forward. At that time, Ms. 
Greenfield owed $1,128.00. That amount was written off. Ms. Greenfield then paid Mr. Smith 
the $10,000.00 flat fee for his efforts going forward from October, 2011. Exhibit 11 39. 11 When 
Mr. Smith withdrew from representing Ms. Greenfield in March 2012, he refunded the entire flat 
fee of $10,000.00. Exhibit 1140. 11 
After Mr. Smith withdrew, Ms. Greenfield represented herself through the remaining pretrial 
proceedings, through trial and on appeal. 
I have reviewed the files and records in the Civil Case in light of the claims made by Ms. 
Greenfield against Mr. Smith. In my opinion, Ms. Greenfield's claims that Mr. Smith Breached 
the applicable standard of care in representing her in the Civil Case are also without merit. In 
my opinion, Mr. Smith's representation of Ms. Greenfield in the Civil Case was well within the 
applicable standard of care and he provided excellent representation. Highlights of that 
representation are as follows: 
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• Shortly after being retained, Mr. Smith filed a comprehensive and thorough Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and for Damages. He then immediately began 
pursuing discovery depositions of the plaintiffs. 
• When Mr. Smith did not receive adequate or thorough responses to written discovery, he 
vigorously fought to compel thorough responses and successfully obtained orders 
compelling those responses along with sanctions for noncompliance. 
• Mr. Smith obtained and disclosed expert witnesses to provide testimony on all aspects of 
Ms. Greenfield's claims and defenses. 
Concerning the Motion to Withdraw, once the relationship with Ms. Greenfield had broken down 
to such an extent that it was impossible for Mr. Smith to continue to represent her, he was 
obligated to withdraw and seek leave of court to do so. The motion demonstrates that Ms. 
Greenfield and Mr. Smith had fundamental differences on how the claims should be prosecuted 
and how the defense should be advanced. The motion also demonstrates that there was a 
disagreement concerning the nature and extent of discovery and that Ms. Greenfield had 
expressed a lack of trnst and anger relative to her representation. IRCP 1.16 allows for 
withdrawal under the circumstances described by Mr. Smith. In my opinion, it would be 
inappropriate for Mr. Smith to continue representing Ms. Greenfield under the circumstances 
______ ,descr.ihed-in-the-Motion-to-Withdraw .. ---'EG-hi-S-Grec:lit,I\1r.-Smith-re.funded-the-ful-1-$-1-Q,QGGaGG-flat'---------+ 
fee payment that had been made in the fall of 2011. This resulted in Mr. Smith providing 
representation for many months going forward without compensation. 
It is also my opinion that Mr. Smith's withdrawal and handling of the case up lmtil that point had 
no adverse effect on Ms. Greenfield's claims or defenses. This opinion is supported by the 
orders and decisions of the trial court during the time in which Ms. Greenfield represented 
herself. For example, on May 24, 2012 the court entered its decision regarding defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. Exhibit "41." Contrary to Ms. 
Greenfield's claims, her exli:ibits ( other than Exhibit BB) were stricken as they had no evidentiary 
value to the issues before the court on summary judgment. Id. Moreover, defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was denied except for the claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The court rnled that the conduct alleged by Ms. Greenfield, even viewed in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff, simply does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous acts. 
There is nothing that Mr. Smith could have reasonably done to prevent that decision. Moreover, 
Ms. Greenfield's claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress remained intact after the 
summary judgment decision. She was able to present that claim at trial. 
On November 28, 2012 the court entered a Directed Verdict and Order concerning the testimony 
of medical expert Dr. Ambrose, Exhibit "42." As shown by the order, Dr. Ambrose did testify 
but did not offer the opinion that Ms. Greenfield's physical manifestations were caused by her 
alleged emotional distress. Again, this failure of proof on the part of Ms. Greenfield was not 
caused by any act or omission on the part of Mr. Smith. 
Ms. Greenfield's case went to trial on November 26, 2012 lasting for five days. On November 
30, 2012 the jury returned a special verdict in favor of the Wurmlingers on each of Greenfield's 
claims and found in favor of the Wurmlingers on the counterclaims. Ms. Greenfield filed a 
11 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 93 of 710
', 
', 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. On 
March 20, 2013 the court issued its decision denying those motions. Exhibit "43." A review of 
that decision shows that Ms. Greenfield's claims and defenses were rejected by the jury. Mr. 
Smith appropriately did not file a Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. Greenfield's claims. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment would only have succeeded upon the finding of a lack of 
any material issue of fact. The jury's verdict finding against Ms. Greenfield's claims 
demonstrates just the opposite. In my opinion, filing a Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. 
Greenfield's claims would have been a wasted effort on the part of Mr. Smith and approaching 
frivolous. 
On March 25, 2013 the court entered a Post Court Trial Memorandum Decision and Order. 
Exhibit "44." In that decision, the court dismissed Ms. Greenfield's claim for declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief. Again, the decision demonstrates that Ms. Greenfield was able to 
present the evidence concerning those claims. The court simply did not find in her favor. Again, 
in my opinion, the decision demonstrates that the result was not d11e to any act or omission on the 
part of Mr. Smith. 
Finally, the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court rejecting Ms. Greenfield's appeal also 
demonstrates that Ms. Greenfield's case was simply unsuccessful. The opinion lends no support 
to-any-argument-th-at-t11-e-flrillrre-u:rMr.ureenfi:elci-'s case was due to any act or omission on tne 
part of Ms. Smith. Mr. Smith never guaranteed a favorable result. In litigation there is often a 
clear winner and loser. 
SECTION 6.0 
CONCLUSION 
In my opinion, Mr. Smith met and exceeded the applicable standard of care in representing Ms. 
Greenfield in both the Criminal and Civil Cases. 
DATED this 2l5t day ofJuly, 2015. 
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP PLLC 
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that th~ undersigned pursmmt to Rule 16 of the Idaho Criminal. 
Rules, the Fourth,.,Fifth, Sixth) Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States, and Article I, § 1, 2, 13 and 17 qf the Constitution of the State ofldaho requests discovery 
and inspection of all materials discoverable by defendant per I. C.R. 16 b (1-8) and the 
aforementioned Constitutional provisions including but not limited to the following inforn1ation, 
evidence and materials: 
1. Any relevant or recorded statements made by the defendant and copies thereof1 when 
in the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of which is known or which is 
available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence1 and also the substance of any. 
relevant or oral statement made by the defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace officer, 
prosecuting attorney or his· agent, and the recorded testimony of the defendant before a Grand Jury 
which relates to the offense charged, 
2, An,Y mitten or recorded statements by a co.defendant, and the substance of any 
relevant oral stat~ment made by a co-defend.ant whether before or after arrest in response to 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY Page 1 
l. w·· 
.J 
,EXHfait< : ·.·. 
·--~··········· .. ·3, 
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interrogation by any person known by the co-defendant to be a peace officer or agent of the 
prosecuting attorney, or which are otherwise relevant to the offense charged. 
3. A copy of the defendant's prior record, if any, as is then or may becorne available to 
the prosecuting attpmey. 
4. Books, papers, documents, photographs (including the booking photograph(s)), 
tangible objects, and copies and portions thereof, which are in the possession or control of the 
prosecuting attom~y and which are material to the preparation of the defense, or intended for use by 
the prosecutor a~ evidence at trial, or o btain:ed from or ~longing to the defendant. 
5. 'fl:e results ofreports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or 
experiments made fa connections witb: this particular case, and copies thereof, -within 1he possession 
or control of the proseGuting attorney> the existence of which is known or is available to the 
prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence. 
6-. --A written list oft.lie names ana aaoresses of all persons naving mowleoge of relevant 
facts who may be called by the prosecuting attorney as witnesses at trial, together with a NCIC report 
and a Spillman report of any such persons, Also the statements made by the prosewtion witnesses or 
prospective witnesses, made to the prosecuting attorney or his agents,' or to any official involved 'in · 
the investigatory process of the case, 
7, All reports, memoranda, audio and/or video recordings in the possession of the 
prosecuting attorney or which may come into the possession of the prosecuting attorney or in the 
possession oflav/enforcement which were made by a police officer or any investigator or any agent 
of.the State or petson or entity acting in su<:h capacity in connection wii:h the investigation o:r the 
prosecution of this case. 
8. The underlying facts or data that form the basis of any expert testimony pursuant to 
Idaho Rule ofEvidence 705. 
9. All documentation in support of or 1n connection with any search warrant issued in 
connection with this case, applications for search warrants (whether granted or deni~)> all affidavits, 
d~clarations and materials in support of such search warrants,' all search warrants and all search 
warrant returns. 


















~· ...... ,.,. ......... ·-~·--,-•""f: ........ ,_ •. , ·-·-·--·--·-· ..... ,·r- ":'t"--·--i--,......-:'7'--.·~·-..,-., ... -, .... ___ ...... ........... •'•1r--· ..... ,, .. _,_,, .... .,..1 .. ""'i:""":' ........ ............ ,, ...... ,, ............ .., ...... ,,: ... , •.• ,... •• -•···--·· :••-..-r·-:--·.--.. --,-........ - .......... , ...... -.:0.···-,,, ........ , .......... -:"' .. 1 . . 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 99 of 710
02/04/2011 FRI 9:02 FAX 44617vi RC PUBLIC DEFENDER->+-> Smith, Ian @]003/004 
10, All material evidence within the scope of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
Un~ted States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), Kyles -v. Whitfry, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995) 
and their progeny .. 
11. The existence and substance of any payments, promises of leniency, preferential 
treatment or other inducements or threats made to prospective witnesses, within the scope of United 
States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) and Napue v. !Uinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) and their progeny. 
12. Disclose whether a defendant or any other perS-On was identified by any lineup, show 
up, photo spread or similar identification proceeding relating to the offense charged, and produce any 
pictures utilized ot resulting therefrom and the names, addresses and telephone numbers of all 
identifying witnesses. 
13. The criminal record of any and all witnesses who will testify for the State at trial. 
14. All ·rough notes or field notes of any agents or officers of the State involved in this 
c:ase. 
15. Inform the defendant of the governmenf s intention to introduce proof during its case 
in chief of evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) I.R.B.; and the general nature of any conduct the 
g~vernmentintends to so introduce> see) e.g., U.S. v. Longan:d Lugo, 814 F,Supp.72 (D. Ks. 1993), 
16. State whether the defendant was an aggrieved person, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 
251 0(11) of any electronic surveillance, and if so, set forth in de:tail the circumstances thereof. . 
. ' 
17. Provide a copy of all documentation generated as a result of pelfonned drug tests by 
the State for drug identification purposes, .including types of testing perfonned in this case, testing 
procedures, reagents and/or solvents used in testing, comparative analyses perfonned, and number of 
experiments performed in each test. 
18, Provide copies of each and every Subpoena issued by the State to any person or entity, 
regardless of whether served or not, in connection with this case, 
19. Provide verification of the hire date of all lawenforcemeniofficers that maybe called 
~ a wltness in thls matter, or who were involved in the investigation and/or arrest(s) in this case. 
Provide a copy oftthe POST certification for all law enforcement officers identified above. 
I'' 
The \ll1der~igned further 1·equests pennission to inspe<:t and copy said information, 
PEf'ENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
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evidence and materials within FOURTEEN ( 14) days of this request, unless this information is given 
to this office at a sooner time. 
DATED this 2-8' day of June, 2010, 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
CO Y PUBLIC DEFENDER 
BY: 
ANNE TAYLOR 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
' ' 
I hereby certify th3:1 a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing a copy 
of the same as indicated below on the S:.<1 day of June, 20 l 0, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
_$,_ . Via Fax 
Interoffice Mail 
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· KOOTENAI COUNTY 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
:WIAGISTRATE'S DNISION 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Y, 
CASE NO. CR-2010-10624 
ORDER OF VOLUNTARY 
----1,-CHRI£Til:'fA-GREENEIELD, ______ ,_DIS_Q_UALIEICATIQN ________ 11_~--~JJ 
Defendant. 
It appearing to the court that the ends of justice would best be served by another judge 
handling the above-entitled matter, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 25( d), the undersigned 
is hereby disqualified from presiding further and the case shal1 be reassigned to a new judge. 
DATED ~dayo~O 
~er 
Magistrate #22 6 
ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION· l. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Trial Court Administrator 
(inter-office mail) y ~ (o - ( J 2,L\ 
Public Defendant ..__)(1 ~ 
446-1701 v· 
Kootenai County P_J:.0secutor 
446-1833 / 
-~--~-~1_0_1 
ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION· 2. 
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Anne c: ~aylor, Deputy _Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
· PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho _83 814 
Phone: (208) 44(5-1700; .Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 5836 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
.STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE. COUNTY QF KOOTENAI 
'. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V .. 










CASE NUMBER CR~10~00l0624 
WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY HEARING 
---------'----------Befendant-. ----)··--------~------------~ ________________ ) 
. . 
· COMES NOW the above named Defendant by and through her attorney,. Anne Taylor, 
. Deputy Public Defender, and knowingly and intelligentiy waives her rightto a.preliminary hearing .in 
. .. 
the above entitled matter on the charges of Malicious Injury to Property aRd requests that this matter . 
be forwarded to the District Court for further proceedings. 
'Ip.e Defendant \i.cknowledges that her attorney has ·explained· to her the purpose of a . · 
· .. p;e1iminary h~aring and the effect ·of waiving' the right to a preliminary he~ng. The defendant 
. . . ' . . 
understands' that she has an absolute right to a preliminary hearing, and .that by waiving her 
preliminary.hearing no evidence will be presented, and she is relieving the State of the burden of 
establishing probable cause to show that, the crime of Malicious Injury to Property have been . . 
· committed and she is the person that committed that _crime, and she will be ordered to appear in 
District Court·for further proceedings.· 
W AIYER OF PRELIMINARY HEARING PAGE1 
•... ~i .:)~~~)13'11_· 
.~,·· ...... .. 
t·.>·50 
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The defendant furt~er ac~owledges that she has not been coerced or forced into waiving his 
·preliminary hearing, and she does not feel that she will be preJudiced if she wer.e to waive her 
preliminary hearing. 
DATED this /)-· day of August, 2010 .. 
· ANNETAYLOR~ 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY . . . ... · ·.W~v, 
. I hereby certify that a true and corr~ct copy of the foregoing was p·ersonally served by pl.acing fr"""" 
~fthe same in the interoffice mailbox on the lJ.liv day of August, 2010, addressed to:. 
· · Kootenai County Prosecutor by Fax 
WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY HEARING · PAGEi 
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FIRST J1JDICIAI; 1J"'TR1CT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY )KOOTENAI 
324 W. GARDE_., . mUE, P.O. BOX 9000, COEUR D'ALENE, II I 83816-9000 
STATE OF IDAHO . . ~D c;; ~/;)..-/ 0 AT} .'3o,r, 
. vs ... CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
• CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIELD 
BY. ~-; )\ -- ,DEPUTY DOB
.... ): 
FELONY CASE# CR-2010-0010624 ·. ORDER f .M' HOLDING . r fDISl\ilSSING CHARGE(S) 
CHARGE(S): COUNT 1- PROPERTY-MALICIOUS INJURY TO PROPERTY- I1S-7001 F 
Amended to: --------------------------------------
[ J Dismi~sed - insufficient e".idence .to hold defe~dant to aI1sw~r charge(s). [ ]Bond exonerated. [ ]NCO Lifted. 
(Specify dismissed charge(s) on above line, if other charges still pending) 
[)<1 Preliminary.heanng having been wai\red by th~ defendant on the ~bove listed charge(s), 
[ J Preliminary hearing having been held in the.above entitled matter, and it appearing to me that the offense(s) set 
forth above has / have been committed, and there is sufficient cause to believe the named defendant is guilty 
thereof, · · · 
· IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant is h(;).ld to answer the above charge(s) and is bound over to D1stnct Court .. 
The Prosecuting Attorney shall file an Infonnatibn that includes all charges under this case number. · 
. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be admitted to bail in the amount of $ 0 , ~.. and is 
committed to the custody of the Kootenai County Sheriff pencl.ing the giving of such bail. 
[ . J .Defen,dant was advised of the charges and potential penalties and of defendant's rights, and having waived his/her 
constitutional rights to: a) trial by jury; b) remain silent; and c) confront witnesses, thereafter pled guilty to the 
charge(s) contained in the Information filed by the Prosecuting Attorney. · 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that not later t;han l,4 days after the date of this order, Defendant shall enter and file a 
written plea which states: the Defendant's true name, age, education and literacy levels; Defendant's rights to trial and counsel and 
any waiver of such rights; the offense or offenses of which Defendant is charged together with the minimum and maximum 
sentence for each charge; and Defendant's plea to each charge; the estimated time necessary for trial, if any; Defendant's current 
custody status; and Defendant's current physical residence· address, mailing address and telephone number. A copy of the 
Defendant's written plea shall be delivered to the assigned judge's resident chambers. Failure to timely file a written plea shall 
be a basis to revoke bond or release, and issue a bench warrant. · 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pretrial motions in this case shall be filed not later than 4i days after the· date 
of this order unless ordered otherwise. All such pretrial motions in this matter shall be accompanied .by a brief in support of the 
motion, and a.notice of hearing for a date scheduled through the Court. 
oos cAsE rs AssrGNED To JDDGE ~(_i--_Gd~_m_·_. _G_~ _b_r e~r __ 
ENTERED this ...Lb. day of _f\_tl--;f'-9 __ , 201.!_. 
I 
Copies .sent L /d-.; /() .as follows: 
~] Prosecutor . · 1{)J Defense Attorney 
C;(J Assigned District Judge: f.)intero~ce delivery 
'li:leputy Clerk ~ ·; 1 ===-::: 
J Defendant [\ft TCA Office at fax 446-1224 
'Nfaxed ______ [ J: Jail (if in 6~tody at fax ~----.-..11a1.--• 
· <2/ ~ ] KCSO Records fax 446- :ii"·:: ::EX)·ii'Bff 
0:cder Holding Defendant/Dismissing Case 
7 ·~ . . . 
':f j 
.\~-· .. ·, D >f .· .... 
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' ' . - •. "'"FIR5'~ .. ,:.::-,,...::..ww·..:>1STRICT COURT, STATE OF )HO 
Il . ,\iD FOR TI:lE COUNTY OF KOOTEN/ ., :. · 
32.4 W. GARDEN A VENUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, Jl)A.H:0 S:.,816-9000 
r!I.EO 10/27/2010 AT 09:41 AM 
~AT!: OP \OAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
CLER!< OF THE DISTRJCT COURT 
BY _________ __;.,.EPUTY · 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff.: · 
vs. 
Christina. J1me Greenfield 






) KOOTENAI COUNTY 








NOTIO: OF :PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND. 
TRIAL. 
AKA= 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled cas<J is hereby set for: 
Pre-Trial Confere,:i,ce Friday, l'anuary 21, 2011 at 02:00 )?'M 
Judge: Fred M- Gi.blet . 
Alternate Presid~ng Judges: BenjimiifR-:Slmpson; Jolin r.Lumr; Jolin T:-Mitcliell;Lansing L-:-Haynes; Free 
M. 01:bleri Charle~ W. Hosack; SteVen Verby; George Reinhardt, UX. 
Jury Trial Schedu.le<i Tuesday1 January 25, 2011 at 09:00 AM 
4da}'$ 
Judge: Fred M. Gibler 
.AltarnateP,esidingJudges: Benjamin R.. Simpson; John P. LU$tet; John T. Mitohell; Lansing L. Haynes; Fred 
M_ Gibler, Charles W. Hosaek; Steven Verby; George Remll.awt,, m. 




Chrutina June Greenfield 
Mailed Hand Delivered - . -
Lynn Nelson, Deputy Puhlio Defender 
Interoffice Delivery· 
Coeur d'AJ.~e lD SS816·9000 
Mailed H8:!1d beliVere:d 
I -- • -
Koorenai County }'tQ$eCV.tW 
M.aUed Hana Delivered - --
cefaxed (Zos) 44o--1101 
~d \208) 4415-1833 
Pated: Wednesday1 October 27, 2010 
Da:niel J. English 
Clerk OfThe Di:miot Court 
By: ~,1'.,_.,,~,r.U,./ 
Secretary to J~ 
.~- , · .~XHh~tr< 
[,.>f'·· 
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RECEIVED 1~,-fe=:j:;JJ.Z:f. 
DEC 2 1 2Dill ·· o . p-! 
roreHonorableJudgeGibler, JUDGE GIBLER Oecember16,2RECEfVED B 
1 h.~mblv request you dismi.$5 the felony charges against m:. AS I wm ~t.md u~n .twlow, my pub~c .'..-~ ,5{~<' !J 
deFder has failed to adequately represent me and there ts no legal basw for a cr1mmal charge agam:ffiEC 2 2 2J10 
m,, . · K0UTENAI OOVN'J' , 
PUBllC OEFENOO 
M~ public defender h~s. fal!ed to meet with me on t\Umerous, sch~uled ,;1pp0intments and coerced me 
z~p waiving my right to a preliminary hearing. Despite havirig 49 days before the prelimin~ry hearing 
a~r being appointed as my public defender, Ann Taylor only met with rne orie time for twenty 
mirutes, ()wing this meeting she did not look ~t ~my of the facts/evidence 1 had given her and focused 
hel time enc:.:o1..1roging rne to take a plea bargain, even thQugh I insisted that I was not guilty of a crime. 
On the day of the prelimiM ry heating ZO minutes before I was to go to court, Ms. Taylor asked me to 
· m¥ttier:at·her offtre. -She pr.esemed ~ with a prepared-<h,eument w S.fin triEt w1iived my nghtto a·· .... · 
preliminary hearing, We rwd not previo~y discussed this document and she irnm~iately preS$Ured me 
to · nit. She continually stressed the n~ to sign it befu.re the preliminary hearing ~rted. 1 fett: 
e rernely di.stressed and under dur~ so I signed ttia document wtt:hout reading it or understanding 
wh tt:was. 
!t as not until laterthat 1 found 'Out what she had me sign. Without my consent or knowledge I \lad 
wa['.'ed my right to a pnMtia! heating. I had trtJste<l Ms. Tayior as my Public Defender to take my 
------wer.:1:re-~hd-ionor::ence-irito-consicle~on;;-By·<::t;)t)rctng-me-to·$igr't-adoQ.1nient-giving-up·rny-right-to-a 
pri;liminal)' hearing, sM was grossly negfigent in defending me. I am 30 days from trial and the public 
de;endef has not ·met with me to discuss my case, evidence,. or my witness list. I ~I I have no one 
protecting my rights w a fuir trnil at this point 
finf( IJy, the dispute aboutthe trimming of the hedge boroeriogo1,1rcomrno11 property line Wl;lS not 
cri inal in ttature. The felony charge against me is fur 0 Ml;llicious Injury to Property," Frrot of all, there 
is/. as no matictous intent to damage the shrubs; this isroutual prop~, and it is in neither my nor my 
nei bars best interest to damage the hedge 1ine. 
Se ndly, the extent of the trimming was grossly ~;i,;aggerated; the hedge was only minimally trimmed 
by meone I hired. I am ~Ing ac~ of having caused $10,000 worth of damage (this Is the total 
re lacement C(lst for each shrub If they were actually destroyed}. They ~re not damaged or destroyed 
an~ are quite hl;':al'thy. Mr. Wurrn!ingers acrusation in itselftSa malicious attack against me after I vsed 
Jej-I remedy to address n\s ilJ.egal tiUSiness th,ffvmlates our-cc&R.'s, Wrfu no damage~ there is oo baSiS 
for a criminal felony charge for injury w property, · 
I h ve a cMI suit against the Wurm lingers that addresses the issues named above, along with other 
C~R vrotations. f met with the prosecut. or Barry McHo.gl\ on November S, 2010 and gave him all of my 
evi~ence after finding that Anri Taylar !'lad not turned over any -0f my evidence during .discovery. Just 
reqintly I ~ve Mr. McHugh the deposltlon results from Mr. Wurmlingers testfmony in the cMI case, 
wt1fu.e he states that he does not know where the property !i11e Is. With a 11 this information I expected 
aaryy McHugh to·dismiss the case as tttere was no evklence to support Mr. Wurmlingers a~ns. 
rnsijead, Sa rry McHugh hired a surveyor to survey the property fine: The surveyors arrived today, They 
surveyed the property line that not only proved that thE hedge is on my property but found an 
ad 1tional 4"3 inches in my favor. 
. I . ·e~Hi~~r 
!· ... ' g). 
<. 
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r,v, ) Vt I,, .)/ j 
I . . 
rLate, B'arry McHugh has informed m< that he has not read overanv of the documents that I 
ptented to him over a month and half ago, It seems a friYolous wast;e of tax ®Ila rs to bring both 
~es to court when the evidence can prove that I have done no wrongs. Ratherth~n hire a civil 
attorney to pursue this dispute; Mr. WutmHnger is using tax dollars to personally fund ~n ;;ittomey (Mr. 
Mb.Hugh) and have his lot surveyed for-free. Where is 1ile justire? · 
wtne any one of the issues discussed above would raise the posslbllity of dismissing the case1 when 
th~y are reviewed togethi;r rt reinforces the need to consider dismissal. 
nt~k you fur taking the time to read and consider my request. 
vf Respectfu , a 
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01/12/201~ WED 11:50 FAX 446170{Kc PUBLIC DEFENDER .. ,_,__, Smith, Ian 
~rm,m~w••••llll'i.,illaNa•~ 
@002/003 
Lynn Nelson, Chief Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Numbe:r: 3152 
JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 










CASE Nl)MBER CR-10-0()10624 
Fel 
STIPULATION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF 






COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through her attorney, Lynn Nelson, 
Chief Chief Deputy Public Defender, and Ian Smith, Private Counsel, and hereby stipulate to the 
substitution of Ian Smith as attomey of recorc;! for the Defendant in all further proceedings and 
authorizing the Withdrawal of the Kootenai County'Public Defender from the above-entitled 
case. It is further requested that copies of all. future notices and pleadings should be 
qirected to Ian Smith at PO Box 3019, Coeur d'Alene lD 83819-3019. 
This stipulation is based upon the grQunds that Defendant has secured Jan Smith as 
private .counsel in this matter and it is in the best interest of the Defendant and the Kootenai 








'i· .i EXHiSrt· 
J.'~41f 
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01/12/2011 WED 11:50 FAX 4461702 RC PllBLIC DEFENDER-)-)-) Smith, Ian 
DATED this_·· ____ day ofJanuaty, 2011. 
BY: 
DATED this 
THE LAW OFF1CE OF THE PUBLIC 




·-------------------\: _____ !AN_SML H----------------:-----1 
SUBSTI UTING COUNSEL 
CERTIFICAT),J: OF l;>ELlVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by 
placing a copy of the same as indicated pe)ow on the day of January, 2011, addressed 
to: · 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
Via Fax 
Interoffice Mail 
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FIRST Jl.J;~•C:IAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF ID ':o 
IN . . ; FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
324 W. GARDEN A VENUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000 
FILED 1/27/2011 AT 11:35 AM 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY ___________ DEPUTY 




J1\\\I 3 1 2,J11 
lar.i D. Srnith 













Christina June Greenfield 
210 S Parkwood Pt 
Post Falls; ID 83854 CaseNo: CR-2010-0010624 
DOB: 
AKA: 
Defendant. NOTICE OF PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND 
TRIAL 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Pre-Trial Conference Friday, AprH;2, 2011 at 02:00 PM / ~ 
Judge: Fred M. Gibler 
Alternate Presiding Judges: Benjamin R. Simpson; John P. Luster; John T. Mitchell; Lansing L. Haynes; Fred 
M. Gibler; Charles W. Hosack; Steven Yerby; George Reinhardt, III: 
Jury Trial Scheduled Tuesday, April 26, 2011 ~t 09:00 AM / ,J 
4days 
Judge: Fred M. Gibler 
Alternate Presiding Judges: Benjamin R. Simpson; John P. Luster; John T. Mitchell; Lansing L. Haynes; Fred 
M. Gibler; Charles W. Hosack; Steven Yerby; George Reinhardt, III. 




Christina June Greenfield 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered __ 
Ian Sm[th 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-3019 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered __ 
Faxed __ 
[uh~ed (208) 765-9089 
[yfaxed (208) 446-1833 
Dated: Thursday, January 27, 2011 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By:VJt~~./Jt1~· 
. Secretary toudge Gibler 
NOTICE OF PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND TRIAL 
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02·14-11 04:34PM FROM-KC DIST CT FAX 2 2D844S11a3 i-610 P.01/01 F-895 
IAND. SMITH 
Attorney qt Law 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Bo~ 3018 
COB\Jrd'Alene, ID 83816-a018 
Telephone: (408) 7°65-4050 
F~C$imrle: (208) 755 .. gosg 
Idaho Sn1te Sar No. '4696 
Attorney fQr Pefendant 
?OIi ff7'8 14 PH 4: 25 
DF.Pt1°1" ' -
------1N-"FHE-l3ISTRle=r-ee1;Jfff-f)f-"fHE::-flRS-T ;;Jl:JDIClA-i:--01STRICTUF-TFIE 
STATE OF IPAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF ICAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFlf:LO, 
~fencfant. 
MOTION TO COMPJ:l. 
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIELD 
(hereinafter: "Defendant"), by and through her attorney cf record, IAN D. SMITH, and 
pursuant to R~le 16(J). of the fdaho Criminal Rules, hereby moves the Court for the 
issuance of an Order compelling the State to comply witl11he Oatendant's Request far 
Discove,v filecl herein, 
MOTIQN TQ COMPl:L 
RESPONSE TO PISCOVl;ffY - 1 - i :· . EX.t:tl_BIT} ,•, 
f Y(ii' 
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/ 
This Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons as set forth below: 
1. On June 28, 2010, the Defendant served a Request for Discovery upon 
the Plaintiff. A true and correct copy of said Request for Discovery is 
attached hereto and hereby incorporated herein by this reference as 
Exhibit 1. 
2. On or about the .:1 q1h day of December, 2010, the State conducted a 
survey ·of the property in question in the above-entitled matter. 
3. On the day of the Pre-Trial Conference herein held on the 21st day of 
January, 2011, the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the State informed me 
that I would receive a copy of said survey. 
4. On the 26th day of January, 2011, the State served upon the Defendant 
the States 2nd Supplemental Response· to Discovery, wherein the State 
disclosed- the existence of "photos taken during survey of property ... " 
Attached hereto and hereby incorporated herein by this reference as 
Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the State's 2nd Supplemental 
Response to Discovery. 
5. On the· 8th day of February, 2011, the Defendant del_ivered a letter to the 
State seeking the disclosure of any and all notes, documents, charts, 
drawings, surveys and information obtained from said survey, as well' as 
the name, address and telephone numbers of any and all individuals 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
RESPONSE.TO DISCOVERY - 2 -
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involved in said survey pursuant to the Request for Discovery filed herein, 
and specifically Rule 16(7) of the Idaho Criminal Rules. A true and correct 
copy _of said letter is attached hereto and hereby incorporated herein by 
this reference as Exhibit 3. 
6. The issues in the above-entitled matter hinge upon the location of certain 
shrubbery in relationship to the property line between the Defendant's real 
property and that of the alleged victim. As such, the survey is material 
and relevant evidence relative to the guilt or innocence of the Defendant. 
Therefore, based upon the above, the Defendant respectfully requests that the 
Court enter an Order requiring that the State immediately disclose the requested 
information and that the Court sanction the State for failing to comply with the 
Defendant's Request for Discovery in a timely manner and award the Defendant her 
reasonable attorney fees for the prosecution of this Mo · 
DATED this 14th day of February, 201 . 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of February, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method as indi.cated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Amy Borgman 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Kootenai County Prosecuting .Attorney 
501 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000C 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9.000 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
! ] Certified U.S. Mail 
[] Overnight Mail 
[X] Faes· ·1e To: (208) 446-1833 
. - 4 -
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· D- BL.I-
Anne Taylor, Deputy Public Defender 
Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208)'446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 583Q 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DlSTRJCT OF THE 
S'f ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 'fHE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
















PLEASE T.AKE NOTICE that thi,, undersigned pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Criminal . . . 
Rules, the Fourth,.,Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
.. . 
States, and Article I, § 1, 2, 13 and 17 9f the Constitution of the State ofidaho requests discovery 
and inspection of all materials disw-verable -by defendant per !..C.R. 16 -b (1-8) and the 
aforementioned Constitutional provisions including but not limited to· the following infonnation, 
evidence and materials: 
1. .Any relevant or recorded statements made by _the defendant and 'copies thereof) when 
in the possession, custody or control of the State, the existence of which is known or which fs 
available to the prosecuting .attomey by the exercise of due diligence, and also the sub~ce of any . 
relevant or oral statement made by the defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace. officer, 
prosecuting attorney or his·.agent, and tbe recorded testi~ony of the defendant before a Grand Jury 
which relates to the offense charged. 
2. . An,Y written or recorded statem~nts by a co~defendant, and the substance of any 
·relevant oral stat~ment made by a co-defendant whether before or after arrest in response to 
1' ' • 
DEFENDANT1S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY Page 1 
EXHIBff 
j_ 
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interrogation by any person known by the co-defendant to be a peace officer or agent of the 
prosecuting attomey1 or which are otherwise relevant to the offense charged, 
3. A copy of the defendant1s prior record, if anyi as is then or may become available to 
the prosecuting attorney. 
4. Bo9ks, papers, documents, photographs (including the booking photograph(s)), 
tangible objects, and copies and portions thereof, which are in the possession or control of the 
prosecuting attom~y and which are material to the preparation of the defense, or intended for use by 
the prosecutor as ~vidence at trial, or obtained from or belongin.g to the defendant. 
5. 'fl?.e results of reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or 
experiments made 'in connections with this particular case, and copies thereof, within the possession 
or control of the prosecuting attorney., the existence of which is known or is available to the 
prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due dnigence. 
6. A written list of the names an<l addresses of aU persons having knowleclge ofrelevanf 
facts who may be called by the prosecuting attorney as wii.nesses at trial, together with a NCIC report 
and a Spillman report of any such persons. Also the stateme.nts made by the prosewtionwitnesses or 
prospective witnesses, made to the prosecuting attorney or his ageiits,'er to any official involved 'in· 
the investigatory process of the case. 
7. All reports, memoranda, audio and/or video recordings in the possession of the 
prosecuting attorney or which may come into the possession of the prosecuting attorney or in the 
possession oflaw .:enforcement which were made by a police officer or anymvestigator or any agent 
()fthe State or petson or entity acting in such capacity in connection with the investigation·or the 
' . 
prosecution of thi~ case, 
8. The underlying facts or data that form the basis of any expert testimony pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 705, 
9. All documentation in support of or in connection with any search warrant issued in 
connection vr.ith thi.s case, applications for search warrants (whether granted or deni~\ all affidavits, 
d~clarations and materials in support of such search warrarrts, 'all searoh· warrants and all search 
warrant returns. 
DEFENDANT'S R~QUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
' i 
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10. Ali'material evidence within the scope of Brady v. Maryl-and, 373-U.S. 83 (1963), 
Uni!ed States v. Ag_urs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), Ky{es Y. Whi'tley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995) 
and their progeny.'; 
11. The existence and substance of any payments, promises of leniency, preferential 
treatment or other inducements or threats made to prospective witnes.ses, within the scope of United 
States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) and Napue v. Illinois, 3·60 U.S. 264 (1959) and their progeny. 
12. Disclose whether a defendant or any other person was 'identified by any llneup, show 
up, photo spread or similar identificationprooeeding relating to the offense charged, and produce any 
pictures utilized ot resulting therefrom and the names; addresses and telephone numbers of all 
identifying witnesses. 
13, The criminal ri;ii;iord of any and all witnesses who will testify for the State at trial. 
14. All -rough notes or field notes of any agents or officers of the State involved in this 
--------::-::--=-::,---------;'---------------------------------...:.__--11 c;as·e. 
15, Inform the defendant of the govemmenf s intention to introduce proof during its case 
in chief of eviden·oe pursuant to Rule 404(b) I.R.E.; and the general nature of any conduct the 
g~vemment intends to so introduce, see, e.g·., U.S. v. Long arid Lugo, 814 F.Supp.72 (D. Ks. 1993). 
16, · St~te whether the defendant was an aggrieved person, as defined by 18 U.S.C: § 
2510(11) of any el~ctronio surveillance, and if so, set forth in d~tail the circumstances thereof. 
17. Provide a copy of all documentation generated l:IS a result of performed drug tests by 
the State for drug identification purposes, including types of testing performed in this case, testing 
procedures, reagents and/or solvents used in test;ng, comparative analyses perfonn{')d, and number of 
experimerits performed in each test. 
18. Provide copies of each and every Subpoena issued by the State to any person or entity1 
regardless of whether served or not, in connection with this case, 
19. Provide verification of the hire date of all law enforcement officers that may be called 
as a witness in this matter, or who w~re involved in the investigation and/or arrest(s) in this case. 
Provide a copy ofithe POST certification for all taw enforcement officers identified above, 
F• 
Th~ undersigned further requests permfosion to inspect and copy said information, 
I . 
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evidence and materials within FOUR !EEN ( 14) days of tlris req ues~ unless this infonnation is given 
to this office at a sooner time. 
,7q 
DATED this __ v_o'--- day of June, 2010, 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
CO Y PUBLIC DEFENDER 
BY: 
ANNE TAYLOR· 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
[hereby certifytha!atrue and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing a copy 
ofthe same as indicated below on the 9--.,'i> day of June, 2010, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 
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:501 ·Government Wayffiox 9000 , 
·Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Telephone: (208)-446-.1800 




! . JNTHEDISTRJCT COURT OFTHEFIRST.JUDICIALDISTRlCT OF THE STATE-OF 
IDAf-rO, IN AND FO~ nm CO'ONTY OF KOOTENAJ 
·STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff~ 
vs. 
CIDUSTlNS JUNE. GREENFlELD, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-F10~10624 
PLAINTIFF'S 2ND 
· SUPPLEMENT AL RESPONSE 
TO DISCOVERY 
CQMES NOW, BARRY McHO~H, Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, Idaho, 
and submits ·'the following Supplemental .Response to Request for Discovery. 
. . 
The State has complied :with Defendant's request qy furnishing ·the 'f ollo'vY:in,g. additional · 
evidence and materials: 
1. ·COPY ofphotos (CD is available forpicku.p);.and 
2. Additional photos·taken during survey of properly-to be provided via.e-mail. 
If _you have ·not -received any· :of the fore.going copies, please contact ibis office 
i.rnmecliate~y. 
:Pursuant io Idaho Criminal .Rul;e 16, the .Prosecuting Atto'rney furthet informS' the 
defendant ·that you are permitted ·to in~p¢ct and COP.Y or photograph books, paper,. documents, 
' I I ~ 
photographs, tangible ,objects, buildin_g,: or places) or copies or 'Portions ihereot;'· whiqh are 
.l 
PLAJNTIFF'S.2ND SUJ>PLBJvffiNTAL RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY 
' ' 
Page 1 of 26!1-•EX•H•l•B•IT-111111 
I 2-. 
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material to the preparation of the d~fense, or intended for use ·by the ·prosecutor as evidence at 
' iriaJ, or obtained from. or belongiug·to the,idefendant. 
The :Prosecuting Attorney further µ1forms the d~fondant that you are :permitted to inspect 
and copy o:i: photograph any results OJ:" reports of physical or mental examinations, and of 
scien:tifi? iests or experiments, made in .6onnection with the particular case, or copies thereof, 
within the possession, custoqy or control: of the prosecuting attornc:.;y, the existence of which is 
Jmown or is available'to the prosecuting attomey by 'the exercise of due diligence, 
::(11 . . 
DATED this 1Jo day of January,:2011. 
---1------· 
I Mlfll ' 
·---------~~~ 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that, on i:he~ day of ranuary,2011., J caused the foregoing to be. 
delivered as followed: 
IAN SM1TH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
FAXED 765u9089 
PLAilff]FF'S 2ND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY 
I 
Page .. 2 of2 
[ 
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IAN OM SMITH 
AITORNEY AT LAW 
THE SPOKESMAN REVIEW 8UlLDING 
608 NORTHWEST BOULEVARD, SUITE 101 
P.O. Box3019 
COEUR D'ALENE, [083816-3019 
February 8, 2011 
Amy Borgman . 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney . 
Office of the Kooten~i County Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Via Facsimile: (208) 446;.1833 
TELEPHONE: (208) 765-4050 
FACSJMJLE: (208) 765-9089 
E-MAIL: [ANSM!THLAW@GMAIL.COM 
------------------------:-___________ ______: ______ , 
( 
Re: State v. Greenfield, Case No. CRF-10-10624 
Dear Ms. Borgman: 
It is my understanding that your office commissioned a survey to determine the location of the 
bushes in question relative to the llne dividing my Client's property from that of the "victim." 
Please provide me with any and all notes, documents, charts, drawings, surveys and. 
information obtained from said survey, as well as the name 1 address and telephone numbers of 
any and all individuals involved in said survey pursuant to the Request for Discovery filed 
herein, and specifically Rule 16(7) qf the Idaho Criminal Rules. Your failure to provide the 
requested information will result in a Motion to Compel and/or a Motion in Liminie to exclude 
evidence not disclosed. 
Please be advised that depending upon the conclusions drawn from said survey which you 
provide, I may seek the entry of an order from the Court requiring the State to pay for my Client 
to obtain a survey of her own from an independent surveyor to rebut the State's survey. 
ard.to your timely response. 
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IAN D. SMITH 
ATIORNEY AT LAW 
THE SPOKESMAN REVIEW BUILDING 
608 NORTHWEST BOULEVARD, SUITE 101 
P.O. BOX3019 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816~3019 
February 8, 2011 
Amy Borgman . 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Office of the Kootenc:!i County Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Governmen1Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Via Facsimile: (208) 446-1833 
Re: State v. Greenfield, Case No. CRF-10-10624 
Dear Ms. Borgman: 
TELEPHONE: (208) 7 65-4050 
FACSIMILE: (208) 7 65-9089 
E-MAIL: IANSMlTHlAW@GMAIL.COM 
It is my understanding that your office commissioned a survey to determine the location of the 
bushes in question relative to the line dividing my Client's property from that of the "victim." 
Please provide me with any and all notes, documents, charts, drawings, surveys and· 
information obtained from said survey, as well as the name, address and telephone numbers of 
any and all individuals involved in said survey pursuant to the Request for Discovery filed 
herein, and specifically Rule 16(7) qfthe Idaho Criminal Rules. Your failure to provide the 
requested information will result in a Motion to Compel and/or a Motion in Limihie to exclude 
evidence not disclosed. 
Please be advised that depending upon the conclusions drawn from said survey which you 
provide, I may seek the entry of an order from the Court requiring the State to pay far my Client 
to obtain a survey of her own from an independent surveyor to rebut the State's survey. 
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lAN O. SMtTH 
At1omey Elt law 
608 Northwest Soulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 Hl-3019 
Telephone: (208) 766-4050 
Facsimile: (208} 765-9089 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
At1Qrney for ~fendant 
2084461153 T-633 P.01/01 F-~8 
------~IN~T~HE~D~ISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUPlCit:;.LJ21SIRICI OF_tHE~----
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF JOA.HO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHR1S11NA JUNE GREENFIELD, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO, CRF-10-10624 
MOTION FOR ORDER REQUIRING 
PUBLIC FUNDS TO BE USED TO PAY 
FOR DEFENDANT'S SURVEY 
COMES NOW, the above--named Defendant, CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIELD 
(hereinafter: "Defendant"), by and thro1.1gh her attorney of record IAN P. SMITH, and 
pu~µant to Idaho Coda§ 1 e..852 and the decision in State v, Olin, 10J Idaho 3911 64! 
P.2d 203 (ldahQ 1£182) heret,y m<Wee the Court for the issuance c,f an Order requiring 
that public f1.mds be USijQ to pay for the Defendant's suMy herein. 
M()TION P'OR PROER REQUIRfNG 
P~£1LIC F'-INIJS TO Pl= U~ED TO PAY 
FOil O~f ENPANT1S SUR\/EY - 1 -
~ . EXHIBIT 
:IJ.· 
~ ·: ·13· ·.··.:.'. ·.~.·' . . . . . 
. v{':""· . , ,: ·. . .. 
·~· ... 
! 
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This Motion is ·made upon the grounds and for the reasons as set forth herein: 
1. The State has obtained a survey and has yet to disclose said survey 
pursuant to the .Defendant's Request for Discovery as more· fully set forth 
in the Defendaht's Motion to Compe.C which is hereby incorporated herein 
by this reference. 
2. A survey is necessary for the Defendant to properly prepare a defense to 
. . 
the charges herein as more fully set forth in the Defendant's Motion for 
OraerPerm,tting Inspection ofReal Property, wfilcn 1s nerel5y 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
3. The Defendant is without sufficient financial resources to obtain a survey 
herself, by a licensed surveyor, the cost of which is estimated to be 
$1,000.00. 
4. The princip·les of equal protection, dye process, fundament~l fai~ness and 
the right to a fair trial mandate that the Defendant be afforded the same 
opportunity to develop her defense as the State is afforded in developing 
the prosecution. 
Therefore, based upon the above, the files and records herein, and the evidence 
and testimony to be adduced at the hearing on this Motion, it is respectfully requested 
that the Court enter an Order as sought'herein. 
MOTION FOR ORDER REQUIRING 
PUBLIC FUNDS TO BE USED TO PAY 
FOR DEFENDANT'S SURVEY - 2 -
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DATED this 14th day of February, 2011. 
for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of February, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method as indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Amy Borgman 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000C 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
MOTION FOR ORDER REQUIRING 
PUBLIC.FUNDS TO BE USED TO PAY 
f=OR DEFENDANT'S SURVEY 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. ·Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X 'mile To: (208) 446-1833 
- 3 -
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IAN O. SMITH 
Attcmey at .Law 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur cfAlene, IP 83816-3019 
T~lephone: (208) 766-4050 
facsimile: (208) 755¥9089 
Idaho State aar No. 4696 
Attorn,.,y fer Defend.int 
2084461153 T-633 P.01/01 F-917 
Ci..EFJ;, D'ST1~1C:'1' COURT 
·------IN-'fHE-~IS'.fR!GT-GGWR-T-GF-THfi-.flRS'.f-JUOICIAL-DIS+RIC:T-OE lt::f E.-------,1 
STATE Of IOAHO, IN AND FOR. THE COUN1Y OF KOOTENAI 
ST A Tl: OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
V$. 
CHRISTINA JUNE GRE5NFIEL.O, 
Defendant. 
CAsE NO. CRF-10-106'14 
MOTION FOR ORDER PERMITTING 
INSPECTION OF REAi- PROPERTY 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIEL.D 
(hereinafter: "Defendant''), PY and through her attorney of record !AN P. SMITH, and 
pursuant to Rule 16(b)(9} of the lcaho Criminal Rules, anti the decision in State v. 
9~bb, 12S Idaho 934, B7T P.2d 905 (lrtaho 19S4), and, her~by mov~s ttie Court fQr the 
issu~nce of an Order pem,rttlng the Pefendan1 to enter upon and inspect.the real 
property pf the all~ed victim~ herein, Eric anc:l R.osalynd Wurmllnger. 
MOTION FOROROER fll:.RM\TTING 
INSPECTION Of R£AJ.. PR.OPEiRTY • 1 • 
:r\..:~XHlfl:T. 
:d.!.'..> : l""d, '\i . 
. . ·.• .. ·:·:· 
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This Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons as set forth below: 
1. The Complaint in the above-entitled matter alleges that the Defendant has 
injured _ce.rtain shrubbery, which is located on or near the property line 
dividing the Defendant's real property from the alleged victim's re·al 
property. 
2. If the shrubbery is upon the Defend.ant's real property, th·en no crime has 
been committed. 
3. · The alleged victim, Eric Wurmlinger, has testified, under oath, that the 
shrubbery was planted along a line he "believed to be the property line," 
that he did not have a survey and did not have a line "chalked" that 
represented the property line in question prior to planting the shrubbery. 
(See attached hereto as Exhibit 1, excerpts of the Deposition Transcript 
of Eric Wurmlinger at P. 39, Ln. 16-25; P. 40, Ln. 1-25; and P. 41, Ln. 1-
6). 
4. Therefore, there is not definitive evidence as to where the shrubbery ·is 
located in relationship to the property line. 
5. The best evidence of the location of the shrubbery is through a survey 
conducted by a licensed surveyor. 
MOTION FOR ORDER PERMITTING 
INSPECTION OF REAL PROPERTY - 2 -
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) 
6. Therefore, it is necessary and ·essential for the Defendant to be able to 
obtain a survey of the property line and the relationship of the shrubbery 
to said property line in defense of the charges herein. 
7. The Defendant has made inquiry with a surveyor to conduct such a 
survey. 
8. On the 9th day of February, the Oefendant'ssurveyor requested that Eric 
Wurmlinger's permit the survey to occur. 
9. Eric Wurmlinger .refused to permit th~ survey to occur. 
r-' 
Therefore, bas·ed upon the above, it is respectfully requested that the Court enter 
an Order permitting the Defendant's surveyor to enter upon the alleg·ed victim's real 
property for the purpose of conducting a sulv'.eY to determine the location of the 
property line in question and the location of the shrubbery in relation thereto. 
DATED this 14th ~ay of February, 2011. 
for Defendant 
MOTION 'FOR ORDER PERMITTING 
INSPECTION OF REAL PROPERTY - 3-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of February, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method as indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Amy Borgman 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000C 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
MOTION FOR ORDER PERMITTING 
INSPECTION OF REAL PROPERTY 
[] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mail 
[] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsi · : (208) 446-1833 
- 4 -
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Is that your n~t or gross? 
Gross. 
Okay. And then what do you net .out of 
What I net? 
Correct. 
Well, it depends on the .expenses and 
I understand that. I understand that's 
10 ho~ net works versus gross. 
11 Right. I'd have to look at my tax 
12 records. I'm not sure. As a gain or a declared income 
13 that the business makes. 
But you have those tax records. Correct? 






Q. So -- now, you had planted some vegetation 












We planted lots of vegetation on our 
EXHIBIT 
Okay. So is that a "yes"? ' Can you clarify your question? 
Yeah. I'll state it again. I think it 
24 was pretty simple. You've- planted some vegetation along 
25 the property line between your property and Ms. 
www.mmcourt.com WURMLINGER, ERIC J. 11/22/2010 
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1 Greenfield's property. Correct? 
2 
3 yes. 
A. We plinted some near the property line, 
Q. Near the property lin~? 
A. 5 Yes. 
6 What ~oes that mean? Q. 
A. 7 On our property, but very close to the 
8 property line. 
9 Q. Okay. Did you get a survey of where the 





No, I did not. 
How do you know where the bushes are in 
13 relationship to the property? 
14 A. By the corner stakes, and this has been 
15 back in. 19 95 that we put those in. 
16 Q. So does that make a difference, when you 
17 put them in, as to where th~ property line is located? 
18 A.' We didn't hire a surveyor, no, but I had a 
19 very good understanding of where the property line was. 
20 
21 
Q. Okay. So you just yourself made a 
determination of what you thought was the location of 
22 the property line. Correct? 
23 





What I believed to be the property line, 
Right. You didn't have an i~dependerlt 
WURMLINGER, ERIC J. 11/22/2010 
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1 expert come out and say, "This is where the property 
2 line is," did you? 
3 A. We didn 1 t have it chalked, no. 




say, "This is where the property line is," did you? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. So tell me: How close to the 





Well, there's many bushes. They're 
the root ball is on our property, but very 








What's a couple inches?· 
Maybe an inch or two. 
No. I mean, what portion of the 
16 vegetation is an inch or two from the property line? 
17 A. What portion of those bushes or what 
18 portion of all the bushei that are on our property? 
19 Q. Well, rrm speaking specifically to bushes 
20 that you planted on the property line between your 











Do you understand that? 
Yes. 
Okay. Now, you, in fact, testified that 
WURMLINGER, ERIC J. 11/22/2010 
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IAN D. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
Telephone: (208) 765-4050 
Facsimile: (208) 765-9089 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
,STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIELD, 
· Defendant. 
GASE NO. CRF~10-1 o·e24 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIELD 
(her'einafter: "Defendant"), by and through her attorney of reco.rd !AN D. SMITH, and· 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(c), hereby submits the following response to 
Plaintiff's written request for discovery. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 1 -
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1. Documents and tangible objects. 
A Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 95 Idaho 367, 509 P .2d 785 (Idaho 1973) 
B. Parkwood Place Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, recorded 
July 31, 1992 
C. Receiptfrom Meckel Engineering, dated June 2, 2005 
D. Letter from Nancy Stricklin to Christina Greenfield, dated March 27, 
2006 
E. Letter from City of Post Falls to Wurmlinger, dated April 12, 2006 
F. Letter from Eric Wurmlinger to City of Post Falls, dated April 16, 
2006 
G. Lefter from City of Post Falls to EricWurlinger, -mrtea-May s~-2006 
t H. Letter from Ka_cey Wall to Wurlingers, dated May 10, 2006 
I. Letter to Kacey Wall from Eric Wurmlinger, dated May 17, 2006 
J. Letter to Eric Wurm linger from Kacey Wall, dated July 25, 2006 
K. Letter from Christina Greenfield to Eric Wurmlinger, dated May 25, 
2008 
L. Letter to Christina Greenfield from City of Past Falls, dated July 24, 
2008 
M. Letter to Eric Wurm linger from City of Post Falls, dated August 19, 
2009 
N. Complaint- Greenfield v. Wurlinger, Kootenai County, Case No. 
CV-10-8209, filed September23, 2010 
0. Answer - Greenfield v. Wurlinger, Kootenai County, Case No. CV-
10-8209, filed October 10, 2010 
P. Deposition of Eric Wurmlinger, dated November 22, 2010 
Q. Deposition of Rosalynd Wurmlinger, dated December 6, 2010 
R. Tax Assessments showing Defendant's real property 
S. Idaho Code§ 35-102 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 2 -
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·.·· ', 
T. Idaho Code § 52-302 
U. Any and all such documents and tangible objects disclosed by the 
State 
V. Photographs of the shrubbery at issue herein 
2. Reports of Examinations and tests. At this time there are no results or 
reports of physical or mental examinations, or scientific tests or experiments or copies 
thereof, made in connection with this particular case, within the possession or control of 
the Defendant, which the Defendant intends to introduce into evidence at trial, or which 
were-prepared-by-a-witness-relating-to-thedestimony-of-the-witness-w!:iern-t!:ie--. -~----·--. 
Defendant intends to call at trial. 
Please be advised that the Defendant intends to obtain a survey of the property 
line and the location of the shrubbery at issue herein relative to said property line. 
Once said survey has been completed, the Defendant wlll supplement this Response to 
Discovery. 
3. Defense Witnesses. The following are the names and addresses of 







D. Jerry Mason, 250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 204, Coeur d'Alene, 
Idaho 83814 - Counsel for the City of Post Falls, Idaho - expert 
witness, will testify that City Ordinances do not do not take 
precedence over CC&R'~ 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 3 -





Nancy Stricklin, 250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 204, Coeur 
d'Alene, Idaho 83814 - Counsel for the City of Post Falls, Idaho -
expert witness, will testify that City Ordinances do not do not take 
precedence over CC&R's 
Collin Coles, 408 N. Spokane Street, Post Falls, Idaho 83854 - City 
Planner, City of Post Falls, Idaho - expert witness, will testify that 
City Ordinances do not do not take precedence over CC&R's 
Kacey Wall - 1875 North Lakewood Drive, Suite 200, Coeur 
d'Alene, Idaho 83814 · ·· 
Records 'Custodian - City of Post Falls, 408 N. Spokane Street, 
Post Falls, Idaho 83854 - Records re: Planning Department and 
/ Building Department 





d'Alene, Idaho 83814 - re: Characterization of Defendant's real 
property as view property 
Records Custodian - Meckel Engineering, 3906 N. Schreiber Way, 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 - Defendant's prior survey work and 
receipt for the same 
Dusty Obermeier, Ruen-Yeager & Assodates, Inc., 3201 North 
Huetter Road, Suite 102, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 - Surveyor, 
expert witness will testify to the survey of property line and 
relationship of shrubbery thereto (not yet completed) and the 
propriety of the State's survey (not yet provided to Defendant) 
Joe Zabaly, Northwest Plant Health Care, P.O. Box 1978, Post 
Falls, Idaho 83877 - Arborist, expert witness will testify to thG type, 
nature, growth rate, and cost of the shrubbery allegedly injured by 
the Defendant herein 
Any and all witnesses of Plaintiff, which are enumerated in ~my of 
Plaintiff's discovery, or which are called by Plaintiff to testify at trial. 
Please be advised that pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(c), the requested 
information, evidence and materials, if subject to discovery under Idaho Criminal Rule 
1.6, shall not be filed with the court, unless otherwise ordered. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 4 -
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DATED this 14th day of FebruaG_~_:_,,. _  .+-/-, -------
!AND. SMITH 
Attorne for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-
-------l-h~e--re_b_y_c_e_rt-if_y_t-ha_t_o_n_t_he_1_4 t-h-d-ay_o_f F_e_b_r-ua_ry_,_ 2_0_1_1_, -I -ca_._ u_s_e_d_a_t-ru_e_a_n_d ________ ,1· 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be serve.d by the method as indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Amy Borgman 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000C 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
[] Hand-delivered 
[X] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mail 
[] Overnight Mail 
[] Facsi ile To: 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 5 -
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3/29/11 
TIC 
RE: FEES FO 
CURRENTLY OWES: $3-,610 
ESTIMATE FUTURE FEES: 
4 DAYS OF TRAIL: $7,680 
PREP TIME NOT INCLUDED IN CALCULATION 
$3610 OWED 
$7680 TRlAL TIME 
EQUALS: $11,280 
MULTIPLY BY .66 = $7,444 
TOLD CHRIS I WOULD TAKE FLAT FEE OF $7,500 FOR CRIMINAL CASE ¥ 
NEEDS TO BE PAID :SOON - SHE IS TALKIN"G TO DWIGHT ABOUT IT TODAY 
-I TOLD HER ABOUT FLAT FEE RlSK FOR HER - IF PA DISMISSES THE CASE , I 
STILL GET ENTIRE FLAT FEE 
T(!,,r' ~ u;;t · 3411 --------
@ l ( ·.oqa,~ 
D)·-vf·/( 
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IAN 0. SMITH 
ATI'ORNEY AT LAW 
THE SPOKESMAN REVIEW BU!LDfNG 
608 NORTHWE'.51 BOULEVARD, SUITE 101 
P.O. BOX 301 9 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-30 f 9 
TELEPHONE'.: (208) 765-4060 
F ACS/MILE; (208) 765-9089 
E-MAIL: )ANSMJTHLAW@GMAfl.COM 
FLAT FEE AGREEMENT 
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES 
This Agreement, made this 61h day of April, 2011, between CHRISilNA JUNE 
GREENFIELD, 210 S. Parkwood Place, Post Falls, Idaho 83854 (hereinafter: "Client"), 
and IAN D. SMITH, Attorney at law, P.O. Box 3019, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816~3019 
(hereinafter: "Attorney"), wherein the Pa~les hereby agree to the following: 
1. PURPOSE OF RETENTION 
The Client retains, employs, and appoinis the Attorney to represent the Cllent 
ana provioe crimmalaefenss counsel (hereinafter: "Action") arising out of criminal 
charge of Felony Malicious lnjmy to Property in Idaho District Court1 First Judicial 
District, Kootenai County, Case No. CR-10..-10624. Please be advised that this 
engagement is directly related to and limited to the aforemeniioned matter. Any Issues 
outside of those involved in the aforementioned matter will require a separate 
engagement agreement. This agreement does not include any appeal of any outcome 
of the Action. 
2. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
A. Client hereby retains Attorney to represent me In the above-described 
Action for the flat fee sum of $7,500.00, receipt of payment which is hereby 
acknowredged. l agree that the flat-fee does not include any appeals. Client agrees 
that Attorney is entitled to receive the entire flat fee whether the Action is resolved by 
dismissal, plea agreement, acqui\tal or conviction. · 
B. · l iigree that-in addition tc the flat-fee, I am responslble for the 
payment of all costs in this matte!'. Costs may inc[ude, but are not limited to: 
transcript fees, filing fees, service fees, witness fees, and charges for Investigation, 
records, medical reports, photographs, exhibits, photocopies. facslmlles, telephone long 
distance, postage, travel and accommodations, videotaping, and deposllh?ns. Client 
wilf receive monthly, itemized statements showing out-of"pocket expenses only. These 
monthly statements for out"of-pocket expenses are due upon receipt. Client hereby 
agrees to pay all costs upon receipt of the monthly statement from Attorney. 
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES 
FLAT FEE AGREEMENT - 1 -
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3. WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY 
Upon conclusion or disposition of the engagement involving the maHer(s) 
outllned In thls Agreement Jn Section 1, above, and If said matter involves litigation, ihe 
Attorney Is permitted to withdraw from said matter as prescribed by the respective rules 
of procedure for said litigation. 
4. COOPERATION OF CLIENT 
The Client shall keep the Attorney advised of the Client's whereabouts at all 
Hmes, shall appear on reasonable notice at any and all depositions, court appearances, 
and shall comply with all reasonable requests of the Attorney in connection with the 
. preparation, and presentation, of the Claim. 
5. IDAHO LAW TO APPLY 
This agrnement shall be governed by, and construed In accordance with, the 
laws of the State of Idaho. The venue for any action regarding the interpretatron or 
performance of thls agreement shall be in Kootenai County, idaho. 
6. LEGAL CONSTRUCTION 
Jn the event that any one, or more, of the provisions contained in this agreement 
shall be held to be lnvalld, illegal, or unenforceable in any respect 1 such Invalidity, 
ll!egality, or unenforceabilily shall not affect any other provision, and this agreement 
shall be construed as if such Invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision did not exist. 
7. FAVORABLE OUTCOME NOT WARRANTED 
· The Attorney makes no representations, nor warranties, concerning the success 
of the Client's defense to the Action, or the favorable outcome of any legal action·, and 
the Attorney does not warrant, nor guarantee, that he will obtain reimbursement for the 
Client of any of Client's costs, or expenses, arising out of the Client's Action. 
8. PRIOR AGREEMENTS SUPERSEDED 
This agreement constitutes the only agreement of the Parties, arid supersedes 
any prior understandings, or written, or oral, agreements, between the Parties, in 
respect to the representation of the Client, by the Attorney, in this Action. 
CONTRACT FOR L.EGAL. SERVICE$ 
FLAT rEe. AGR!:SME:Ni . w 2 ~ 
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\ 
9. MfSCELLANEOUS 
A At the conclusion of the Attorney's representailon of the Client in this 
matter, the Client agrees that the Alton:iey may destroy the file which the Attorney has 
maintained. 
B. By the signature below, Client agrees to the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement and acknowledges that they have received a copy of this Agreement.. 
DATED this 6111 day of April, 2011. 
\-(4b-
DATED fhfs .--U-- day of Aprir, 2 
·' 
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES 
FLAT FEE AGREEMENT - 3 -
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IAN 0. SMITH 
AITORNEY AT LAW 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
Phone: {208) 765-4050 Fax: (208) 765-9089 
email: lanSmithLaw@gmail.com 
Invoice submitted to: 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls ID 83854 
l nvoice # 20462 
In Reference To: State v. Greenfield 
Case No. CR-10-10624 
For professional services rendered 
Accounts receivable transactions 
4/7/2011 Write. off time charges 
10/6/2011 Payment from Account 
Total payments and adjustments 
Balance due 
Client Funds Transactions 
Previous ba!.ance of Client Funds 
4fi/2011 Payment to account. Check No. 1751 
10/6/2011 Payment from Account 
New balance of Client Funds 
October 06, 2011 
Thank you! We appreciate your business. 
For your convenience we accept Visa, MasterCard, 
Discover and American Express payments.over the 
. phone. Accounts 30+ days past due will be charged 
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04-05-11 07: 33AM FROM-KC O I ST CT FAX 2 
14N P, SMITii 
Attorney ~ ~w 
eoa NorthweSt Soul.svard, Suite 101 
P.O. Sox 3019 
Coeur a'Alen1&, 10 63816-3018 
Telephone; (208) 765-4050 
Facsimil~: (208) 765-808$ 
ldahQ Stene aar No. 4696 
·Attorney for CeffiJndant 
2084461153 T-832 POl/04 HSI 
SlATE OF 'DArlO } SS 
· CQli~iTY Cf- 1<0C11EM 
FlLW 
?011 APR-? AM 8: 20 
-~----~IN:____T:....:_H=E"-"D---'-l S::::;_T:_:_R=IC=--T~C.OU BT OE.JJ:lSJ:JBSJ_JUDJCIALDIS+RfCT-O~T-H-S-·-----
STATE OF IPAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STAT~ OF IDAHO, 
PfaJntiff, 
vs.' 
CASE NO. CRF .. 10-10624 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL 
Rl=SPONS~ TO DfSCOVl:RY. MOTJON 
FOR ENlRY UPON REAL. PROFl;RlY 
FOR SURVEY AAO MOTION FOR 
CHRISTINA JUNS GReENFIJ;LO; 
Defenctan1. . PUBLIC FUNDS TO PAY FOR SURVEY 
on me 23/d day of March, 2011, the at,ove-named Defend~m. CHRISTINA JUN5 
GR.t::ENFl!:I..O (hereinafter: "Oefend~nt'), by and through Mr attorney of record, IAN 0. 
SMITH, brougM the ~ollowlng Motions on for heflring refora the coun: 
OROfR Re: MOTION TO COMPf:~ R.ES~E 
TO PfSQOV~RY, MOTIPN FOR E:NTijY UPON 
. R!?AL. f1ROP£mTY FOR SU~ ANP MOTION · 
FOR puawc rUNpS TO PAY FOR SUI\VEY • 1 ~ 
i E~Hi~'1f; . , 
.~ .... ,·:. 
'! )''' ' 
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0.4-0HI 07:33AM FROM-KC DIST CT FAX 2 2084461 I 53 T-832 P.02/04 F-991 
"f'/11'1\., 'f,lUil" "f,'IVll'I"'" 
., 
1. Motion to Compel Re5ponse to Discovery; 
2. Motion for Eniry Upon Real Propsrty for Survey, and; 
3. :Mo'tion fer Public Funds to Pay for Survey._ 
Aft~r conl}icer~tion or ~id Motion$, the arguments of tne Parties, and the files 
and ·recorcis hereJin; 
NOW1HEREFORE,. IT IS HERESY ORDf:F(J::D, ADJUDGED AND Df:CREED 
THAT: 
1. The Motion to Compel is granted as follows: 
A If the State has heretnfore commis.sioned a survey, has accaas to a 
syrvey, or i3 in possession of a survey, cf the property line bet.ween 
the property of me aUe9ed victim and tne Def6¥lqant, whieh swrvij)y 
m~y or may not indicate tMe location of the shrubbef"/ in question 
rela~s to said property )'ins, the State tshafl provf~e ~aid survey to 
the Defendant nc later1har, May 151 2011; 
If the State ha~ not yet ~CJmmi66lcned, has no acce&s to, or ls n9t · 
.in poa$&$$io11 of any swrvsy of the property line between the 
pl"Qpeny of tha aUegeq victim and the Defsndant. which s1.1rvey 
iricl~tes tha loaition of the shn.ibbery in queaoon re1a1ive to eald 
OIUJ,R ~: MOT10N TQ COMP?;I,. Re!SPONSI! 
TO PISCOVJ:RY, MOTIPN f OR l:NTlfC.Y UPON 
RL;At. PROPe!RTY FOR SURvtrr ANQ ¥0T10N 
FOR PllfJt.jf; FUNC>a TO ~AY FOR SIURVEY • 2 · 
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04-0H I 07:33AM FROM-KC DIST CT FAX 2 208W1153 T-832 P.03/0~ F-991 
1 J 11 11. 1, '- V I I I ' 1..,' ''' 
propef'tY line, the State has 1 •.mtil M¢1Y 15, 2011, to obtain sl..li:h a 
.swNey and proviqe it to tne Defendant 
2. The Motfon for Entry Upon Real Prqperfy for Survey shall be, and, hereby 
Is gran~d. conditioned wpon the State$' response ta items 1(A) ~nd 1 (a) 
.above. ShQuld the State fail to ~roouce a eul'Yey In the time allotted) or 
Ghould the State provicie a survey- in the time ~lloctad anci the1 Defendant 
de6ires to obtain an indeR§nd eot~4LIYJ~-~,-tb_e_Defendal'.1t-!$hall-be-permitted-----i 
m enter upon th~ alleged victim's real property to conduct a survsy; 
3, The Mation for Public Funds to Pay for 81.nwy shall be reserved by the 
Cc~rt ijnd ruled upon at ;:l later date depending wpon the need for the 
Oefenclant to ~nduct E';l sur,ey based l.lpor, the remainder of the Order 
herein. 
J1,-
DATED thf$ 4 day of April, 2011. 
oRPeR Rf;: MOTION ro COMPl=I,.. FU26!PON~I; 
TO OJ.$COVF!RY. MOTION FOR f:NTRY UPON 
~L PRQl"'ml'Y FOR SURm AND MOTION 
P:~R PUl'awc FUNDS TO PAY FOR SURVEY • 3 -
f---12 ff\ ml-
Fi=tED M. G)BLf:B ' 
District Court Judae 
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04-05-11 07:34AM FROM-KC DIST CT FAX 2 2084461 !53 T·B32 P.04/04 F-991 
l I r-111 lh 1 • I,. V I I• j ' I Y' '" 
g§BIJf lCATii Of SfiBY(C!; 
. . d"l--, 
l herepy certify that on th';'l _....!_L day of Aplili 2011, I cau~ed a true anc:t c:mrect 
copy of tne fQregoinf) do~ment to be ~erved PY me methoci as indicated below, and 
addr~~ to the following: · 
Amy Sorgman 
Oep\fly Pro$ecutln9 Attomey 
Kootenai County Pto.secutins Attorney 
601 Government Way 
P.O. Sox 9000C 
Coe~r d'Alene, ID 63816~9000 
Ian Q. Smittl 
Attc.lmey at Law 
PO !Sox 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, JD 83816 
( J Hand-delivered 
{ J Rsgtllar ~.s. MQil 
f J Ceriified U.S. Mi:iH 
( l Overnight M~il 
[X] Facsimile To: .~OB) 446-1!333 
[ J Hand.-Qelivired 
[ J Regu~r U.S. Mail 
[] Certffied U.S. Mall 
() Overnight Mail 
(XJ Fa~imlle To: (20B) 765~9089 
CLERK OF THl2 COURT 
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Juh is 20ii 3:19~H !RN o. SHtrH ~riORNEY 
f.At4 b. SMliH 
Attorney at Law 
S08 Northwest Soulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeut d'Al~lie. ID 83816~019 
feler:,hohe: (208) 765-4050 
Facslml/e: (208) 765-9069 
Idaho State aat No. 4698 
Attorney for Oofo11dat1t 
20S-7B5-S089 ~. 1 
2011 Jt1~ 16 PM 3:l~ i 
CLERK DISTRICT coum 
IN-T~S-l)IS+RIG=l"-GGlJR-r-o!='-"tHE-f=·IR-S:f-Jl/lJlelAL-tJlfffRle-T-eF-rHr,::__------,II· 
STAfE OF IDAHO. IN AND FO~ iHE COUNiY OF KOOTENAI j 
S'tATE OF IOAHO, 
!=>lsihtlff, 
\IS. 
CHRISTtNA JUNE GREENFIELD, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR.F-10 .. 1oa24 
WAIVE~ OF RIGHt TO JURY iRIAL 
COMES NOW, the above1-named Defendant, CHRISTINA JUN~ GREE:NFIELb 
(hereinafter: iJefendant") 1 by and thrOl.J~h her attomey or record IAN O. $Ml1H 1 and 
1-')Utsuant to FWle 23 of the Idaho Crlrriit1al ~ules, hereby waives het right to a trial by 
Jury in the above~m~Jed mattet and reciuests that the matter be tried as a court trlal 
befotti? the Honorable Dl!trlct Court Judge Fred M. Gibler. 
WA1'/E1t Of: roGHt to JUf;tY TRIAL • 1 • 
811-d 10/IO'd ZZE·l £9118\7VBOZ 
i • · ' EXHIBIT 
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) 
This waiver is made with the consent of the Prosecuting Attorney as evidenced 
by the signature of Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Amy Borgman set forth below. 
DATED this { U, ~ay of June, 2011. 
DATED this 
Attorne , for Defendant 
-ft-
~----- day of June, 2011. 1 .,. . 
j\ i /. / I 
·~-------·---------------· I / /> f! ; , +'- -------! . /·-';/_/_/---··-/~;!-{// i1-v !i 
1/ }i J : / 11 ( / / ij 
l )f . l I .• ,•-!/ 1 
/. ;/ • • c.,,,-· /.I. /J L \ . 
, "" · • , /.,/.,,f,{ r~·1~v 
l_CHRlSTINP,,(JUNE G.8_E8-NFIELD 
Defendantu -u 
DATED this ___ day of June, 2011. 
AMY BORGMAN 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
WAJVER OF RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL - 2 -
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, • !. •• • • ·, , 1 i··r=·· 
2011/JUN/iO/FRI 15:02 · KO CO PROSECUTER FAX No, 208-446""!841 P. 002 
Jun 07 201l'3t43PM 
I . 
IAN D. SMITH Fl'l"TO NEY OB-765-90'6S p,S 
s,> I 
This waiver Is made witt, the consent of the Prosecuting Attorney as evidenced 
. . l I . 
by the signature or ~~uty Prosecutin1;1 Attoli ey Amy Bor ma7:1 .set forth below. 
OATED·ihiij ·day of June, 2011. 
JAN D. SM\TH · 
Attorney fi r Defendant 
;::._~1.,.....;__ _____ l~----1------~------~ 
·--------D~iA~~r=e:~_D-th-is-.:;;;;-~ day of June, 2011. 
WAIVER OP ~IGHT TO JURY TRIAL • 2 M 
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06-21-11 07: 26AM FROM-KC D 1 ST CT FAX 2 
lAN O. SMITJ-i 
Attorn<ay at Law 
608 Northwest S0ule11ard, Suite 101 
P .0. Sex :3018 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8Ja1e .. 3019 
T eleph~ne: (208) 765-4050 
Facsimile: (208) 765~9009 
Idaho Si.ate Bar No. 4696. 
Attorney for Defendant 
2084461153 T-435 P.01/01 F-2!1 
STAl t uf iDAH) } SS 
COON TY OF KOO TENaJ 
F!l!:D 
?OH JUN 20 PH 3: 48 
CL.ERK DISTR:cr COURT . 
©D":'i----
=~=------~--ii .~- ---m-rHE-DIS'fRICTCOtJRTOF1RE-FlRST1U-D1ClA[1l1STRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTINA JUNE GRl:ENFIELO, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CRF-10-1002,4 








COMES NOW, the sbove-named Defendant, CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFl~J..O 
(/'ierijinafter: ''Defendant"}, t)y and through her attorney of record IAN D. SMITH, and 
heret:iy provides notice to the ahov~named Plaintiff, THS ST ATE Of IDAHO 
(hereinafter: the "State"), and tQ ail interested parties, that the Defendant will call for a 
hijarlng on t,er Objtction to Amended Information t1nd Mtmon to Ofa1mhu11 or In the 
AJtfl~t.lvu... Motion fQr Prallmlnary Hearing, to be heani on tne 12111 day of July, 
. 1 . 
.,..~ ...•. EXHIBIT > 
''\H . . ··. 
'I.'~~\ 
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2011 at the hour of 1 :30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, before 
the Honorable Judge Gibler. 
Furthermore, the Defendant hereby provides notice of the intent to present 
evidence, testimony, and oral argument in support of said Motion, and to cross-examine 
the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiffs witnesses. 
DATED this 20th day of June, 2011. 
--------------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J hereby certify that on the 201h day of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method as indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Amy Borgman 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000C 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
NOTICE OF HEARING· 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mail 
[] Overnight Mail 
simile To: 
IAN D. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
- 2 -
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JUL. 7. 2011 8:43AMFIRS'lJY£~~~G.!~~RJSTR1C1C01JRT,STA!'EOFIDAB~ 
lN ANO FOR TB:E COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
324 W, GARDEN AVENUE 
COEUR l)'AL:ENE, IDAHO 83816-9000 
NO. 34 5 
FILED 717/2011 AT 08;0:3 AM 
p. I 
STATE OP IDAHO, COUNT'I' OF KOOl'ENAI SS 
CLERK OF THE D1STR1CT COURT 
STATE Of IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
Christina June Greenfield 













Post Falls, ID 83854 CaseNo: CR-2010-0010624 
Defendant, 
DOB: 
NOT1CE OF PllE·TlUAL CONli'ERENCE AND 
TR1AL 
Al<A 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Pre-Trial Conference Friday, September 23; 2011 at 02!00 PM 
Judge. Frl;!1;!-M-;-6ib1er·---------------------------------;1 
.Altern.ate Presiding Judges; Benjamin R. Simpson; John P. Luster; John T. Mitchell; Lansing L. Haynes; Fred I 
M. Gibler; Charles W. Hosack; Steven Yerby; George Reinhardt, m, J.effBrudie. . . / / 
Court Trial Scheduled Tuesday, September 27, 2011 at 09:00 AM ( )tJ,J 
Z days 
Judge: Fred M. Gibler 
Alternate Presiding Judges: Benjamin R. Simpson; John P. Lusier; John T. Mi't:chell; Lansing L. Baynes; Fred 
M. Gibler; Charles W. Hosack; Steven Yerby; George Reinhardt, m, JeffBrudie. 




Christina June Greenfield 
Mailed__ Hand Deli'tere<l __ 
liln Smi\h 
P.O. Box 3019 
CoeUJ d'Alene ID 83'816-3019 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered __ 
Kootenai Co1,1nty Prosecutor 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered __ 
Fa--<ed __ 
(Jaxed (208) 765-9089 
(v#'axed (208) 446-1833 
Dated: Thursday, July 07, 2011 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: ~rtvr•;,., ~ 
· Secretary tudgeGibler 
NOTICE OF PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND TRIAL 
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OH 3·11 01 :43PM FROM-KC DIST CT FAX 2 
M- V~ 4~~.~~ 
13MRY McHUGH 
Pto~-AitO:mey 
. SOl Oovemme:nt Way/Bo& 9000 
Coeiu- d I Al~ !D 83 816-SIOOO 
re1~:ne: (208) 446~1 soo 
:Fa.csimile: 008) 446 .. J 833 
2084461153 T-582 P.01/02 F-211 
cil.1 JH. Luo-Ho~ J ~4 l P. 001 
·ZQ/1 JJL. I 3 PH 2.: .39 
CLERK DISTR:C i COURT 
IN TEE :OLSTRJCT COURT Of THE FIRST . I9Af. DISTRICT OF, THE STA TE OF 
, IDAHO, IN A.ND FOR. TIJE OUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
5TA'rn OF IO.AHO, . . 
p~ 
vs. 
Cfffi.IS'I!NE JUN};;_G~~--__ , _____ _ 
D~t 
The above~ cm:ne ® to:· a he 'pefore the Honmable FRED M. GIB~ 
J~.on th¢ 1,2tti IUy of July, 2011, The State. represer.ited by AMY .BORG:MAN1 D~ucy 
Pro:ieG'Utmg Attorney, for Kootenai Com:ey~ l o. The defetidant was pres~ repzes~ by 
IAN ·SMITH, AttQJ:MY fo: 'The Defuudaot; argumrni. from all p~ the C0tut entetra ils 
weer a,s :follows: 
IT IS EERJ:.ijY ORDERED that the i:W'endant' s MotiOll to DiS'lll.lis is ~. 
' ~ 
~ U1.iE ' I 3 qay of JULY, 2011. 
. . {,,..,Q (h ~ 
.rut>GE .Ol:SLER 
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N. . . . - - ... 
07·13·11 01 :43PM FROM·KC DIST CT FAX 2 2084461153 T-582 P.02/02 F-271 
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F x • .. 
•' . 
•,•• 
07-27-11 02:23PM FROM·KC 01ST CT FAX 2 
IAND.$MITH 
Attorney at J..aw 
600 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Bex ~019 
CoeL.lr d'Alene, 10 63816 ... 301 a 
Telephone: (208) 765.-4050 
Facsimile: "(208) 765-9089 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
Ait'ofn(JY far Oef4nefant 
RNEY .. · . . 
2084461153 T-366 P.01/01 F-073 
?n1 l .JUl. 27 PM 2: 44 
·1N1r1e-P1"STRlCT-c-OaHT-OFTRE-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
~TATe OF tOAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIELD, 
Defendant 
CA.SE NO. ·cRF-10-10624 
MOTJON FOR OEPOSfTION 
COME'.S NOW, the above-named Oefencfant, CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIEI..P 
(hereinafter: "Defendant"}, by and through her attorney of record IAN D. SMITH, anA 
pursuant to Rule 15 of the ldaha Criminal Rules, hereby moves the Cowrt for the 
issuance cf an Order permitting fhe Defendant to take the deposition of a 
representative of lnl~nd Nor1hwfH3t Consultants Inc. relativ~ to lhe survey work 
MOTION FOR t>t:POSITJON 
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\ 
I 
performed as described in Exhibit A, attached hereto and hereby incorporated herein 
by this reference. 
This Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons as set forth below: 
1. The deposition testimony of the witness is material and it is necessary to 
take the deposition of the witness as the State has failed and refused to 
disclose the names of the individuals who performed the survey work, and 
the State has failed and refused to provide a description of the 
conclusions drawn by the individuals who performed the survey work. 
2. The information which the State did provide indicates the, location of the 
property line as indicated by the alleged victim was in fact incorrect and 
the survey work performed demonstrates that some of the bushes in 
questions may not be located on the property of the alleged victim. 
3. In order to properly prepare a defense to the charge herein, the 
Defendant has the right, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Criminal Rules 
to any information which tends to negate the guilt of the Defendant. 
4. The State appears to have taken the position they are not in possession 
of any information or conclusions drawn from the survey work and as 
such, cannot disclose the same, despite the fact the State paid for the 
surveywork to be conducted. 
MOTION FOR DEPOSITION - 2 -
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5. Therefore, in order to obtain information and conclusions obtained and 
drawn from the survey work, it is necessary for the Defendant to take the 
deposition of a representative of Inland Northwest Consultants Inc. who 
has knowledge relative to the survey work described in Exhibit A hereto. 
Therefore, based upon the above, it is respectfully requested that the Court enter 
an Order as requested herein. 
DATED this 27th day of July, 2011. 
_ ... ---
Attorne for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of July, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method as indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Amy Borgman 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000C 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
MOTION FOR DEPOSITION 
[] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Fae · · e To: (208) 446-1833 
Attorney at Law 
- 3 -
r 
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•i ··'. 
... , 
Post·Falls Police Department 
Check Request 
To: Finance 
From: Tan;nny Holmes 
Date: December 30, 2010 
Pay to: Eric Wurmlinger 
Amount: 225.00 
---------·eode: 
For: Survey for boundary of lots·. 
Authorization~-=-·-·___,, _______ _ 
Special Instructions:-
Mail Check to: 
Eric Wurmlinger 
212 S Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
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) 
Rod Gunderson 
Prosecutor Barry Mchugh/ Chief Scot Haug, 
Here Is the bill from INC- Engineers. Surveyors. Planners, related to the Survey completed for Eric Wurm linger on PFPD 
case #10PF05642. Eric had to pay for the cost of the survey prior to the completion of the work. The reimbursement 
would be paid to him. 
Thanks, 
Det. Rod Gund.~~.;iPJl--··-
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08-01·11 03:46PM FROM-KC DIST CT FAX 2 
IAN C. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
608Nor1hWSS1 Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. aox ~019 
CoeurcfAJene.10 83816-3019 
Teleptrone: (20a) 765-4050 
Fa~imile: {208) 7B5-908Q 
Idaho State Bar Ne. 4696 
AUQrnuy for OQfendant 
2084461153 T-535 P.02/03 F-225 
OtnJ', ---·-
____ IN_TJ:IE-OIStRICJ'-COURT-,O~"f:tclE-~IRST-JU[)ICIAb-Oi SfRIGT-GF-"fHE---
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFleLO, 
Oefenc:lant. 
CASE NO. CRF·10-10624 
DEFENDANT'S FOURTH 
SUPPLEMENT AL RESPONSE 
TO PI..AINTIFF1S REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, the abov~named Defendant, CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIEt..D 
(heteinf!fler: "Defendant"), by and through her attorney of record IAN D. SMITH, anq 
p41'$Uant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(c), hereby SL1bmiul the following !upplemental 
re;sponse to Plaintiff's written request for discovery. 
i · EXHIBIT 
~ 
---~·--' 2q:;.•· ,•' 
;;!_ 
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1. Documents and tangible objects. 
W. "Valuation Report" from Kootenai County Assessor for the following 
parcels of real property: 
(1) 210 S. Parkwood Place, Post Falls, Idaho 
(2) 212 S. Parkwood Place, Post Falls, Idaho 
3. Defense Witnesses. The following are the names and addresses of 
· witnesses which the Defendant may call at trial: 
N. John Wilhelm 
--ResiEleAtial-Appi:-aiser-111 
Kootenai County Assessor 
451 GovernmentWay 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
(208) 446-1500 x1540 
Please be advised that pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(c), the requested 
information, evidence and materials, if subject to discovery under Idaho Crlminal Rule 
16, shall not be filed with the court, unless otherwise ordere 
DATED this 1st day of August, 2011. 
DEFENDANT'S FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of August, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method as indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Amy Borgman 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000C 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
[] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile To: (208) 446-1833 
Attorney a Law 
DEFENDANT'S FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 3 -
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Sep. l, 2011 9:34AM 
Aµ~ c~ ~Lill !i4~~M 
JJC DISTRICT COURT 208-446-1245 No. 5085 P. I 
lHN U, SMl IH .HI IUk'Nl:.Y 208-765-9088 11<:: 
IANO. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
608 Not1hwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
Telephone: (208) 765-4050 
Facsimile: {208) 765-9089 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
Attorney for Dafandant 
-------------------
I 
s TATE OF IOAHO I 
COUNTY or l(OOTENAI ss 
FILED: 
2011 SEP -7 AM 9: 32 
CLERK OlSTRICl' COURT 
DEPU1'Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURi OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IOAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIELD, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CRF·10·10624 
ORDER FOR DEPOSITION 
The above-named Defendant, CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIELD (hereinafter: 
41Defendanl''). by and 1hrough her attorney of record IAN D. SMITH, having moved the 
Court, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, for the ls$uanca of an Order 
permitting the Defendant to take the deposition of a representative of Inland Northwest 
Consultants Inc. relative to the survey work performed as described In Exhlbtt A, 
attached 1o said Motion. 
p. 1 
ORDER FOR DEPOalTION - 1 -
~. cXHIBIT 
W· . 
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RNEV .. .. . . . · 
Sep, l,2011 9:35AM JJC ·o!STRJCT COURT 208-446-1245 No, 5085 P .. 2 
Au« 29 2011 1:45PM IAN D, SMITH ATTORNEY 208-785-SOSB 
The matter having come on for hearing before 1he· undersigned on the 29th day of 
August, 2011, the Court having considered the arguments of the Parties, the files and 
records herE3ln, and good cause appearing; 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED ANO DECREED 
THAT: 
1. Gm_~d_s_b.a!Lb.e.,.:and_bereby-ls.,-per-mltted~to-lake-tMe-deposition-of. 
C.had Johnson, and employee of Inland Northwest Consultants Inc., as a 
witness In the above-entitled matter; 
2. The subject of the deposition shall be any and all surveying work, and any 
and all other services provided by Chad Johnson and/or Inland Northwest 
Consultants lno. which were petformed on or upon the real property of 
Eric Wurmllnger, lncludlng but not llmlted to:· 
A. The "tine marklng11 conducted on or about December 16. 2010; 
B. ~Findings of the survey company" from the services provided on or 
about December 16, 201 O: 
C. Whether any documents h·ave been created as a result of the 
services ·provided on or about December 16, 2010; 
D, Who commissioned the services provided on or about December 
16,2010; 
E. What services were requested; 
ORDER FOR DEPO&TTION - 2 -
p,2 
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,.Sep. 1, 2011 9:35AM JJC DISTRICT COURT 208-4{6Y-1245 208 765 80N8o8, 5085 P. 3 3 ,Au~ I:'..:/ CIJ11 1:-tot-'M lHN LI, ::iMllH HIIUrsNc u - P· 
I 
f, The relative tooatlon of the trunks or base of any vegetation which 
are planted on or near the property line, 
DATED this~ 'Haay 0~011. 
FR D M. GIBLER 
District Court Judge 
· CERTIFICATE~ SERVICl; 
L Pi"" I hereby certify that on the day of~ 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method as indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Amy Borgman 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way 
P.O. Box 900DC 
Coeur d'Alene, ID B3816-9000 
Ian D, Smith 
Attorney et Law 
PO Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
ORDER FOR DEPOSITION 
[ J Hand-delivered 
[ J Regular U.S, Mail 
[ J Certified U.S. Mell 
[) Overnight Mail 
[XJ Facsimile To: (208) 446~1833 
I J Hand-dellvered 
[] Regular U.S. Mall 
[ J Certified U.S. Mall 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile To; (208) 765-9089 
CL,K OF THE COURT 
a{ ltr14: tltvvwl l 
~- DE UTY CLERK 
- 3 .. 
11 
1-, 
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201!/0CT/03/MON !3:56 KO KO PROSECUTORS 
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d1Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Telephone: (208) 446-180Q 
Facsimile: (208) 446~ 18 3 3 
FAX No. 208-446-!840 
W THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATB OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
















CASENO. CR-F 10-10624 
MOTION TO DlSWSS 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
P. 00 I 
CO:MES NOW, AMY BORGMAN, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, 
Idaho, and hereby mo-ves the above.entitled Court for an Order to dlsmlss without prejudice the court 
trial heating currently set for the 41h day of October, 2011, before the Honorable Judge Gibler, The 
basis for this motion is the fact that the State does not yet have an official survey of the property at 
issue identifying the location of the subject trees. A 'dismissal without prejudice will allow the 
"Victim to obtain a survey and will best serve the interests of justice. 
Oral argument is requested. 
Dated this 3 day of October, 2011. 
M~ Deputy Proecutingttomey. 
MOTION TO DISTv.OSS W1TBOUt :PREJUDICE · page 1 
I 
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2011/0CT/03/MON 13:56 KO KO PROSECUTORS FAX No,208-446-1840 P. 002 
CER TIFJCATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 2-_ day of October> 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was caused to be delivered to: · 
lAN SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LI\,,~ c,CI 
FAXED rf.e 6· ~ I// v O I 
Jiu'& e &if b/e,t c(tl¥) 
MOTION TO DIS:rv.ITSS WITHOUT PREJUDICE page 2 
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10-04-11 OZ:35PM FROM-KC DIST CT FAX 2 
IANC. SMITH 
Atto ey;;n~ 
608 Ne>f1hWe$1 S0u1evard, Suite 101 
P.O Sox ~019 
Coe r d'Alene, 10 83816~3019 
Tel hone: (20S) 76S-40SQ 
Fa imile: (206J 76S·90es 
ldah State ear No. 4e96 
ey for Detunaant 
2084461153 T-660 P.03/05 H67 
20!1 OCT-Lt PH 3: 27 
CLERK OiS1 :\ICT COURT 
-----·---OEPtl r :· 
IN THE DISTRICI coue:r_OE-1'.l··H~-i;:1RST-JUQIC)Al..StSTRIC'f-C>f1riE 
STATE OF IOAHO, IN ANO FOR THS COUNTY OF KOOTENAI · 
ST TE OP IOAHO, 
Pl~intiff, 
CH U>TINA '1UNE GREENFIELD, 
Oefendant 
CA$E NO. CRP-10-10624 
OROf:R DENYING Pl..AINTIFF1S 
. MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE 
The above--nameQ Plaintiff, STATE OP IDAHO (hereinafter: a5~1e'1), by and 
h P~puty Prosec~tlng Attorney, AMY BORGMAN, filed a Motion to Oismi.ss the 
abov entttfed mitt.er Witnout prejudice on October 3, 2011, the day pefore Trial wiUll 
~en uleci to cQmn,ence. The ~·s Motlor, was heard by 1he Caurt en the mcm;11g cf 
Trial, October 4, 2011. 
OROe P~NVING PLAINTIFF'~ MOTION 
TO t){ Ml&e WITMOUT PfUWUOJCE • 1 • 
I ' -
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10·04·11 02:3SPM FROM-KC DIST CT FAX 2 2084461153 T-660 P.04/05 F-187 
The Motion was b~sed w1e1y on the eia1m tt,at 1he State·· ... does noty~t hllve 
an fflcif:ll s1JNey of the property at ~stJe ldentifying the location of ·the subjeC1 trees." 
I • -
Toe Issue of a $UNey hacj come before the Court prevJO\.f1$ly, On Mach 23,2011. 
a h aring was held at which the Court artic~lated from the bench that the Stita had 
unti May 16, 2011 io obtain a survey identifying the 1o~ticn of the Bubjact trees. The 
Cou emt~red a written Order constetent witn U1e 01111 prcnour,cement on April 6, 2011. 
The State pid not obtain a s1Jrvey pursuant to the Courts Order. 
Ses~d upon the above, the oral de~l~lon of il'1e Cour1 on the record in open co~rt 
on 13 dat1:1 the State's Mollon to Pismias without Prejudice was hearci, which is hereby 
inCQ prmrted herein by this reference, and the filea and records herein1 the Court ecllnnot 
flnd hat a qismlssat as requ~ted by tt,e State will serve the ends PfN~ce and the 
TH 
Ive ac1mini-Stration of the court's business, and: 
NOW THEREFORE. IT IS HE:RSBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND OECR~EO 
, , The State's Motion to Plsmiss Without Prejudice shall b~1 and hereby iii 
OENIED. 
DATgO th!$ 4-"';,ay of Octol:lii#r, 2011. 
FR l:)M, Gll31..ER 
Dletrlc;t .co~rt Ju~ge 
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RNE - -- ' , .- ·_ --". 
10·04·11 02:3SPM FROM-KC DIST CT FAX 2 2084461153 T-660 P.05/05 F·l67 
. - • ... .. r"" • 
ru;BI!flCAm op ilaRVJ~~ 
./....kt---. . 
I h~reby certify thal on the :.....L_ Clay i:if October, 2011, I cauaed a true ialnd 
eorr et copy of the foregolna document to be sef\ied by the method a~ ir,ciicated below, 
and ddreesed tc the following: 
aorgman 
Pe l,;j'ty Pros@cutintJ Attorney 
Kc tenal County Prosecuting Attorney 
eo Government Way 
P. . Sox 9000C 
Cc ur d'Alene, 10 63816-8000 
____ JQn D,-Smith 
Att mey at Law 
PO Box 3019 
Co 1-1r cf Alene, ID 83616-.3019 
QR))i: Cf=NYIN~ Pt.AINTIFF'I MQTIQN 
TO Pl MWS ~OIJT PRE.JUOICt; . 3. 
[ J Hand-delivered 
( J Regwlar U.S. Mail 
t] Certified U.S. Mail 
J J O\t'ernight Mail 
P<l racsimile To: (~08} 446-1833 
tTR~nd-delivered 
l l Reaular U .$. M1;1H 
I] Cenified U.S. Mijrl 
{] Oven,lght Mail 
[XJ Fac:$lmlle To: (208) ?es .. eoss 
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I HH 1 0 2: 35PM FROM·KC DI ST CT FAX 2 
IANC. SMITH 
Attorn~y ~r Law 
808 Not1hwest Boulevard, Suits 101 
P.O. Box3019 
C.,atJr d'Alene, IP 83616-3019 
Telfi!phorie: (:206) 76~"4060 
FilcsimllQ: (208) 766-9089 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
AttgrnPy for Pefar,da»t 
2084461153 T-660 P.01/05 F·167 
STA~~Cr i\),;HO t~s 
:'.CUN: y :'.:P ~OOTENAII • 
rlLEG 
201 l OCT -4 PH 3: 27 
CLERh D1ST~1CT COURi 
Of Pu r '1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRS::LJHDICIAL..-OIS+RIG-=f-GF-TH~--------, 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 





JUOOMENl OF ACQUITTAL 
The above-entitlact matter c-ame befora the Court for a colJrt 1Tilill on October 4, 
2011. The ~bave~nametd Plaintiff, STAT!: OF IDAHO (hereinafti,r; "State"), appeareQ 
PY ;and thrcn.1gh Deputy Pros~uting Attorney, AMY BORGMAN, and the a~ove..narnec:1 
Defendant. CHRISTINA JUNS eREENFll=LO (hereinafter: "Defendant"), appeared 
~1'$onally and with nerattomey of re¢0rd, IAN D, SMITH. The State f$11ed !Q prodµee 
any e'.'!c:Jence or t:e&tjmQ.ny ~t trial: 
~UCGMl;NT OF ACQUITTAL • 1 .. 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 173 of 710
I O·OH I 02: 35PM FROM-KC DI ST CT FAX 2 2084461153 T-660 P.02/05 F-167 
NOW THEREFORE, CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFlf!LD $hall be, and hereby is, 
ACQUITT5D of the offense of MALICIOUS IN.JURY TO PROPERTY, a Felony, ai 
charged in the Second Amenasd Information herein. 
DATED this !/!:c1.ay of October, 2011, 
1'~m~ 
FRS:D M. GISLER 
. ___ Diswct_cowrt-J~dge---
Cf:~TE QI: SERVf(!J; 
I hereby certify that en the ~y of October, 2011 1 I c.auseQ a tru&l and 
cQrreict eopy of the ro,egoins document to be served by the method as incticateQ' tJelow, 
and ar.UJre&sed to the folloWin;: 
Arny Borijm~ 
Depu'ty ?rcaecuting Attorney 
KoQtenai Co~nty Proaee1,1ting Attorney 
501 Government Way 
P. o. Box aoooc 
CQe,~rd'AJene, ID 63816-9000 
tan D. Smith 
Attorney :at Law 
P06~3019 
Coeur d'Alene, IP 83616~3019 
f J Hand-<"Jeliven;d 
[ J Regular u.s. Mau 
[ J CertWed U.S. Mail 
[ J Owmight Mail 
(XJ Facsimile To: {208) 446·183~ 
C 1 H~nd-<lelivered 
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IN AND FOR TIJE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
324 W. GARDEN AWNUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000 
FILED 2/212012 AT 10; 13 AM 
STA Tli OF IDAHO, COUNTY Of l<.OOTE.NAI SS 
CLE:'R.K OF THE DISTRICT COUR'T 
P. I 
BY. __________ DEPUTY 
STATE OF fDAHO, 
, Plaintiff. 
I'S. 
CHRlSTlNA JUNE GREENFIELD 
210' S Parkwood Pl 















NOTICE JS HEREBY GIVEN that me above-entitled case is hereb 
Status Conference Monday.,a 
Defendant's Motion to Seal Csise 
Judge: Fred M. Gibler 
----------'·Geur-treom: 
Case No: CR-20 I 0-00 I 0624 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
I cenify that copies of this Notic:e were served as follows on Thursday, February 02'. 2) ~2. I / J / Y · . '- q 
Defendant: Christina Jun~reenfield :) '~ J / 5-'J 0 ,/ 




Ian Smit ~-c/. J:)d!v· _./ 
PO Bo 3019 
Coeur 'Alene lb 83816-3019 Jf!: _ ,) ex... rr1 Hand Delivered_ [ )Fox,d(208) 765-9089 V p- l. 
Kootenai County Prosecutor 
Mailed__ Hand Deliver~d__ ~ed (208) 446-1833 
[ J Ema(led 
Date'1: Thursday, February 021 20 J 2 
Cllfford T. Hayes 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: Bonnie Johnsen~etary to Judge Gibler 
~ 
";· -· -- - EXHIBIT· - ,• ··.- . :-.·1,_ .··-·-:. 
l'.:iy,;,.,,. 
:l . . . 
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Case History 
Cases for: Greenfield, Christina June 
Kootenai 
14 Cases Found. 
State of Idaho vs. Christina June Greenfield 
No hearings scheduled 
CR-2012- . 
Case: 0018113 Magistrate Jud e: Clark A. Amount$0.00 Closed g Peterson due: 
























j Case: 0003018 Magistrate Filed: 04/24/2015 
' Defendants:Kisle.r, Darr.ell Keith 
C 
Christina-June Greenfield-vs. Darrell Keith Kisler 
. Small Scott 
Subtype: Claims Judge: Wayman 
Plalntiffs:Greenfield, Christina June 
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j Case: 0008801 District 
Other Cynthia 
Filed: 12/01/2014 Subtype: Claims Judge: K.C. Meyer Status: Pending 
Defendants:smith, Ian D 
Plaintlffs:Greenfield, Christina June 
/ Pending Date/Time Judge 
,hearings: 
12/17/2015 . 
B:OO AM Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
01/19/2016 
9 :00 AM Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
09/01/2015 . 
3 :00 PM Cynthia K.C. Meyer 
Type of Hearing 
Pre-Trial Conference 
Jury Trial Scheduled 
Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
,.-------------------------------~-------·====i 
Christina June Greenfield vs. Michael Anthony Antonicchio 
: cv-2012- . 
i Case: 0007244 Magistrate Filed: 10/03/2012 
Defendants:Antonicchio, Michael Anthony 
Plaintiffs:Greenfield, Christina June 
Small Scott 
Subtype: Claims Judge: Wayman 
..•. Disposition: Date Judgment Disposition Disposition Parties 
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IAN D~ SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
THE SPOKESMAN REVIEW BUILDING 
608 NORTHWEST BOULEVARD, SUITE 1 01 
P.O. Box 3019 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816·301 9 
TELEPHONE: (208) 765-4050 
F ACSJMILE: (208) 765-9089 
E-MAIL'. IANSMITHLAW@GMAJL,COM 
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES 
HOURLY FEE AGREEMENT with RETAINER 
This Agreement, made this 151h day of September, 2010, between CHRIS Tl NA 
JUNE GREENFIELD, 210 S. Parkwood Place, Post Falls, Idaho 83854 (hereinafter: 
"Client''), and !AN D. SMITH, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 30"19, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
83816~3019 (hereinafter: "Attorney"), wherein the Partles hereby agree to the following: 
1. PURPOSE OF RETENTION 
·--------T~h~e~C=lie=n=t~re=t=a=in=s, emgloy~, and agr2oints the Attorne}' to regresent the Client to 
--aerend,- sefITe,aaJust, file, ana prosecufetne·cnerrt's daim- (hefeinaffet:-"Claim"Ttci·----..-
pursue a declaratory judgment action against Eric J. Wurmlinger and Rosalynd D, 
Wurmlinger, husband and wife, for violation of CG&R's and a tort claim in Post 
Falls, Idaho. Please be ad.vised that this engagement is directly related to and limited 
to the aforement[oned matter. Any issues outside of those involved in the 
aforementioned matter will require a separate engaaement agreement. 
2. ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND REQUIRED RETAINER 
A Client hereby retains Attorney to represent me in the above-
described Claim for the sum of $240.00 per hour, based upon time actual 
incurred. Also, for your informatlon, actual time billed is calculated \n tenths of the 
hour and monthly statements will reflect the computation of actual time for said legal 
services. These monthfy statements are due upon receipt, if applicable. Client hereby 
agrees to pay all fees upon receipt of the monthly statement from Attorney, if 
applicable. 
B, Client agrees that in addltron to the hourly rate, he is responsible for 
the payment of ·all costs in this matter, if applicable. Costs may include, but are not 
limited to: transcript fees, filing fees, service fees, witness fees, and charges for 
lnvestigatlon, records, medical reports, photographs, exhibits, photocopies, facsimiles, 
telephone long distance, postage, travel and accommodations, videotaping, and · 
depositlons. Client will receive monthly, itemized statements showing out-of-pocket 
expenses and are due upon receipi, if applicable. Client hereby agrees to pay atl costs 
upon receipt of the monthly statement from /:>-ttorney, if applicable. 
FE'E AGREEMENT" HOURLY with RETAINER • 1 • 
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C. Attorney also reserves the rig.ht to withdraw from representation in 
this matter at ainy polnt any monthly statement becomecsixty (60) or more days 
past due. By signing this Fee Agreement, you agree to stipufate to a withdrawal by me, 
as your legal counsel, in the event that expenses incurred or monthly installments. 
become sixty (60) or mor.e days past due. 
D. r agree that assoclate counsel may be employed at the discretion. of 
Attorney, and that· any attorney so employed may be designated to appear or1· my 
behalf, or undertake my represent.atfon in this matt~r. 
E. A retainer is also required for this mattar in the amount of $7,500.00, 
receipt of which ls hereby acknowledged. The fu[l amount of the retainer wll! be 
applied and credited to your monthly statement of services and costs rendered 
until the retainer Is fully depleted. The retainer is NOT a flat fee for legal services. 
At any time during th!s engagement that r.etainer funds fall below $100.00, you 
will be asked to repl.enisry these funds in increments of $500.00, Gllent hereby 
agrees to immediately notlfyAttorney at any point durlng thrs engagement should Client 
decide to instruct Attorney to cease all further work in connection with this engagement. 
·----------'ln.:..c.-th_a_c_t _ev.c._e_n-"t,_a_nY.: unused 12ortion of the reia1ner will be returned to Client,,_.a"""ft""eL._r _______ .-.... -.. ------···--· ----J 
............ ···········-···-· ""application of any. outstanding fees ana co:STstfiafh~ive-6ofb-een applfeff"fo Your ... 
account. Llkewise, should services rendered fall below the balance of the retai·ner, any 
unused portion will be returned to you after appltcafion of any outstanding, fees and 
costs that have not been applied to your account. If the retalner has been fully 
depleted, and c[lent does not replenish the retainer funds as outlined above, 
Client hereby agrees to pay for all services and costs rendered that are fn excess 
of the retainer upon receipt of the monthly statement from Attorney, if applicable. 
3. SUPPORT STAFF 
Th~ Attorney may, in his discretion, require the assistance of, c!·nd employ, 
associates, clerical staff, ·and like support staff; and the -Client hereby consents to the 
Attorney retaining ·such Individuals to assist him in the evaluation, and preparation, of 
the Claim. Except for paralegal time charge·s (as outlined below), if applicable, other 
such support staff services and assistance will be at the expense of the Attorney ... 
. Paralegal.s,. who are utilized where appropriate and at the drscretion of 
Attorney to avoid unnecessary attorney fees, are b!Hed to Client at the rate of 
$60.00 per hour, based upon time actually incurred. Once again, actual time billed 
is calculated in tenths of the hour and are Included in the monthly statements. These 
monthly statements are due upon receipt. Cli.ent hereby agrees to pay all foes upon 
receipt of the monthly statemerit from Attorney. 
FEE AGREEMENT- HOURLY with RETAINER -: 2 -
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 178 of 710
4. WITHDRAWA'L OF ATTORNEY 
Upon conclusfon or disposition of the engagement involving the matter(s) 
outlined In this Agreement in Section 1,. above, and if said matter involve$ litigation, the 
Attorney is permitted to withdraw from said matter as prescribed by the respective rules 
of procedure for said litigation. · 
5. COOPERATION OF CLIENT 
The Client shall keep the Attorney advised of the Client's whereabouts at a!I 
times, shall appear on reasonable notice at any and all depositions, court appearances, 
and shall comply with all reasonable reques1s of the Attorney in connection with the 
preparation, and presentation, of the Claim. 
6. IDAHO LAW TO APPLY 
-. , This agreement .shaltbe governed by, and construed in accordance with, the 
laws of the State of Idaho. The venue fo(any action regarding the interpretation or 
periorma·nce of this agreement shall be in Kootenai County, Idaho. 
7. LEGAL CONSTRUCTION 
In the event that any one, or more, of the provisions contained fn this agreement 
shall be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable ln any respect, such invalidity; 
illegality, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision, and this agreement 
shall be construed as If such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision did not exist. 
8, FAVORABLE OUTCOME NOT WARRANTED 
The Attorney makes no representations, nor warranties, concerning the success 
of the Cllent's Claim, or the favorable outcome of any legal action, and the Attorney 
does not warrant, nor guarantee, that he will obtain reimbursement for the Client of any 
of Client's costs, or expenses, arising out of the Client's Claim. 
9. PRIOR AGREEMENTS SUPERSEDED 
This agreement constitutes the only agreement oflhe Parties, and supersedes 
any prior understandings, o'r written, or oral, agreements, between the Parties, in 
respect to the representation of the Client, by the Attorney, in this Claim. 
FEE AGREEMENT· HOURLY with RETAINER • 3 -
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·c 
10, MISCELLANEOUS 
A. At the conclusion of the Attorney's representation of the Client in this 
matter, the Client agrees that the Attorney may destroy the file which the· Attorney has 
maintained. 
8. The Client acknowledges that the Attorney has not represented to the 
Client, nor advJsed the Client, that the Client has a valid cause of action,. arid that no 
opinion about the merits of the Claim can be reached untiJ after the completion of all 
investigative procedures, . 
C. By-the. signature below, Client agrees to the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement and acknowledges that they have received a copy of this Agreement. 
DATED this 151h day of September, 2010. 
DATED this 151h day of September, 2010. 
~--. 
---
FEE AGREEMENT - HOURLY with RETAINER - 4 -
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!AND. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
( 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID -83816-3019 
Telephone: (208) 765-4050 
Facsimile: (208) 765-9089 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STA1E ()F iQALJ.(j 1 
GQU~iTY OF KOOTENAI> ss 
FILED: · 1 
20/0 SEP 23 Pri 3: oo 
CLERK DIS IRICT COURT 
Of.Pl/TY ____ _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




ERIC J. WURMLINGER and 
ROSALYND D. WURMUNGER, 
husband and wife-1 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-10- ~ J._ 6 J· 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
AND DAMAGES 
Fee Category: A 
Total Fees: $88.00 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
-(hereinafter: "Greenfield"), by and through her Attorney of Record, IAN D. SMITH, and 
for cause of action against the above-named Defendants, ERIC J. WURMLINGER and -
ROSALYND D. WURMUNGER, husband and wife (hereinafter collectively: 
"Wurm linger"), hereby complains and alleges as follows: 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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Idaho. 
( ' 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. 
At all times material hereto, the Plaintiff has been a resident of the State of 
2. 
At all times material hereto, the Defendants have been residents of the County of 
Kootenai, State of Idaho. 
-··· ·-·-···-·-··- ·- .. ··-··--··-·-------·- ---·-----· .. ····3,··· ·-··-·· 
All of the acts alleged herein occurred within the County of Kootenai, State of 
Idaho. 
4. 
At all times material hereto, the Defendants have been the owners and operators 
of a business known as The River Cove Bed and Breakfast (hereinafter: "Bed and 
Breakfast") in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho. 
5. 
The Bed and Breakfast is located within the Defendants' residence and upon the 
Defendants' real property legally described as Block 1, Lot 7, Parkwood Place. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
AND DAMAGES -2-
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6. 
The Plaintiff's residence is on a parcel of real property immediately adjacent to 
the Defendants' real property and is legally des-cribed as Block 1, Lot 6, Parkwood 
Place. 
7. 
Both the Plaintiff's real property and residence and the Defendants' real property 
and residence are located within the Parkwood Place Subdivision as platted in the 
Place"). 
8. 
The use of lots and residences located with Parkwood Place are subject to 
certain covenants, conditions and restrictions recorded in records of Kootenai County 
on July 31, 1992 as Instrument No. 1268229 (hereinafter: "CG&R's). 
9 .. 
The CC&R's were properly recorded with the Office of the Kootenai County 
Recorder. 
10. 
The Defendants have actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the 
CC&R's. 
COMPLAINT FOR pECLARATORY 
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11. 
Article I, Section 1 (a) of the CC&R's prohibit the operation of any business upon 
any real property or residence within Parkwood Place. 
12. 
The Defendants operation of the Bed and Breakfast is in violation of the CC&R's. 
13. 
The Defendants have planted tall growing shrubs on or near the property line 
befween the Plaintiff's real property and the Defenaam's real property. 
14. 
The shrubs that the Defendants have planted as described herein constitute a 
fence. 
15. 
Article 11, Section 2 of the CC&R's limits the height of fences within Parkwood 
Place to five (5) feet. 
16. 
The shrubs that the Defendants have planted as described herein have grown to 
a height in excess of that allowed by the CC&R's. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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17. 
Pursuant to an Amendment of the CC&R's, recorded in the records of Kootenai 
County on September 19, 1994 as Instrument No. 1370427, a pedestrian easement 
over and across the Defendants' ·real property was created for use of all of the property 
owners within Parkwood Place. 
18. 
The Amendment to the CC&R's provides that the Defendants are not to place 
19. 
The Defendants have obstructed the easement described herein by intentionally 
planting trees and or shrubs in the easement and or by failing to remove naturally 
occurring trees and or shrubs from the easement. 
20. 
The Plaintiff is an interested person under the CC&R's whose rights, status and 
legal relations to the Defendants are affected by the CC&R's, the Court has the 
authority to construe the CC&R's, and the Plaintiff has the right to obtain a declaration 
of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder from the Court. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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21. 
The above~entitled Court has personal jurisdiction over the Parties named 
herein, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the allegations set forth herein and 
venue is properly before the Court. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Each and every allegation set forth above is hereby incorporated herein by this 
··-··- -· ---·reference:·-- · 
BED AND BREAKFAST 
22. 
The Defendants' operation of the Bed and Breakfast is in violation of the 
CC&R's. 
23. 
The Court should enter an Order declaring that the Defendants' operation of the 
Bed and Breakfast in Parkwood Place is a violation of the CC&R's and the Court should 
enter an Injunction prohibiting the Defendant's from operating the Bed and Breakfast, or 
any similar business, in Parkwood Place. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
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FENCE 
24. 
The shrubs planted by the Defendants upon or near the property line between 
the Plaintiff's real property and the Defendants' real property constitutes a fence. 
25. 
The shrubs planted by the Defendants as described herein have grown to a 
height in excess of the maximum height for fences as permitted by the CC&R's. 
· · ·-·-··--· ·--· ---------·---·-···· ---···2 6: ····- ·- ··-· .. 
The Court should enter an Order declaring that the Defendants' shrubs as 
described herein constitute a fence, that the height of the shrubs is in excess of that 
permitted by the CC&R's, and that the shrubs in excess of the height permitted by the 
CC&R's constitutes a violation of the CC&R's. The Court should enter an Injunction 
prohibiting the Defendants from permitting the shrubs to exceed the height restrictions 
for fences as set forth in the CC&R's. 
EASEMENT 
27. 
The Defendants' real property is encumbered by an easement. 
28. 
The easement is for the use of the property owners in Parkwood Place. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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29. 
The easement is obstructed by naturally occurring vegetation and or vegetation 
planted by the Defendants and or manufactured structures. 
30. 
Pursuant to the Amendment of the CC&R's, the easement is to remain free from 
obstructions. 
31. 
· TheCourt should enter an ·order' declaring thattne easemenns·to be cleared of ___ · 
all obstructions, that the Defendants are required to pay the cost for clearing any and all 
obstructions, and enter an Injunction prohibiting the Defendants from further obstructing 
the easement in an manner. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
32 . 
. The Plaintiff has incurred reasonable attorney fees and costs in the pursuit of 
this claim for the enforcement of the CC&R's. 
33. 
Pursuant to Idaho law and Article Ill, Section 8 of the CC&R's the Court should 
award the Plaintiff her reasonable attorney fees. and costs incurred herein. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
NUISANCE, ABATEMENT AND DAMAGES 
This cause of action relative to shrubs planted on or near the property line of the 
Parties real property is in the alternative to the claims set forth in Paragraphs 24, 25, 
and 26 herein. 
Each and every allegation set forth above is hereby incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
- 34·:········ 
The Defendants have planted shrubs and trees upon their real property which 
block the Plaintiff's view of the Spokane River and which infringe upon the Plaintiff's. 
real property. 
35. 
The actions of the Defendants as described herein have obstructed the Plaintiff's 
free use of property, and have interfered with the Plaintiff's comfortable enjoyment of 
life and property. 
36. 
The actions of the Defendants as described herein constitutes a nuisance. 
37. 
The Plaintiff's real property is assessed as "view" property. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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38. 
The actions of the Defendants herein have resulted in obscuring the Plaintiff's 
view and have resulted in the reduction in the value of her real property. 
39. 
Due to the actions of the Defendants as alleged herein, the Plaintiff has suffered 
monetary damages in an amount in excess of Ten Thousand Dolla_rs ($10,000.00). 
40. 
· ·· - - ··· The C-ourt shoa!Cfenteran-e)rder-of-Abatement-requirlng-the-Befen-dants·to-··--- - ·- ··---- ------- · 
remove any and all shrubs and trees located at or near the Parties common property 
boundary and any and all other trees or shrubs which obstruct the Plaintiff's free use of 
property, and interfere with the Plaintiff's comfortable enjoyment of life and property. 
41. 
The Court should enter an Injunction prohibiting the Defendants from planting 
any shrubs or other vegetation upon the common boundary line between the Parties 
real property and prohibiting the Defendants from planting any trees, shrubs or other 
vegetation which blocks the Plaintiff's view ofthe Spokane River or otherwise obstructs 
the Plaintiff's free use of property, and Interferes with the Plaintiff's comfortable 
enjoyment of life and property. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Each and every allegation set forth above is hereby incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
42. 
The Defendants entered into. an agreement with the Plaintiff to maintain the 
shrubs located at or near the common property line between the Parties real property at 
a helght of sfx (6) feet. · · 
43. 
The Defendants permitted said shrubs to grow to a height in excess of six (6) 
feet. 
44. 
The Plaintiff gave the Defendants written notice to trim the shrubs to the agreed 
upon height or the Plaintiff would trim the shrubs to the agreed upon height. 
45. 
The Defendants failed to trim said shrubs to the agreed upon height and failed to 
communicate with the Plaintiff regarding the height of said shrubs. 
46. 
The Plaintiff thereafter trimmed the shrubs to the agreed upon height. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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47. 
The Defendants contacted !aw enforcement and alleged that they had been the 
victims of a crime. 
48. 
The allegations of the Defendants were false and were made intentionally and or 
recklessly. 
49. 
· · Due-t6-tneacti6ris of the Defendahts;--me-Plaifitiffwascharged with-Felony ----- -·---- ·-·-- · 
Malicious Injury to Property. 
50. 
In addition to the actions of the Defendants as set forth above, the Defendants 
have intentionally and or recklessly made other false accusations to law enforcement 
about the Plaintiff, at least one of which has resulted in the Plaintiff being charged with 
a Misdemeanor, which was dismissed. 
51. 
The Defendants are intentionally and or recklessly unlawfully operating a 
business next door to the Plaintiff. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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52. 
Due to the fact that the Plaintiff has attempted to enforce the CC&R's relative to 
the Bed and Breakfast, the result of which would be the closing of the B~d and 
Breakfast, the Defendants have engaged in a course of conduct to harass the Plaintiff. 
Said course of conduct includes, but not limited to, the installation of excessive exterior 
lighting facing the Plaintiff's residence, placing a camera in a window facing the 
Plaintiff's residence, trespassing upon the Plaintiff's real property and making 
d"efa'iiiatory·commenfa··aoourme·P1a1ntifflo-neiglibors~-----------······-··--·---·------·· 
53. 
The actions of the Defendants as set forth above are extreme and outrageous. 
54. 
The actions of the Defendants as described above have caused the Plaintiff 
severe emotional distress. 
55. 
The actions of the Defendants as described herein are the direct and proximate 
cause of the Plaintiff's emotional distress. 
56. 
Due to the actions of the Defendants as alleged herein, the Plaintiff has suffered 
injuries and damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10i000.00). 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Each and every allegation set forth above is hereby Incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
57. 
The Defendants have a duty to abide by the agreements entered into, to permit 
the Plaintiff to the quiet enjoyment of her property, and to not make false and 
····· ffefamatorystaternents a5out=tneFlaintifFto-lawenforcernent-orany-ofner-inaivratial-or-- - ·· 
entity. 
58. 
As alleged herein, the Defendants acted negligently and breached said duties. 
59. 
Due to the Defendants' negligent breach of their duties to the Plaintiff, the 
Plaintiff has suffered physical Injuries, including but not limited to stress, anxiety, fear, 
loss of sleep, acid reflux, loss of appetite, Increased blood pressure and cardiac 
problems. 
60. 
The actions of the Defendants as alleged herein are the direct and proximate 
cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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61. 
Due to the actions of the Defendants, the Plaintiff has suffered damages in 
excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). 
ATTORNEY FEES 
62. 
The Plaintiff has incurred reasonable attorney fees and costs herein. 
63. 
attorney fees and costs incurred herein. 
WHEREFORE: the Plaintiff prays for the following relief: 
1. That the Court enter an Order declaring that the Defendants' operation of 
the Bed and Breakfast in Parkwood Place is in violation of the CC&R's 
and that the Court enter an Injunction prohibiting the Defendants from 
operating the Bed and Breakfast, or any similar business, in Parkwood 
Place; 
2. That the Court enter an Order declaring that the Defendants' shrubs as 
described herein constitute a fence, that the height of the shrubs is in 
excess of that permitted by the CC&R's, and that the shrubs in excess of 
the height permitted by the CC&R's constitutes a violation of the CC&R's. 
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That the Court enter an Injunction prohibiting the Defendants from 
permitting the shrubs to exceed the height restrictions for fences as set 
forth in the CC&R's; 
3. That the Court enter an Order declaring that the easement is to be 
cleared of all obstructions, that the Defendants be required to pay the cost 
for clearing any and all. obstructions, and that the Court enter an Injunction 
prohibiting the Defendants from further obstructing the easement In any 
manner;- -
4. That the Court award the Plaintiff a judgment against the Defendants, 
jointly and severally, for Nuisance, in an amount in excess of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10;000.00); 
5. That the Court enter an Order of Abatement requiring the Defendants to 
remove any and all shrubs and trees located at or near the Parties' 
common property boundary and any and all other trees or shrubs which 
obstruct the Plaintiff's free use of property, and interfere with the Plaintiff's 
comfortable enjoyment of life and property; 
6. That the Court enter an Injunction prohibiting the Defendants from 
planting any shrubs or other vegetation at or near the common boundary 
line between the Parties real property and prohibiting the Defendants from 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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( 
planting any trees, shrubs or other vegetation which blocks the Plaintiff's 
view of the Spokane River or otherwise obstructs the Plaintiff's free use of 
property, and interferes with the Plaintiff's comfortable enJoyment of life 
and property; 
7. That the Court award the Plaintiff a judgment against the Defendants, 
jointly and severally, for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, in an 
amoU_nt in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00); 
---· -- .. --·- ···- . . . . . . .. . fl,--- . . 'f!Tattt-re=Goor-t-awara=the=P-lalntrf:f-a·Judgmeiit--ag a 1Ast-tf-i.e·-Hef-ena·a nts;-----------.. -·---- -
jointly and .severally,_ for Negligent !nfHction of Emotional Distress, in an 
amountin excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00); 
9. That the Court award the Plaintiff posHudgment interest on any judgment 
entered herein; 
10. That the Court award the Plaintiff her reasonable attorney fees and costs 
herein; and 
11. Such other and further relief as the Court deems to be just and equitable 
under the circumstances. 
rJ . 
DATED this 23-day of September, 201 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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IAN D. SM TH 
Attorney at Law 
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VERIFICATION 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, being fit·st duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That I am the Plaintiff in the above~named action, that I have read the foregoing 
Complaint, I know the contents thereof, and I state the same to be true and correct to 
the best of my knowledge. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
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JAN D. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
• • 1 t t tJ • VI I ,l I I I /'l f I U ~ J 1 I: f 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
. P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d1Alene, ID 83816-3019 
Telephone: (208) 765-4050 
Facsimile: (208) 765-9089 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
cUtl-'loti-!:!U8!:I p, j 
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CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDIClAL DJSI8lCT_O-E-T~HE-------; 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERJC J, WURMLINGER and 
ROSALYND 0, WURML/NGER, 
huaband ~nd wife, 
Defendants. 
CASS NO. CV-10-8209 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF 
DEFENDANT ROSALYND D. 
WURMLINGER 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, ROSALYN D. WURMLINGER, AND YOUR 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, GARY!. AMENDOLA 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 30 ot the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the above-named Plaintiff, CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, Wifl, on the 22rn1 
day of November, 2Q10, at the hour of S:00 a.m.; at the office of Ian D. Smith, 608 
Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814, before an officer 
NOTI<::E OF DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT 
ROSAL. nm D. WUR.MUNGl':R • 1 -
I 
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authorized to administer oaths, take testimony, upon oral examination, of ROSALYND 
D. WURMLINGER You are hereby notified to appear at said time and place and take 
part in the examination as you deem proper. 
DATED this 1st day of November, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of November, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method as indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Gary I. Amendola 
Amendola & Doty, PLLC 
702 N. Fourth Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
M & M Court Reporting 
816 Sherman Avenue, Suite 7 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT 
ROSALYND D. WURMLINGER 
[] Hand-delivered 
[ 1 Regular U.S. Mail 
[ J Certified U.S. Mail 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile To: (208) 765-1046 
[] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mail 
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IAN D. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwsst Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
Telephone: (208) 765-4050 
Facsimile: (208) 765-9089, 
Idaho State Bar, No. 4696 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
i.:..uo- 10.J-,;Jl.1ov F• I 
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CLERk D!STA icr coum 
t5t!z;r,·-------
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIS_t81CJ__D£_Tl=JE---~----: 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERIC J, WURMLINGER and 
ROSALYND D. WURMLINGER, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-10..S209 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF 
DEFENDANT ERIC J. 
WURM LINGER 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, ERJC J. WURMLINGER, AND YOUR 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, GARY I. AMENDOLA 
· PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 30 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the above-named Plaintiff, CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, will, on the 23rs1 
day of November, 2010, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., at the office of fan D. Smith, 608 
Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814, before an officet 
NOT~E OF DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT 
ROSALYND 0, WURML!NGER • 1 -
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authorized to administer oaths, take testimony, upon oral examination, of ERIC J. 
WURMLINGER. You are hereby notified to appear at said time and place and take part 
in the examination as you deem proper. 
DATED this 1st day of November, 2010 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of November, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method as indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Gary I. Amendola 
Amendola & Doty, PLLC 
702 N. Fourth Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
M & M Court Reporting 
816 Sherman Avenue, Suite 7 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT 
[ J Hand-delivered 
[ J Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mail 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile To: (208) 765-1046 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mail 
[X] F . 1 : (208) 765-8097 
ROSALYND D. WURMLINGER - 2 -
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' 
SW1: OF ll)N 1() t \ 
9,0UNTY 0~ !<DOTEll!AJ J SS 
r1LED: 
IANO. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'AJene1 ID 83816--3019 
Telephone: (208) 765-4050 
Facsimile: (208) 765-9089 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
Attorney tor Plai'ntiff 
?.01011ny -2 P/1 J: 18 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
DEP[j'f\·----
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE: OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREeNFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
\,'8, 
ERIC J. WURMLINGER and 
ROSALYND D. WURMLINGER, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. cv~10.a209 
REPLY TO COUNTER Cl.AIM 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
(he-reinafter. "Greenfield"), by and through her Attorney of Record, !AN D. SMITH, and 
hereby provides the follow!ng Repty to the Counter Claim filed by the above-named 
Defendants, ERIC J. WURMLINGER and ROSALYND D. WURMLINGER, husband 
and wife (hereinafter collec1ively: ·wurmlinger"), in the above-entitled matter. 
REPLY TO COUITTER CLAJM - 1 -
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REPLY 
Each and every allegation set forth in the Counter Claim is hereby denied unless 
specifically admitted herein. 
1. 
Paragraph 1 of the Counter Claim does not contain a factual allegation, and the 
same is therefore denied. 
2. 
Greenfield denies the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the 
Counter Claim. 
3. 
Paragraph 5 of the Counter Claim does not contain a factual allegation, and the 
same is therefore denied. 
4. 
Greenfield denies the allegations contained within Paragraph 6 of the Counter 
Claim. 
5. 
Paragraph 7 of the Counter Claim does not contain a factual allegation, and the 
same is therefore denied. 
REPLY TO COUNTER CLAIM - 2 -
I 
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6. 
Greenfield denies the allegations contained within Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the 
Counter Claim. 
7. 
Paragraph 10 of the Counter Claim does not contain a factual allegation, and the 





Greenfield denies the allegations contained within Paragrnph 11 of the Counter 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted; 
2. Unclean Hands; 
3. Statute of Limitations; 
4. . Estoppel; 
5. Consent, and; 
6. Waiver. 
WHEREFORE: Greenfield prays for the following relief: 
1. That Wurmlinger's Counter Claim be dismissed, with prejudice; 
2. For an award of attorney fees and costs against Wurmlinger for 
Greenfield's defense of thE3 Counter Claim, and; 
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3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems to be fair and 
equitable ~r the circumstances. 




County of Kootenai ) 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That I am the Plaintiff in the above-named action, that I have read the foregoing 
Reply to Counter Claim, I know the contents thereof, and I state the same to be true 
and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
lu 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this :J.- day of November, 2010. 
Notary Public lil!r: ~ ~ (~ 
Commission Expires: o3. /3 · ;:lo(o?, 
REPLY TO COUNTER CLAIM - 4 -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ir:J day of November, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method as indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Gary I. Amendola 
"Amendola & Doty, PLLC 
702. N. Fourth Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
• -• I-•· ' 
REPLY TO COUNTER CLAIM 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[ ] Certified U.S. Mail 
[] Overnight Mail 
[X s lie To: (208) 765-1046 
-5-
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p. 1 
IAN D. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
6-08 Northwest Boulevard, Suita-101 
P.O. Box3019 
Coeur d1Alene, ID 83816-3019 
Tel.ephone: (208) 765-4050 
Facsimile: (;208) 765-9089 
Ida-ho State Bar No. 4696 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
., 
~0-ll APR -7 Pr/' J: 40 
CL£ . RK DfSiRICT COU 
~.\\ _:___u "" ~T 
DEP[r'R~-:.,1' '0v ·0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT -OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
P·laintiff, 
vs. 
ERIC J. WURMLINGER and 
ROSALYND D. WURMLING·ER, 
husband and wife, 
Def end ants. 
OP.DER RE: MOTION TO AMEND PRE-TRIAL 
ORD.ER RE DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT 
WITNESSES, MOilON FOR ORDER 
PERMITTING ENTRY UPON DEFENDANT'S 
REAL PROPERTY, M0110.N FOR SANCTIONS 
AND FOR ORDER REQUIRING COMPLIANCE 
9ASE NO. CV-10-8209. 
ORE>E-R RE: 
MOTION TO AMEND PRE-TRIAL · 
ORDER RE: DISCLOSURE OF 
. EXPERT WITNESSES 
MOTION FOR ORDER PERMITTING 
ENTRY UPON DEFENOANT1S . 
. REAL PROPERTY 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AND FOR ORDER REQUIRING 
COMPLIANCE WITH RULE. 30(c) 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
WITH RLl!~E 30{c}, AND MOTION TO COMPEL - 1 -
i ··.EXH181t•··· 
l·:.:~-.-~314··· >~ 
-~ . ..· .. 
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The above-named Plaintiff, CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD (hereinafter: 
"Greenfi~ld"), by and through her attorney of record, IAN D. SMITH, moved the Court 
for the entry of the following Orders: 
1. Amending th_e Pre-Trial Order herein to· permit Greenfield an extension of 
time to disclos·e expert witnesses. 
p.2 
· 2.· · · ·permitting Green"field to enter upon the real property of the Defendants 
herein for the following~ oses~ --------------------_j 
A. To in~pect and photograph the interior of the Defendant'.s 
residence to determine the. number of rooms which are utilized by 
their bed and breakfast business; 
' . 
B. To inspect and photograph the exterior of the Defendanfs 
residenC6 to determine tne extent of the use of the grounds by their 
bed and breakfast business; 
. . 
C. To conduct and phot6g~a-ph a survey to determine the location of 
the property line between Greenfield's property and the 
Defendant's real property and ta determine the location of certain 
shrupbery in relationship to said property line; and 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO AMEND PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER RI:: D1SCLO$URE OF EXPERT 
WITNESSES, MOTION FOR ORDER 
PERMITTING ENTRY 'UPON DEFENDANT'S 
REAL PROPERTY, MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AND FOR ORDER REQVIRlNG COMPLIANCE 
WITH RULE 30(c), AND MOTION TO COMPEL · 2 -
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0. To permit an arborist to inspect the shrubbery at issue herein. 
3. Sanctioning the Defendant and Defendant's counsel by requiring the 
Defendant and/or Defendant's counsel ta reimburse the Plaintiff her 
reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in taking the Defendant's 
deposition, and the prosecution of this Motion. 
4. . . Requiring the.Defendant to comply with Rules 3Q(c) and 30(d) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and not refuse to answer any questions 
posed during the deposition of the Defendant. 
5. Compelling Responses to the following Requests for Production of 
Documents: 
A RFP No. 16 
B. RFP No. 6 
C. RFP No. 7 
D. RFP No. 8 
E. RFP No. 9 
F. RFP No. 10 
G. RFP No. 11 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO AMEND PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER RE DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT 
WITNESSES, MOTION FOR ORDER 
PERMITIING ENTRY UPON DEFENDANT'S 
REAL PROPERTY, MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AND FOR ORDER REQUIRING COMPLJANCE 






Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 210 of 710
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H. RFP No. 12 
I. RFP No. 13 
J. RFP No. 14 
K. RFP No. 15 
L. RFP No. 17 
M. RFP No. 18 
N. RFP No. 1-9 
The matter came before the Court for hearing on the 171h day of March, 2011, 
the Court having considered said Motions, the argument of the Parties and the files and 
recortj~ hE?rein; 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
THAT: 
1. The Motion to Amend the Pre-Trial Ord·er herein to permit Greenfield an 
extension of time to d_isclose expert ~itnesses shall be, and hereby is, 
granted. The Parties shall stipulate to a new date by which Greenfield 
shall dis-close expert witnesses .. If the Parties cannot agree 1 the Court 
,•' 
shall retain jurisdiqtion over this issue and enter an date accordingly. 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO AMEND PRE·TRIAL 
ORDER RE DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT . 
WITNESSES, MOTION FOR ORDER 
PERMITIING ENTRY UPON DEFENDANT'S 
REAL PROPERTY, MOTION FOR SANCTtONS 
AND FOR ORDER REQUIRJNG COMPLIANCE 
WITH RULE :30(c), AND MOTION TO COMPEL - 4 -
p.4 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 211 of 710
Apr 05 2011 11:58AM f D. SMITH ATTORNEY 20~ 65-9089 
2. The Motion to permit Greenfield to enter upon the real property of the 
Defendants herein sha II be, and hereby is, granted as follows: 
A. . To permit Greenfield's agent to inspect'and photograpt) the interior 
of the Defendant's residence to determine the number of rooms 
which are utilized by their bed and breakfast business; 
B: ·. - ·-·:r-o permit Greenfield's agent to inspect and photograph the exterior 
p.5 
of the Defendani's residence to determine the extent of the u_s_e_oJ _____ 1 
the grounds by their bed and breakfast business; 
C. To permit Greenfield's agent to conduct and photograph a survey 
to determine;; ths=t lgg~Jign of the prn~J::_cty line betws?Jen Greenfield's 
property and the Defendant's real property and to determine the 
location of certain shrubbery in relationship to said property line; 
and 
., . 
D. To permit an arborist to inspect the shrubbery at issue herein. 
3. The Motion ta Sanction the Defendant and Defendant's counsel shall l;)e, 
and hereby is, denied. However, Greenfield shall be, and hereby is 
permitted to conduct a renevyed deposition of Rosyland Wurmlinger. 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO AMEND PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER RE DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT 
WITNESSES, MOTION FOR ORDER 
PERMITTING ENTRY UPON DEFENDANT'S 
REAL PROPERTY, MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AND. FOR ORDER REQUIRING COMPUANCE 
WITH RULE 30(c), AND MOTION TO COMPEL · 5 · . 
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4. The Defendants shall be, and hereby are ordered to provide responses to 
the following Requests for Production of Documents within thirty (30) days 
of March 17, 2011: 
RFP No. 8; 





RFP No. 1 O - Year 2000 to present; 






RFP No. 12 - Year 2000 to present; 
RFP No. 16; 
RFP No. 17; 
RFP No. 18 - Year 2000 ta the present; and 
RFP No. 19 - Year 2000 to the present. 
DATED this ] day of April, 2011. 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO AMEND PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER RE DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT· 
WITNESSES, MOTION FOR ORDER 
PERMITTING ENTRY UPON DEFENDANT'S 
REAL PROPERTY, MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AND FOR ORDER REQUIRING COMPUANCE 
WITH RULE 30(c), AND MOTION TO COMPEL - 6 -
District Court _Judge 
p.6 
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CERTIFlCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the --1- day of April, 2911, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing -document to be served by the me'thod as indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Gary r. Amendola 
Amendola & Doty, PLLC 
702 N. Fourth Street 
Qoeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified u:s. Mail ~1 ~~ 
[ ] Overnig·ht Mail ef 
[X] Facsimile To: (208) 765-1046 
Ian D. Smith [] Hand-delivered 
-----Attomerat-i:--a·~w~----------[TRegular U.S. Mail 
PO Box3.019 [] Certified U.S. Mail \[~ 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381-6-3019 [] Overnight Mail 11 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO AMEND PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER RE DIS-CLOSURE OF EXPERT 
WITNESSES, MOTION FOR ORDER 
PERMITTING ENTRY UPON DEFENDANT'S 
REAL PROPl:RTY, MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AND .FOR ORDER REQUIRING COMPLiANCE 
WlTH RULE 30(c}, AND MOTION·ro COMPEL 
[X] Facsimile To: (208) 765-9089 
- 7 -
p.7 
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JAN D. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
( 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
Telephone: (208) 765-4050 
Facsimile: (208) 765-9089 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STATE OF JOilJ~O } 
fOUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
rlLED: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRlSTlNA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERIC J. WURMLINGER ?nd 
ROSALYND D. WURMLINGER, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-10-8209 
· ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES FOR DEFENDANT'S 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
ORDER COMPELLING DISCOVERY 
The above-named Plaintiff, CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD (hereinafter: 
"Greenfield"), by and through her Attorney of Record, /AN D. SMITH, filed a Motion for 
Sanctions and Attorney Fees for Defendant's failure to Comply with the Order 
Compelling Discovery against the above-named Defendants., ERIC J. WURMLINGER 
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES FOR 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY 
WITH ORDER COMPELLING DISCOVERY - 1 " i· .· . EXHIBIT 
~· '' · .. ·· .·. 
'f''9$':···~ 
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and ROSALYND D. WURMLINGER, husband and wife (hereinafter collectively: 
"Wurmlinger"). The hearing came before the undersigned on the 21s1 day of June, 
2011. After considering said Motion, the argument of the Parties, and after review of 
the files and records herein, and good cause appearing; 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
THAT: 
1. Wurm linger shall, no later than 5:00 p.m., July 20, 2011, provide 
----------G r-eeAfi eld-with-zdt111-response-to-(3reenfie-ld'-s-Req uestsforP roa ucfion 
No,'s 10, 11, 12, 16, 18 and 19 as previously ordered, and; 
2. Greenfield shall be, and hereby is, awarded her reasonable attorney fees 
and costs against Wurmlinger that were incurred in prosecuting tt,e 
Motion for Sanctions and Attorney Fees for Defendant's failure to Comply 
with Order Compelling Discovery and for prosecuting Greenfield's Motion 
to Amend Pre-Trial Order and Continue Trial. 
DATED this d l\ day of June, 2011. 
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES FOR 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY 
District Court.Judge 
WITH ORDER COMPELLING DISCOVERY - 2 -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '17 day of June, 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Ian D. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816,.3019 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[ ] Certified U.S. Mail 
[] Overnight Mail______ k iY1 
· d2[Facsif!]~__: (208) 7~ 7r 
Eric & Rosalynd Wurmlinger [ 1 Hand-delivered 
212 S. Parkwood Place [X] Regular U.S. Mail 
----Post-falls-;--IB-8-S85-.4--------rrcertifieaTrS-:-l'v1afl------------~, 
Douglas S. Marfice 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 NodhwestBoulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES FOR 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY 
[] Overnight Mail 
[ J Facsimile To: 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail q ·! g 
rFacsimile To: (208) 664-5884-._,_ ff '.)__ 1 
WITH ORDER COMPELLING DISCOVERY - 3 -
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:1AN D.·SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
6b8 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.b. Box 3019 
Gdewd'Aline,JD 83816-3019 
Tefephpne:{208) 765A050 
· Facs/rnilft {208) 765~9089 
Idaho 'State:Har No. 4686 
. ·, .. ···· ...... . 
AftorneffpkPlaintiff 
. . .... 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE . '·· '.':.?·>.:}. . ., 
i),(::.i'.fsTATE_Q.f JDAHD, .lN-ANo-i:;_oR-THE G8UNTY- OF~KO:OTENAl- -
:- ',::"." :• -/~ :'·_ --,,,, .. ,-- ... -,--, . -·--- ' . . ' '. . ''-




,,. ·:" ·.,.:·;·;,~/::.-.··:··./·:,~ 
_·:--· 'e.~f~:f?WWRfltlLINGER and 
,_ROSALYND Q.,WURMLJNGE'.R, 
· -,-·:r:.f t~:n:1rr~;ci,~.-•'.Hi.~,.-_ 
·. Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-10-8209 _-
PLAINTIFF'S EXPEi31)yjfNE$S 
DISCLOSURE 
•bqivti$ J:jOVV, the above-named Plaintiff, CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
(herei6a'H§/{?qr~§.&fi~lq;'), by and through her attorney of record, IAN D. SMITH, ancJ 
• "',{··.:·. /· :. ·•.'.: ";:·,,;_. •• :•C ',",'.:,: •• : ::•;J:..:'.::> .. '· • .. •'. 
pur~u~Fi'(to'th~ P.?e;Jria) Order herein hereby submits the Plaintiff's Expert Witness -- . 
. :: .. :::.:_:; :k;:<i/rtii:0;\i::Cti//./i .. :t·:<::-0:·.=· .. -.. · ... --.· -· 
p.if~l,9'~~f~J?J-s~:;1:R.,8,Y~;:'n~.n1ed Defendants, ERIC J. WURML/NGER and ROSALYND·. 
' , 
0 
:_ '· '(;._ ·1-
1
/,.' :· •• :·1·,· ·. · .. ··· f :,~\:/ '1, ',, :I";;;·,: .' ' 
D. ,W't.JJ~~(1Nq~·1r').usb~hd and wife (hereinafter: "Wurmlinger") .. 
'PtAiA~~~\iiJf ~j~~~:o;;y~els 
DISCLOSURE:>.,,-. i.... - 1 -
. :, . :\ .. :·:.:::,: :·. :::,··:.=, ::/:.'.,<,\,) .:::;-:: .'.'\/\)·:·.· . 
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1. John Wilhelm, Residential Appraiser Ill., .Kootenai County Assessor, 45.1 
Government Way, P.O. Box 9000, Coeur d1Alene, ID 83816-9000, (208) 
446-1500 x1540. It is anticipated that Mr .. Wilhelm will testify that 
Greenfield's real property is taxed as river view property and that an 
obstruction of Greenfield's river view will result in a reduction in the 
· assessed value of Greenfield's real property. This opinion is supported by 
the records of the Kootenai County assessor relative to Greenfield's real 
prORE?rt':lc3.JJ.d._ ttle._exp_e.dence of Mr.-Wilhelm. =fhe-qualifications·Df Mc- ---· 
Wilhelm, beyond his employment as a Residential Appraiser are 
unknown. Any publications authored by Mr. Wilhelm are unknown. Mr. 
Wilhelm is not being compensated. It is unknown in what other cases Mr. 
Wilhelm has te$tified at trial or by deposition. 
2. Dusty Obermeier, Surveyor, Ruen-Yeager & Associates, Inc.I 3201 North 
Huetter Road, Suite 102, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814. It is anticipated 
that Mr. Obermeier will authenticate survey of property lrne and 
relationship of shrubbery thereto which he performed. The survey 
performed by Mr. Obermeier reflects the opinion of Mr. Obermeier as to 
the location of the property line and the relationship of shrubbery thereto. 
The qualifications of Mr. Obermeier, beyond his Hcensing and employment 
as a Surveyor are unknown. Any publications authored by Mr. Obermeier 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURE - 2 -
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ar:e unknown. Mr. Obermeier is not being compensated for his testimony. 
It is unknown in what other cases Mr. Obermeier has testified at trial or by 
deposition. 
3. Joe Zabaly·, Arborist, President, Northwest Plant Health Care, P .0. Box 
1978, Post Falls, Idaho 83877. It is anticipated that Mr. Zaba!y will testify . . 
concerning the type, nature, growth· rate, and cost of the shrubbery 
allegE;Jdly injured by Greenfield herein and conclude that the shrubbery at 
- · -- -- -- -- issue herein Is relatively inexpensive~ Is Mealthy~-ahd has not been · 
damaged by the acts of Greenfield. Mr. Zabaly has personally inspected 
the shrubbery at issue herein. · Mr. Zabaly is an International Society of 
Arboriculture (ISA) Certified Arborist with 18 years of experience. Mr. 
Zabaly is the president of Northwest Plant Health Care. The qualifications 
of Mr. Zabaly, beyond his certification as an Arborist, and President of 
Northwest Plant Health Care, are unknown. Mr. Zabaly's business, 
Northwest Plant Health Care, publishes a newsletter entitled: "Let's Talk 
Trees", Any publications authored by Mr. Zabaly other than this are 
unknown: Mr. Zabaly will be compensated for his testimony in an amount 
yet to be determined. ft is unknown in what other cases Mr. Zabaly has 
testified at trial or by deposltlon. 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WIT.NESS 
DISCLOSURE -3-
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4. Patricia Easton, Licensed Clinical Socia[ Worker, 1800 Lincoln Way, Suite 
202 Coeur d'Afene, Idaho, 83814. It rs anticipated that Ms. Easton will 
testify that Greenfield suffers from depression, anxiety, fea:r, panlc1 Joss of 
income, feeling of loss of home, and feelings of loss of identity as a result 
of the issues with Wurm linger _as set forth in the Complaint herein. Ms. 
Easton's opinion is th~ result of weekly therapy sessions which she has 
had with Greenfield .and her training as a Licensed Clinical Social Worker. 
- The_q ua lrfication-Gf Ms.-Easton··beyond··her·state ·ce"rtlficatiori-a na -- ... 
employment as a Therapist are unknown. It is unknown what 
publications, if any, have been authored by Ms. Easton. Compensation 
for Ms. Easton's testimony has not been discussed with Ms. Easton. It is 
unknown b1 what other cases Ms. Eastqn has testified at trial or by 
deposition. 
5. Dr. Frederick Ambrose, Women's Clinic of North Idaho, 980 W. Ironwood 
Dr. Suite 306, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814. It is anticipated that Dr. 
Ambrose will testify that he is familiar with Greenfield's general medical 
history and specifically the surgery which he performed upon Greenfield 
in February 2010. It is anticipated that Dr. Ambrose will testify that 
Greenfield's condition and surgery was the result of stress she was 
experiencing. The opinion of Dr. Ambrose is the resu.lt of his personal 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURE - 4 -
. .. __ l. 
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knowledge of Greenfield and his physician/patient relationship with 
Greenfield. Greenfield's medical records support the opinion of Dr. 
Ambrose. Other than befng licensing as a physician, it is unknown what 
other any qualifications Dr. Ambrose possesses. It is unknown what 
. publications, if any, Dr: Ambrose has authored. The compensation of Dr. 
Ambrose has yet to be determined. ·It is unknown what other cases, if.any, 
in which Dr, Ambrose has testified as an av ... ~= ai trial or by deposition. 
'k. ' 
__ DATEDJh1s j=- __ day_of-Januaryr20-
Attorne 
CERTIFJCATE OF SERVICE 
. I hereby certify'that on the q ~ay of January, 2012, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing doc~t to be served by the method as indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
John C. Ri$eborough 
Paine Hamblen LLP 
717 W. Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, WA 99201 
PLAINT)FF'S EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURE· 
[] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mail 
[] Overnight Mail 
[X] F . o: (509) 838-0007 
- 5 -
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feb J6,2012 8:44HM l U. SMllH HIIUHNEY 
IAN D.·SMrtH 
Attorney at Law . 
608 Northwest Boulevard ,·Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019· 
Coeur•d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
Telephone: (208) 7.65-4050 
F acsimllt;·: (208) 765-9089 · 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
Attorney for. Plaintiff 
2 r I, 6 5 - 9 08 9 
'; 
' ' 
. ·,.',.,, ,' '\·,, . ' , .. , . ·•,··. 
~. ,"'• ,r: . ' ' . ' •." 
' ·,:. 
' \I. ·1· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
p.3 
' ' ~ 
- ~-- -------=--·-·------· -.-- --- - -- ~---·-·····-:::.:--: . .:- - - ---- - - --=-------·---·- -· --· 
--~---······ ,-.-,.-
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J, GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERIC J. WURMLJNGER and 
ROSALYND D. WURMLINGER, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-1 O-S209 
STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
The above-named Plaintiff, CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD (hereinafter: 
"Greenfield"), by and through her at~orney of record, IAN D. SMITH, and the above-
named Defendants. ERIC J. WURMLINGER.and ROSALYND D. WURM LINGER, 
' ' 
husband and wife (hereinafter: "Wurmlinger"), by and through their attorney of record, 
JOHN· C. RISEBOROUGH, and having stipulated and agreed to the entry of a · 
STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 
ORDER - 1 - . i .. t}(HIBIT 
.. !:J . r:r1-·· .. -. - -
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~eb 1~ 2Ul2 8:44HM I D. SMITH ATTORNEY 
20 765-9089 
r, 
. . . 
fiOtective Order herein; the.Cour:t having reviewed said S-tipulatlon, the files and 
' ' ' 
. records herein, and good. cause appearing; 
NOW. THEREFORE, IT IS H~REBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
AS FOLLOWS: 
1 . Any and all documents produced by Greenfield relative to her medical 
. _ ... __ history and con9ition may be reviewed by Wurm lingers ·in the office of 
p.4 
their attorney, ·but may not be copied or removed from said ·office. __ 
.-- ~":.· .. :·.:-_-::--:;-·---:-,---------: ... _:-·-:-.·-:::.::--::--7"".-:- ... - -;-:-:--.... .. : . .. -·· -·· .. 
·:- .. -:: .. -:···::.-. :- ---- -- - --
2. Wurmlingers may not disclose· any information about Greenfield's medical 
history end condition to any third party; 
3. Greenfield's medical records may be copied and provided to any E:Jxpert 
retained by Wurmlinger. 
4. Greenfield's medical records may only be used in this case and may be 
admitted inio evidence, but may not be disclosed to any third party except 
as provided herein. 
5. At the conclusion of this case, any copies of Greenfield's medical records 
in the possession of Wurmringer's attorney and/or Wurmlinger's experts 
must be returned to Greenfield. 
6. Greenfield's medical records, history and condit(on are cohfidential and 
shall not be disclosed by Wurmlinger, Wurmlinger's attorney and/or 
experts to any third party for any reason. 
STIPULATED PROTECTNE 
ORDER .. - 2 -
---·· ······-·· --· ·---·· --- . ----·- .- ---·----.--.. --.-----·--------- . ·-·-··· -·· '-----· --·-
-·---·--·---- --- -· -- --
---J 
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Feb 16 2012 8:44AM I D. SMITH ATTORNEY 20( '85-9089 
DATED this _J]_ day of February, 2012. ,· ."~·,. . 
LANSINtrL. HAYNES 
District Court Judge · 
CERTIFICATE Of SERVICE 
.• j ,.., -" ,;- ,_. Jher~by certify that o.n .the i2__ day of February, 2012, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document- to. be served by the method as indicated below, 
and·addressed to the following: 
John C. Riseborough 
Paine Hamblen LLP 
717 W. Sprague Avenue, Suite 1.200 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Ian D. Smith · 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 30.19 
Coeurd'AJene, ID 83816 
[] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mai! 
[] Overnight Mail · 
fr·'!- [XJ Facsimile To: 509-838-0007 
f] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Certified U.S. Mail 
[ J Overnight Mail 
,7 -:;e,.:i;, [X] Facsimile To: 208-765-9089 
S'o 
. STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
9 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
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02-14-'12 11:11 FROM-Kootenai Dist Court 
!AND. SMITH 
Attorney a1 law 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O; Box .3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
Telephone: (208) 765-4,050 
Facsim lie: (208) 765-9089 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
Attorney for PlaintJff 
T-395 ?0001/0001 F-205 
STATE OF IOAHO · 
COUl·fff OF 1rnorrnA1~SS 
FILEO: -
20/?f[R /Ii .f:r'.//: // 
Clf.J:rs 01$ TR.lCT COURT 
••; ••••••'·'--·· .,,. r 
- .. -·- - -
- -- ----- --- IN-THE 131ST°RICTCOURTOF THE-FI.RS-TJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TH~ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plalntiff1 
1/S. 
ERIC J. WURMLINGER and 
ROSALYND D. WURMLINGER1 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. Cl/-10-8209 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
COMES NOW, IAN D. SMITH, the attorney of record for the above-named 
Plai'ntiff, CHRISTINA J. GREENFJELO (hereinafter: "Gr~nfie/d''), and pursuant to Rule 
11 (b)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves the Couri for :the issuance 
ofan Order permitting the unde~signed ta wnhdraw as the attorney of record for 
Greenfield ln the above-€ntMled matter. 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW - 1 - t EXHIBIT ·"' 
-~... ·. . . 
/l; .·. -.·· ·. ---·- ··------·· - ~~~~8~ .. _· _,. 
r .. 
- - - ·---- - -- ------ --- --- - -- --- -----··----. ·--·--·--. -·----··-- ··-····- ----. --··-- -
!-, 
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This Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons that 
1. There are fundamental differences between the undersigned and 
Greenfield on the manner in which Greenfield's claims herein should be 
prosecuted and how Greenfield should defend against the Defendant's 
claims herein. As a result, the attorney/client relationship has broken 
down to such an extent that it is impossible for the undersigned to 
continue representing Greenfield; 
2. There are fundamental differences between the undersigned and 
Greenfield concerning the nature and extent of discovery which should be 
obtained. As a result, the attorney/client relationship has broken down fo 
such an extent that it is impossible for the undersigned to continue 
representing Greenfield; 
3. Greenfield has expressed a lack of trust and anger relative to her 
representati~n by the undersigned. As a result, the a·ttorn~y/client 
relationship has broken down to swch an extent that it is impossible for the 
undersigned to continue representing Greenfield; 
DATED this / L/t;;,y of February, 2012. 
____ .... 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW - 2 -
·-·-·- -- ···--· --------------·-· -·-·-.. ---·-·-- -----···-··-·- --- ---·----- -·--- _., _____ --- --·-------·------ .. -·-·· - - . -
------··-·-· -·- ----·-·- -·- - --·-------- --- - -- - ---·--·- ·--·- --
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I tf ;;y of February, 2012, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing. document to be served by the method as indicated below, 
and addressed to the· foll'owing: 
John C. Riseborough 
Paine Hamblen LLP 
717 W. Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, WA 99201 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
[] Hand-delivered 
[] Regular U.S. Mail 
[] Ce.rtified U.S. Mail 
[] Overnight Mail 
[X] Fae · · To: (509). 838-0007 
- 3 -
--·-·--···---·-··--- -.. --------·--·----····--·----·-· ---------------------
---·- - --- - -------·-- ------ -------- ---·- --··-·- -- ---·-----·- ---- _______ ,, .. __ 
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JAN O. SMITH· 
ATIORNEY AT LAW . 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite i Oi 
P.O. Box 30i9 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-30i9 
Phone: (208) 765-4050 Fax: (208) 765-9089 
email: lanSmithLaw@gmail.com · 
Invoice submitted to: . 
Christina J. Greenfield 
21 O S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls ID 83854 
Invoice # 20428 
In Reference To: Greenfield v. Wurmlinger 
Case No. CV-10-8209 
For professional services rendered 
Previous balance 
Accounts receivable transactions 
i 0/6/20i 1 Write off - convert to Flat Fee 
Total payments and adjustments 
Balance due 
October 06, 2011 
Thank you! We appreciate your business. 
For your convenience we accept Visa, MasterCard, 
Discover and American Express payments over the 
phone. Accounts ~O+ days past due will be charged 
· interest al (he rate of 18% per annum. 
Amount 
0.00 $10,000.00 
$1, i 28.o'o 
($i,128.00) 
($1,128.00) 
~. · '.EXHIBit i. · • · .· l·>' .... ,. ' ···--.. ----·--·----·-·--·----------- . :~~<---.' 
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IAN 0. SMITH 
6\ITORNEY AT LAW 
THE SPOKESMAN REVIEW BUILDING 
608 NORTHWEST BOULEVARD, SUITE 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
COEUR D'ALENE, JD 83816-3019 
March 4, 2012 
Christina June Gmenfield 
21·0 S. Parkwood Place 
. Post Fairs, ID 83854 
Re: Refund 
Dear Chris: 
TELEPHONE: (208) 765-4050 
F ACS1MILE: (208) 7 65-9089 
E-MAIL: IANSMJTHLA W@GMAIL. COM 
Enclosed herewith is Check Number 1737 made out to you in the amount of 
-$rO~OOO~OO. ByWayofllii~fGheck I am·rerunaTng·fo-yoiT the-entirety of th-eflaflee-
which you provided to me in the civil case. 
an~· Smith 
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) 
STATE OF JDAHO 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JDDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERIC J. WURMLINGER and 
ROSALYNN D. WURMLINGER, 
husband and wife 
Defendants. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV-10-8209 
) 
) 
7--~ .·. -MEI\fORANbUM trrtctsro'N°AND · 
) ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 




) _______________ ) 
Christina J. Greenfield, Pro Se 
John C. Riseborough, Attorney for Defendants 
Defendants' Motion to Strike is Granted in Part and Denied in Part. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted in Pmi and Denied in Pmi. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1994 Defendants built a home in Kootenai Couniy in a neighborhood known as 
Parkwood Place. Defendants have used that residence as a bed and breakfast home business 
("B & B"), and eventually expanded the residence's use to host weddings and receptions. 
Defendants' residence is subject to covenants, conditions and restrictions ("CC&R's''), which 
i EXHIBIT. 
~ . 
-------·-_G_w_~~~~t[J)ji~:crsroN AND oRJ~t~~-gE~1~oc~Jfs~MbgffJiJ-1i~1luMMARY JUDGMENT AND Nit ;rq':-/ 
TO STRJKE Page l ~. . · 
r 
I 
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prohibit the operation of a business in a residence, with the exception of a home occupation 
business. 
Plaintiff bought a parcel of real property and residence in May, 2005, on a lot directly 
adjoining the Defendants' properly. Plaintiff re-modeled her residence throughout the remainder of 
2005, and finally fully occupied her residence in December, 2005. Defendants have asserted that 
Plaintiff knew of the B & B even befme she purchased her residence, whereas Plaintiff avers that 
she did not fully understand the extent of the B & B business until December of 2005. 
The parties agree that a five-foot easement crosses Defendants' property for the benefit of 
the association members subject to the CC&R's, but Defendants have no duty to maintain the 
- --easement. 0 -Defendants are, restricted from placing any Jenee or obstruction-that-interferes,withccthe-. · 
use of the easement. 
Defendants planted and maintained a row of arborvitae on or near the boundary between the 
parties' properties. The arborvitae had grown to a height of ten to twelve feet by April, 2006. 
Plaintiff contends the row of arborvitae constitutes a fence, the CC&R's restrict fence heights to 
five feet, and the Post Falls City Code (in 2006) restricted fence/hedge heights to six feet. In April, 
2006, Defendants lowered the height of the arborvitae to comply with the city code. 
In April, 2007, Defendants accused Plaintiff of trespassing and destroying property. A 
similar accusation was made again in May, 2008, resulting in Plaintiff being charged by the City of 
Post Falls with Trespassing, but the charge was ultimately dismissed. From May to November of 
2008, Plaintiff was actively complaining to Post Falls City authorities that Defendants were 
violating city regulations due to the business and traffic of the B & B operation. 
In April, 2010, Plaintiff hired a man to cut Defendants' arborvitae to a height that she 
believed complied with the city code and/or the CC&R's. Plaintiff was charged by the Kootenai 
! . '·t'·-r 





__ _,G.[ee.11fi.el.d~vs ... Wurmlit1ger ____ ., _____ Supreme_Co.ur.t.D0.ckeLNumberA.1.1.78.20.1.3---·---·--··-----167-of-7-17---- .... - - . - -
MEMORANDUM DECfSION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION 
TO STRIKE Page 2 
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County Prosecuting Attorney with Felony Malicious Injury to Property, although she was not 
ultimately convicted of that offense. 
On September 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed her Verified Complaint alleging/seeking the 
following: 
1. Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief that the B & B, the row of arborvitae and 
obstructions of the easement violate the CC&R's; 
2. Nuisance, Abatement and Damages with respect to her assertion that the arborvitae 
obstructs the view of the Spokane River from the Plaintiff's property, a property listed as a 
"view" property; 
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress from Defendants' refusal to keep the arborvitae 
trinm1ed, false and reckless statements by Defendants that resulted in Plaintiff's arrest and 
criminal prosecutions, the placement of excessive lighting and a camera pointed at i 
--- -,. -- ~- -· -- --Plainti.ff'-.s--propertyi"--trespassing-=by l)efendants-.. -on.. 0.Pl-aintiffs-F)roperty;- --and-.,-false~ and,~ -. - --~- , .. -.. c.,·. -'----
defamatory statements about Plaintiff to neighbors; and 
4. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress from the actions described in #3 above. 
On January 26, 2012, Defendants filed their Motion for Sununary Judgment asserting that: 
(1) the CC&R's issues are barred by the statute oflimitations~ (2) the Nuisarrce claim is barred by 
the statute of limitations and without merit; and (3) that the Intentional and Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress claims ai·e ~aiTed by the statute of limitations and without rp.erit: 
On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Statement of Facts in Support of Plainfiff s 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Substituted and In 
Support of Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. She also, on the same date. filed her 
Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for-Sununaiy Judgment. 
On April 6, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Specific Exhibits Attached to 
Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition. Oral argument on the motions was heard on May 16, 2012, and 
the matters were taken under advisement. 
--·-----Greenfield-v-s.-Wur-mlin9er------Supreme-C0ur.l-[;)0c;:ke.1-Number.-4-'1-1-i'6°2.0-'13 166.of-7-1-7---- ----
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION 
TO STRIKE Page 3 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 233 of 710
II. STANDARDS 
l.R.C.P. 56(e) provides in pertinent part that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify about the matters stated therein." 
I.R.C.P. 56(e). A trial court has the discretion to decide whether an affidavit offered in support 
of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is admissible under Rule 5 6( e). Esser 
Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc. 145 Idaho 912, 188 PJd 854 (2008)(citation 
omitted). 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, j 
.. .. ,- ... ,.,, .. 0.·,., ..... , .................. · .... ~~-· .. · .. ·---- - ------ ---- .... --..... ----- ... --·· ..................... -· ..... --!---· .. .. 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." LR. C.P. 56( c ); Bonz v. 
Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539; 541; 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). In ruling upon a motion for summary 
judgment, all disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Bonz, 119 Idaho at 541,808 P.2d at 878; The burden of proving the absence 
of material facts is upon the moving party. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 
868,452 P.2d 362,365 (1969). 
Once the moving party has properly supported the motion for summary judgment with 
affidavits, admissions or depositions, it is incumbent on the nonmoving party to present opposing 
evidence through depositions, discovery responses and affidavits sufficient to create a genuine 
issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 
2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Petricevich, 92 Idaho at 868,452 P.2d at 365. 
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To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving paiiy's case must consist 
of more than speculation, it must create a genuine issue regarding a material fact. G & M Farms 
v, Funk Irrigation Co,, 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991). A mere scintilla of 
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. Id. If the evidence presented by the nonmoving 
party fails to raise a genuine issue for trial, summary judgment shall be entered against that party, 
I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
In considering the evidence presented in support of or opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment "a court will consider only that material contained in affidavits or depositions 
which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial." Petricevich, 
·· ··· ~ at-869,--452-Y-2d ·(1969);-LR,C.P .. 56(e);-- When there is a-conflict-in-the e-vidence-whiGh-.is- - ,- ·. --~ 
presented, a determination should not be made on summary judgment if the credibility can be 
tested by testimony in court before the trier of fact Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 691 P .2d 
. 1283 (Ct.App. 1984). 
The purpose of summary judgment proceedings is to eliminate the necessity of trial where 
facts are not in dispute and where existent and undisputed facts lead to a conclusion of law which 
is certain. Bergv. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441,444,690 P.2d 896 (1984). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion to Strike 
Defendants' Motion to Strike, in summary, asserted that almost all of the exhibits attached 
to Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition were unauthenticated, hearsay and/or not relevant. Defendants 
objected to some forty-four attached exhibits, but this Court determines that only Exllibit BB, 
which contains photographs of the arborvitae from May 6, 2008, has any evidentiary value to the 
issues before the Court on summary judgment. Consequently, Defendants' Motion to Strike is 
·-·------·---ereenfield·vs:-WtJrmllnger--------S~preme-Go~rt-800ket·N1;Jmi:>er-4-H7-8-204J---------·-·----1-7-0·Gf-7-1-7---·-·····-· 
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granted, in this Court's discretion, with respect to all attached exhibits, except Exhibit BB, because 
the remaining exhibits are irrelevant and stricken. 
B. Summary Judgment 
1. Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief: B & B, Arborvitae and Easement 
Obstruction 
This Court assesses the CC&R's at issue as a written contract between the two parties. As 
such, an action for breach of contract is subject to a five-year statute of limitation that begins to run 
when the Plaintiff becomes aware of the breach. Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 516-17, 198 
P.3d 740, 745-746 (Ct. App. 2008). 
a. TheB &B 
Defendants' argument is that Plaintiff became aware of the B & B operation before she 
bought her property, but at the latest when she bought her residence in May, 2005. They argue that 
her Complaint was filed five years and four months later, and is therefore barred by the I.C. § 5-216 
statute of limitation. 
Because Plaintiff has testified that she did not become aware of the B & B breaching the 
CC&R's until December, 2005 1, and construing the facts in the record in the light most favorable to 
Plaintiff, this Court determines that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to when Plaintiff 
became aware of the alleged breach, and summary judgment as to this issue is denied. It is for the 
jury to decide whether Defendants have proved facts necessary to support their statute of limitation 
affirmative defense. 
b. The Arborvitae 
The evidence before the Court is that Plaintiff knew -of the arborvitae at least as early as 
May, 2005; however, Defendants trimmed the arborvitae in the Spring of 2006, and it is unknown 
-----,Greer:ifisld-vsrWwrmllnger-------Swprsme-Court-t:locket.Number-4-1-1-7-8,20-1.3 - 1.7-1.of-7-1.7.---· 
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when they again grew to a height that may have been a breach of the CC&R's. Thus, there is no 
evidence on which to grant Defendants' sununary judgment request on the statute of limitation 
defense. As such, summary judgment as to this issue is denied. 
c. The Easement Obstruction 
This Court finds that there is no evidence in the record to conclusively detennine when the 
easement was allegedly blocked. Therefore, summary judgment on the statute of limitation defense 
cmmot be granted. 
Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the breach of the CC&R's 
claim is denied. 
2. Nuisance -- - - --- - -
a. Statute of Limitations 
I. C. § 5-101 defines nuisance as "anything which is injurious to health or morals, or is 
indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere 
with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property ... " 
I. C. § 5-201, et. seq. addresses the limitation of various actions; nuisance is not one of the 
listed actions and therefore falls under I.C. § 5-224, Actions for Other Relief.· As such, an action for 
nuisance must be commenced within fom years after the cause of action accrues. 
Defendants argued that the arborvitae were planted in 1995, and had grown to ten feet or 
more when Plaintiff bought her property in May, 2005. They assert that Plaintiff's action for 
nuisance was commenced outside the statute -of limitation by one year and four months. 
As discussed above, the arborvitae were trimmed to what appeared to have been an 
acceptable height in the Spring of 2006, and it is not established in the record the precise time at 
1 Approximately four years and nine months before the Complaint was filed, 
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which the arborvitae again grew to a nuisance height. The record ce1iainly establishes that Plaintiff 
considered them a nuisance in April, 2010, when she hired a man to trim them. To be barred by the 
four-year statute of limitation, Defendants would have to prove that the arborvitae, if they in fact 
constituted a nuisance, were a nuisance on September 23, 2006. There are genuine issues of 
material fact whether that is the case, and it would be improper to grant Defendants' statute of 
limitation defense at this time. As such, summary judgment as to this issue is denied. 
b. Nuisance on the Merits 
Plaintiff has specifically alleged in her Verified Complaint that the arborvitae, when not 
properly trimmed, block the view of the Spokane River from her "view1' property. Thus, there 
exists ·a genuine· -issue ,of~material 0-fact-0 whether-Defendants'.=-arborvitae-·are· an° obstruction-=to ~-. 
Plaintiff's free use and comfortable enjoyment of her property. Summary Judgment is denied as to 
this issue. 
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
a. Statute of Limitations 
Defendants cite I. C. § 5-219(4) and Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 201 P.3d 563 
(2009), for their position that Plaintiff's two emotional distress claims are barred by a two-year 
statute of limitations. Defendants point to evidence in the record that Plaintiff has stated that she 
has suffered emotional distress from Defendants' operation of the B & Bas early as 2006. 
Plaintiff's Verified Complaint alleges that the arborvitae issues discussed previously, 
Defendants' various false and reckless statements to police and Post Falls City officials that led to 
Plaintiffs anest and criminal prosecutions, defan1a.tory statements about Plaintiff to neighbors, 
excessive lighting and a camera pointed at Plaintiffs property, and instances of Defendants' 
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Cobbley v. City of Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 59 P.3d 959 (2002), stands for the proposition 
that a continuing tort is not subject to the applicable two-year state of limitation. In Cobbley, the 
Idaho Supreme Court defined a continuing tort as one inflicted over a period of time, and involving 
v.rrongfu1 conduct that is repeated until desisted. Fwiher, a continuing tort is occasioned by 
continued unlavrful acts, not continued ill effects from an original violation. Cobbley, 138 Idaho at 
157-158, 59 P.3d at 962-963 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff's Verified Complaint establishes facts in the record that Defendants' conduct is a 
continuing series of acts over a period of time, and thus a continuing tort if proved. Therefore, 
Defendants' request for summary judgment based on a statute oflimitation bar is denied. 
To establish a claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, a plaintiff must 
establish four elements: (1) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be 
extreme and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between the v.rrongful conduct and 
the emotional distress; and ( 4) the emotional distress must be severe. Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 
140 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P.3d 623 (2004). The phrase extreme and outrageous is defined as conduct 
exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, and of a nature calculated to cause, or 
does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind. Brown v. Matthews Mortua1y, Inc., 118 Idaho 
830, 801 P.2d 37 (1990). Liability for this intentional tori is generated only by conduct that is very 
extreme. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 180, 75 P.3d 733, 741 (2003). 
The conduct must be not merely unjustifiable; it must rise to the level of "atrocious" and 
"beyond all possible bounds of decency," such that it would cause an average member of the 
community to believe that it was outrageous. Id The district court acts as a gatekeeper for IIED 
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159 P.3d 884 (2007). 
Further, comment (g) to the Restatement (2d) of Torts § 46 (1948), describes in more detail 
the level of conduct necessary for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress: 
In short, the rule stated in this section imposes liability for 
intentionally causing severe emotional distress in those situations in 
which the actors conduct has gone beyond all reasonable boW1ds of 
decency. The prohibited conduct is conduct which in the eyes of 
decent men and women in a civilized community is considered 
outrageous and intolerable. Generally, the case is one in which the 
recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would 
arouse his resentment against the actor and l.ead him to exclaim 
''outrageous!" 
In thls case, the conduct alleged by Plaintiff, even viewed in a light most favorable to 
• · 0 •• • •••· 0 Plaintif:[;csimply does·not.risecto.the,level,of extreme andoutrageous,acts,c, This Court,c~mcludes,,ass 
a matter of law, that no reasonable fact finders could conclude that Defendants acted outrageously 
or beyond all reasonable boW1ds of decency. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted as to Plaintiff's cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress. 
4. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
a. Statute of Limitations 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to a statute of limitations bar is denied for 
the reasons discussed in section 3(a) above. 
b. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress on the Merits 
A claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress requires evidence of some physical 
manifestation of the claimed emotional injury. Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 466, 201 P.3d 
563, 574 (2009). Plaintiff's Verified Complaint does aver physical manifestations of emotional 
distress that include loss of sleep, acid reflux, loss of appetite, increased blood pressure and cardiac 
·---··----Greenfltlld-vs-:-Warmlin-gilT Stipreme-eotirt·B0cket0 Nt1mber-4·11-78~01-3---------'1-75-01-7-H---
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problems. 
Construing the facts in the existing record most liberally in Plaintiffs favor, as is required in 
assessing this summary judgment motion, reveals at a minimum that a genuine issue of material 
fact exists with respect to Plaintiffs claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. See Esser · 
Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, 145 Idaho 912, 918, 188 P.3d 854, 860 (2008)(a 
verified complaint can satisfy the affidavit requirements of I.R.C.P, 56). Therefore, Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment as to the merits of the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
claim is denied. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
-- -~- .. -·-···----------. -- ---- -----·---.. ···-·. - .... 
Defendants' Motion to ·Strike is GRANTED with the exception of Plaintiffs Exhibit BB 
attached to her affidavit. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment re: CC&R's claims is 
DENIED. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment re: Nuisance is DENIED. Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment re: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is GRANTED, 
because Plaintiff has not alleged conduct by Defendants that a reasonable jury could construe to be 
extreme and outrageous. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment re: Negligent Infliction 
ofEmotionalDistress is DENIED. 
Now therefore, based upon the above reasoning, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Strike is granted in part and denied in pmi, as explained 
above; 
2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in pmt,. as 
explained above. 
DATED this~ day of May, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Ji day of May, 2012 a true and conect copy of the foregoing 
was mailed with postage prepaid, faxed, or sent by interoffice mail to: 
John C. Riseborough 
717 W. Sprague A venue, Ste. 1200 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Fax: (509) 838-0007 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
- ~- ---·--- - -~ ·--··· -
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STATEO )AHO ) 
County of Kootenai / 8 
FILED / (' :) /?' ~ /;) 
AT L/ : 0 6 O'clock____Q_M 
CLERK OF THE DlSTJi-lCT COURt 
ldutu~ /::_'L/'--_. 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFKOOTENAJ 
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The scheduled five-day jury trial in this matter commenced on November 26, 2012. On 
November 28, 2012, Plaintiff's case-in-chief concluded, and Defendants moved for a directed 
verdict as to Plaintiff's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. Defendants argued that 
Plaintiff had not presented substantial evidence as to the causation element of this claim as 
Plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. Ambrose, had not testified that Plaintiff's physical manifestations 
were caused by her aIIeged emotional distress. Further, Defendants argued that the Court's 
Memorandum Order Re: Motions in Limine was violated as Dr. Ambrose did not offer medical 
opinion testimony that was held to a reasonable degree of medical ce1iainty. 
The Court granted, in open court, the motion in part and denied the motion in part. This 
Court ruled that Plaintiff had not presented substantial evidenc6 :that any physical manifestations 
~la!lllll-.all!ll!a-~ .... 
·~ . • EXHIBI! 
~· .. 
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of her alleged emotional distress, amounting to a diagnosable medical condition, e.g., 
gynecological or heart. conditions, were proximately caused by the alleged emotional distress. 
The Court ruled that there was substantial evidence presented as to physical manifestations of 
stress known to an average person, i.e. fatigue, exhaustion, sleeplessness and trouble walking. 
As such, this Court ruled that Ms. Greenfield's alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress 
damages, if any, are limited to injuries resulting from fatigue, exhaustion, sleeplessness and 
trouble walking. Additionally, this Court ruled that Dr. Ambrose did not offer medical opinion 
testimony that is held to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
- ------- --- -
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(a), is granted in 
- - - -- - - - - - - -
part and denied in part; and 
2. Plaintiff shall not refer to Dr. Ambrose's testimony in her closing arguments, nor 
shall she request an award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress relating to medical conditions that Dr. Ambrose discussed in his 
testimony, i.e. gynecological and heart related injuries. 
DATED this cl q day of November, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ceitify that on the .:? ? day of November, 2012 a trne and correct copy of the foregoing 
was mailed with postage prepaid, faxed, emailed, sent by interoffice mail or hand delivered to: 
John C. Riseborough 
717 W. Sprague Avenue, Ste. 1200 J 11 , 0 ,·, i..LJJ.J___, 
Spokane, WA 99201 ha10:... ~ 
Fax: (509) 838-0007 
i ohn.riseborough@painehan1blen.com 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83 854 
crystalgreens@yahoo.com 
..£1)'14~ 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: L d~ f2_u__ 
Deputy Clerk 
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m THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CI-IRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintif£1Cmmterclaim Defendant, 
.vs, 
ERIC J. WURMLINGER and 
ROSAlYNND. WURMLWGER, 








MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: 
) - -- - - - - - - -. ) 1: 15LAINTIFF;S MOTION FOR 
) JUDG:MENTNOTW1THSTANDIN"G THE 




2. PLAINTIFPS MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT _______________ ) 
Christina Greenfield, prose, argued for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant. 
John Riseborough, Paine Hamblin LLP, argued for Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is denied. 
Plaintif£'Counterclaim Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment is denied. 
I. Introduction 
In her Complainti Plaintifv'Counterclaim Defendant ("Greenfield") asserted legal claims 
for nuisance and negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well as equitable claims praying for 
injunctive and abatement relief. In their Counterclaim, the Defendants/Counterclaimants 
("Wurmlingers") asserted legal ·claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, trespass and 
timber trespass. 
. 8 .... . 
. •·l: .... EXHIBIT··· .. 
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On November 26, 2012, a five-day jury trial commenced as to the legal claims asserted, 
with the Court reserving Greenfield's equitable claims for detem1ination by court trial. 
Greenfield was represented pro se and the Wurmlingers were represented by attorney John C. 
Riseborough. 
On November 30, 2012, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of the Wurmlingers on 
each of Greenfield's claims, and found in favor of the Wutmlingers on their counterclaims. As 
to Greenfield's claims, the jury found that the Wurm.lingers' maintenance of their arborvitae 
and/or operation of their bed and breakfast did not constitute nuisances. Additionally, the jury 
foW1d that the Wurmlingers had not inflicted emotional distress upon Greenfield. 
As to the Wurmlingers' counterclaims, the jury found that Greenfield had committed 
trespass, but did not award trespass damages. Additionally, the jury found that the arborvitae 
--- -- ---- - ... - - ·- -- . -·- -· - ·- -··· 
were trees and that Greenfield committed timber trespass. The jury awarded the Wurmlingers 
timber trespass damages in the amount of $17,000.00. Lastly, the jury found that Greenfield's 
general conduct negligently inflicted emotional distress on the Wmmlingers, and that the 
negligence was the proximate cause of the Wutmlingers' damages. The jury awarded the 
Wurrnlingers negligent infliction of emotional distress damages in the amom1t of $52,000.00. 
On December 10, 2012, Greenfield filed her Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (''J.N. 0. V. ") along· with her affidavit. · On-December 
21, 2012, the Wurmlingers filed their Memorandum in Opposition. On January 14, 2013, 
Greenfield filed her Reply Brief. 
On January 7, 2013, this Court entered its Order Establishing Post Jury Trial Judgment, 
wherein the Court recited the above trial and verdict summaries and trebled the jury's timber 
trespass damages pursuant to LC. § 6-202. The Court also stated that it would address an award 
of costs, if any, after a final judgment in this matter had been entered. Also, on January 7, 2013, 
this Court entered its Judgment (Jury Trial) that dismissed with prejudice Greenfield's claims at 
--····-·-
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law brought against the Wurmlingers. Further, the Judgment awarded the Wurmlingers 
$103,000.00 as against Greenfield. 
Greenfield's motions came on for hearing on January 16, 2013, and, after the Court heard 
oral argument in support of and in opposition to the motions, the Court took the matters under 
advisement. 
IL Motion for J udgruent Notwithstanding the Verdict 
In her J.N.O.V. motion, Greenfield argues that "no reasonable jury could reach the verdict 
that the jury did in this case." Motion at p. 2. She asserts four arguments in support of the 
motion and requests that this Court enter judgment in her favor. 1 
A. Standard 
··--- -- -------- - - - - - -·--- ·-· -- - - -·--·-- --·- - - -- --· .. .. ··-···· ······-···· ... - .... - -· ---·--·--- -- . ·- -·· 
In Hei v. Holzer, 145 Idaho 563, 181 PJd 489 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Couii 
provided: 
The jury's verdict on factual issues will generally not be disturbed on 
appeal. McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568, 572, 149 PJd 843, 847 (2006). 
This Court will review a jury's factual determination only in exceptional 
circumstances. It is axiomatic that a factual determination made by a jury 
will not be overturned if it is sustained by the evidence. This is particularly 
true in tort actions where the damages cannot be ascertained with 
mathematical precision. Hence, where such injuries are subjective and 
measurable with only an approximation of certainty, their award is 
primarily a question for the jury and an appellate court· should interfere 
with such a verdict only in the most exceptional circumstances. 
Bentzinger v. McMurtrey, 100 Idaho 273, 274, 596 P.2d 785, 786 (1979). 
"[W]hen reviewing a jury verdict on appeal the evidence adduced at trial is 
construed in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed at trial .... " 
Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 722, 
726, 735 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1987). 
£-45 Idaho 563, 566-567, 181 P.3d 489, 492-493. 
In Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129> 219 P.3d 453 (2009), t11e Idaho Supreme Court 
1 Greenfield's motions assert various argwnents (or assertfons) but do not provide which arguments are applicable to 
what motion. At the January 16, 2013, hearing, the Court asked Greenfield to explain which arguments ·apply to 
what motion. She stated that there were three arguments to the J.N.O.V. motion, two arguments to the Motion to Set 
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provided: 
In determining whether a district court should have granted aj.n.o.v. motion, 
this Court employs the same standard the district court used in ruling on the 
motion. Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach Shop, Inc., 131 Idal10 242, 247, 953 P.2d 
992, 997 (1998). An order granting a j .n.o.v. is appropriate when "the facts 
are undisputed" and "there Cfill be but one conclusion as to the verdict that 
reasonable minds could have reached" -namely, that the moving party 
should prevail. O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472, 480, 733 P .2d 693, 701 
(1986). On the other hand, a verdict will be upheld when it is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Jeremiah, 131 Idaho at 24 7, 953 P.2d at 
997. Substantial evidence is evidence of "such sufficient quantity and 
probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the 
jury was proper." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 567, 97 P.3d 428,434 
(2004). Evidence may be substantial even though it is contradicted. Watson 
v. Navistar fnt'l Transp. Corp., 121 Idallo 643, 658, 827 P.2d 656, 671 
(1992). 
In determining whether substantial evidence exists, this Court may not 
- .weigh·~the-·evidence) -:.attempt-to.:.judge ... the= .. credibility~-of .the-witnesses;:..or- ··- -- - - - ··· 
compare its factual findings with those of the jury. Hall v. Farmers Alliance 
Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idalio 313,324, 179 P.3d 276,287 (2008). Instead, the 
Court must review the evidence as a whole, drawing all inferences "in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party" and "view[ing] the facts as if 
the moving party has admitted the truth of all the non-moving [party's] 
evidence." Jeremiah, 131 Idaho at 247, 953 P.2d at 997. The Court will "not 
examine any conflicting evidence presented by the moving party to refute 
the non-moving party's claims." Karlson, 140 Idaho at 567, 97 P.3d at 434. 
Whether there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact for the jury 
is a pure question of law over which this Court exercises free review. O'Neil, 
112 Idaho at 480, 733 P.2d at 701. 
148 Idaho 129, 136-137, 219 P.3d453, 460-461. 
B. Discussion 
Greenfield first argues that the timber trespass claim violates her constitutional protection 
against double jeopardy. She asse1is that a civil timber trespass claim constitutes a double jeopardy 
violation because she had been acquitted in a separate felony malicious injury to properly 
prosecution. 
The Cowi notes that this is not an appropriate issue for a J.N.O.Y. motion. Additionally, in 
Aside Judgment, and one argument applicable to both motions. 
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Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Techs.,. inc., 145 Idaho 563, 181 P.3d 489 (2008), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in denying the plaintiffs J.N.O.V. motion 
where the plaintiff had waited to raise new legal argwnents until after the trial. Such is the case 
here as Greenfield asse1is this argwnent for the first time in the present motion. Further, this Comi 
does not find that a civil claim for timber trespass constitutes double jeopardy on the basis that 
Greenfield had been charged with and later acquitted of a criminal malicious injury to property 
charge. The burden of proof in the.criminal matter was higher than in the instant civil matter. 
Second, Greenfield argues that the jury could not have found that she committed timber 
trespass because the arborvitae were shrubs as opposed to trees. The Court and the jury heard 
testimony from both Greenfield's expert witness, certified arborist Joseph Zubaly, and the 
Wum1lingers' expert witness, Timothy Kastning, certified master arborist. Mr. Zubaly testified that 
the arborvitae were shrubs, but did not testify that they were not trees. He also testified that the 
Wunnlingers' arborvitae could grow to approximately twenty feet in height depending on growing 
conditions. 
Mr. Kastning testified that the industry considers shrubs to be plants that grow less than 
fifteen feet and trees to be plants that grow more than fifteen feet in height. He testified that 
arborvitae can be considered trees because they grow to heights of twenty to twenty five feet. There 
was also evidence presented to the jury that at times the arborvitae were fifteen feet in height. 
The Court, seeing the conflicting evidence as to whether the subject arborvitae were trees or 
shrubs, put a special interrogatory on the special verdict form, as follows: 
Question 14: Based upon the evidence presented to you, do you find that the 
arborvitae are trees? 
Answer to Question 14: Yes LJ No LJ. 
The jury unanimously marked "Yes." Therefore, this Court finds that there was substantial 
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and competent evidence to support the jury's determination that the subject arborvitae were trees. 
Greenfield further argues that even if the arborvitae were trees, the jury could not have 
properly found that the Wunnlingers suffered timber trespass damages because there was no 
evidence presented as to "stumpage value." Additionally, although argued under Greenfield's 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Greenfield appears to also argue that the arborvitae were located on 
her property. 
In Masell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc., No. 38338, WL 646266 (Idaho February 
22, 20 I 3 ), the Idaho Supreme Court provided: 
Where there is no object1on to the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a verdict must be based upon the jury instructions. 
Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 867, n. 6, 292 P.3d 248, 258, n. 6 
·· (2012); ThaHs ,because thejury,-is to apply·.;the law0 as set forth in the jury., 
instructions to the facts in order to reach the verdict. Whether the evidence 
was sufficient to support the verdict will therefore depend upon the law as 
set f01th in the jury instructions. 
WL 646266 at *5. 
In the present matter, the Court's notes and minutes show that the parties were presented 
with the final jury instructions and Greenfield was asked if she had any objections to the 
instructions. She answered that she had no objections. 
Jury Instruction No. 16 provided: 
A trespasser is a person who goes or remains upon the premises of another 
without pem1ission, invitation or .lawful authority. Permission or invitation 
may be express or implied. 
Jury Instruction No. 18 provided: 
On the defendants' claim that plaintiff damaged their trees and arborvitae, 




That defendants owned certain trees and/or arborvitae; and 
That the trees and/or arborvitae were located on the 
defendants' property; and 
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3. That plaintiff damaged or destroyed said trees and/or 
arborvitae; and; 
4. That defendants have sustained damages. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict fom1: 
Did plaintiff damage or destroy defendants' arborvitae and/or spruce tree? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these 
propositions has been proved, then you should answer this question 11 yes. 11 If 
you fincl frem y0ur 0ons·ideration of all the evidence that any of th€se 
propositions has not been proved, then you should answer thi.s question 
11no. 11 
Jury Instruction No. 19 provided: 
Any person who, without pem1ission of the ovmer, girdles or otherwise 
injures any tree on the land of another person, without lav\lful authority, is 
liable to the owner of such land for treble the amount of damages which may 
be assessed therefor. 
Both Greenfield and the Wurmlingers presented the_jury with testimony and documentary 
evidence as to the location of the arborvitae and the property line. It was undisputed that 
Greenfield's agent, acting on CJTeenfield's order, cut the arborvitae. Mr. Kastning and Mr. Zubaly 
both testified to whether the cutting of the arborvitae actually damaged the arborvitae. The 
Wurmlingers presented evidence as to the actual value of the arborvitae. The Wunnlingers 
provided testimony regarding how they valued the trees for specific and personal reasons, namely~ .. 
privacy, rather than stumpage value. 
While it is true that, at one time, timber trespass damages only consisted of the market value 
of the harvested trees as sold for lumber, that is no longer the case in Idaho. Today, timber trespass 
damages may be based upon aesthetic value and other specific and personal reasons. See Weitz v. 
Green, 148 Idaho 851,230 PJd 743 (2010). 
Therefore, this Court finds that there was substantial and competent evidence to support the 
jury's detennination that the arborvitae that were cut were on the Wurmlingers 1 property, that the 
cutting damaged the arborvitae and the amount of timber trespass damages the Wunnlingers 






Third, Greenfield-argues that the jmy should not have considered the Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress claim because the Wunnlingers dismissed that claim with prejudice before trial. 
Again, this does nGt appear to be a proper issue for Ell1 I.R.C.P. 50(b) motion, and was first 
raised in the instant motion. However, this Court will address the matter for clarity purposes. 
The record shows that the Wunnlingers asserted causes of action in their original Answer 
and Counterclaim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress. On February 15, 2011, the Wurmlingers, through their previous com1sel, filed 
a Motion to Dismiss wherein they sought to dismiss their Negligent Inf1iction of Emotional Distress 
claim. The motion was unopposed by Greenfield, and this Court entered an Order of Dismissal on 
March 24, 2011, wherein the Wunnlingers' Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim was 
dismissed with prejudice. The Wunnlingers later filed their Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
asserting causes of action for (1) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (involving 
Greenfield's allegedly harassing and defamatory behavior and other actions), (2) Trespass,. and (3) 
Timber Trespass. 
On October 29,. 2012, this Court entered its Pre-Trial Conference. Order. and Notice of 
Hearing. In its Order, this Court ordered the parties to file briefing as to the remaining claims that 
they would try to the jury and this Court. The Wunnlingers' provided that trespass, timber trespass, 
harassment, and other claims remained for determination. At the pre-trial conference, 
Wunnlingers' counsel provided that the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim was 
being amended to a Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim. 
In Belstler v. Sheler, 151 Idaho 819, 264 PJd 926 (2011), the Idaho Supreme Court 
provided: 








•• C r .... -:-:-- . 
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When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raisedinthepleadings. I.R.C.P. IS(b). · 
The purpos.e of Rule 15(b) is to allow cases to be decided on the merits, 
rather than upon technical pleading requirements. Implied consent to the trial 
of an lmpleaded issue is not established merely because evidence relevant to 
that issue was introduced without objection. At least it must appear that the 
parties understood the evidence to be aimed at the unpleaded issue. 
The determination whether an issue has been tried with the consent of the 
parties is within the trial court's discretion, and such determination will only 
be reversed when that discretion has been abused. In reviewing an exercise 
of discretion, this Comt must consider (1) whether the trial court conectly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted 
within the outer boundaries of its discredon and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether 
the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Hughes v. 
Fisher, 142 Idaho- 474, 483-484, 129 P.3d 1223, 1232-1233 (2006) 
, (citations.and··internal quotes·omitted).. .. - _-:,,, __ cc_--= - - - ·- · 
151 Idaho 819,825,264 P.3d 926,932. 
In the present matter, the first time this issue was raised was in the instant motion. 
Greenfield did not object to the proposed amendment at the pre-trial conference and she did not 
object when this Court granted the amendment. She never objected to the introduction of evidence 
in regards to the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim, nor did she object to jury 
instructions addressed to this claim. Further, she did not object to the final Special Verdict Form 
containing interrogatories relating to this claim. Therefore, this Court in its discretion finds that the 
parties impliedly agreed to try the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim to the jury. 
Lastly, Greenfield ru:gues that the jury should have determined that the arborvitae and the 
bed and breakfast were nuisances. 
The jury was presented with the following instructions as to nuisance. 
Jury Instruction No. 3 provided: 
On plaintiffs' claim of nuisance against the defendants, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
i __ 
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1. That defendants engaged in a course of conduct which was 
injurious to health, or offensive to her senses, or obstructed plaintiffs free 
use of her land; and, 
2. That, considering the parties' right to use their respective 
prope1iies, the defendants' conduct and use of their land was unreasonable; 
and, 
3. The nature and extent of any damages caused by defendants' use 
of their property. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did the defendants' maintenance of the arborvitae and/or operation of the 
bed and breakfast constitute a nuisance'?2 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these 
propositions has been proved, then you should answer this question "yes. 11 If 
you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that any of these 
propositions has not been proved, then you should answer this question 
"no. 11 
· Jury Instruction No. 04°provided: ,c- ····'·0 =· 
One factor in determining whether a landowner's use of their property is a 
nuisance as to a neighboring landowner, is whether the complaining 
landowner "came to the nuisance," i.e. whether the complaining lai1.dovrner 
purchased the neighboring property with knowledge of the use of which she 
later claims to be a nuisance. 
Jury Instruction No. 5 provided: 
A person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or, if 
necessary, destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance; Such 
abatement, however, must be done without committing a breach of the peace 
or doing unnecessary injury. 
Jury Instrnction No. 6 provided: 
Where a private nuisance results from the mere omission of a wrongdoer 
and where the nuisance cannot be abated without entering upon his land, 
reasonable notice must be given to him before entering to abate it. 
At trial, the jury was presented with evidence regarding the purpose of the arborvitaej 
Greenfield's view and the operation of the bed and breakfast. Therefore, this Court :finds that the 
jury had substantial and competent evidence to find that the Wmmlingers' operation and 
Page 10 399 of 717 
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maintenance of the arborvitae and bed and breakfast were not nuisances. 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, and considering the Wurrnlingers' presented evidence 
as true and credible, this Court finds that there was substa11tial and competent evidence to support 
the jury's verdict in this matter. As such, Greenfield's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict is denied. 
III. Motion to Set Aside the Judgment 
Greenfield asserts that the judgment entered in this matter should be set aside because the 
Wmmlingers committed fraud on the court, the evidence submitted to the jury did not show that the 
arborvitae were on the Wunnlingers' property, and the juzy should have determined that the 
arborvitae and bed and breakfast were nuisances. 
A. Standards 
Whether to grant relief under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) is committed to the 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent m abuse of the court1s discretion. In 
reviewing whether or not a court abused its discretion this Court relies on a three-part test: (1) 
whether the trial court correctly perceiv~d the issue as discretionary; (2) whether the trial court 
acted within the bmmdaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards; and 
(3) whether the trial court reached its detennination through an exercise of reason. Flood v. Katz, 
143 Idaho 454, 456A57, 147 P.3d 86, 88-89 (2006). Motions to set aside a judgment are governed 
by equitable principles and "will only be granted in the most unusual of circumstances." Campbell 
v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640,649, 115 P.3d 731, 740 (2005), 
B. Discussion 
Greenfield first asserts that Defendants' Exhibit B ("Monaco Survey) did not comply with 
I.C. § 54-1215(b)-(c) because the exhibit was not signed or dated by the surveyor, John Monaco. 
2 Although this interrogatory contained a combination of the arborvitae and bed and breakfast, a later interrogatory 
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As such, Greenfield contends that because the survey did not comply with the statute, the 
Wwmlingers' submission of the survey constituted fraud upon the court, which prejudiced her 
because it was submitted to and relied upon by the jury.3 Therefore, she argues that the judgment 
should be set aside pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). 
In Rae v. Bunce, 145 Idaho 798, 186 P.3d 654 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court provided: 
Rule 60(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes that courts have 
the inherent power "to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." "The 
tenn 'fraud upon the court' contemplates more than interparty misconduct, 
and, in Idaho, has been held to require more than perjury or 
misrepresentation by a paxty or witness." Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 
328, 334, 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980). It "will be found only in the presence 
of such 'tampering with the administration of justice' as to suggest 'a wrong 
against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public.' " Id. 
(quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,246, 
.. 64 S .Gt. 99'1;=1001, 88 c1.Ed:c 1-250,~l255~6~(l944)}-"1The partycasserting a --- 0 ~ -_ • -·· - • 
claim of fraud on the court must establish.that an unconscionable plan or 
scheme was used to improperly influence the court's decision and that such 
acts prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting its case or 
defense." 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments§ 728 (2006). 
145 Idaho 798, 801, 186 P.3d 654, 657 (2008). 
\Vhile Greenfield is correct that I.C. § 54-1215(b)-(c) contains requirements applicable to 
land surveyors, it is not an evidentiary rule of admissibility. At trial, the jury heard testimony about 
the authenticity of the Monaco Survey. Specifically, there was testimony to the methods of that 
Monaco used to conduct the survey and how his measurements, recordings and findings were 
accurately transferred to the survey. Wmmlingers' counsel then offered the Monaco Survey for 
admission into evidence. Greenfield objected. This Court overruled the objection finding that the 
survey had been sufficiently authenticated. 
A motion to set aside should not be used to "remedy the inadvertence or oversight of one of 
allowed the jury to award individual nulsance damages as to either the arborvitae or the bed and breakfast. 
3 ln her affidavit in support of her motions, Greenfield testifies that she contacted jurors after trial and was informed 
that jurors had relied on Defendants' Ex. B fu making certain determinations. Greenfield has not submitted any juror 
affidavits. As such, this testimony is inadmissible hearsay and has not been consipered by the Court. 
l 
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the parties to the original action. It will lie only in the presence of an extreme degree of fraud." 
Flood, 143 Idaho at 457, 147 P.3d 86 at 89. 
This Court finds that Greenfield has not established that the offering for admission of the 
Monaco Survey was a part of an unconscionable plan or scheme used to improperly influence the 
court's decision. Further, this Court finds that the offering of the survey prevented Greenfield from 
fully and fairly presenting her case or defense. Additionally, this Court does not find any presence 
of 'tampering with the administration of justice' as to suggest 'a wrong against the institutions set 
up to protect and safeguard the public. Specifically, this Court finds that the Wurrnlingers' 
submission of the Monaco Survey does not establish fraud on the court. 
Even assuming that admission of the Monaco survey constituted enor, any error was 
mitigated by Monaco's deposition testimony and other admitted evidence, and therefore, would 
constitute hannless error. White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 891, 104 P.3d 356, 365 (2004) ("A 
judgment may not be disturbed on appeal due to error in an evidentiary ruling unless the error 
affected the substantial rights of a party.") Any defect in the Monaco Survey would go to the 
evidentiruy weight given to the exhibit rather than its admissibility. 
Additionally, Greenfield argues that the Monaco Survey warrants setting aside the judgment.· 
pursuant to LR.C.P. 60(a). In Silsby v. Kepner, 140 Idaho 410, 95 P.3d 28 (2004), the Idaho 
Supreme Court provided: 
Rule 60(a) applies to those errors in which the " ... type of mistake or 
omission [is] mechanical in nature which is apparent in the record and which 
does not involve a legal decision or judgment by an attorney. The clerical 
mistake under Rule 60(a) may be differentiated from the mistake or 
inadvertence referred to in Rule 60(b )(1 ), upon the ground that the latter 
applies primarily to errors or omissions committed by an attorney or by the 
court which are not apparent on the record." (citation omitted) Dursteler v. 
Dursteler, 112 Idaho 594,597, 733 P.2d 815,818 (Ct.App.1987). 
140 Idaho 410, 411, 95 P.3d 28, 29. 




This Court finds that I.R.C.P. 60(a) is inapplicable because there are no clerical errors 
involving the judgment at issue. 
Greenfield next argues the judgment should be set aside because the jury could not have 
found timber trespass because the arborvitae that were cut were on her property. This Court does 
not know what evidence the jury relied upon in making its determination. As provided above, there 
was substantial and competent evidence, albeit conflicting, presented to the jury as to the location 
of the arborvitae. They may have relied upon the Monaco Survey or they may have relied on other 
evidence in determining the location of the trees and the property line. 
Lastly, Greenfield argues that the judgment should be set aside because the jury should have 
determined that the arborvitae and the bed and breakfast were nuisances. As to the arborvitae, 
Greenfield argues that the jmy should have determined that the Wurmlingers planted the arborvitae 
in such a way that the trees constituted a spite fence. Additionally, Greenfield argues that the 
arborvitae and the bed and breakfast should have been found nuisances because both violate the 
CC&Rs of the subdivision where the parties live. The jury was presented with testimony as to the 
reasons for planting the arborvitae and other trees. This Court does not know what evidence the 
... _ jury relied upon in making its finding that the arborvitae were not a nuisance. As to the allege_d 
CC&R violations, those relate to separate equitable claims that will be addressed by this Court in its 
post-court trial memorandum decision and verdict. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds that there was no fraud committed against the 
court and that there is no other I.R.C.P. 60(b) justification to set aside the judgment that was entered 
after the jury trial portion of this action. Therefore, this Court, in its discretion, denies Greenfield's 
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. 
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.IV. Conclusion .. 
Based upon the foregoing, and considering the Wunnlingers' presented evidence as true and 
credible, this Court finds that there was substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's 
verdict in this matter. Further, this Court finds that there was no fraud committed against the court 
and that there is no other I.R. C.P. 60(b) justification to set aside the judgment that was entered after 
the jwy trial portion of this action. 
V. Order 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintif£1Com1terclaim Defendant's 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is denied. 









the Judgment is denied. 
----- ---· ·· ...... -··-r-· - ' 
DATED this Q o~day ofMarch, 2013. 
\_cw_1;,'~ l.B T~ 
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John C. Riseborough 
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Spokane, WA 99201 
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Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
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ERIC J. WURMLINGER and 
ROSALYND D. WURMLJNGER, 







) _______________ ) 
Christina Greenfield,pro se, argued for Plaintiffi'Counterclaim Defendant. 
John Riseborough, Paine Hamblin LLP, argued for Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
I. Introduction 
This lawsuit involves a dispute between neighbors who own adjacent lots in the Park 
Wood Place Subdivision ("Park Wood Place"), located in Post Falls, Idaho. 
On September 23, 201--0, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Chrfstina Greenfield 
("Greenfield'') filed her Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and 
Damages. In her Complaint, Greenfield alleged that Defendants/Counterclaimants Eric and 
Rosalynd WuITI11inger ("Wurmlingers") were operating a bed and breakfast business, known as 
The River Cove Bed and Breakfast, out of their residence. Further, Greenfield alleged that the 
PGo~~n~~~rr:1~--ng=:~~or_an_d_u_m_D_e~~~r=i;=~~=e~~-=d=u~cr-,D""'rd=~=;incN=um=_ 5=e-=--r 4r.r1 =11..s-a-""'20=13,.--p-ag_e_'l _____ ··-Ri-i< 
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lots and residences located in Park Wood Place are subject to certain 1992 recorded covenants, 
conditions and restrictions ("CC&Rs"}that prohibit the operation of any business upon any lot or 
within any residence. 
Greenfield also alleged that the CC&Rs limit the height of fences within Park Wood 
Place to five feet, and that the Wurmlingers planted a shrub fence on or near the property line 
between the two lots that have grown in excess of five feet. Additionally, Greenfield alleged that 
the CC&Rs were amended in 1994 to establish a pedestrian easement over and across the 
Wurmlingers' lot for the use of Park Wood Place lot owners. Greenfield alleged that the 
Wurmling~rs have obstructed the easement by intentionally planting trees and/or shrubs within 
the easement. Further, Greenfield accused the Wurmlingers of failing to remove naturally 
Greenfield asserted four causes of action, to wit: (1) Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive 
Relief; (2) Nuisance, Abatement and Damages; (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 
and, (4) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.· 
As to the first cause of action, Greenfield requested that this Court declare that the 
operation of the bed and breakfast violates the CC&Rs and enjoin current and future business 
operation.s at the Wurmlingers' residence. Further, Greenfield requested that the Court declare 
the shrubs a fence, declare that the fence violates the CC&Rs' height restriction, and enjoin the 
shrubs from exceeding the height restriction in the future. Lastly, Greenfield requested that the 
Court declare that the easement is obstructed, order the Wunnlingers to clear the obstructions at 
their cost, and enjoin any further obstructions. 
As to the second cause of action, Greenfield asserted that the shrubs and trees planted on 
the Wurrnlingers, property obstructed her view of the Spokane River, infringed upon her 
property rights and reduced her property value, all of which constitute a nuisance. Greenfield 
prayed for monetary damages, and requested that the Court enter an abatement order requiring 
Greenfield vs. Wurmllnger Supreme Court Docket Number 41178-2013 423 of 717 
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the Wurmlingers to remove all shrubs and trees located near or on the parties' common property 
boundary and any tree or shrub blocking Greenfield's view of the Spokane River. 
As to the third cause of action, Greenfield asse1ied that the Wunnlingers had entered into 
an agreement with her to maintain the height of the shrubs at no more than six feet in height, but 
the Wunnlingers failed to do so. As such, Greenfield had the shrubs trimmed to the alleged 
agreed upon height. The Wurm.lingers contacted law enforcement which resulted in a Felony 
Malicious Injury to Property prosecution. She alleges that this caused her severe emotional 
distress. Additionally,. Greenfield asserted that the Wunnlingers engaged in extreme and 
,outrageous harassing cqndu,ct (installed cameras .and exterior lighting on their property that were 









--- - -- - -__ , ____ , - -- ,- -, r -- --
As to the fourth cause of action, Greenfield asserted that the Wunnlingers had a duty to 
honor their agreements with her, to pennit her to enjoy her property and to refrain from making 
false and defamatory statements about her to others. Greenfield asserted that the Wurm.lingers 
breached their duty which caused her to suffer emotional distress. She prayed for monetary 
damages. 
On October 17~ 2011, the Wuimlingers filed their Amended Answer and Amended 
Counterclaim. In their Answer, the Wmmlingers admitted that they opemte the bed and 
breakfast from their residence and admitted they had knowledge of the CC&Rs, but denied the 
CC&Rs prohibit the operation of a business within Park Wood Place. The Wurrniingers also 
admitted that they planted shrubs near the property line,_ but denied that the shrubs violated the 
CC&Rs because the shrubs were not a fence. The Wurmlingers admitted that the amendment to 
the CC&Rs encumbered their property with an easement and prohibited them from obstructing 
the easement, but they denied that they had planted trees or shrubs within the easement. They 
also affirmatively defended that the amended CC&Rs do not require them to maintain the 
easement. 
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In their Counterclaim, the Wurmlingers alleged that over the course of several years 
Greenfield had engaged in harassing conduct that caused them to suffer emotional distress. 
Further, the Wunnlingers alleged that Greenfield cut arborvitae planted on their property and 
otherwise trespassed upon their property resulting in property damage. The Wurmlingers 
asserted three causes of action, to wit: (1) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (later 
amended to and tried by consent of the parties as Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress); (2) 
Conunon Law Trespass; and, (3) Timber Trespass. The Wurmlingers demanded a jury trial and 
prayed for monetary damages. 
On May 24, 2012, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. In its Order, this Court dismissed Greenfield's 
--- - Intentional ·Ihflfctibn of Emotional Distress · claim: bur denied slllJll11ary ]udgriierif as--fo ·the ___ -- ·--- ·· 
remaining issues. 
On November 26, 2012, a five-day jury trial commenced in this matter as to the legal 
claims asserted by the parties, with the Court reserving Greenfield's equitable claims for 
determination by court trial. 1 Greenfield was represented pro se and the Wurmlingers were 
represented by legal counsel. 
On November 3 0, 2012, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of the Wurmlingers on 
each of Greenfield's claims, and also found in favor of the Wurmlingers on their counterclaims. 
As to Greenfield's claims, the jury found that the Wurmlingers' maintenance of their arborvitae 
and/or operation of their bed and breakfast did not constitute nuisances. Additionally, the jury 
found that the Wurrnlingers had not caused Greenfield emotional distress. As to the 
Wurmlingers' counterclaims, the jury found that Greenfield had committed common law 
trespass, but did not award trespass dam~ges, Additionally, the jury found that the arborvitae 
were trees and that Greenfield committed timber trespass, The jury awarded the Wurmlingers 
1 On November 19, 2012, the Court held a pre-trial conference. At the conference, the Court and parties agreed that 
the parties would introduce evidence (testimony and documentary) as to the equitable claims during the jury trial in 
the interest of the Court's and parties' economies. 
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timber trespass damages in the amount of $17,000.00, which this Court later trebled pursuant to 
LC. § 6-202. Lastly, the jury found that Greenfield's general conduct negligently inflicted 
emotional distress on the Wunnlingers, that the negligence was the proximate cause of the 
Wunnlingers' damages, and awarded damages in the amount of $52,000.00. 
On December 12, 2012, the Court held a hearing as to the court trial portion of this 
action. The Court and pruiies discussed the remaining equitable claims and administrative 
matters relating to the detern1ination of those claims. The parties agreed to written closing 
arguments and a briefing schedule. On December 13, 201,2, the Court entered its Order Re: 
Court Trial Issues and Briefing Schedule. 
On January 7, 2013, this Court entered its Order Establishing Post-Jury Trial Judgment, 
al orig with its -J udginent (Jury Trfal; a.fsmfssTng--Greenlield' s legal clamis- arid awaiding-,,fut"".,.-,- -
Wurmlingers $103,000.00. 
On March 21, 2013, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
In its Order, this Court denied both motions. 
On January 2, 2013, Greenfield filed her closing argument brief. On January 16, 2013, 
the Wurmlingers filed their closing argument brief. On January 30, 2013, Greenfield filed her 
rebuttal brief. On February 5, 2013, the Wunnlingers filed an objection brief re: Greenfield's 
rebuttal brief along with an affidavit. On February 11, 2013, Greenfield filed an objection 
wherein she objected to the Wunnlingers filing additional materials.2 
The Court has carefully reviewed and considered the pleadings, evidence, and briefing, 
and now enters its Memorandum Decision and Order that shall constitute its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(a). Any of the following findings of fact that should 
be denominated as a conclusion of law shall be deemed to be a conclusion of law. Any of the 
2 The Court has not considered the Wunnlingers' February 5, 2013, materials as the WLJnn!ingers did not seek leave 
to file additional materials as required by the December 13, 2012., Order. 
Greenfield vs. Wurmllnger Supreme Court Docket Number 41178-2013 426 of717 













following conclusions of law that should be denominated a finding of fact shall be deemed a 
finding of fact. 
II. Discussion 
The parties and the Court agreed that the remaining claims for determination were: (1) 
Does the Wurmlingers' operation of the bed & breakfast violate the CC&Rs; (2) Does the 
Wurmlingers' maintenance of the arborvitae violate the CC&Rs; and (3) Are the Wurmlingers 
obstructing the pedestrian easement. Order Re: Court Trial issues and Briefing Schedule entered 
December 13, 2012. 
, The.Declaratory.Judgment Act authorizes courts to "declare rights, status, and other legal 
relations, whether or not further reliefis or could be claimed." LC. § 10-1201; see also Schneider 
·--·--··--···-----~------·····-· ····-· ... . ··-- ··•·· -· ·-"~ ·--· - ...... ··- ....... . .. ,..- .,. .:-:.· .·:-.-.-; .. --
v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006) ("The Declaratory Judgment Act 
provides authority for the comts to render declaratory judgments."). Further, "[t]he declaration 
may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment or decree/' I.C. § 10-1201. The Declaratory Judgment Act 
also provides, 
"any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other 
writings constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose 
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, 
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined 
any question of construction or validity arising under the 
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." 
I.C. § 10-1202. 
A. The Bed and Breakfast 
The CC&Rs were recorded on July 31, 1992, in the Kootenai County Recorder's Office 
as Instrument No. 1268229. Plaintiffs' Ex. 1. 
Article I, Section 1 (a) provides: 
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) 
No grantee under any conveyance, owner, tenant, or other person shall at 
any time conduct, or permit to be conducted on any lot, any trade or 
business of any kind, either commercial or religious, including, but not 
limited to, day care, school, nursery, out-patient, treatment, rehabilitation 
or recovery facilities, nor shall said premises be used for any other purpose 
whatsoever except for the purpose of a private dwelling or residence for 
one family. Home occupations of family members, which have no exterior 
visibility, are not prohibited provided they are conducted totally within the 
residence, are not open to the public, have no employees and do not 
generate extra vehicular traffic or street parking. 
Id atp. 2. 
In Nordstrom v. Guindon, 135 Idaho 343, l7 P.3d 287 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court 
·provided the rules of construction for restrictive covenants: 
When a co~i.:t _ i11t<::_rprets ;a_ !~~tri~tJ-y__e _c9y~n@t, 0 itj,~-1~a_ppJ)c'_g~11J~_rnlly_th~ __ _ 
same rules of construction as are applied to any contract or covenant. 
Where contract terms are clear and unambiguous, the interpretation of the 
contract's meaning is a question of law. On the other hand, where the 
terms of a contract are ambiguous, the interpretation of the contract's 
meaning is a question of fact. The preliminary question of whether a 
contract is ambiguous, is a question of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. A restrictive covenant is ambiguous when it is capable of 
more than one reasonable interpretation on a given issue. It is only if an 
ambiguity is found that any construction is necessary. Where there is no 
ambiguity, there is no room for construction; the plain meaning of the 
language governs. 
135 Idaho at 346, 17 P .3d at 290 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
This Court, in viewing the CC&Rs as a whole, concludes as a matter of law that the 
CC&Rs are clear and unambiguous. Further, this Court concludes that Article I, Section l(a) is 
clear and unambiguous. The covenfil1t clearly allows a family to operate a small business :from 
their residence (home o_ccupation\ if that business: has no employees, has no exterior visibility, 
is not open to the public, does not generate extra vehicular traffic or street parking and commerce 
is conducted within the residence. The covenant prohibits commercial or religious enterprises 
3 Occupation has been defined as: "an activity or pursuit in which a person is engaged; esp., a person's usual or 
principal work or business. Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)(emphasis added). 
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that extend beyond a home-based business, such as churches, schools and medical facilities. 
Those types of businesses are open to the public (showing up unannounced and uninvited), often 
have employees, are not residential in nature, generate a good deal of traffic and street parking, 
and often extend outside of the business. 4 
Now that the Court has determined that the covenant-is clear and unambiguous, it must 
turn to the facts presented to detennine if the Wurmlingers' operation of the bed and breakfast 
violates the covenant. 
At trial, Eric Wurmlinger testified that the Wunnlingers purchased their Park Wood Place 
lot in 1993, and built their home in 1994. It was his intent to operate a bed and breakfast from 
bed and breakfast is licensed by the City of Post Falls as a home occupancy business. 
The home has five bedrooms and a room above the garage. The Wurmlingers and their 
minor children (one girl and one boy) occupy three of the rooms. Guests use the other three 
bedrooms. 
Since 2008, guests park their vehicles in the Wurrnlingers' driveway. There is a 2'x3' 
wooden plaque attached to a brick lamp-post that provides the name of the bed and breakfast.5 
Guests must make advanced reservations and check-in from 4:00-6:00 p.m. There is a hot 1.ub 
located in the backyard, approximately 20 feet from the home, that guests may use, 
In 2005, the Wurmlingers built a patio_ and had a water feature installed in their backyard. 
The water feature consists of a -stream and pond. 
4 The City of Post Falls Business License Application provides a discussion of home occupations and lists a few 
examples, e.g. professional offices, clothing alterations and hair salons. The Application was admitted· as Plaintiffs 
Ex. 4. 
5 Plaintiff's Ex. 102 at pp. 7-8 shows a photograph of the plague and lamp-post. 
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In 1994, the Wurmlingers began to allow their guests to hold.wedding ceremonies inside 
their home and/or in their backyard. The largest wedding ceremony occurred in 2008, and 
approximately 38 individuals were involved. Since 2008, the Wurmlingers no longer allow 
wedding ceremonies; rather, guests excbange vows in small nuptial services that are limited to 
five to eight individuals. On average, only three or four nuptial services are conducted during the 
summer months. 
Greenfield purchased her home on May 27, 2005, and moved into the home in December 
2005. Upon moving in, Greenfield noticed increased traffic and heard noise coming from the hot 
tub. 
-Tnis-Court, sitting as the finder-of~fact;-firids lliattne Wumilfrigers op-eration of the bed--.. 
and breakfast does not violate the CC&Rs for the following reasons. 
1. Emplovees 
It is undisputed that the Wunnlingers occupy a single family residence. It is also 
undisputed that the bed and breakfast is operated by the Wunnlingers and no employees are 
involved. 
2. Exterior Visibility 
The bed and breakfast has no exterior visibility other than the small plaque affixed to the 
Wurmlingers' brick lamp-post that also contains their home's address, which Greenfield argues 
is exterior visibility. This Court finds that the lamp-post is located in their front yard and near 
their driveway. The plaque is illuminated with a small light that is pointed at the plaque. The 
photographs introduced into evidence show what appears to be a home, not a commercial 
enterprise. Kathy Cayman testified that she lived next door to the Wurmlingers from June of 
2000 - May of 2010, and that the Wurmlingers' residence looked like a home. Joe Malloy 
testified that he lives directly across from Greenfield, has found Greenfield to be a nice neighbor, 
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and that he only knew that the Wurrnlingers operated a bed and breakfast because Eric 
Wurmlinger told him. This Court found both witnesses credible, and finds that the bed and 
breakfast has no exterior visibility. 
3. Within the Residence 
This Court also finds that the bed and breakfast conducts all commerce within thi; 
residence. Greenfield argues that the bed and breakfast is operating outside of the residence 
because the Wurmlingers provide boat cruises for their guests, house guests at other locations, 
perform wedding ceremonies on their property and allow guests the use of the hot tub. Eric 
Wurrnlinger testified that at one time, long before this litigation began, he had set-up a tent 
Triathlon. He also testified that he owned a boat that was advertised as an extra suite, but no one 
ever slept on the boat. Further, the boat was used to provide cruises on the Spokane River, but he 
sold the boat in 2010, and no longer provides cruises. Additionally, at one time, guests stayed at 
another location, outside Park Wood Place, but that also has stopped. The Wurmlingers have 
ceased offering wedding ceremonies for their guests and now offer small nuptial exchange 
ceremonies that involve no more than eight individuals. Eric and Rosalynd Wum11inger offered 
testimony that all commerce is conducted within the residence, which is where the guests 
exclusively stay while at the bed and breakfast. 
Albe1i Hudson, an ordained minister, testified that he performed wedding ceremonies at 
the bed and breakfast from 1997 to 2011. Mr. Hudson also testified that wedding ceremonies are 
no longer conducted and that any music played was very soft. Rocky Poole testified that he lived 
in the neighborhood from 1993 to 2005, next door to Greenfield, and only knew that weddings 
were being conducted because Eric Wmmlinger told him. Dillon Martin is the property manager 
for the Amway mansion and resides in the caretaker residence that is located next door to the 
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Wurm]ingers. Mr. Martin testified that he had not heard excessive noise coming from the 
Wurmlingers' property, and had no complaints about the bed and breakfast. Ashley Labau 
testified that she rented a home near Greenfield's home from June 2009 to March 2010, and that 
she did not hear any noise coming from the Wurmlingers' property. Eric Wurmlinger testified 
that guests are attracted to his bed and breakfast because it is secluded and quite, a state he works 
hard to maintain. All of this testimony was found persuasive and credible. 
This Court found Judy Richardson's testimony quite persuasive. Ms. Richardson is the 
former owner of Greenfield's residence. She testified· that she lived next door to th~ 
Wurmlingers from 1993 to approximately 2005, except for one year while her daughter resided 
residence. Further, while she resided in the home, she slept in the same master bedroom that 
Greenfield cunently sleeps in and never heard any excessive noise nor believed that the wedding 
ceremonies were a problem. 
While guests do venture outside of the residence, to use the hot tub or gather on the patio, 
this Court finds that such conduct is not i11consistent with the conduct of the operation within the 
residence or with the normal and. expected activities of a residence. 
4. Traffic and Parking 
This Court finds that the bed and breakfast does not generate extra vehicular traffic or 
street parking. Greenfield argues that the bed and breakfast has created extra traffic and there are 
numerous vehicles parking on the street due to the bed and breakfast. At trial, Greenfield so 
testified and she offered photographs of vehicles parked in the street in front of the Greenfield 
and Wunnlingers properties. This Court does not find those photographs persuasive of 
Greenfield's argument that the bed and breakfast has increased traffic because those photographs 
were taken in 2007 and, one photo, in 2008, the years when larger wedding ceremonies were 
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offered. The Court does find the testimony of former residents Richardson, Labau, Cayman and 
Poole persuasive. Each of these witnesses testified that they did not observe increased vehicular 
traffic. Current residents Malloy and Martin testified that they have not noticed increased traffic. 
Further, Eric Wunnlinger testified that most guests park their vehicles in his driveway, and it is 
rare for a guest to park on the street. 
5. Open to the Public 
Lastly, this Court does not find that the bed and breakfast is open to the public. 
Greenfield passionately argues that no business open to the public may operate within Park 
Wood Place. She argues that open to the public means that no member of the public can come to 
the residence to conductany--business transaction. - cf his Court does not find her definition of · · · 
open to the public reasonable. This Court finds that open to the public means that the public 
could simply walk in the front door, off the street, unaIL.riounced and without invitation. 
Examples of open to the public would include Wal-Mart and McDonalds. Many hotels and, 
perhaps, even some bed and breakfast establishments are also open to the public because 
individuals walk-in and ask for accommodations. Based upon the facts presented in this matter, 
this Court finds that the Wum1lingers' bed and breakfast is not open to the public. 
. . . 
The Wui·mlingers testified that their bed and breakfast is not open to the public because it 
does not accept walk-up clientele, does not advertise with street signs, and does not have 
directional signs inviting the public to walk-in and obtain a room. Eric Wurmlinger testified that 
the bed and breakfast takes advanced reservations only. At the River Cove Bed and Breakfast the 
procedure was explained as: guests phone the bed and breakfast, inquire into availability, 
questions are asked about the guests, and then the Wurmlingers decide whether to invite those 
guests to stay. Therefore, this Comi finds ihat the bed and breakfast is not open to the public. 
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This Court heard conflicting testimony from Greenfield and the Wurmlingers. It also 
heard testimony from individuals who reside in Park Wood Place and individuals who previously 
resided in the subdivision but felt it important to come to court and offer testimony about the 
non-intrusive nature of the bed and breakfast. This Court, as finder of fact, hearing all of the 
testimony, judging the credibility of the witnesses and reviewing the documentary evidence 
presented, finds that the Wurmlingers operation of the bed ·and breakfast does not violate the 
unambiguous CC&Rs because it is a home occupation that complies with the restrictions 
provided in Article I, Section l(a) of the CC&Rs. 
B. The Arborvitae 
Article II, Section 2 provides: 
.. ·~- --~- Building-Conditions: --No building shall-be-erected~except ·one detached· -. 
single-family dwelling on each lot which does not exceed-two and one half 
stol'.ies in height, together with a private attached garage for not less than 
two cars. No dwelling, building or other structure shall be moved on to 
any lot; new construction being required. No tent, trailer, mobile home, 
boat or other vehicle or structure shall be used or allowed for hwnan 
habitation on a temporary or permanent basis on any lot at any time. No 
lot, lots or parcels, shall ever be enclosed or fenced by any fence or 
structure exceeding five (5) feet in height. Approval from the 
Architectural Control Committee shall be required for all fences. 
Greenfield argues that the Wurmlingers' arborvitae violate this covenant because they 
exceed five feet in height and are a fence. She asserts that I.C. § 35-102(5) defines a fence as any 
.hedge. She also argues that the Wurmlingers planted the arborvitae to function as a spite fence,6 
that the Wunnlingers breached an oral agreement to keep the arborvitae at six feet in height7 and 
h b . . 8 that t e ar orv1tae are a nmsance. 
6 Greenfield never pied a cause of action for spite fence. As such, this Court need not address this argument. 
7 Greenfield did not plead a cause of action for breach of contract. In her Complaint, she asserted an Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress claim alleging that the Wurm lingers had agreed to maintain the arborvitae at six feet, 
failed to do so, and she had the arborvitae trimmed. This resulted in her being arrested, charged with the commission 
of a felony and suffering severe emotional distress. This claim was dismissed at the summary judgment stage. 
Additionally, Greenfield asserted a Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim alleging, in part, that the 
Wurmlingers owed her a duty to honor their agreements with her, which they did not do causing emotional distress. 
At trial, attorney Kasey Wall, who Greenfield had hired in 2006, testified about an exchange of letters between her 
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The Wmmlingers argue that fence is not defined as a hedge, that I. C. § 3 5-102 is 
inapplicable, and that the Court can look to the performance of the parties to interpret the 
CC&Rs. 
Eric Wunnlinger testified that he planted twelve arborvitae on his property from 1994 to 
1995, and he never intended that the row of arborvitae would function as a fence. He also 
testified that he planted nine additional arborvitae in 2008. See also Plaintiff's Ex. 25. Mr. 
Wurmlinger never testified that he planted the arborvitae to annoy or injure Greenfield; rather, he 
testified that he planted the arborvitae for privacy. 
__ Further, Eric _Wmmlinger testified that he received a letter from the City of Post Falls on 
April 12, 2006, stating that his arborvitae hedge exceeded the city ordinance that limited hedges 
to ·six feeHn-height: -plaintiff's Ex: 12. -Eric Wurmling-enesttfi eci-trrn.t he· trimi:ned the aibc:ifvitae· · · - - · ----
and the City of Post Falls sent him another letter, dated May 8, 2006, thanking him for trimming 
the arborvitae. Plaintiff's Ex. 14. The May 8, 2006, letter also provides, "[b]ased on recent 
discussions among staff, the Mayor and the City Administrator, this pruning will satisfy the City 
and no further action will be taken." Id. 
Surveyor John Monaco testified that the Wurmlingers currently have thirty-three 
arborvitae planted on their property and Greenfield has two arborvitae planted on her property. 
Ashley Labau testified that the Wurmlingers' arborvitae, that Greenfield had trimmed, are 
approximately seven to eight feet in height. Dillon Martin testified that he maintains the 
arborvitae on his property at eight feet in height. Eric Wurmlinger testified that many of the 
arborvitae on his property are currently about twelve feet high. 
Initially, this Court finds that I.C. § 35-102(5) is inapplicable to the matter at hand. LC.§ 
3 5-102( 5) provides, "[i]f made in whole or in part of brush, ditch, pickets, hedge or any other 
materials, the fence, to be lawful, must be equal in strength and capacity to tum stock, to the 
and Eric Wurmlinger as to the height of the arborvitae. Greenfield testified that she suffered emotional distress due 
to the breach of this agreement. The jury did not find that the Wunnlingers inflicted emotional distress upon 
Greenfield. Therefore, because this issue has already been tried to the jury, this Court will not address it here. 
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fence above described." The fence above described refers to a barbed-wire fence and refers to 
big game animals. It appears that this section refers to livestock fences and i.s likely a part of 
Idaho's open range system. It would have nothing to do with an arborvitae hedge. 
In reviewing the CC&Rs at issue, this Court has found that the CC&Rs are clear and 
unambiguous. This Court also concludes that Article II, Section 2 is clear and unambiguous. 
This section provides restrictions relating to the construction and building of pennanent 
structures, such as residences. It also precludes the placing of certain vehicles (campers, RVs, 
boats) upon a lot The section also provides that no one may enclose their lot with a fence_ or 
structure exceeding five feet.·· This clearly refers to a wood, chain-link or vinyl fence. Nowhere 
~ t~s-~e_cti_o~ is ther~ c1I1(me11tio~ ~! ~y_typ_e_ofJan_}sc~pin¥,_:t_Tee,_ shrub or hedge. The enti_r~ __ -· _ _ _ _ l 
section refers to construction, erection and building. \¥bile one may construct or erect a wood, 
chain-link or vinyl fence, one plants arborvitae. 
In looking at the CC&Rs as a whole, Article II, Section 8 provides that the o-w:n.ers of Lots 
1 and 17 shall maintain fences which have been constructed along Park Avenue. Eric 
Wurmlinger testified that the fences on Lots 1 and 17 are stone fences that contain Park Wood 
Place signage. 
Lastly, the only section in the CC&Rs that speaks to landscaping and trees is found at 
Article II, Section I, which provides that no one may erect a building or strncture on any lot until 
the construction plans, landscaping or tree planting plans are approved by the Architectural 
Control Committee. At trial, there was testimony that the Architectural Control Committee had 
approved of the Wurmlingers' landscaping plans. Further, the Committee, in compliance with 
the CC&Rs, has since disbanded. 
8 The Complaint asserted nuisance as a legal claim, and that claim was tried to the jury. 
reen 1e vs. urm 1nger Supreme Court Doc el Number 41178-2013 436of717 
Post Colui Trial Memorandum Decision and Order Page 15 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 276 of 710
(''•. (--.., 
• I 
....... __ .,. 
This Court concludes that Article II, Section 2 limits fences to five feet in height. 
Further, this Court concludes that the CC&Rs do not provide that arborvitae or any other tree or 
landscaping constitute a fence, and, also concludes, that the Wurrnlingers' arborvitae are not a 
fence as defined in Article II, Section 2. Therefore, this Cowi finds that the Wurmlingers 
maintenance of their arborvitae is not violating the CC&Rs, including Article II, Section 2.9 
C. Pedestrian Easement 
Article IT, Section 10 provides: 
Easement: Between Lots 8 and 9, a pedestrian easement will be installed -
and reserved for all lot owners. The Owners of Lots 8 and 9 shall not place 
any fence and/or obstruction which -will interfere V!ith the easement which 
has been reserved. 
Greenfield argues the Wurmlingers have obstructed the easement by intentionally planting 
trees and/or shrubs within the easement. Further, Greenfield argues that the Wurm.lingers have 
failed to maintain the easement. 
The Wurrnlingers argue that other than Eric Wurmlinger's generalized testimony, there was 
no e-vidence presented that shows the easement's location. Further, there was no evidence 
presented that the Wurmlingers have placed obstructions within the easement. 
This Court notes that neither party offered the alleged 1994 a.mended CC&Rs for 
introduction into evidence. Indeed, this Comi has not found the amended CC&Rs on either of 
the parties' exhibit lists. Nevertheless, the Wunnlingers admitted in their Answer that the 
CC&Rs were a.mended in 1994 to locate a pedestrian easement through their property. It is 
undisputed that the amendment moved the easement to Lot 7, which the Wurmlingers admit they 
own. 
9 The CC&Rs do not provide Greenfield with any relief as to the arborvitae, and this Court cannot re-write them to 
assist her. See Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 2.20 P .3d 575 (2009) ("courts do not possess the roving power to 
rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable"). ln 2006, Post Falls Municipal Code 18.24.020 limited 
hedges to a maximum height of six feet (Plaintiff's Ex, 12), but there was trial testimony that the ordinance was 
repealed. It may be possible for Greenfield to petition the Post Falls City Council to reinstate the ordinance, or to 
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At trial, Eric Wunnlinger tesiified that the pedestrian easement was five feet wide and 
located between his property and his neighbor to the south. Further, he testified that he has 
constructed a large retaining wall, and the wall lies next to, but not within, the easement. 
Additionally, he testified that there is one naturally growing Aspen tree that has grown up next to 
the wall. 
Dillon Martin testified that he has observed Eric Wunnlinger cleaning up the easement 
area. 
Greenfield introduced photographs that show a trimmed grassy area with a retaining wall 
_ (Plaintiff's Ex. 102 at p. 1) and a dirt pathway lightly covered with pine needles, cones and a few 
saplings growing (Id. at pp. 4-5). 
_ ·_This. Court finds-that-because no survey,was introduced showing·the-location -of·the-
easement and because this Court does not have the amended CC&Rs before it, the Court is 
unable to dete1mine the width or the exact location of the easement. Based upon the limited trial 
testimony, it appears the easement is five feet wide and is located somewhere at the south end of 
the Wunnlinged lot. If the dirt pathway, shown in the photographs, is the easement, the trees 
shown in the photograph appear to be naturally growing pine tree saplings. This Court finds that 
there is no proof that the Wurmlingers planted anything within the easement or have obstructed 
the easement. 
Additionally, this Court does not know if the amended CC&Rs require the Wmmlingers 
to maintain the easement because the amended CC&Rs are not in evidence. In their Answer, the 
Wurmlingers denied Greenfield's assertion that they are to maintain the easement, and they 
affirmatively defended that the CC&Rs do not require them to do so. Therefore, this Court finds 
that Greenfield has failed to prove that the Wmmlingers have a duty to maintain the easement. 
This Court finds that the Wunnlingers are not obstructing the pedestrian easement, and) 
as such, they are not violating Article II, Section 10. 
amend the CC&Rs to address landscaping matters. 
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As to Greenfield's claim that the Wunnlingers operation of the bed and breakfast violates 
Article I, Section l(a) of the Park Wood Place CC&Rs, this Court finds thatthe River Cove Bed 
and Breakfast is a home occupation that is in compliance with the restrictions provided in the 
covenant. 
As to Greenfield's claim that the Wurrnlingers are violating Article II, Section 2 of the Park 
Wood Place CC&Rs, this Court finds that the Wurml.ingers' arborvitae are not a fence and 
therefore-are not in violation .of the five foot height restriction. 
As to Greenfield's claim that the Wurrnlingers are violating Article II, Section 10 of the 
... -Park:·W0od ·Place.CC&Rsi this Court- findsthaHhe· Wurr.nlingers are not obstructing the pedestrhm~~- ,.· -
easement. 
IV. Order 
Based upon the foregoing, NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
Plaintiff's claim for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief is dismissed.with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court will enter a final judgment, which will 
incorporate the post jury trial judgment. After the fmal judgment is entered, the Court will address 
awards of costs and/or attorney's fees, if any. 
DATED this d--G day of March, 2013. 
Lo.M.~ I 
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CLERICS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the :JS" day of March, 2013 a true and conect copy of the 
foregoing was mailed with postage prepaid, faxed, emailed, sent by interoffice mail or hand 
delivered to: 
John C. Riseborough 
717 W. Sprague Avenue, Ste. 1200 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Fax: (509) 838-0007 / 
iohn.riseborough@patnehamblen.com V S S 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place - .. 
Post Falls, ID 83854 ~ .. 0 . 3 <J.s-f '3 
crystalgreens@yahoo.com f.~A1Jt;-11.60 • " · 
,.!) , 3 - 'J..o - /J vs f Cl~ llUL- -
. . . .. . . . . ------ ·- - -- -··· --·- .,. -- ·--· ··-- - - -- - -· 
Clifford T. Hayes ,I .. 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: ~4l, £ed~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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David A. Kulisch 
Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
Troy Y. Nelson, ISB #5851 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Telephone: 509-747-2052 
Attorneys for Defendant 
) 
STATE OF IOAH01· E'1A1}SS COUNTY OF KOO n 
FILED: 
2015 JUL 30 AM 9: 24 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
AFFIDAVIT OF IAN SMITH Plaintiff, 
v. 




County of Kootenai ) 




I am over 18 years of age and I am competent to testify herein; 
I am an attorney in good standing, licensed in the State of Idaho; 
On September 15, 2010, Plaintiff Greenfield ("Plaintiff") hired me 
on an hourly basis to represent her in a civil suit against her 
neighbors, Eric and Rosalynn Wurmlinger ('1Wurmlinger"); 
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On January 19, 2011, Plaintiff retained me to represent her in a 
criminal case; 
The underlying criminal and civil cases have a common factual 
background, which is accurately summarized in the Supreme Court 
Decision attached to the Affidavit of Troy Y. Nelson as Exhibit 2; 
In the criminal matter against Plaintiff, the day before the trial was to 
begin, on October 3, 2011, the deputy prosecuting attorney filed a 
motion to dismiss the charge without prejudice stating that "the state 
does not yet have an official survey of the property at issue 
identifying the location of the subject trees"; 
On the morning of trial, October 4, 2011, I argued against the 
motion to dismiss without prejudice. Significantly, the court denied 
the state's motion to dismiss without prejudice. I prepared an order 
for the court to sign, and which was signed by Judge Gibler on 
October 4, 2011. The state was then required to go forward with its 
evidence. However, the state faiJed to produce any evidence or 
testimony at trial. As a result, I obtained a judgment of acquittal for 
Plaintiff; 
On February 14, 2012, I filed a motion to withdraw from 
representation of plaintiff in the civil case. The basis of the motion 
was that the attorney-client relationship had broken down to such an 
extent that it would be impossible for me to continue representing 
Plaintiff; 
The motion to withdraw was later granted on March 8, 2012 by the 
Court and Plaintiff began representing herself in regard to her civil 
claims against the Wurmlingers. Exhibit 1; 
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10. Following March 8, 2012, I had no further involvement m 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~g day of July, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the J....!J day of July, 2015, addressed to the following: 
Plaintiff Pro Se: 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
D Hand Deliveied 
~ USMail 
D Overnight Mail 
D Fax Transmission 
Troy Y. Nelson 
\31731 IPLEADINGS\S UMMARY JUDGI\-IENTIAFF-SMITH: kml 
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IAN D. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
Telephone: (208) 765-4050 
Facsimile: (208) 765-9089 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
208-446-1188 T-453 P0001/0004 F-082 
S!Alf. Of ID1\HO •,s<, 
COUNTY OF l,OO:F.)i;l.l: ~ 
FILED: 
"LOIZµ~R -P Pl.I,. c;J ., ., H·U 1_1 1 f J ~· , • ., 
CLEH1, O!STRICT COUfli 
OEPrny 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFiELD, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
ERIC J. WURMLINGER and 
ROSALYND D. WURMLINGER, 
husband and wife, 
- Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-10-8209 
ORDER PERMITTING 
WITHDRAWAL 
!AN D. SMITH, the attorney of record for the above-named Plaintiff, CHRISTINA 
J. GREENFIELD (hereinafter: "Greenfield"), having moved the Court, pursuant to Rule 
11 (b)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for the entry of an Order permitting 
Smith to withdr~w as Greenfield's attorney of record in the above entitled matter. 
ORDER PERMITTING 
WITHDRAWAL • 1 -
ORIGINAL 
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; 
03-09~'12 08:23 FROM-Kootenai Dist Court 208-446-1188 T-453 P0002/0004 F-082 
The matter having come on for hearing before the undersigned on the 271h day of 
February, 2012, the Court having considered said Motjon, the arguments of the Parties, 
the files and records herein, and good cause appearing; 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
THAT: 
1. Smith shall be, and hereby is, permitted to withdraw as Greenfield's 
attorney of record in the above entitled matter; 
2. Smith shall forthwith, and with due diligence, serve a copy of this Order 
upon Greenfield and file proof of serve of the same with the Court;_ 
3. Greenfield shall, within twenty days (20) days of the mailing of this Order, 
appoint another attorney to appear on her behalf in the above-entitled 
matter, or file a written notice with the Court stating how she will proceed 
without an attorney; 
. . 
4. If Greenfield falls to file and serve an additfonal written appearance in the 
action either in person or through a newly appointed attorney within such 
twenty (20) day period, such failure shall be sufficient gmund for entry of 
default and default judgment against Greenfield or dismissal of the action 
of Greenfield, with prejudice, without further notice; 
ORDER PERMITIING 
WITHDRAWAL - 2 -
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5. No further proceedings which will affect the rights of Greenfield may be 
had in the above entitled matter for a period of twenty (20) days after the 
maifing of this Order 
DATED this_:]___ day of March, 2012. 
ORDER PERMITTING 
WITHDRAWAL - 3 -
LANSI HAINES 
District Court Judge 
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I.I I o f 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE· 
I HEREBY CERTiFY that on the~ day of March, 20i2, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: · · · 
. ' 
Ian D. Smith [ J U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law [ J U,S. Certified Mail 
P.O. Box 3019 ( J Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 [X] Facsimile To: 208-765-9089 
[ J Overnight Mail 
John C. Riseborough 
Paine Hamblen LLP 
717 W. Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Joshua D. Johnson 
Attorney at Law . 
101 South Capital Bivd., Suite 300 
Basie, ID 83702 . 
Christina June Greenfield 
210 S. Parlcwood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
ORDER 'PERMITTING 
WITHDRAWAL 
[ ] Inter-office Mail 
[ J U.S. Mail 
[ J U.S. Certified Mail 
[ ) Hand Delivered 
[XJ Facsimile To: 509-838-0007 
[] Overnight Mail 
() Inter-office Mail 
[ J U.S. Mail 
[ J U.S. Certified Mail 
[ J Hand Delivered 
[X] Facsimile To: 208-433-0167 
[] Overnight Mail 
[ ] lnter~office Mail 
[XJ U.S. Mail 
[ J U.S. Certified Mail 
I ) Hand Delivered 
[ J facsimile To: 
[ J Overnight Mail 
r J Inter-office Mail 
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David A. Kulis ch 
Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
Troy Y. Nelson, ISB #5851 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Telephone: 509-747-2052 
Attorneys for Defendant 
S1ATE OF iOt,JIOTEtit-.lf ss 
COUNTY OF KOO I 
FILED: 
20\~ JUL 30 M~ CJ: 25 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF TROY Y. NELSON 
V. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
: ss. 
County of Spokane ) 




That I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to be a witness 
in the above-entitled proceeding and not a party thereto; 
Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of a 
Memorandum Decision and Order entered on April 2, 2014 by the 
Honorable Candy W. Dale; 
Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of a document 
entitled "2015 Opinion No. 47", filed May 21, 2015; 
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Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy Plaintiff's 
Response to Defendant's Interrogatories (Nos. 1-17) and Requests for 
Production (Nos. 1-9) Propounded to Plaintiff; 
Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs 
Second Response to Defendants Request for Production; 





( · 1/l (__..-
TROi Y. NELSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2cr-r11 day of July, 2015. 
Notary Public 
State of Washington 
KIMBERLEY M TRITT 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
September 15, 2016 
Notary Publicindfor the State of 
Washington, residing at:SfD k{Ln~ 
My Commission Expires: q -( S-{ Lo 
AFFIDAVIT OF TROY Y. NELSON -2 





























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the '2--'1 day of July, 2015, addressed to the following: 
Plaintiff Pro Se: 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
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UNJTED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRJCT OF IDAHO 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POST FALLS 
MUN1CIP ALITY, including employees 
and/or agents; MAYOR CLAYTON R. 
LARKIN, in his capacity; PRECEDING 
ADMINISTRATOR TIM HAMMOND, 
in his individual and official capacity; 
PRECEDING ADMINISTRATOR 
ERIC KECK, in his individual and 
official capacity; PROSECUTOR JOEL 
K. RY AN, in his individual and official 
capacity; PRECEDING CITY 
PLANNER COLLIN COLES, in his 
individual and official capacity; POST 
FALLS POLICE DEPARTMENT; 
CHIEF OF POLICE R. SCOT HAUG, 
in his individual and official capacity; 
DETECTIVE RODNEY L. 
GUNDERSON, in his individual and 
official capacity; DETECTIVE MARK 
GOODWIN, in his individual and 
official capacity; CAPTAIN GREG 
McLEAN, in his individual and official 
capacity; BERNARD (BARRY) 
WILLIAM McHUGH (KOOTENAI 
COUNTY PROSECUTOR) working for 
the City of Post Falls, in his individual 
and official capacity, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER· 1 
Case No. 2: l 3-cv-0043 7-CWD 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
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INTRODUCTION 
Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on January 21, 2014. In 
response, Plaintiff Christina Greenfield filed a motion to amend her complaint. 
Thereafter, Greenfield served discovery, and Defendants filed a motion to stay discovery 
because of the pending motions. The Court granted the motion to stay further discovery 
until it considered the pending dispositive motions. The motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and motion to amend are fully briefed, and ripe for the Court's consideration. 
Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are 
adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding 
delay, and because the Court conclusively finds that the decisional process would not be 
significantly aided by oral argument, the motions will be decided on the record before the 
Court. Dist. Idaho L. Rule 7.l(d). 
BACKGROUND 
On October 4, 2013, Pro Se Plaintiff Christina Greenfield filed a complaint against 
the City of Post Falls, its mayor, and various administrators and employees (past and 
present), as well as members of the Post Falls Police Department, seeking damages for 
the Defendants' alleged failure to enforce its zoning laws to her detriment. The facts 
giving rise to Greenfield's complaint arise out of a zoning and boundary dispute, and a 
dispute about her neighbors' commercial activity operated out of their home. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2 
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The specific details of Greenfield's dispute with the City regarding her neighbors, 
the Wurmlingers, 1 are set forth in a thirty-four page complaint. (Dkt. 1.)2 Defendants 
filed their answer on October 24, 2013, (Dkt. 23), denying the claims. The events giving 
rise to the complaint begin with Greenfield's purchase of her home in May of 2005, 
which was when she first became aware that her neighbors owning the adjacent property 
allegedly were operating an illegal bed and breakfast out of their home. Greenfield asserts 
that the operation of a bed and breakfast is prohibited under Post Falls City Ordinance 
18.20.030. Greenfield notified the City on May 23, 2005, of the alleged illegal activities 
of her neighbors. Greenfield claims the City took no action. 
The other dispute with the Wurmlingers involves an arborvitae hedge consisting of 
twenty-four arborvitae shrubs planted by the Wurmlingers on or near the property line 
separating Greenfield's property from the Wurmlinger property. Greenfield alleges the 
hedge constitutes a fence, that it exceeded the height limit set forth in the City Fence 
Ordinance, and that it obstructed Greenfield's view. Greenfield first notified the City on 
April 12, 2006, and demanded enforcement of the fence ordinance by the City. In 
1 In addition to this lawsuit, Greenfield sued the Wurmlingers in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State ofldaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, Case No. CV 2010-8209. Erb land Aff. ~l, Ex. 1, (Dkt. 30-1.) 
Greenfield asserted claims against the Wurmlingers for nuisance and negligent infliction of emotional distress, as 
well as equitable claims praying for injunctive relief and abatement relief with regard to the bed and breakfast 
business operated by the Wurmlingers out of their home. Id. The Wurmlingers filed an answer and counterclaim, 
asserting their own claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, trespass, and timber trespass for the cutting 
of their hedge. Erbland Aff. ~3, Ex. 2, (Dkt. 30-1.) 
After ajury trial in which the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Wurmlingers, Erbland Aff. ~5, Ex. 3, 
Special Verdict Form (Diet, 30-1 ), judgment was entered against Greenfield on January 7, 2013. Erb land Aff. ~5, Ex. 
4, (Dkt. 30-1.) 
2 Greenfield filed an amended complaint on January 7, 2014, (Diet. 34), but did not seek leave of the Court to do so 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Therefore, the Court does not consider it to be the operative complaint for purposes of 
Defendants' motion. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3 
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response to the City's enforcement letters, Wurmlinger trimmed "some" of the hedges, 
but not all. 
The hedge dispute burgeoned in May of 2006, when Greenfield hired an attorney 
whom she directed to send a demand letter ordering the Wurmlingers to trim their hedge 
to the allowable "CC&R height requirement of five feet," and to correct other violations 
noted on the property. The Wurmlingers and Greenfield entered an agreement regarding 
those issues, including a requirement that the hedge be maintained at a height of six feet. 
Comp 1. 130. In June and July of 2006, the City changed its fence ordinance to exclude 
"landscaping and hedges" from the ordinance language prescribing the maximum height 
of fences. 
In November of 2008, the City issued a warning letter to the Wurmlingers 
regarding the expansion of their business activities subject to their special use permit, but 
Greenfield alleges the Wurmlingers ignored the City's demand to scale back their bed 
and breakfast business. Greenfield alleges that, but for one letter, the City did nothing 
further to enforce its zoning ordinances to halt the neighbors' activities. Greenfield 
persisted in attempting to have the City enforce its zoning regulations by writing several 
letters in 2009, which she alleges fell on deaf ears. 
On April 1, 2010, Greenfield decided to take matters into her own hands. She 
trimmed ten of the arborvitae shrubs to the prescribed height of six feet. Mr. Wurmlinger 
called the police, who began an investigation. The police submitted a criminal complaint 
against Greenfield as a result, charging her with Felony Malicious Injury to Property. On 
June 14, 2010, Greenfield was served a summons to appear in district court, wherein she 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4 
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was formally charged. Greenfield alleges she was arrested, hand cuffed, searched, and 
forced to sit in a chair for several hours while being processed for the crime. Greenfield 
was arraigned on the charges on June 23, 2010, and she appeared before Judge 
Friedlander, the City Attorney's wife. Because the judge did not recuse herself given the 
history between Greenfield and the City Attorney's office, Greenfield alleges a 
miscarriage of justice. 
After her arrest and arraignment, Greenfield alleges that Defendant McLean was 
interviewed by the local paper and described Greenfield as a "criminal Hedge Hacker," 
among other remarks. Greenfield alleges that her reputation was tarnished by the 
"slanderous remarks." 
Greenfield had several court appearances, which she alleges caused absences from 
her work. She asserts that the absences, together with negative publicity on local news 
sources, resulted in the termination of her employment on September 2, 2010, from her 
job at a local bank. 
As part of the criminal investigation, Wurmlinger hired a crew to perform a survey 
of the arborvitae hedge on December 16, 2010. The survey was allegedly provided to the 
City and the Kootenai County Prosecutor, Defendant Barry McHugh. Greenfield asserts 
she requested the results of the survey, but that Defendant Gunderson and Defendant 
McHugh denied the existence of the survey and refused to give Greenfield the findings 
from the survey during the course of discovery in the criminal case. 
On October 4, 2.011, after "a grueling nineteen months post her arrest," Greenfield 
was acquitted and found not guilty of the criminal charges. Greenfield alleges that, after 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5 
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the termination from her employment with the bank, she was unable to secure 
employment during the "post-arrest timeframe, pending criminal proceedings while 
awaiting trial," and that she has not been employed for thirty-six months after her initial 
arrest. Greenfield asserts that her arrest and prosecution caused her financial ruin, 
resulting in filing for banlauptcy. 
The hedge dispute has continued. Greenfield contends that Mr. Wurmlinger has 
trespassed upon her property ten times to trim the arborvitae shrubs, and each time, 
Greenfielci.complaineclt0-Jhe_policedepartment,buUhe_City-_hasrefusedto.prosecute_Mr __ 
Wurmlinger. Apparently, Mr. Wurmlinger also has filed numerous malicious injury to 
property reports accusing Greenfield of trespass on his property from April 2007 to the 
present. Defendant Gunderson was assigned to investigate the matters, but Greenfield 
alleges instead that Defendant Gunderson and other members of the police force have 
"conspired to harass Greenfield by confiscating her garbage and inspecting said contents, 
installing surveillance cameras ... on the Wurmlinger property ... and organizing several 
overnight surveillance watches .... "Neither Greenfield nor Wurmlinger have been 
charged with any crimes. 
Greenfield alleges that on August 17, 2011, Defendant Gunderson and Defendant 
Goodwin retrieved a garbage bag from her residence and "released unrelated personal 
and confidential information in his [Gunderson's] report pertaining to highly sensitive 
data that Greenfield had submitted to the Idaho American Civil Liberties Union 'Legal 
Department,' as well as receipts ... and personal information about Greenfield's financial 
situation." Greenfield alleges that such acts have caused "extreme emotional distress." 
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Greenfield alleges that her reputation has been tarnished by the continuing acts of 
Defendants stemming from the "false Felony charge" and other charges brought against 
her. Greenfield contends that the City and the named Defendants have refused to enforce 
city ordinances to her detriment as a property owner, and have "retaliated against her 
with malicious prosecution, harassment, abuse of power, and police misconduct," causing 
her lost "economic opportunity, deprivation of civil rights, violation of Constitutional 
rights, defamation of character, failure to keep from harm, invasion of privacy, 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and false arrest." 
Greenfield alleges she filed a notice of tort claim on April 2, 2012, pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 50-219, with the City of Post Falls and Kootenai County. However, 
according to the affidavits Defendant submitted, the City and the County received the 
notices by certified mail on April 3, 2012. Aff. of Hayes (Dkt. 35-2); Aff. of Howard 
(Dkt. 35-3.) The notice of tort claim specifies that her claim arose out of her June 14, 
2010 arrest and acquittal of those charges on October 4, 2011. 
Greenfield's Complaint contains several claims for relief. Claim number one 
alleges violation of her right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, on the 
grounds that the City and the named Defendants subjected her to unequal treatment by 
refusing to enforce city ordinances. She claims her property rights have been damaged as 
a result. Greenfield's second claim alleges violation of the "right of equal protection of 
law under Article I, Sections 1, 8, 13, 17, and 22" of the Idaho Constitution. In this claim, 
Greenfield alleges that Defendants "did not protect Greenfield from harm by falsely 
accusing her of a crime and maliciously prosecuting her for said crime," when she had a 
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legal right to maintain her hedge. As part of the criminal prosecution, Greenfield alleges a 
conspiracy to conceal evidence, namely the survey that was conducted to determine the 
true property line and location of the hedge. Greenfield's third claim alleges another 
violation of her right to equal protection under "Article I, Section 14141." In this claim, 
Greenfield alleges that her right to privacy was violated because of the "unwarranted 
surveillance abuse" and retrieval of "highly sensitive, personal information" from her 
property. 
Greenfield's fourth claim alleges "deprivation of rights under color of law" and 
cites Title 18, U.S.C. § 242. The constitutional violation alleged is the violation of her 
"human rights" including the right that her integrity and safety will be protected, the right 
to a fair trial, due process, and the right to participate in a civil society. 
Greenfield's fifth claim for relief alleges abuse of process during the criminal 
proceedings against her that culminated in the acquittal on October 4, 2011. She alleges 
she was unjustly accused of a crime, and that the police engaged in misconduct during the 
investigation. Continuing in that vein, Greenfield's sixth claim alleges malicious 
prosecution, again referring to the prosecution for malicious injury to property. 
Greenfield's seventh claim alleges "tortious interference for damages lost for past and 
future earnings," claiming that as a result of Defendants' conduct, Greenfield lost "past 
and future earnings along with prospective future employment opportunities." 
Greenfield's eighth and ninth claims for relief allege intentional and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, respectively. Greenfield again refers to Defendants' lack of 
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enforcement of the city ordinances with respect to the Wurmlingers' conduct, and the 
criminal prosecution of her for trimming the hedge. 
Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings asserts Defendants are entitled 
to judgment because Greenfield's claims are legally insufficient; barred by the two-year 
statute of limitations; or barred for failure to timely file a notice of tort claim. 
In response to Defendants' motion, Greenfield filed a motion to amend her 
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(l)(B). The motion attached a proposed Amended 
Complaint consisting of a hefty eighty pages instead of a mere thirty four pages 
constituting the original complaint. Claims one through nine are the same as in the 
original complaint. The proposed amended complaint generally describes the same facts 
as the Complaint, albeit in more detail. Greenfield adds claims for libel and defamation; 
intentional breach and tortious interference of contractual agreement; civil conspiracy; 
violation of her Fifth Amendment right of procedural due process; and spoliation of 
evidence. Defendants argue that Greenfield's motion is improper and should be denied 
because she does not have the right to amend her pleading "as a matter of course" under 
Rule 15( a)( 1 )(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants further contend that 
amendment would be futile. 
DISPOSITION 
1. Standard of Review 
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a judgment on the pleadings 
is properly granted when, "taking all allegations in the pleading as true, the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 392 
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(9th Cir. 1996). In determining whether a complaint states a cognizable claim under Rule 
12( c ), courts apply the same legal standards applicable to motions brought under Rule 
12(b)(6). Cafasso, US. ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 
1054, n. 4 (9th Cir. 2011) ("we have said that Rule 12(c) is functionally identical to Rule 
12(b)(6) and that the same standard of review applies to motions brought under either 
rule."). 
A Rule 12(b )(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a plaintiffs claim for 
relief. The relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff's allegations are sufficient under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which sets forth the minimum pleading 
requirement, i.e., that the plaintiff provide a "short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and "give the defendant fair notice of what 
the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all 
nonconclusory, factual (not legal) allegations made in the complaint, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 
F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2009). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the 
grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 555. In addition, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 
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the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true 
( even if doubtful in fact)." Id. Dismissal may therefore be based on the lack of a 
cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable 
legal theory. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); Balistreri v. Pacifica 
Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 
Further, the Court may not consider any evidence contained outside the pleadings 
without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); 
United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-908 (9th Cir. 2003). "A court may, however, 
consider certain materials-documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated 
by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice-without converting the motion 
to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 908 (citing Van Buskirk v. CNN, 
284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002); Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994); 2 
James Wm. Moore et al., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 12.34[2] (3d ed. 1999)). And, 
the Court may consider evidence upon which the complaint "necessarily relies" if: ( 1) the 
complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiffs claim; and 
(3) no party questions the authenticity of the document. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 
453-54 (9th Cir. 1994 ). The court may treat such documents as "part of the complaint, 
and thus may assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6)." United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Defendants have attached to their motion the Affidavit of Kootenai County clerk 
Clifford Hayes and the Affidavit of Post Falls City clerk Shannon Howard, which 
affidavits authenticate the notice of tort claims received by the respective offices. 
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Greenfield references the notice of tort claim she filed in paragraph 53 of her Complaint, 
and does not question the authenticity of the documents Defendants submitted, The Court 
therefore considers them as part of the Complaint and for purposes of ruling upon 
Defendants' motion. 
2. Constitutional Claims Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claims One, Two, 
Three, and Four) 
Greenfield asserts her constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil 
rights statute. See Pl. 's Mem. at 5-6, (Dkt. 3'7-1.)To assert a claim under Section 1983, a 
plaintiff must show the existence of four elements: "( 1) a violation of rights protected -by 
the Constitution or created by federal statute (2) proximately caused (3) by conduct of a 
'person' (4) acting under color of state law." Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 
(9th Cir. 1991 ). Section 1983 is "' not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely 
provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred."' Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 
(1979)). 
A. Statute of Limitations 
The statute of limitations period for filing a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 is determined by the statute of limitations period for personal injuries in the state 
where the claim arose. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (later overruled only as to 
claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, not applicable here). Idaho 
Code § 5-219 provides for a two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice, 
personal injury, and wrongful death actions. Federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho 
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are governed by this two-year statute of limitations. Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F.Supp. 
1381, 1410 (D. Idaho 1996), aff'd 129 F.3d 127 (9th Cir. 1997). 
Although the Court relies upon the state statute of limitations to determine the 
time for filing a claim, the Court uses federal law to determine when a claim accrues. 
Elliottv. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1994). The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has determined that a claim accrues when the 
plaintiff knows, or should know, of the injury that is the basis of the cause of action. See 
Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996). Under this "discovery rule," the 
statute begins to run once a plaintiff knows of her injury and its cause. Gibson v. United 
States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1344 (9th Cir. 1986). 
Greenfield filed her Complaint in this case on October 4, 2013. Therefore, to 
proceed, her claims must have accrued on or after October 4, 2011. Greenfield's federal 
claims are time-barred to the extent they are based upon facts alleged prior to October 4, 
2011. Greenfield must have known about her injuries at the time they were sustained, as 
she was an active participant in making complaints to the City about the alleged zoning 
violations. The law is clear that a claim accrues upon awareness of an actual injury, "and 
not when the plaintiff suspects a legal wrong." Lukavsky v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2008). 
The Court will proceed to discuss Greenfield's allegations in each of her claims 
for relief in further detail. 
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B. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim (Count One) 
In her first claim, Greenfield alleges violation of the Equal Protection Clause in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. This claim is based upon the City's acts in failing to enforce 
the fence height requirement applicable, at the time, to hedges. These events occurred, as 
described in the Complaint, between 2005 and 2006. Compl. 1128, 29, 30, 31, 32. 
Additional allegations comprising this claim appear to be based upon the Wurmlingers' 
commercial activities, and the City's failure to enforce its zoning ordinances to 
Greenfield's detriment. These events occurred, as described in the Complaint, between 
2005 and 2009. Compl. 1133-38. Claims based upon these events are therefore time 
barred. 
To the extent Greenfield's claim for violation of her right to equal protection is not 
time barred, her claim does not survive on its merits. Under the Equal Protection Clause, 
"all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike" by governmental entities. 
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). However, "[t]he 
Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in 
law as though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940). The Ninth 
Circuit has held that § 1983 claims based on Equal Protection violations "must plead 
intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an 
inference of discriminatory intent." Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 
F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). 
Greenfield has not alleged that she is a member of a protected class. Although she 
is not a member of a protected class, Greenfield's equal protection claims are cognizable 
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under the theory that she is a "class of one," because she has asserted that she "has been 
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational 
basis for the difference in treatment." Village of Willowbrook v. Ole ch, 528 U.S. 562, 
564 (2000). "[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper 
execution through duly constituted agents." Id. at 564 (internal citation omitted). The 
relevant inquiry is whether Defendants' actions are "patently arbitrary and bear[] no 
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest." Vermouth v. Carrothers, 827, 
F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1987). 
· Under this rational basis test, Greenfield would prevail only if she is similarly 
situated with persons who are treated differently by Defendants, and if Defendants have 
no rational basis for the dissimilar treatment. In other words, Greenfield must show that 
Defendants intentionally, and without rational basis, treated Greenfield differently from 
other similarly situated property owners and that the discriminatory treatment was 
"intentionally directed just at [her], as opposed ... to being an accident or a random act." 
Yocum v. Kootenai County, 2011 WL 2650217 *3 (D. Idaho July 6, 2011). 
Here, Greenfield has not alleged that other property owners similarly situated to 
her were treated differently. She contends the City deprived her of her due process rights 
when the Defendants conspired to remove the words "landscaping" and "hedges" from 
the fence ordinance. She contends that the City's change to the fence ordinance "protects 
one individual over the rights of another" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. But 
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she has not alleged that the City failed to follow its own legislative process, or that the 
amendment applied only to her property. In other words, she has not alleged that she was 
treated differently from other property owners seeking to enforce the fence height 
requirement. 
Similarly, Greenfield alleges that the City has allowed the Wurmlingers to 
continue to operate their bed and breakfast business in violation of City ordinances, 
thereby depriving Greenfield of her property rights. Again, she has not alleged that the 
City intentionally treated Greenfield differently than other neighbors with similar zoning 
disputes against adjacent property owners. Greenfield has not applied for a conditional 
use permit to operate a home business and been denied. Nor has Greenfield alleged that 
other property owners are successful in having the City enforce its zoning regulations. 
Further, the Court is reluctant to become the arbiter of the City's land use policy, and its 
decision to enforce (or not enforce) its zoning ordinances. Burch v. Smathers, 2014 WL 
29261 *10 (D. Idaho Jan. 3, 2014) ("land-use planning questions touch a sensitive area of 
social policy into which the federal courts should not lightly intrude."). 
Greenfield proposes to amend her complaint with additional facts and events 
comprising her equal protection claim. Am.Compl.1123-83. However, most of those 
events occurred prior to October 4, 2011. Id. Further, the equal protection claim based 
upon the fence ordinance and the zoning ordinance is subject to the same substantive 
analysis above. 
Greenfield asserts new allegations about several vandalism complaints lodged by 
the Wurmlingers against Greenfield, and by Greenfield against the Wurmlingers, 
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occurring after October 4, 2011, for trimming the arborvitae hedge. Am. Comp 1. ,r,r 87-
98. Greenfield contends the police, prosecutor, and the City have never brought criminal 
charges against the Wurmlingers for cutting the hedge, even though she was arrested, 
charged, and prosecuted for similar activity. The facts as alleged raise a selective 
prosecution claim in Claim number one, as amended. Am. Compl. ,r 101, p. 54. 
Greenfield alleges she was prosecuted while the Wurmlingers were not for the same or 
similar offense, in violation of her equal protection rights. See Maxfield v. Thomas, 557 
F.Supp. 1123, 1128 (D. Idaho 1983) (naturopath alleges Fourteenth Amendment violation 
for selective prosecution for involuntary manslaughter while medical doctors were not 
prosecuted for similar offences). 
To prevail upon an equal protection claim for selective enforcement or selective 
prosecution under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 
"enforcement had a discriminatory effect and the police were motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose." Lacey v. Maricopa County, 593 F.3d 896, 920 (9th Cir. 2012). 
Enforcement may be shown through a variety of actual or threatened arrests, searches and 
temporary seizures, citations, and other coercive conduct by the police. Id. To prove a 
discriminatory effect, "the claimant must show that similarly situated individuals ... were 
not prosecuted." Id. The standard for proving discriminatory effect "is a demanding one." 
Id. To state a claim, Greenfield must allege facts, either anecdotal or statistical, 
demonstrating "that similarly situated defendants ... could have been prosecuted, but were 
not." Id. 
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To establish that the police were motivated by an improper purpose, Greenfield 
must show that the named Defendants decided to enforce the law against her "on the 
basis of an impermissible ground such as race, religion or exercise of ... constitutional 
rights." Id. at 922; Maxfield, 557 F.Supp. at 1134 (granting summary judgment to the 
defendant because there were no facts supporting the plaintiffs assertion he was 
prosecuted upon impermissible grounds, such as for the exercise of a constitutional right). 
Greenfield has a dispute with her neighbor. Other than her neighbor not being 
criminally charged and prosecuted for chopping the hedge, Greenfield has not (and likely 
cannot) alleged facts demonstrating that other simHarly situated individuals, like her, 
were not prosecuted for trespass or malicious injury to property. Even if she could 
establish such facts, she has not demonstrated, nor can she, that the law was enforced 
against Greenfield on an impermissible ground. Greenfield has not alleged that she 
suffered criminal prosecution because of race, religion, or the exercise of her 
constitutional rights, such as free speech. 
Greenfield has not pled that she was treated any differently than the Wurmlingers 
for the tit-for-tat hedge trimming events occurring after October 4, 2011. Neither 
Greenfield nor her neighbor have been criminally charged. Greenfield cannot, therefore, 
establish disparate treatment based upon selective enforcement of the law for the hedge 
trimming episodes occurring after October 4, 2011. She has been treated exactly the same 
as her neighbor, and no criminal charges have been pursued against her or her neighbor. 
Furthermore, the prosecutors (Defendant Joel Ryan and Barry McHugh) would be 
entitled to prosecutorial immunity from the claims for relief alleged by Greenfield arising 
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out of her arrest in 2010 and prosecution that ended in October 2011. Maxfield, 557 
F.Supp. at 1128-31 (dismissing the plaintiff's case for selective prosecution because the 
plaintiff's complaint fell within the decision to prosecute, initiate, and present the state's 
case against the plaintiff). The City and its agents would not be liable for selective 
prosecution unless Greenfield could show that the decision to prosecute her was a 
manifestation of an unconstitutional policy or custom of Defendant City of Post Falls. 
Maxfield, 557 F.Supp. at 1133. Greenfield has not alleged the existence of an 
unconstitutional policy or custom-only that there was an allegedly concerted effort to 
bring charges against her (and only her). 
Greenfield's claims under the Fourteenth Amendment are time barred. To the 
extent they are not, they are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Amendment 
as proposed would be futile, because Greenfield cannot establish the elements of 
selective prosecution, or a violation of her right to equal protection based upon the 
boundary dispute with her neighbor. 
C. Idaho Constitutional Claims (Claims Two and Three) 
Greenfield seeks money damages for alleged violations of the Idaho Constitution. 
Specifically, she alleges that she was falsely accused of a crime and maliciously 
prosecuted for the crime, which conduct constituted a violation of her equal protection 
rights under the Idaho Constitution. She further alleges a "miscarriage of justice," 
because Defendant Gunderson allegedly concealed evidence by preventing the survey of 
the property boundary from being used in the felony case. And finally, she alleges her 
equal protection rights were violated because her "right to privacy" was violated by 
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"surveillance abuse" and by taking her garbage. Greenfield claims that Defendants' 
course of conduct led to false arrest and malicious prosecution. 
This Court has previously held that no direct cause of action exists for violations 
of the Idaho Constitution. This Court has previously reviewed some of those decisions 
and held that "no Idaho statute serves a function analogous to that of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by 
creating a cause of action for violations of Idaho's Constitution." Campbell v. City of 
Boise City, 2008 WL 2745121 *1 (D. Idaho July 11, 2008) (quoting Hancockv. Jdaho 
Falls School Dist. No. 91, 2006 WL 1207629 (D. Idaho May 2, 2006). In Campbell, the 
Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for false arrest in violation of sections of the Idaho 
Constitution equivalent to the Fourth Amendment. Id. See also Sommer v. Elmore 
County, 903 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1074 (D. Idaho Sept. 30, 2012) (refusing to recognize a 
private right of action for monetary damages for vioiation of due process under Section I 
of the Idaho Constitution); Mott v. City of McCall, Idaho, 2007 WL 1430764 *6 (D. 
Idaho May 14, 2007) (finding no private cause of action for an Idaho Constitutional law 
violation alleged to have occurred as a result of a traffic stop); Boren v. City of Nampa, 
2006 WL 2413 840 * 10 (D. Idaho Aug. 18, 2006) ( dismissing plaintiffs claims against 
the City of Nampa under the Idaho Constitution because it does not provide for a private 
cause of action for monetary damages based on an alleged violation of a person's civil 
liberties). 
Greenfield's second and third claims as set forth in her Complaint are properly 
dismissed with prejudice and any amendment as set forth in her proposed Amended 
Complaint would be futile. 
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D. Deprivation of Rights Claim (Claim Four) 
Greenfield's fourth claim alleges deprivation of her rights lUlder 18 U.S.C. § 242, 
a federal criminal statute providing criminal penalties for deprivation of constitutional 
rights committed by state or federal agents. See Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91 (1945) 
(discussing constitutionality of prior version codified at 18 U.S.C. § 52). The statute 
provides no basis for civil liability. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 
1980); Agnew v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226,230 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 353 
U.S. 959, (1957), overruled on other grounds, Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 29-30 (9th 
Cir. 1962). 
In her proposed amended complaint, Greenfield adds additional factual assertions, 
but continues to assert deprivation of her rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242. She adds a claim 
under 18 U.S.C. § 241. Aldabe precludes civil claims brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 241 as well. Greenfield's proposed amendment to this claim would therefore be futile. 
Greenfield may not maintain a claim for civil liability under 18 U.S.C. § 242 or 18 
U.S.C. § 241, and her fourth claim for relief is appropriately dismissed with prejudice and 
her motion to amend denied because of futility. 
3. State Law Claims (Five, Six; Seven, Eight, and Nine) 
The Court has discretion whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
remaining state law claims contained within colUlts five through nine of the Complaint. 
28 U.S.C. § 1367. Given the reasons for finding Defendants entitled to judgment, and in 
an effort to prevent further litigation, the Court will exercise jurisdiction over the 
remaining state law claims. 
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Defendants argue that Greenfield's state law claims for abuse of process, 
malicious prosecution, tortious interference for damages lost for past and future earnings, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress 
(counts five through nine of the Complaint) are precluded due to Greenfield's failure to 
file a timely notice of claim as required by the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA"). See 
Idaho Code § 6-906. Idaho Code § 6-908 provides, "No claim or action shall be allowed 
against a governmental entity or its employee unless the claim has been presented and 
filed within the time limits prescribed by this act." The Tort Claims Act requires the 
notice of claim to be presented and filed within 180 days from the date the claim arose. 
Idaho Code § 6-906. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the filing of a notice of claim as required 
by the Tort Claims Act is "a mandatory condition precedent to bringing suit, the failure of 
which is fatal to a claim, no matter how legitimate." Banks v. Univ. of Idaho, 798 P .2d 
452, 453 (Idaho 1990) (quoting McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (Idaho 
1987)).Claims subject to the ITCA include "any written demand to recover money 
damages from a governmental entity or its employee which any person is legally entitled 
to recover under this act as compensation for the negligent or otherwise wrongful act or 
omission of a governmental entity or its employee when acting within the course or scope 
of his employment." Idaho Code § 6-902(7). In addition, "a governmental entity and its 
employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without 
malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which arises out of any act or 
omission of an employee of the governmental entity exercising ordinary care." Idaho 
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Code§ 6-904(1). A person bringing such a claim against a political subdivision of the 
state or against any employee thereof is required to file a notice of claim with the clerk or 
secretary of the political subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date 
the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered. Idaho Code § 6-906. 
The Affidavits of Post Falls City clerk, Shannon Howard, and Kootenai County 
clerk, Clifford Hayes, contain public records establishing Greenfield filed her notice of 
tort claims with both entities on April 3, 2012. In her notice of tort claim, Greenfield 
alleges she was falsely accused and charged with felony malicious injury to property on 
June 14, 2010, and acquitted of the charge on October 4, 2011. According to her 
Complaint, Greenfield's damages are premised upon the initial criminal prosecution and 
acquittal. All of her state law claims arise out of conduct allegedly ending upon her 
acquittal on October 4, 2011. 
Greenfield admits in her memorandum that October 4, 2011, began the 180 day 
countdown for filing her notice of tort claim. Pl.'s Obj., at 4 (Dkt. 41.) Greenfield 
correctly notes that, when calculating the 180 day filing period, the day of the event 
triggering the period (October 4, 2011) is excluded. October 5, 2011, is included as day 
number one. One hundred eighty days from October 4, 2011, ends upon Sunday, April 1, 
2012. Therefore, the 180 day period ended on Monday, April 2, 2012. Greenfield admits 
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that the 180 day deadline to file the notice of tort claim fell on "Tuesday [sic] April 2, 
2012.' Pl. 's Obj., at 4 (Dkt. 41.)3 
Greenfield contends, however, that her Notice of Tort Claim, received by mail on 
April 3, 2012, was timely. She alleges she mailed the notice of tort claim on April 2, 
2012, and therefore the three day mailing rule in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) applies to give her 
an additional three day grace period. Greenfield is correct that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6( d), 
three days are added after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a) if service is 
made by mail. However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 applies only when computing any time period 
"specified in these rules," and therefore do not apply to the filing deadline specified in 
Idaho Code § 6-906. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 6(e)(1), like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contains a three 
day grace period applicable after service by mail. The Rule states: "Whenever a party has 
the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed 
period after the service of a notice or other paper upon the party and the notice or paper is 
served upon the party by mail, three (3) days shall be added to the prescribed period." 
This rule applies only if an opposing party receives service of papers by mail, and is 
required to act after receipt of service within a prescribed period of time. For example, if 
a plaintiff serves requests for admission by mail, the opposing party has thirty days plus 
three within which to respond. However, the Rule does not apply to the filing deadline in 
3 Idaho R. Civ. P. 6(a) applies to the computation of time prescribed by "any applicable statute." Rule 6(a) indicates 
that the day of the act is not included in the time period, but the last day is included unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, 
or holiday. Thus, if the last day falls on a weekend or holiday, the next day which is neither a weekend nor a holiday 
constitutes the end of the period. Rule 6(a) comports with the computation above, meaning the end of the 180 filing 
period was Monday, April 2, 2012. 
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Idaho Code§ 6-906. See also Idaho R. Civ. P. l(a) (indicating the scope of the rules is 
limited to the procedure applicable in the district courts and magistrate's divisions of the 
district courts in the state ofidaho). 
The effect of a claimant's failure to comply with the notice requirement contained 
in § 6-906 is straight forward; it is an absolute bar to an action sounding in tort against a 
governmental entity for violation. ofldaho state law. See Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 
885 P.2d 1162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (affirming trial court's dismissal of state law claims 
when plaintiff filed notice of claim 182 days after the incident occurred). The failure to 
comply with the notice requirement is fatal to one's claim, no matter how legitimate. 
McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 741, 744 ( 1987). There is no exception in the 
Tort Claims Act providing an extension, by mail or otherwise, to the time in which notice 
of the claim must be filed. Petty v. Bonner County, 2011 WL 1484120 *3 (D. Idaho Mar. 
30, 2011). 
Further, Greenfield has not presented any authority indicating that Idaho courts 
would apply the mailing rule applicable to service contained in Idaho R. Civ. P. 6(e)(l) to 
extend the 180 day filing deadline. If Greenfield's proposition were accepted, litigants on 
the one hundred and eightieth day could simply drop their notice of tort claim in the mail, 
and claim entitlement to the extra three days afforded by mailing. Such is not the rule 
under Mallory, which barred a claim filed two days late. Mallory, 885 P.2d at 1164-65; 
see also Lewis v. City of Nampa,, 2006 WL 318812 (D. Idaho Feb. 8, 2006) ("Notice of 
the tort claim needed to be received by the municipalities within 180 days from the date 
the claim arose ... ") ( emphasis added). 
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The 180 day filing deadline is absolute. Greenfield's notice of tort claim 
encompassing Counts five, six, seven, eight and nine in her Complaint are time barred 
because the notice of tort claim was not "presented to and filed with the clerk" within the 
prescribed time period. It was received, and therefore filed, one day late. 
Further, all of Greenfield's claims arise out of her alleged false arrest and 
prosecution for malicious injury to property. Defendants are immune from allegations of 
false arrest and malicious prosecution. Idaho Code § 6-904(3) provides: "A government 
entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment 
and without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which ... (3) Arises 
out .... false arrest, malicious prosecution .... " 
Idaho Code § 6-904(3) precludes government liability on claims arising out of 
false arrest, malicious prosecution, or both. Greenfield asserts claims of malicious 
prosecution, harassment, and abuse of process, as well as negligence. The crux of these 
claims is Greenfield's theory that Defendants did not have an adequate basis for pursuing 
prosecution for violations of City codes. Greenfield's asserted claims of negligence, 
harassment, tortious interference for damages lost for past and future earnings, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress each arise 
out of the general claim of malicious prosecution. Immunity granted under I.C. § 6-
904(3) is not annulled because Greenfield changed the wording for her theories upon 
which her claims are based. Boren v. City of Nampa, 2006 WL 2413840 *10 (D. Idaho 
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Aug. 18, 2006) ( citing Intermountain Construction v. City of Ammon, 122 Idaho 931, 841 
P.2d 1082 (1992)). 4 
Greenfield's state law claims are subject to dismissal. 
4. PlaintifPs Proposed Amended Complaint 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 permits amendment of the pleadings before trial, during trial, 
and after trial. Greenfield contends she may amend her complaint as a matter of right. 
Rule 15(a)(l)(B) allows amendments as a matter of course within 21 days after service of 
a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). Defendants filed their motion under Rule 12(c). 
Alternatively, Rule 15(a)(2) permits a party to amend its pleadings prior to trial 
with leave of the court, and the court "should freely give leave when justice so requires." 
See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit has stated that in 
assessing the propriety of a motion to amend, the Court should consider five factors: "(1) 
bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; 
and (5) whether the [party] has previously amended his [pleadings]." Nunes v. Ashcroft, 
375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2004). 
Futility alone can be enough to deny a motion for leave to amend. Id. In Bonin v. 
Calderon, the Ninth Circuit found the "proffered amendments would be nothing more 
than an exercise in futility." 59 F.3d 815,845 (9th Cir. 1995). That court also noted that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend, because the 
4 In Boren, the Court considered a complaint similar to the one Greenfield brings here. The complaint in Boren arose 
out of a zoning dispute. The plaintiff wanted the City of Nampa to approve her business of selling renovated cars 
from her property zoned for residential use. The City of Nampa filed a criminal charge against the plaintiff alleging 
she was operating an illegal salvage operation in violation of the City's zoning laws. The plaintiffs claims against 
the City and law enforcement personnel for malicious prosecution and false arrest were dismissed pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 6-904(3), as well as for failure to file a notice of tort claim. 2006 WL 2413840 at *10. 
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moving party presented "no new facts but only new theories and provide[ d] no 
satisfactory explanation for his failure to fully develop his contentions originally." Id. 
A. State Law Claims 
Greenfield proposes again to bring claims for abuse of process, malicious 
prosecution, t01iious interference for damages lost for past and future earnings, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress 
(counts five through nine of the proposed Amended Complaint). But, these are the same 
claims that arose out of the allegations in the original complaint, and which Greenfield 
admitted arose out of her mTest and prosecution for malicious injury to property. The 
claims under state law arose, at the latest, on October 4, 2011. No matter how the claims 
are restated or further embellished with facts, the state law claims are barred by operation 
of Idaho Code § 6-906 because the notice of tort claim encompassing these claims was 
untimely filed one day late. An amendment to the complaint would therefore be futile. 
Greenfield purports to add more claims under state law. She alleges libel and 
defamation; intentional breach and tortious interference of contractual agreement; civil 
conspiracy; and spoliation of evidence ( claims ten, eleven, twelve, and fourteen). With 
the exception of "defamation," none of these causes of action are mentioned in the Notice 
of Tort claim. Even if they were, they are, again, time barred. 
The libel and defamation claim is described in paragraph 62 of the proposed 
amended complaint. Greenfield refers to several allegedly libelous or slanderous remarks 
made about her by Defendant McLean to the news media. According to the facts alleged 
in the Complaint and the proposed amended complaint, these statements would have been 
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made prior to her acquittal on October 4, 2011. She therefore failed to file a timely notice 
of tort claim, and amendment of the complaint would be futile. 
The intentional breach and tortious interference of contractual agreement occurred, 
according to paragraph 125 of the proposed amended complaint, on June 3, 2010. The 
nqtice of tort claim was therefore untimely, and amendment of the complaint would be 
futile. 
The next state law cause of action for civil conspiracy arises out of the prosecution 
of Greenfield for malicious injury to property. It, too, would be subject to the 180 day 
time bar, and amendment of the complaint would be futile. 
Finally, the claim for spoliation of evidence is time barred. According to the 
proposed amended complaint, paragraph 131, the evidence that was destroyed consists of 
the survey commissioned by Defendants on December 10, 2010, and which related to the 
criminal prosecution resulting in Greenfield's acquittal on October 4, 2011. A claim for 
spoliation in the context of Greenfield's criminal prosecution would be barred by 
operation of Idaho Code § 6-906, and amendment of the complaint would be futile. 
Greenfield's state law claims will be dismissed with prejudice, and her motion to 
amend will be denied. 
B. Fifth Amendment Claim (Thirteenth Claim) 
The Court previously addressed the futility of Greenfield's proposed amendments 
to her federal and state constitutional claims, and will not repeat its reasons here. 
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Greenfield proposes to add, however, a claim under the .Fifth Amendment. 5 Greenfield 
alleges that Defendants deprived her generally of her due process rights, and she adds 
that she was not read her Miranda Rights during two instances of "custodial 
interrogation." She identifies the two occasions as "when Defendant Gunderson 
interrogated Greenfield on her property, even though at the time Greenfield was not 
under arrest," and again when she was "subjected to a restrained lack of freedom of 
movement" after she was arrested and processed for the crime related to cutting her 
neighbor's hedge. 
Plaintiff has not stated a cause of action against Defendants for violation of due 
process under the Fifth Amendment. While it is true the Fifth Amendment is applicable 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has clarified that the "Fifth Amendment prohibits the 
federal government from depriving persons of due process, while the Fourteenth 
Amendment explicitly prohibits deprivations without due process by the several States." 
Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002 n. 5 (9th Cir.2005) (emphasis added). In other 
words, Greenfield may not bring a claim for violation of her due process rights under the 
Fifth Amendment against the Defendants, all of whom are state actors. 
5 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or .otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment ofa grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the militia, when in actual service in time ofwat or public danger; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
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Other provisions of the Fifth Amendment, such as the prohibitions against self-
incrimination and double jeopardy, are applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Duncan v. State of La., 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (self-incrimination); 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (double jeopardy). But Greenfield's 
claims are subject to the two year statute of limitations. The incident with Defendant 
Gunderson is described in paragraph 57 of the proposed amended complaint. Greenfield 
alleges the event occurred on April 6, 2010, which is beyond the two-year statute of 
limitations. The second event occurred beyond the two-year statute of limitations as well. 
It is described in paragraph 60 of the proposed amended complaint as having occurred on 
June 14, 2010. 
Further, based upon the facts as alleged, Greenfield cannot establish a Fifth 
Amendment violation. Even assuming Greenfield was subject to coercive police 
questioning, 6 coercive police questioning, in and of itself, does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment unless the statements obtained through that questioning are later "used" in a 
"criminal case." Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766-67 (2003) (Thomas, J., joined by 
Rhenquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J.) Absent use of the statements against the 
defendant at trial or during pre-trial proceedings, the Fifth Amendment is not violated. 
Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 429 (9th Cir. 2010) See also Foti v. County 
of Marin, No. C09-4167-CRB, 2010 WL 957645 *6 (N.D. Cal. March 12, 2010) (the 
6 In both instances, Greenfield does not describe situations involving coercive police questioning. On April 6, 2010, 
Greenfield alleges Defendant Gunderson approached her to ask about Mr. Wurm linger' s cut trees, Greenfield 
answered his questions, and thereafter drove to work. On June 14, 2010, Greenfield does not describe any 
conversation or interrogation other than the conversation she had with the female guard about her surgical incision 
causing her pain. 
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court found no Fifth Amendment violation when the statements were not used "to initiate 
or prove a criminal charge"). Greenfield has not alleged that any statements made by her 
were used against her in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
Any proposed amendment of the Complaint to assert Fifth Amendment violations 
based upon the facts alleged would be futile. 
CONCLUSION 
Dismissal without leave to amend is generally improper unless it is beyond doubt 
that the complaint "could not be saved by any amendment." Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 
F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will prevail but 
whether she "is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Diaz v. Int'lLongshore 
and Warehouse Union, Local 13, 474 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.2007) (citations omitted). 
The Court will grant Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings without 
leave to amend for the reasons explained above. Greenfield has had an opportunity to 
submit her proposed amended complaint, and the Court reviewed and considered it. The 
scenario giving rise to Greenfield's complaint has been extensively pled, and there is 
simply no basis to conclude a further amended pleading would save this action from 
dismissal. There appears to be no legal basis for relief from this Court. 
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ORDER 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1) Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 35) is 
GRANTED; 
2) Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint (Dkt. 37) is DENIED as MOOT; 
and 
3) Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. 
Dated: April 03, 2014 
~ 
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ERIC J. WURMLINGER and ROSALYND. ) 
WURMLINGER, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) ________________ ) 
Coeur d'Alene, April 2015 Term 
2015 Opinion No. 47 
Filed: May 21, 2015 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
·· Appeal from the District {;ourt of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for Kootenai County. Hon. Lansing L. Haynes, District Judge. 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
Christina J. Greenfield, Post Falls, argued in her own behalf. 
John C. Riseborough, Paine Hamblen LLP, Spokane, Vvashington, argued for 
respondents. 
EISMANN, Justice. 
This is an appeal out of Kootenai County from a judgment holding that the defendants 
were not violating the subdivision CC&R's by operating a bed and breakfast from their home or 
by having arborvitaes higher than six feet, and awarding them a judgment totaling $168,755.37 
against the plaintiff for her conduct that caused them emotional distress. We affirm the judgment 
of the district court and award attorney fees on appeal. 
I. 
Factual Background. 
This is an appeal from a judgment resolving a dispute between two neighbors. In 1994, 
Eric and Rosalynn Wurmlinger (Defendants) built their home in the Park Wood Place 
subdivision in Post Falls, Idaho, on a lot next to the home of Judy Richardson. The Defendants 
operated a bed and breakfast from their home, and they planted a row of arborvitaes near the 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 328 of 710
) 
property line between their lot and the lot owned by Ms. Richardson. In 2005, Christina 
Greenfield (Plaintiff) purchased the Richardson property. The following year, Plaintiff had an 
attorney write to the Defendants, stating that the operation of their bed and breakfast violated the 
subdivision's protective covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R's) and that the height of 
the arborvitaes violated the height restriction on fences contained in the CC&R's and the height 
restriction on hedges contained in a city ordinance. Thereafter, the dispute between Plaintiff and 
Defendants centered on the operation of Defendants' bed and breakfast in their home and the 
height of their arborvitaes near the boundary between the two properties. 
On April 12, 2006, Post Falls sent Mr. Wurmlinger a letter stating that the city had 
received a complaint regarding a hedge on his property and that the city code required fences and 
hedges within a side yard setback to be no higher than six feet. The letter quoted the relevant 
-~ ordinance-0and askedi:hat- the hedge tre brought into compliance within thirty days. ·· Defendants 
trimmed their arborvitaes to bring them into compliance, and in June 2006 the city amended its 
ordinance to remove the limitation on the height of hedges. Thereafter, Defendants allowed their 
arborvitaes to grow taller than six feet. 
By 2010, the arborvitaes had grown to a height of ten to twelve feet. In April 2010, 
Defendants returned from a vacation and discovered that about four to six feet had been cut from 
ten of their arborvitaes. It is undisputed that Plaintiff had her agent cut the trees. Plaintiff was 
charged criminally, but the charges were later dismissed. Thereafter, Defendants began 
experiencing vandalism to their property. Over a period of about eighteen months, there were 
fourteen incidents of paint being splashed or poured on improvements to their property, with the 
last incident occurring about four months before the jury trial in this case. 
On September 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed this action alleging four claims against 
Defendants. First, Plaintiff asked for a declaratory judgment that Defendants were violating the 
CC&R's by operating the bed and breakfast, allowing their arborvitaes to grow higher than five 
feet, and obstructing a pedestrian easement across their property. She sought an injunction 
requiring Defendants to cease the alleged violations. Second, Plaintiff alleged that the plants and 
trees on Defendants' property that blocked her view of the Spokane River constituted a nuisance. 
She sought damages and an order requiring Defendants to remove the offending foliage. Third, 
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had agreed to maintain their foliage along the common 
botmdary line at a height of six feet; that Plaintiff had the foliage trimmed to the agreed height 
2 
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when Defendants breached that agreement; and that Defendants then contacted law enforcement 
which resulted in Plaintiff being charged with a misdemeanor. As a result, Plaintiff claimed that 
Defendants intentionally caused her emotional distress, for which she was entitled to recover 
damages. Fourth, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants breached their agreement with her and made 
false and defomatory statements about her to law enforcement, which negligently caused her 
emotional distress. She requested an award of damages on that claim. Defendants filed a 
counterclaim seeking damages for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
common law trespass, and timber trespass. 
Prior to trial, Plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was 
dismissed upon Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's claims for nuisance and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress and Defendants' claims were tried to a jury. It returned 
-- - -asp'ecia:1-verdict-finding that Plaintiff-had failed to prove her claims of nuisance and negligent--": ···· 
infliction of emotional distress. The jury also found that Defendants had proved their claim of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, for which it awarded them $52,000 in damages, and 
their claim of timber trespass, for which it awarded them $17,000 in damages. The jury also 
found that Defendants had proved that Plaintiff committed a common law trespass, but 
Defendants did not prove any damages for that claim. Plaintiff's action for a declaratory 
judgment that Defendants were in violation of the CC&R' s was tried to the district court, and it 
later entered a decision finding that Plaintiff had failed to prove that claim. 
The timber trespass damages were trebled to $51,000 pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-
202, and the court awarded Defendants court costs and a reasonable attorney fee totaling 
$65,755.37. It entered a judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of$168,755.37, and she timely 
appealed. 
II. 
Did the District Court Err in Finding that Defendants Were Not Violating the CC&R's? 
Prior to the jury trial, the district court instructed the parties that it would determine the 
issues regarding Defendants' alleged violations of the CC&R's, but would do so based upon the 
evidence presented during the jury trial. After the jury returned its verdict, the court had a status 
conference with the parties, and it informed them that they could submit closing arguments in 
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writing regarding the alleged violations of the CC&R' s. Once they had done so, the court filed 
its decision finding that Plaintiff had failed to prove the alleged violations of the CC&R's. 
With respect to the alleged violations of the CC&R's, Plaintiff lists the following issues: 
a) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' operation of their 
business, the River Cove Bed and Breakfast and wedding event facility did not 
violate the neighborhood CC&Rs? 
b) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' operation of their 
business, the River Cove Bed and Breakfast and wedding event facility was "Not 
open to the public"? 
c) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' operation of their 
business, the River Cove Bed and Breakfast and wedding event facility, qualifies 
as a ''Home Occupation" and not a "Business" as so defined in the neighborhood 
CC&Rs? 
d) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' lack of 
maintenance of the arborvitae hedge, which is located on or near the real property 
- - - - - ---- --- · · - -line thar-s-eparates ·both--properties, did not violate the neighborhood CC&Rs 
height restrictions and therefore refuse to enter an Injunction prohibiting the 
Respondents' [sic] from allowing the arborvitae shrubs to exceed the height 
restrictions as set forth in the neighborhood CC&Rs? 
Operation of the bed and breakfast. The CC&R's provide that no lot within the 
subdivision can be used for any purpose except for a single family residence, but that "[h]ome 
occupations of family members, which have no exterior visibility, are not prohibited provided 
they are conducted totally within the residence, are not open to the public, have no employees 
and do not generate extra vehicular traffic or street parking." Defendants' house has six 
bedrooms, three of which they rent for their bed and breakfast. 
Initially, Defendants had weddings at their home which attracted a significant number of 
guests; they owned a boat and offered river cruises to those staying at their bed and breakfast; 
and they once set up a tent trailer to accommodate a couple who wanted to attend an athletic 
event in nearby Coeur d'Alene. In 2008, there was a wedding which resulted in nine cars 
parking on the street. That prompted a call from the city, which licenses home occupation 
businesses and requires that they comply with certain conditions. As a result, Defendants 
changed their wedding policy, and the district court found that they "now offer small nuptial 
exchange ceremonies that involve no more than eight individuals," that the ceremonies are 
conducted in the residence, that those in the wedding party must stay in the bed and breakfast, 
and that any music is played very softly. The court found persuasive the testimony of neighbors 
who never heard any excessive noise corning from Defendants' property. 
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Covenants that restrict the uses of land are valid and enforceable. Brown v. Perkins, 129 
Idaho 189, 192, 923 P.2d 434, 437 (1996). However, "[b]ecause restrictive covenants are in 
derogation of the common law right of a person to use land for all lawful purposes, covenants are 
not to be construed to extend by implication any restriction not clearly expressed in the 
covenants." Id. Rather, "[a]ll doubts and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the free use 
of land." Id. Therefore, while clearly expressed restrictions will be upheld, "restrictions that are 
not clearly expressed will be resolved in favor of the free use ofland." Id. 
The district court found that the bed and breakfast had no exterior visibility. There was 
only a small plaque with the street address affixed to Defendants' brick lamppost near their 
driveway, and the photographs introduced into evidence showed what appeared to be a home, not 
a commercial enterprise. The court found persuasive the testimony of a neighbor who lived 
·across-the-street and·-did·not know that the Wurmlingers operated a bed and breakfast in their 
home until Mr. Wunnlinger told him. The court found that the operation is conducted totally 
within the residence and that guests walking outside to use the hot tub or gather on the patio are 
normal activities for a residence. The court determined that the words "open to the public" in the 
CC&R's meant that members of the public could simply walk in the front door, off the street, 
unannounced and without invitation, to ask for accommodations. Defendants' bed and breakfast 
does not accept walk-up clientele, but only accepts people with advance reservations arranged 
over the telephone. It does not have street signs or directional signs inviting the public to walk in 
and obtain a room. The court found that the Wurmlingers had no employees, which fact was 
undisputed. Finally, the court found that since 2008 the bed and breakfast has not generated 
extra vehicular traffic or street parking. 
In her brief, Plaintiff cites testimony concerning the operation of the bed and breakfast 
prior to 2008. In the declaratory judgment claim in her complaint filed on September 23, 2010, 
she alleged that "[t]he Defendants' operation of the Bed and Breakfast is [present tense] in 
violation of the CC&R's"; she requested an order "declaring that the Defendants' operation of 
the Bed and Breakfast in Parkwood Place is [present tense] a violation of the CC&R's"; and she 
sought "an Injunction prohibiting the Defendant's [sic] from operating the Bed and Breakfast, or 
any similar business, in Parkwood Place." (Emphasis added.) The district court found that at the 
time the complaint was filed, the operation of the bed and breakfast was not in violation of the 
CC&R's. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants repeatedly referred to the bed and breakfast as a 
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"business" and the evidence showed it was profitable. A "home occupation" by definition would 
be a business, 1 and profitable home occupations are not excluded by the CC&R's. 
Plaintiff also asserts that "a 'Home Occupation' [is] not a 'Business' as so defined in the 
neighborhood CC&Rs," but she does not cite to any definition of ''business" in the CC&R's. 
However, the provision regarding home occupations prohibits "any trade or business of any 
kind," and then excludes from that prohibition "[h]ome occupations of family members" that 
comply with certain conditions. 2 In context, that would certainly indicate that a home 
occupation would be a trade or business. 
Arborvitaes. The CC&R's provide that "[n]o lot, lots or parcels, shall ever be enclosed 
or fenced by any fence or structure exceeding five (5) feet in height." Based upon the testimony 
of a surveyor, the district court found that Defendants have thirty-three arborvitaes on their 
property and- that Pla.intiff has·· two on hers. Plaintiff contended that the arborvitaes on 
Defendants' property constituted a fence under the CC&R's. The district court found that the 
relevant provision in the CC&R' s was unambiguous and that it did not provide that arborvitae or 
any other trees or landscaping constituted a fence. The restriction as to the height of fences was 
in a section of the CC&R's titled "Building Restrictions" and in a subsection titled "Building 
Conditions,"3 and in the context there was nothing indicating that the word "fence" included 
foliage. 
1 The word "occupation" in this context means "a person's usual or principal work or business, especially as a 
means of earning a living; vocation." Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/occupation (accessed: April 30, 2015). 
2 The relevant provision in the CC&R' s is as follows: 
1. Residential Purposes: No lot shall be used except for single family residential purposes 
and amenities. . ... 
a) No grantee under any conveyance, owner, tenant, or other person shall at any time 
conduct, or permit to be conducted on any lot, any trade or business of any kind, either 
commercial or religious, including, but not limited to, day care, school, nursery, out-patient, 
treatment, rehabilitation or recovery facilities, nor shall said premises be used for any other 
purpose whatsoever except for the purpose of a private dwelling or residence for one family. 
Home occupations of family members, which have no exterior visibility, are not prohibited 
provided they are conducted totally within the residence, are not open to the public, have no 
employees and do not generate extra vehicular traffic or street parking. 
3 The provision in the CC&R's is as follows: 
2. Building Conditions: No building shall be erected except one detached single-family 
dwelling on each lot which does not exceed two and one half stories in height, together with a 
private attached garage for not less than two cars. No dwelHng, building or other structure shall be 
moved on to any lot; new construction being required. No tent, trailer, mobile home, boat or other 
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"A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous." Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002). In 
applying that principle, the appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence, judge the credibility of 
the witnesses, or substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Argosy Trust ex rel. 
Andrews v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 572, 114 P.3d 128, 130 (2005). It is the responsibility of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses and weigh conflicting evidence. Bream v. 
Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 367, 79 P.3d 723, 726 (2003). The appellate court's role is simply to 
determine whether there is evidence in the record that a reasonable trier of fact could accept and 
rely upon in making the factual finding that is challenged on appeal. Miller v. Callear, 140 
Idaho 213,216, 91 P.3d 1117, 1120 (2004). 
Plaintiff does not argue in her brief that the district court's findings are clearly erroneous. 
--- She argues·that Defendants called their :bed and breakfast a ''business" and that such business 
"creates excessive traffic, constant noise, and intrusions from unwelcome patrons who stray onto 
adjacent properties, block driveways, mail boxes, and causes street congestion." She cites 
nothing in the record supporting her accusations. "This Court will not search the record for 
error. We do not presume error on appeal; the party alleging error has the burden of showing it 
in the record." Id. at 218, 91 P.3d at 1122 (citation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to show that the 
district court erred in finding that she had failed to prove that Defendants were violating the 
CC&R's. 
III. 
Did the District Court Err in Finding that Defendants' Planting of Trees and Shrubs that 
Block Plaintiff's View of the River Did Not Constitute a Nuisance? 
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that "[t]he Defendants have planted shrubs and trees 
upon their real property which block the Plaintiffs view of the Spokane River and which 
infringe upon the Plaintiffs real property," and she alleged that such conduct constituted a 
nuisance. Plaintiff asserts various issues on appeal that can be grouped as asserting that the 
vehicle or structure shall be used or allowed for human habitation on a temporary or permanent 
basis on any lot at any time. No lot, lots or parcels, shall ever be enclosed or fenced by any fence 
or structure exceeding five (5) feet in height. Approval from the Architectural Control Committee 
shall be required for all fences. 
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) 
district court erred in finding that Defendants' planting of trees and shrubs that block her view of 
the river did not constitute a nuisance. She lists as issues the following: 
o) Did the District Court err in its finding that Respondents' [sic] did not 
purposely and or negligently plant large trees and or shrubs to intentionally block 
Appellant's view of the Spokane River, which infringes upon Appellant's real 
property, obstructs her free use of property and interferes with her comfortable 
enjoyment oflife and property? 
p) Did the District Court err in its finding that the large trees and or shrubs that 
were planted intentionally to block Appellant's granted view of the Spokane 
River, which infringes upon Appellant's real property, obstructs her free use of 
property, and interferes with her comfortable enjoyment of life and property, 
should be abated by the Respondents' [sic] and ordered an injunction prohibiting 
future obstructions of Appellant's view of the Spokane River, and not interfere 
with her comfortable enjoyment of life and property? 
. z) Did th~ District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by failure to Order 
an Abatement requiring the Respondents' [sic] to remove any and all shrubs and 
trees located at or near the parties [sic] common property line which obstruct the 
Appellant's free use of property, and interferes with the Appellant's comfortable 
enjoyment oflife and property? 
aa) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by failure to Enter 
an Injunction prohibiting the Respondents' [sic] from planting any trees, shrubs, 
or other vegetation which blocks the Appellant's view of the Spokane River or 
otherwise obstructs the Appellant's free use of property, and interferes with the 
Appellant's comfortable enjoyment of life and property? 
The district court did not make any findings regarding whether Defendants' actions 
constituted a nuisance. That issue was submitted to the jury for its decision. On the special 
verdict form, the jury was asked, "Did the defendants' maintenance of the arborvitae and/or 
operation of the bed and breakfast constitute a nuisance?" The jury unanimously answered that 
question, "No." 
With respect to Plaintiff's nuisance claim, the court only ruled on her motion for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. One of the issues she raised in that motion was that the 
jury should have determined that Defendants maliciously planted the shrubs and trees for the 
purpose of annoying her and blocking her view. In denying the motions, the district court ruled 
that "[t]he jury was presented with testimony as to the reasons for planting the arborvitae and 
other trees" and that "there was substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's verdict 
in this matter." 
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On appeal, Plaintiff argues that after she had an attorney write to Defendants about the 
height of their arborvitaes, Defendants began planting other bushes and trees on their property 
out of spite in order to block Plaintiffs view of the river. She also contends that Defendants 
agreed to keep their arborvitaes trimmed to a height of six feet, but allowed them to grow higher 
out of spite. She argues that Defendants' actions in planting the bushes and trees had no 
beneficial use to them and that their failure to keep them trimmed to a height of six feet in 
violation of Mr. Wunnlinger's agreement shows that the plantings were done solely to annoy 
her. 
Plaintiff's contention that Defendants agreed to keep the arborvitae trimmed to a height 
of six feet is based upon their response to a letter sent them by Plaintiff's attorney. On April 12, 
2006, Post F.alls sent Mr. Wurmlinger a letter stating that the city had received a complaint 
.·· regarding·a hedge on'his properly and that the city code required fences and hedges within a side 
yard setback to be no higher than six feet. Defendants trimmed the arborvitae, and by a letter 
dated May 8, 2006, the city responded that the pruning satisfied the city. The letter also stated, 
"It is important that you maintain this height." On May 10, 2006, Plaintiffs attorney sent 
Defendants a letter stating, among other things, that the height of the arborvitae violated the 
CC&R's restriction on the height of side fences. On May 17, 2006, Mr. Wurmlinger responded 
in writing to the attorney's letter and stated with respect to the height of the arborvitae as 
follows: 
In point 4, it cites that we have large shrubs which are higher than 5 ft. 
The C.C. & R states that fences and enclosing structures not be higher than 5 ft. 
Our shrubbery and trees are living plants and do not fall in that category of the 
C.C. & R's. We recently prnned all of our shrubs which enhanced the view from 
our neighbors property to the North. The City of Post Falls was satisfied by my 
prnning. We certainly will control and maintain the shrubbery to its current level 
(See attached letter from the City of Post Falls regarding pruning and shrubbery). 
Plaintiff called Mr. Wurmlinger as her first witness, and during her questioning of him 
she asked with respect to the letter, "Did you agree to maintain the shrnbs at a 6-foot height in a 
letter dated May 17th, 2006?" He answered, "I agreed to do what the city told me I had to do at 
the time." The following month, the city amended its ordinance so that the height restriction no 
longer applied to hedges. 
In denying Plaintiff's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the district 
court did not decide whether or not Defendants' actions constituted a nuisance. "[T]he court 
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cannot weigh the evidence when ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." 
Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100, 106, 254 P.3d 1, 7 (2011). The court merely found that there 
was substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's verdict. When reviewing a trial 
court's denial of a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, "we determine whether 
there was sufficient evidence to justify submitting the claim to the jury, viewing as true all 
adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference in favor of the party opposing the 
motion for a directed verdict." Todd v. Sullivan Constr. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 124, 191 P.3d 196, 
202 (2008). The jury could have reasonably found that Defendants did not plant the bushes and 
trees for the purpose of maliciously annoying Plaintiff by blocking her view of the river. The 
district court did not err in holding that the evidence was of a sufficient quantity and probative 
value that reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper. 
IV. 
Did the District Court Err in Failing to Find that Defendants' Actions Caused Plaintiff 
Emotional Distress? 
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants negligently caused her emotional 
distress. The jury was asked, "Did the defendants' maintenance of the arborvitae and/or 
operation of the bed and breakfast, and/or defendants' alleged defamatory statements to 
neighbors or police negligently inflict emotional distress on plaintiff?," and the jury unanimously 
answered that question, "No." Plaintiff states as an issue on appeal: 
1) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' violation of the 
neighborhood CC&Rs by operating a business, the River Cove Bed and Breakfast 
and wedding event facility, and the arrest of the Appellant after trimming said 
[sic] arborvitae hedge, along with constant harassment, including many false 
allegations of crimes reported by the Respondents, did not cause extreme 
negligent emotional distress on the Appellant? 
The district court did not make any such finding, and Plaintiff did not raise this issue as 
part of her motion to set aside the judgment or to grant her a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. Therefore, there was no ruling by the district court on this issue. It was the jury who 
concluded that Plaintiff had failed to prove her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
In her brief on appeal, Plaintiff recounts her version of the evidence, but she does not 
contend that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. It was up to the jury to 
decide what witnesses were credible, the weight to be given their testimony, and the reasonable 
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inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, 919, 342 P.3d 628, 
631 (2015). "The presumption is in favor of an impartial and considerate action on the part of a 
jury, and we must be convinced affirmatively before we could, by any rule of law, be permitted 
to question such presumption." Cox v. Northwestern Stage Co., 1 Idaho 376, 386 (Terr. Sup. Ct. 
1871). There was conflicting evidence in this case, and it was up to the jury to decide the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Plaintiff has not pointed 
to anything indicting that the members of the jury did not faithfully perform their duty when they 
concluded that Plaintiff had failed to prove her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
V. 
Did the District Court Err in Finding that Plaintiff Committed a Timber Trespass and in 
Awarding Damages? 
Idaho Code section 6-202 sets forth a cause of action for timber trespass. 4 With respect 
to this cause of action, the district court instructed the jury as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
On the defendants' claim that plaintiff damaged their trees and arborvitae, 
the defendants have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. That defendants owned certain trees and/or arborvitae; and 
2. That the trees and/or arborvitae were located on the 
defendants' property; and 
3. That plaintiff damaged or destroyed said trees and/or 
arborvitae; and 
4. That defendants have sustained damages. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did plaintiff damage or destroy defendants' arborvitae and/or spruce tree? 
4 Idaho Code section 6-202 states as follows: 
Any person who, without permission of the owner, or the owner's agent, willfully and 
intentionally enters upon the real property of another person which property is posted with "No 
Trespassing" signs or other notices of like meaning, spaced at intervals of not less than one (1) 
notice per six hundred sixty (660) feet along such real property; or who willfully and intentionally 
cuts down or carries off any wood or underwood, tree or timber, or girdles, or otherwise willfully 
and intentionally injures any tree or timber on the land of another person, or on the street or 
highway in front of any person's house, village, or city lot, or cultivated grounds; or on the 
commons or public grounds of or in any city or town, or on the street or highway in front thereof, 
without lawful authority, is liable to the owner of such land, or to such city or town, for treble the 
amount of damages which may be assessed therefor or fifty dollars ($50.00), plus a reasonable 
attorney's fee which shall be taxed as costs, in any civil action brought to enforce the terms of this 
act if the plaintiff prevails. 
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If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these 
propositions has been proved, then you should answer this question "Yes." If you 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has 
not been proved, then you should answer this question "No." 
INSTRUCTIONNO. 19 
Any person who willfully, intentionally, and without permission of the 
owner, girdles or otherwise injures any tree on the land of another person, without 
lawful authority, is liable to the owner of such land for the amount of actual 
damages which may be assessed therefor. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
If the jury decides that the defendants are entitled to recover from the 
plaintiff on their counterclaim for damage to the defendants' trees and/or 
arborvitae, the jury must determine the ainount of money that will reasonably and 
fairly compensate the defendants for any actual damages proved to be 
proximately caused by the plaintiffs actions. 
The elements of actual damage to defendants' trees and arborvitae are: 
The difference between the fair market value of the tree or the arborvitae 
immediately before the occurrence, and its fair market value without repair after 
the occurrence and, the loss of utility or contribution of that tree or arborvitae to 
defendants' real property. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
The term "fair market value" means the cash price at which a willing 
seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy the subject property, in an open 
marketplace free of restraints, taking into account the highest and most profitable 
use of the property. 
It presumes that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no 
compulsion to do so, and that the buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no 
compulsion to do so. 
It presumes that both parties are fully informed, knowledgeable and aware 
of all relevant market conditions and of the highest and best use potential of the 
property, and are basing their decisions accordingly. 
On the special verdict form, the jury unanimously answered "Yes" to the questions: 
"Based upon the evidence presented to you, do you find that the arborvitae are trees?" and ''Did 
defendants prove that plaintiff committed timber trespass?" The jury assessed damages for the 
timber trespass in the sum of $17,000. 
Plaintiff lists various issues asserting that the district court erred in finding that she 
committed a timber trespass ai1d in awarding damages. She lists the issues as follows: 
t) Did the District Court err in its finding that the arborvitae shrubs that form a 
hedge, as mentioned above, are to be considered trees? 
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g) Did the District Court err in its fmding that the arborvitae hedge is solely 
located on the Respondents' property when a mutual ownership was evident on 
both surveys? 
h) Did the District Court err in its finding that Appellant should be accused and 
assessed damages for intentionally and willfully committed Timber Trespass to 
the property of Respondents wherein LC. § 6-202 allowing for treble damages 
would have applied when a dual ownership of the arborvitae (shrub) hedge, which 
is located on or near the adjoining property line of both the Appellant and 
Respondents, is evident? 
i) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Appellant should be assessed 
"Timber" damages for property ( arborvitae hedge) that she equally owns, after the 
Appellant trimmed said arborvitae hedge to the agreed upon height, which was 
previously cut four years prior to the same height by the Respondent at which 
time it was neither damaged or destroyed? 
j) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Appellant has intentionally, 
willfully or negligently damaged and/or destroyed the ten (10) arborvitae shrubs 
in question? 
n) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' Survey was 
properly signed and introduced into evidence? 
r) Did the District Court err in allowing excessive awards of damages and 
attorney fees to the Respondents' [sic]? 
s) Did the District Court err in detennining whether damages were correctly 
assessed in accordance with the finding for and the allowable amount of awards 
· of damages and attorney fees to the Respondents? 
The district court did not make any findings regarding whether Plaintiff committed a 
timber trespass or the amount of damages. Those issues were submitted to the jury for its 
decision. The court only ruled upon Plaintiff's motion to set aside the judgment under Rule 
60(b) for fraud upon the court because Defendants' counsel submitted a survey into evidence that 
the surveyor had not signed and dated. She also argued that absent such survey, the evidence 
would show that some of the arborvitae were on her property. 
The district court held that Idaho Code section 54-1215(1)(b), which requires a surveyor 
to seal, sign, and date all surveys presented to a client, was not an evidentiary rule of 
admissibility. The court stated that the jury heard testimony about the methods used by the 
surveyor and how his measurements, recordings, and findings were accurately transferred to the 
survey. The court concluded that offering the survey into evidence did not constitute fraud upon 
the court. The court also held that there was substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, 
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evidence presented to the jury as to the location of the arborvitaes. Plaintiff testified that she had 
her brother-in-law cut the arborvitaes down to a height of six feet. The court therefore denied the 
motion to set aside the judgment for fraud upon the court based upon offering the survey into 
evidence and her motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict based upon Plaintiff's 
contention that at least some of the arborvitaes were on her property. 
Defendants presented expert testimony that the difference between a shrub and a tree is 
lhat a shrub is capable of growing to a height of only fifteen feet, while a tree is capable of 
growing taller and that the species of arborvitaes planted by Defendants was capable of growing 
to a height of twenty feet. ''T)'efettclants:pr,e~:cinte¢1:~~11er.t:testiµJ:oµy,,9f 11 s1.+weyor,*owing. :where 
. ... . . . . . ' ·.• . . .. . . . ... . . ' 
.th~x;q1;botvita~s ·were·dh · relatfofi :td:tne ,:pa:rtiesr,, eohmlon: bou:ndary)ixi~;_ ancl:,l?.laifltiff · p:resen;yed 
c~~pel]tJysti,:.1;[1,9.r:iy::?1,,S to·h~r~.o.11te11tiotriti:Ahatr~g~d;{J'he district court did not err in holding that 
the ·evidence·-was-·of a sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could 
conclude that the verdict finding Plaintiff liable for timber damages was proper. 
Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in assessing damages, but it did not do so. 
The jury determined damages pursuant to the evidence and jury instructions to which Plaintiff 
did not object. The issue of whether the damages were excessive was never presented to the 
district court. Therefore, there is no basis for concluding that the district court erred in allowing 
an allegedly excessive award of damages. This Court will not review an alleged error by the trial 
court where the record does not show that the court ever ruled on the issue. Ada Cnty. Highway 
Dist. v. Total Success Invs., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 368-69, 179 P.3d 323, 331-32 (2008). 
VI. 
Did the District Court Err in Submitting to the Jury Defendants' Claim of Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress? 
In their initial counterclaim, Defendants alleged the claims of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Later, at Defendants' request, 
the district court entered an order dismissing with prejudice Defendants' counterclaim of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants later changed attorneys, and they filed an 
amended answer and counterclaim in which they alleged a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotion distress, but not negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Plaintiff alleges as an issue on appeal, 
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k) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err in his finding that 
the Respondents' asserted legal claims for "Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress" during the trial were properly disclosed, when in fact, the District Court 
Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes had previously dismissed the Respondents' 
original claim of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress on March 22, 2011 
with Prejudice? 
The district court held a pretrial conference one week before trial. Prior to that 
conference, the parties filed written statements of the issues to be tried. In their statement, 
Defendants alleged that Plaintiff ''harassed them with unfounded complaints to the police, 
harassed their guests, trespassed on their property, and made defamatory comments about them 
to others." During the pretrial conference, the court asked Defendants' counsel whether the 
claim that Plaintiff harassed Defendants was an infliction of emotional distress claim. 
Defendants' counsel stated 'that' it was; and the court asked, "Is this an intentional and/or 
negligent infliction?" Defendants' counsel answered, "We propose instructions on both." The 
court then asked Plaintiff if there was any record she wanted to make, and she responded, ''No, 
your Honor." The court then stated that Defendants' counterclaims were intentional and/or 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, common law trespass, and timber trespass. The court 
again asked Plaintiff if she wanted to make any record on that, and she again stated that she did 
not. The court then stated: "So with those clarifications, it looks like we have some consensus 
on what is the existence of the defendants' claims. Anything about the claims or issues that the 
Court's brought up to this point that plaintiff would like to get clarified or remark about?" 
Plaintiff responded, ''No, your Honor." 
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence at the trial, the district court gave the 
parties its proposed jury instructions. They included an instruction that addressed "defendants' 
counterclaim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against the plaintiff' and set forth the 
elements that Defendants must prove to recover on that claim. During the jury instruction 
conference, the court asked, "Does the plaintiff have any objection to [the] Court's proposed jury 
instructions or special verdict form or the failure to give any of plaintiffs proposed 
instructions?" and told Plaintiff, ''Now is the time to make those objections." Plaintiff 
responded, ''No, your Honor." 
The order dismissing with prejudice Defendants' counterclaim of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress was not a final judgment because it did not resolve all claims in this case and 
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was not certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I.R.C.P. 54(a) (2010). It was simply an interlocutory order that could later be modified, 
amended, or reversed. In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 107, 320 P.3d 1262, 1266 (2014). Although 
Defendants' amended counterclaim did not allege a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, "[ w ]hen issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings." I.R.C.P. 
15(b). By failing to object at the pretrial conference that Defendants' claim of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress was to be tried to the jury, Plaintiff consented that such issue 
would be tried. The district court did not err in submitting that claim to the jury. 
VII. 
Did the District Court Err in Instructing the Jury? 
Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in instructing the jury. She states as issues 
on appeal: 
m) Did the District Court err in its finding that the jury instructions and the 
special verdict form were properly amended and submitted within the time frame 
as specified under I.R.C.P. Sl(a)(l)? 
y) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by giving the jury 
improper instructions? 
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence at the trial, the district court gave the 
parties its proposed jury instructions. During the jury instruction conference, the court asked, 
"Does the plaintiff have any objection to [the] Court's proposed jury instructions or special 
verdict form or the failure to give any of plaintiff's proposed instructions?" and told Plaintiff, 
''Now is the time to make those objections." Plaintiff responded, ''No, your Honor." By failing 
to object, Plaintiff cannot raise as an issue on appeal the court giving or failing to give any jury 
instruction. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 491, 
224 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). 
VIII. 
Was Plaintiff Denied Her Constitutional Rights? 
Plaintiff lists as issues on appeal the following: 
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q) Did the District Court err in denying Appellant's invocation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to Due Process, which prohibits state and local governments 
from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without certain steps being 
taken to ensure fairness and to recognize her substantive and procedural rights? 
t) Did the District Court err by depriving Appellant her rights by violating 42 
USC § 1983-Civil action for deprivation of rights and due process? 
Plaintiff contends that she was denied due process of law because: 
1.) Judge Haynes allowed Appellants [sic] attorney to quit within eight (8) weeks 
prior to trial, leaving Appellant vulnerable for bias and prejudice. Appellant 
informed the judge that trial deadlines had passed and that she could not afford 
another attorney; 2.) Judge Haynes should have insisted on a site evaluation so the 
jury could visually see the condition of the arborvitae, the properly layout of the 
· homes and proximity of where the river, park, and homes were located in 
relationship to one another; 3.) Judge Haynes did not allow Appellants [sic] 
.timely_ disclosed. witne,ss ·. Leonard Benes to testify on behalf of Appellant, a 
crucial factor to· the Appellants [sic] defense [citation to record]; 4.) Judge Haynes 
allowed the Respondents to submit evidence at trial that was never disclosed to 
Appellant and was in violation of the November 8, 2012, deadline per Court 
Order [citation to record]; 5.) Judge Haynes allowed the Jury Instructions to be 
altered from their original state as quoted within the Idaho Codes; 6.) Judge 
Haynes did not grant Injunctions to Appellant for Abatement and PWP CC&R 
violations as requested. 
(Citations to record omitted.) 
Due process requires the opportunity upon reasonable notice for a fair hearing before an 
impartial tribunal. Miller v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., Inc., 139 Idaho 825, 835, 87 P.3d 
934, 944 (2004). Plaintiff's alleged due process violations contain only two citations to the 
record. 
The first is the district court's refusal to permit Plaintiff to call Leonard Benes as a 
witness. When the city sent a letter to Mr. Wurmlinger regarding the height of the arborvitaes, 
he took pictures of arborvitaes growing on other lots in the subdivision that were taller than six 
feet, including arborvitaes growing on Mr. Benes's lot. Plaintiff contended that she wanted his 
testimony to prove that the hedge was a fence. The court refused to allow his testimony because 
Mr. Benes was untimely disclosed as a witness and Plaintiff wanted him to testify regarding 
photographs that had not been admitted into evidence or timely disclosed as exhibits. Plaintiff 
has not presented any argument or authority showing that the failure to pennit Mr. Benes to 
testify violated due process. 
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The second citation to the record involves evidence that the district court should not have 
permitted Defendants to submit during the trial because it was untimely disclosed. In support of 
that alleged error, Plaintiff cites to two pages of a pretrial motion in limine she filed to exclude a 
list of items of evidence because they were irrelevant, hearsay, or lacked authentication and 
because "the List of Exhibits was introduced after the Pre-trial Order for discovery [was] 
allowed." Plaintiff did not cite to any place in the record indicating that the court ever ruled on 
the motion or how it ruled, nor did she cite to any place in the record showing that any of such 
evidence was admitted during the trial. We will not consider assignments of error not supported 
by argument and authority in the opening brief and citations to the relevant parts of the appellate 
record supporting the argument. Cummings v. Stephens, 157 Idaho 348, 362, 336 P.3d 281, 295 
(2014); VanderWal v. Albar, Inc., 154 Idaho 816, 822, 303 P.3d 175, 181 (2013). Therefore, we 
·. · will not address Plaintiff's other assertions regarding due process violations. 
IX. 
Did the District Court Err in Awarding Attorney Fees to Defendants? 
Plaintiff listed as an issue on appeal, 
r) Did the District Court err in allowing excessive awards of ... attorney fees to 
the Respondents' [sic]? 
She did not present any argument or authority regarding that issue. "We will not consider 
assignments of error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief." Hogg v. 
Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). 
X. 
Did the District Court Err in Failing To Recuse Itself? 
Plaintiff contends that the district judge was biased against her. Her list of assignments 
of error are the following: 
u) Did the District Court Judge Lansing Haynes express an "appearance of 
partiality" against Greenfield during the proceedings? 
v) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by not 
disqualifying him.self, as well as his law clerk, Schuyler A. Pennington, from the 
court proceedings do [sic] to their affiliation with the Knights Of Columbus, an 
inclusive Catholic organization of men, wherein Eric Wurmlinger is also affiliated 
18 
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with such organization, therefore causing prejudicial bias within the judicial 
outcome of the case? 
w) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by allowing the 
Defendants 'Unclean hands' to mislead the trial court into believing that certain 
Trial Exhibits were factual, wherein said exhibits were submitted "Incomplete" or 
contained ''Unacceptable" information? 
x) Did the District Court base its findings upon unsubstantiated and incompetent 
evidence from the Respondents' (sic], and did that evidence support the district 
courts [sic] conclusions of law wherein the Appellant was prejudiced by said 
evidence? 
bb) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes commit Fraud Upon 
the Court as witnessed and verified by the Appellant on December 30, 2013, after 
Appellant viewed her case file, wherein the Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes 
commented in his case file notes "The only issue that concerns me is the N.I.E.D. 
(Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) claim being dismissed ... We can play 
up the fonneLcounsel's decision and the no objection to putting it to the jury later 
on" wherein Judge Haynes openly admits by acknowledging concerns and states 
"We can Play up ... " the N.I.E.D. claim that Judge Haynes had dismissed with 
prejudice a year and a half prior to trial? 
"Judicial rulings, standing alone, do not constitute a valid basis for a claim of bias or 
partiality." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 508, 988 P.2d 1170, 1182 (1999). "Whether it is 
necessary for a judicial officer to disqualify himself in a given case is left to the sound discretion 
of the judicial officer himself." Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 113, 233 
P.3d 38, 44 (2009). In the absence of a motion for disqualification, we will not review the issue 
of whether a judge should have disqualified himself or herself because there is no decision by the 
judge and no factual record developed from which grounds for disqualification can be discerned. 
IdahoDep'tofHealth & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 563,568,249 P.3d362, 367 (2011). 
In this case, the only issue raised by Plaintiff to the trial court involved the court's 
membership in the Knights of Columbus. Both the court and Mr. Wurntlinger were members of 
that organization. Although Plaintiff did not move for disqualification, she raised the issue in her 
motion for reconsideration of the denial of her motions to set aside the judgment and to grant a 
judgment notwithstm1ding the verdict. Judge Haynes explained that he was not a parishioner of 
the same church as Mr. Wurmlinger; that he had attended mass there a couple times a year, but 
his only contact with Mr. Wurmlinger was hearing him say "Good morning" when handing the 
judge a church bulletin and the judge responding "Thank you" when he took it; that he and Mr. 
Wunnlinger were members of separate councils of the Knights of Columbus; that the councils do 
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not hold joint meetings; that the judge had not been to a meeting of the council for three years; 
and that neither he nor members of his family had ever served on any committees with the 
Wurmlingers. Assuming that the Plaintiff raising the issue could be construed as a motion for 
disqualification, Judge Haynes did not err in denying that motion. 
XI. 
Are Defendants Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal? 
Defendants seek an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to the provisions of the 
CC&R's, Idaho Code section 6-202, and Idaho Code section 12-121. Article III, Section 1 of the 
CC&Rs provides that, "In any suit or action brought to reinforce these covenants, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to recover costs and reasonable attorney fees from the other party." Idaho 
Code· section 6~202 provides that a person who c01mnits a timber trespass may be assessed "a 
reasonable attorney's fee which shall be taxed as costs, in any civil action brought to enforce the 
terms of this act if the plaintiff prevails." Idaho Code section 12-121 provides for the award of 
attorney fees to the prevailing party in any civil action, but in normal circumstances this Court 
will only award attorney fees on appeal under the statute "when this court is left with the abiding 
belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation." Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 
(1979). Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal in defending against the 
alleged violations of the CC&R' s under Article III, Section 1, of that document. They are also 
entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal for defending their award of damages for timber 
trespass pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-202. Also, because we find that Plaintiffs remaining 
issues on appeal were pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, Defendants are 




We af:finn the judgment of the distdct court, and we award respondents costs and 
attorney fees on appeal. 
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Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices J. JONES, W. JONES, and HORTON CONCUR. 
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SUMJ\1ARYSTATEJVIENT 
Greenfield v. Wurmlinger, Docket No. 41178-2013 
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. This is an appeal out of 
Kootenai County from a judgment holding that the defendants were not violating the subdivision 
CC&R's by operating a bed and breakfast from their home or by having arborvitaes higher than 
six feet, and awarding them a judgment totaling $168,755.37 against the plaintiff for her conduct 
that caused them emotional distress. We affirm the judgment of the district court and award 
attorney fees on appeal. 
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CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
210 S. PARK WOOD PLACE 
POST FALLS, IDAHO 83854 
(208) 773-0400 
Pro Se Litigant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST TIJDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-8801 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S INTERROGATORIES 
(NOS. 1-l 7)AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION (NOS. 1-9) 
PROPOUNDED TO PLAINTIFF 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, Christina J. Greenfield, hereby provides notice to 
the above-named Defendant, Ian D. Smith, and his attorneys of record Keith D. Brown and 
David Kulisch, that pursuant to Rules 26 and 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
orders of this Court, Plaintiff submits the following objections and responses to Defendants' First 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production: 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
The following General Objections apply to every paragraph of Defendant's First 
Interrogatories: 
1. Plaintiff objects to every interrogatory that calls for privileged information, including, 
without limitation, information protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
2. Plaintiff objects to every interrogatory that calls for information prepared in anticipation 
of litigation or for trial absent a showing of substantial need by Defendant. 
3. Plaintiff objects to every interrogatory that calls for the production of any information 
containing or reflecting the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions and/or legal 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
INTERROGATORIES (NOS. 1-17) AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION (NOS. 1-9) 
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theories of any attorney for Plaintiff, on the grounds that such information is protected by 
the attorney work product doctrine. 
4. Plaintiff objects to every interrogatory that is overly broad, unduly burdensome, 
harassing, duplicative or which requests documents which are already in the possession 
of the Defendant. 
5. Plaintiff objects to every interrogatory that calls for information which is neither relevant 
to the subject matter of the pending Complaint nor reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence in connection with the pending Complaint. 
6. Plaintiff objects to every interrogatory and to every introductory "definition" or 
"instruction," that seeks to impose obligations beyond those required by the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, as reasonably interpreted and supplemented by local court rules. 
RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES 
Subject to and without waiver of the foregoing General Objections, Plaintiff responds to 
Defendants' specific Interrogatories as follows: 
1. Please state the address, birth date and social security number of Plaintiff. 
RESPONSE: 
Address: 210 S. Park Wood Place, Post Falls, Idaho 83854 
Birth Date:
Social Security Number: OBJECTION. Plaintiff's social security number 1s clearly 
irrelevant to the subject matter of the action. 
2. Please identify each and every high school, college, or vocational school attended by 
Plaintiff, the degree obtained, and the year that the degree was obtained. 
RESPONSE: 
High School: Coeur d'Alene High School/ Graduated June 1975 
Vocational College: Kinman Business University/ Graduated 1979 with Certificate 
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College: North Idaho College/ 1983 through present continuing education 
3. Please identify all employers of Plaintiff at any time by name, address, position and dates 
of employment to the present date. 
RESPONSE: 
BANK OF AMERICA: Senior Personal Banker @ Spokane Valley, WA, 10/09 - 9/10 
SAFECO INSURANCE CO: Lead Representative@ Spokane Valley, WA 9/08 -2/09 
MOUNTAIN WEST BANK: Home Loans @ Coeur d'Alene, ID 2/08 - 9/08 
REALTEAM REAL ESTATE: Office Manager/ Real Estate Agent@ Coeur d'Alene, 
ID from 1/06 - 12/08 (Licensed Referral Agent) May 2014 through the present. 
HIGHLANDS DAY SPA: Manager@ Post Falls, ID 2/07 - 6/07 
PARIS FLEA MARKET: Sales/ Owner@Coeur d'Alene, ID 7/06-12/08 
NlNO INTERNATIONAL: Manager@Spokane Valley, WA 9/04-11/04 
ANTIQUITIES: Owner/Operator@ Coeur d'Alene, ID 1/90 - 12/10 
POST FALLS SCHOOL DISTRICT: Transportation/ In-House Supervisor/ Title One 
Professional @ POST FALLS, ID 8/88 - 6/01 
YELLOWSTONE INC.: Bookkeeper/ Insurance@Coeur d'Alene, ID 1979-1980 
RUSANS (MARIPOSA): Assistant Manager@Coeur d'Alene, ID 1978-1979 
PAY-N-SAVE DRUG STORE (RITE-AID): Manager@Coeur d'Alene, ID 1974-1977 
GUY'S RESTAURANT & GIFT SHOP: Waitress@Coeur d'Alene, ID 1973 -1974 
TOPPER TWO RESTAURANT: Waitress@ Coeur d'Alene, ID during 1973 
SHERMAN ARMS HOTEL: Desk Clerk/ Maid @ Coeur d'Alene, ID 1971 - 1973 
4. Please set forth specifically the manner in which you claim Defendant, Ian D. Smith, was 
negligent, including specification of the exact dates upon which any such alleged 
negligence occurred. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. This is repetitive discovery. This discovery request has, in substance, 
been relayed in the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
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The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
5. Please set forth specifically how each such allegedly negligent act of Defendant, Ian D 
Smith, was a proximate cause of some specific injury to Plaintiff. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. This is repetitive discovery. This discovery request has, in substance, 
been relayed in the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
6. Please set forth specifically any statements you recall that Defendant, Ian D Smith, made 
to you or about either of the two cases that he handled for you previously that you rely 
upon or in any of the claims in your complaint. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. This is repetitive discovery: This discovery request has, in substance, 
been relayed in the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
7. Please state the substance of the facts and opinions expressed or held by any of expert 
witness that may be called by you to testify at trial regarding liability, proximate 
causation or damages. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. The interrogatory seeks premature disclosure of expert opinion and also 
seeks attorney work-product. Plaintiff has not decided on which, if any, expert witnesses 
may be called at trial; insofar as this interrogatory seeks to ascertain the identity, writings, 
and opinions of Plaintiffs experts who have been retained or utilized to date solely as an 
advisor or consultant, violates the work-product privilege. 
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The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 
1. Produce any written materials given to you by Ian D. Smith or provided by any expert 
witness that you intend to rely upon at trial to prove liability, causation or damages. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. The interrogatory seeks premature disclosure of expert opinion and also 
seeks attorney work-product. Plaintiff has not decided on which, if any, expert witnesses 
may be called at trial; insofar as this interrogatory seeks to ascertain the identity, writings, 
and opinions of Plaintiffs experts who have been retained or utilized to date solely as an 
advisor or consultant, violates the work-product privilege. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
2. Produce a copy of your entire file, i11cluding but not limited to, your file notes, 
correspondence, calendars, meetings, facsimiles, emails, jury instructions, jury verdict 
forms, trial motions, trial memorandum and other "writings" that you created or received 
from any party in Case No. CV-10-8209, Christina J Greenfield vs. Eric J Wurmlinger 
and Rosalyn D. Wurmlinger, et al. after Ian D. Smith was allowed to withdraw any 
representation in that case. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. The discovery request is so broad and unlimited as to time and scope as to 
be an unwarranted annoyance, and is equally available to the Defendant as such 
information sought in this discovery request is available in court records. To comply 
with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff will consider allowing Defendant to view files in her office when available. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
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3. Produce a copy of any trial expert witness' file including but not limited to, any notes, 
correspondence, articles, treatises, reports, or emails that are utilized to support his 
opinions or upon which he relies for any opinion he will express the trial. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. See response to NO. 1. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
CONTINUING RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES AND PRODUCTION 
8. Please identify each person whom you to expect to call as an expert witness at trial and 
with respect to each person state: 
a. Address; 
b. Area of expertise; 
c. The subject-matter on which he is expected to testify; 
d. The substance of the facts and opinions about which he is expected to testify; 
e. A summary of the grounds for each opinion. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. See response to NO. 1. The Plaintiff has not decided on which, if any, 
expert witnesses may be called at trial. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
9. Please give the name, address and telephone number of each person known to you as 
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Shawn Greenfield 
Holly Greenfield LaHann 











The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
10. Please list any health care providers who treated or cared for Plaintiff to the alleged 
occurrence which forms the basis of this lawsuit and upon whom the Plaintiff intends to 
rely to support any claim for physical, emotional or psychological injury as a claim in the 
Plaintiffs complaint. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. This discovery request seeks to discover Plaintiff's medical history 
and/or treatment which is in violation of Plaintiffs constitutionally protected right to 
privacy. The Plaintiff has not decided on which, if any, health care providers may be 
called as witnesses at trial. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
INTERROGATORIES (NOS. 1-17) AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION (NOS. 1-9) 
PROPOUNDED TO PLAINTIFF PAGE? 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 357 of 710
4. Please provide an executed comprehensive medical record release for any and all medical 
records and billing statements for each health care provider identified in your answer to 
the preceding interrogatory. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. See response to interrogatory NO. 10. This request is an invasion of 
Plaintiffs right to privacy. To require Plaintiff to delineate her entire medical history is 
not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is 
overbroad. Plaintiff asserts her right of privacy to protect the disclosure of medical 
information not directly relevant to the lawsuit. Before Plaintiff agrees to submit, if any, 
medical information, the Defendant will agree to a protection order before releasing any 
of Plaintiff's medical information. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
11. Please list the names and addresses of each physician or other health care provider, 
including ¥/ithout limitation, all treati..11g facilities, who provided care to Plai..11tiff for the 
ten (10) years prior to the health care that forms the basis of Plaintiffs damages or 
injuries, as asserted against the Defendant. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. See response to No. 4 above. The Plaintiff has not decided on which, if 
any, physician(s) and/ or health care providers may be called as witnesses at trial. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
5. Please provide an executed comprehensive medical record release for any and all medical 
records and billing statements for each health care provider identified in your answer to 
the preceding interrogatory. 
RESPONSE: 
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OBJECTION. See response to NO. 4 above. The Plaintiff has not decided on which, if 
any, physician(s) and/ or health care providers may be called as witnesses at trial. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
12. Please identify each person or entity which has provided payment to the Plaintiff in any 
amounts for loss of income, disability, medical expenses, travel, lodging or any other 
item, including but not limited to those who may have lien rights, rights of 
reimbursement or rights of subrogation. This is intended to include without limitation 
entities and individuals such as insurers, state agencies, federal agencies, charitable 
givers, religious organizations, friends, family members, gift givers and health care 
providers. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. This discovery request seeks information not relevant to the subject 
matter of this lawsuit and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence 
in violation of the collateral source rule. This request is also an invasion of Plaintiffs 
right to privacy. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
13. Since the date of the alleged negligence giving rise to this matter and for any injuries 
which are alleged to be related to the claims asserted in Plaintiff's complaint, have any of 
the Plaintiffs medical bills or other costs, including prescription medications, been paid 
for by Medicare or Medicaid? If so, state the dates and amounts of all such payments, 
state to whom such payments were made, for what services such payments were made, 
and whether the bill was paid by Medicare or Medicaid. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. See Plaintiffs response in NO. 4 above. Plaintiff has not received ANY 
assistance from Medicare or Medicaid since the date of the alleged negligence giving rise 
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to this matter and for any injuries which are alleged to be related to the claims asserted in 
Plaintiff's complaint. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
14. Please provide Plaintiffs Medicare and/ or Medicaid identification number, if any. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. See Plaintiff's response in NO. 4 above. Plaintiff does NOT have a 
Medicare and / or Medicaid identification number. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
6. Provide copies of any and all statements, bills or other writings regarding payments made 
by Medicare or Medicaid since the date of the event, occurrence or alleged negligence 
giving rise to this matter, including a copy of any notice of a Medicaid or Medicare lien 
asserted or received. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. See Plaintiff's response in NO. 4 and No. 13 above. NONE 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
7. Please produce a copy of any Medicare conditional payment letters or documents 
pertaining to Plaintiff's claim, if any. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. See Plaintiff's response in NO. 4 and No. 13 above. NONE 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
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8. Please produce copies of any and all bills, statements, canceled checks and/or other 
documents that evidence all claimed past and future economic and special damages. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. This request is an invasion of Plaintiff's right to privacy. This discovery 
request seeks some information not relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit and not 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This discovery request has, in 
parts, been previously propounded in Plantiff's Complaint. Mr. Smith has copies of all 
the pay stubs from Bank of America wherein Plaintiff was employed prior to termination 
in September 2010. Mr. Smith has business records providing the amounts that Plaintiff 
patd Defendant during the attorney-client representation period from September 2010 
through March 2012. Plaintiff has been unemployed in her field of expertise (Banking) 
since September 2010 due to her financial devastation wherein her "Bonding" availability 
was lost. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
9. If Plaintiff claims wage loss or income loss or lost earning capacity as an element of 
damages in this lawsuit, please produce legible copies of any and all tax returns for 
Plaintiff and for any business owned or operated by Plaintiff or the last seven (7) years, 
including W-2's. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. Information regarding tax returns, including income tax returns, W-2 
and/or 1099 forms, is privileged under federal and state law. Plaintiff filed a Tax return 
for 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, NONE for 2012, 2013, 2014. Before Plaintiff agrees to 
submit any Tax returns and/ or W-2's, the Defendant will agree to a protection order 
before releasing any of Plaintiff's financial information. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any addition information 
when available. 
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). 
15. Has Plaintiff ever filed for bankruptcy? If your answer is in the affirmative, please 
provide the dates of filing, the dates of discharge and the jurisdictions where the 
bankruptcies were filed. 
RESPONSE: 
NONE. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any addition information 
when available. 
16. Please list the specific injuries or damages you claim resulted from the alleged negligence 
of Defendant. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. This is repetitive discovery: This discovery request has, in substance, 
been relayed in the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
17. Has Plaintiff ever been involved in a lawsuit or legal proceeding? If your answer is in 
the affirmative please provide the name of the parties, the dates of filing, the nature of the 
claims and the jurisdictions where the lawsuit are legal proceeding occurred. 
RESPONSE: 
OBJECTION. This interrogatory is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and 
the information sought is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend her response and add any additional information 
when available. 
Dated this 9th day of April 2015. 
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VERIFICATION 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai) 
I, Christina J. Greenfield, the Plaintiff herein, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: I have 
read the foregoing answers and responses to interrogatories and req_ues~s for production, and state 
the same to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge. / ;;~) ---)/ cJ 
//!/ ~ /J 
( ' ~ .--c,,/ d 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of April 2015, I caused to be served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keith D. Brown I David Kulisch 
Attorneys At Law 
601 W. Riverside Ave 
Suite# 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
INTERROGATORIES (NOS. 1-17) AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION (NOS. 1-9) 
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RECEIVED 
JUL: 4l S 2015 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
RandalllDanskin, P.S. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST TIJDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 





CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
PLAINTIFFS SECOND RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANTS REQUEST FOR 
PRODUCTION 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, Christina J. Greenfield, hereby provides notice to the 
above-named Defendant Ian D. Smith (Hereafter: "Smith") and his Attorney of record David Kulisch, 
that pursuant to I.R.C.P 26 and I.R.C.P 33 and the orders of this Court, Plaintiff submits the following 
responses to Defendants Request for Production. 
Plaintiff responds to Defendants specific requests as follows: 
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4. See Responses below; 
5. See Responses below; 
6. See Responses below; 
7. Answered 
8. Answered (Addresses forthcoming) 
9. Answered 
10. Pending Protection Order 
11. Pending Protection Order 




16. See Responses below; 
17. Answered 
Production of Documents 
1. Answered 
2. Pending Attorney mutually agreed upon date to copy Plaintiffs documents 
3. Answered 
4. Pending Protection Order 




9. Forthcoming via Protection Order 
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RE: (Answers to Interrogatories: (4) (5) (6) (16) 
A. Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and Idaho State Code 
Ian D. Smith has VIOLATED the following LC., I.C.R & I.R.C.P rules: 
1. I.C.R. 12 / Pleadings and Motions Before Trial - Form of Pleadings - Defenses and Objections 
• Smith NEVER objected to the State's admission of an FBI NCIC Report submitted into evidence 
in criminal proceedings, or inquired as to the misrepresented facts pertaining to Greenfield in 
said report. It was obvious that the report belonged to another individual who lived in California. 
The prosecutor was utilizing said report to smear Greenfield and label her as a repeat offender 
"criminal." (See; FBI NCJC Report in Criminal Case) 
• The aforementioned FBI NCIC Report was utilized once again at the February 27, 2012, court 
hearing by Kootenai County Deputy Prosecutor Art Verharen to prevent the judge from sealing 
the case stating that Greenfield had been criminally charged in California, along with various 
other false accusations. (See; Court Minutes from said February 27, 2012, hearing) 
• Prior to said aforementioned hearing, Smith was informed by the Honorable Judge Gibler to 
"assist" Greenfield if assistance was needed, yet Smith did NOT object to the submission of said 
FBI NCIC Report or respond to the unsubstantiated negative comments from prosecutor 
Verharen regarding Greenfield during the hearing. 
• This was the first time that Greenfield had learned of the FBI NCIC Report. Greenfield 
responded and affirmed to the Court that the report belonged to another individual with the same 
first and last name. (See; Court Minutes from said February 27, 2012, hearing) 
2. I. C.R. 15 / Depositions 
• Smith DID NOT attempt to depose or communicate with any of the State Prosecutors witnesses 
prior to the Greenfield criminal trial, which had been continued several times over a period of 
approximately nineteen ( 19) months. 
• Smith NEVER spoke with or deposed any of Greenfield witnesses prior to her criminal trial. 
3. I.C.R. 25 I Disqualification of Judge 
• Greenfield insisted that Smith request that Judge Gibler recuse himself off the criminal case as he 
had resided over another case involving Greenfield. 
• Smith refused and did NOT submit a "Motion for Disqualification" for Judge Gibler. 
• Greenfield informed Smith that Judge Friedlander, the original judge who summoned Greenfield 
for the alleged felony, was married to the City of Post Falls Attorney, Jerry Mason. 
• Mason had assisted in Greenfield's persecution for several years regarding various issues 
involving the Defendants in the civil case. 
• Mason was acting on behalf of the City of Post Falls Police Department as City Attorney when 
Greenfield was arrested for the alleged felony. An obvious prejudice existed between the parties. 
(This is a blatant violation of IC. § 1-1804 and several Judicial Cannon's). If Smith had 
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pursued this conflict of interest violation, a possible dismissal of Greenfield's alleged felony may 
have been ordered several months prior to the actual dismissal of the criminal case. 
• Friedlander eventually recused herself after Greenfield exposed the personal conflict violation. 
(See,· Recusal dated August 10, 2010) 
4. I.C.R. 26 / Evidence 
• Smith NEVER followed up for "sanctions" against the state for non-compliance of discovery 
rules. (See,· letters and February 14, 2011, Motion to Compel and Minutes from March 23, 2011, 
Court hearing) 
• Smith NEVER followed up for re-imbursement from the State for Greenfield's survey, which 
was paid by Greenfield. NOTE: the State and City of Post Falls paid for Wurmlingers survey. 
• Smith did NOT subpoena Greenfield's witnesses to testify at her criminal trial. 
• Smith NEVER submitted Greenfield's "Expert Witness List" to the Court in her criminal trial as 
required. 
• Smith did NOT object to the State's alleged evidence, nor did Smith hire an investigator to 
investigate and negate the findings in the States alleged evidence. 
• Smith was not prepared for Greenfield's criminal trial and lacked evidence in support of 
Greenfield, which included NO defense for "abatement" under I.C. §52-302. Smith had sent the 
prosecutor a letter dated September 17, 2010, alluding to dismissal of Greenfield's criminal case 
per I.C. §52-302. (See,· Letter dated September 17, 2010) 
5. I.C.R. 44. l / Withdrawal of Counsel 
• Smith did NOT provide "Notice to the Court" until the day of the scheduled hearing on February 
27, 2012, that he intended to withdraw from Greenfield's criminal case. (See,· minutes from court 
hearing dated February 27, 2012) 
• Smith had promised Greenfield that he would assist Greenfield at "No Charge" in "Sealing" her 
criminal case after the acquittal. 
• Smith had agreed because no additional information was sought as the civil case was identical in 
nature, and the court trial only lasted approximately one ( 1) hour. Greenfield had paid an 
additional $7500 for Smith's services, which originally included a weeklong jury trial. 
Furthermore, the amount of time Smith actually spent is questionable, as Smith has blatantly 
refused to submit ANY evidence of the allotted time he devoted to Greenfield's criminal case. 
• Judge Gibler informed Smith to " .. . assist Greenfield if needed ... " during the "Motion to Seal" 
hearing, yet Smith REFUSED to help and did NOT address false accusations from the 
prosecutor, wherein the prosecutor mentioned the erroneous NCIC report to the Court claiming I 
had " ... arrests in California ... " 
• Smith NEVER submitted a "Notice of Withdrawal" to the Court after the February 27, 2012, 
hearing as required by law. 
6. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) / Time limits for filing and serving motions, affidavits and briefs 
• Smith did NOT submit a "Notice of Hearing for Motion for Summary Judgment" or "Motion for 
Summary Judgment" and accompanying documents within the specified Pre-trial Orders cut-off 
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dates of 4/19/2011 and 2/20/2012 on Defendants civil Counter-claims: "Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress" "Trespass" and "Timber Trespass." (See,· Pre-trial Worksheets) 
• Smith did NOT submit a "Motion for Contempt" against the Defendants, Wurmlingers, for non-
compliance of a Court Order per Judge Haynes recommendation, at June 21, 2011, court hearing. 
(See,· minutes from court hearing on June 21, 2011) 
• Smith did NOT timely respond and object to the Defendants Counter-Claims for "Trespass and 
Timber Trespass" by November 11, 2011, which caused extreme losses to Greenfield at trial 
totaling over $200,000 to date. (See; Opposing counsel letter to Smith dated December 12, 2011) 
• Smith did NOT complete all discovery per Pre-trial Orders cut-off dates of June 13, 2011 and 
April 16, 2012. (See; Pre-trial Worksheets) 
7. I.R.C.P. 11 (b)(2) / Withdrawal of Attorney 
• Smith knew that Greenfield had limited funds and could NOT afford to pay for additional fees 
beyond what was agreed upon prior to representation of her civil case. 
• Greenfield repeatedly informed Smith that he needed to quickly dispose of both cases as 
Greenfield could NOT pay for any more frivolous costs and fees. (See,· February 14, 2011, 
Motion, Pg 2, Paragraph 3, Criminal Case) 
• Smith withdrew just prior to Greenfield's civil trial on March 9, 2012. Trial was scheduled for 
May 21, 2012. Greenfield had informed Smith that she could NOT afford to hire another 
attorney and wanted Smith to finish the job per their mutually agreed upon signed contract. 
• Smith was aware that Dwight Greenfield, Chris' ex-husband was paying for her attorney fees and 
costs as Greenfield had been un-employed since September 2, 2010. 
• Smith was aware that Greenfield was preparing for bankruptcy and was receiving food stamps. 
• Smith violated several Pre-trial Orders and missed numerous deadlines prior to his withdrawal: 
Discovery, Motions, Non-disclosed Expert Witnesses, MSJ, etc., therefore leaving Greenfield 
with the daunting task of finding another attorney with short notice, which showed a callous 
disregard for following Court Orders and I.R.C.P. 
• Greenfield attempted to persuade opposing counsel as well as Judge Haynes that a new pre-trial 
order was necessary to "fix" all of the issues that Smith had neglected to respond too. Greenfield 
was DENIED on several occasions by both parties. 
• Due to Smith's withdrawal, the pre-scheduled Mediation dates of May 19, 2011, June 2, 2011, 
and March 7, 2012, were canceled. Greenfield had been prepared to mediate her case for months 
and was hoping for resolution at said mediation. Due to the cancellation of said mediation, 
Greenfield was forced to endure another eight grueling months and additional costs and fees. 
Greenfield was forced to represent herself at trial against Defendants malignant claims. 
8. I.R.C.P. 12(a) / Defenses and Objections - When and How Presented - By Pleading or Motion -
Motion for Judgment on Pleadings - When Presented. 
• Smith NEVER responded to Defendant's Counter-Claims for "Trespass and Timber Trespass" 
which were submitted to the Court by Defendants on October 17, 2011, within the 20-day time 
limit. Smith was attending a class during this important time sensitive period. (See,· Email to 
Idaho State Bar and December 12, 2011, Letter from Riseborough) Smith ignored several of 
Riseboroughs letters (See November 11, 2011, Letter from Riseborough) 
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9. I.R.C.P. 13(b) I Permissive Counterclaims 
• Smith should have objected to the Defendants' counter-claims for "Trespass and Timber 
Trespass" which referenced similar subject matter previously filed under Greenfield's original 
claims. Greenfield had formerly submitted a Claim for damages against Defendants for falsely 
accusing Greenfield of trimming arborvitae that she equally owned! 
10. I.R.C.P. 16(h) / Exhibits and Witnesses 
• Smith neglected to timely submit exhibits and witness lists to the court. 
• Greenfield asked Smith to depose City of Post Falls official Collin Coles or others regarding the 
Defendant's "Home Occupation" license to operate their illegal business. Smith NEVER 
followed up on the deposition. (See; November 22. 2011, Motion) 
11. I.R.C.P 26 (a)(b)(l) / Discovery Methods 
• Smith did NOT request discovery for Defendants October 14, 2011, survey of the adjoining 
parties' property line and pedestrian easement performed by Jon Monaco, with "Empire 
Surveying." If Smith had acquired said survey through discovery, Greenfield's expert witness, 
Dusty Obermayer (Surveyor), would have reviewed Defendants survey, and determined that 
several discrepancies existed within the proposed survey. Smith could have objected to the 
submission of Defendants survey with the obvious defects within said survey. Smith would have 
an opportunity at that point to depose the Defendants surveyor, Jon Monaco, and inquire as to the 
relevancy of facts pertaining to the location of the arborvitae hedge in question and "why" the 
Monaco survey was so vastly different when compared to Greenfield's survey. 
12. I.R.C.P. 26(b)( 4) / Trial Preparation - Experts 
• Smith neglected to timely submit the expert witness lists to the court disclosing Greenfield's 
physicians and medical providers. 
• Smith NEVER interviewed any of Greenfield's "Medical Experts" or prepared them for trial. 
• Smith did NOT interview Greenfield's expert witness, John Wilhelm, County Assessor, or 
prepare him for trial on either case. 
• Smith did NOT prepare Greenfield's expert witness, Joe Zubaly, arborist, for trial. 
13. I.R.C.P. 37(a)(b) / Sanctions for Violation of Orders - Motion for Order Compelling Discovery 
• Smith did NOT follow through with additional sanctions against Defendants for failure to submit 
discovery requests. 
• On July 27, 2011, Smith sent a letter to Defendants counsel regarding the $1224 amount owed to 
Greenfield by Defendants on a sanction awarded to her by the court. In said letter Smith 
informed opposing counsel that Smith would charge additional court fees if the judgment was 
not promptly paid. 
• Smith set another hearing on Aug 18, 2011, set for October 13, 2011, to address the sanction. 
• Smith did NOT add additional fees for supplementary costs incurred for preparation and 
attendance at said hearing as aforementioned in letter to Rise borough. 
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14. I.R.C.P. 45(g) I Subpoena for a Hearing or Trial 
• Smith did NOT issue Subpoenas to any witnesses prior to ANY of the scheduled trial dates. My 
witnesses were not notified of ANY trial dates. 
15. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) / Amount of Attorney Fees 
• Smith charged excessive fees, including in-office meetings & phone calls that totaled over $6000 
when Greenfield communicated her dissatisfaction and concerns regarding missed deadlines, etc, 
and failure to perform his duties as her attorney of record. 
16. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5) I Attorney Fees and Costs 
• Smith has REFUSED to give Greenfield a complete breakdown of costs incurred after repeated 
requests by Greenfield for production of said costs and fees. 
• Smith overcharged Greenfield for hours spent in communication reiterating prior requests made 
by Greenfield about litigation. 
• Smith was charging for items that he NEVER completed! (See; April 15, 2011 and April 18, 
2011, "Professional Services" document, wherein Smith claims $600 for working on "Discovery 
Responses") yet Smith NEVER began or submitted said "Responses" until October and 
December of 2011. 
17. I.C. §3-201(5)(6)(7)(8) I Duties of Attorneys 
• Smith NEVER sought sanctions and / or costs & fees related to the defense of the frivolous 
claims brought by Defendants for their "Motion to Dismiss Tortuous Interference with 
Prospective Economic Advantage" claim on 12/27/2010 and "Motion to Dismiss Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress" claim on 2/15/2011. The Defendants frivolous claims cost 
Greenfield additional attorney fees and costs that should have been reimbursed by Defendants if 
Smith had followed Greenfields demand for sanctions against the Defendants. 
• Smith NEVER followed up on sanctions and/ or costs & fees for the failed attempt to depose 
Defendant, Rosalyn Wurmlinger. (See,· Order dated April 7, 2011, Pg 3, Paragraph 3) 
18. LC. §5-216 / Action on Written Contract 
• The Civil Contract between Smith and Greenfield states that Smith may withdraw "Upon 
conclusion or deposition of the engagement involving the matter(s) outlined in this agreement in 
section one ... " and also states "The client retains, employs, and appoints the Attorney to 
represent the Client to defend, settle, adjust, file, and prosecute the Client's claim ... " 
• Greenfield is entitled to have her entire flat fee sum of $24,702.09 returned to her for Smith's 
breach of said contract, and his failure to abide by their mutually agreed upon contract, which 
states "Client agrees that Attorney is entitled to receive the entire flat fee whether the action is 
resolved by dismissal, plea agreement, acquittal, or conviction." There is NO agreement that 
states Smith will receive any compensation if he quits prior to trial! 
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B. SMITH'S VIOLATIONS OF IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
19. Violation of RULE 1.1: COMPETENCE 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires 
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation. 
• Smith continually misrepresented the facts. (See; "facts" listed below) 
20. Violation of RULE 1.2: SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION 
(a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the 
ob;ectives of representation and, as required by Rule I. 4, shall consult with the client as to 
the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the 
client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a 
client's decision whether to settle a matter. (See; facts listed below) 
21. Violation of RULE 1.3: DILIGENCE 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. (See;facts 
listed below) 
22. Violation of RULE 1.4: COMMUNICATION 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the 
client's informed consent, as defined in Rule I. O(e), is required by these Rules; 
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's ob;ectives are 
to be accomplished,· 
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status ofthe matter; 
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information,· including a request for an 
accounting as required by Rule I. 5 (!): and 
(b) A lawyer shall: 
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation. (See;facts listed below) 
23. Violation of RULE 1.5: FEES 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee 
include the following: 
(I) the time and labor required. the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the 
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,· 
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(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment 
will preclude other employment by the lawyer,· 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services,· 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained,· 
NOTE: Smith over billed for time allotted to conferences between Greenfield and 
Smith that pertained to REPEAT discussions on how Smith was handling the cases 
and what was needed to resolve them in a prompt manner as to not prolong 
Greenfield's agony and deepening financial burden. 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances,· 
NOTE: Immediate attention was requested by Greenfield for the Criminal Case as 
it was taking a toll on Greenfield emotionally and financially due to prolonged 
unemployment. Smith was informed on several occasions that Greenfield did NOT 
have funds above and beyond $5000 to spend on the civil case as she was borrowing 
funds from her ex-husband and family members. 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client,· 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
Rule 1. 5(!) 
Requires a lawyer, upon reasonable request from the client, to provide an accounting to the 
client for fees and costs claimed or previously collected. The duty is limited to reasonable 
requests, to prevent the client from unduly burdening the lawyer with duplicative requests or 
.from demanding detail beyond that reasonably calculated to inform the client about the 
handling and disposition of money The lawyer is not permitted to charge a fee for the time 
spent in preparing such a billing statement, although reasonable copying charges may still be 
appropriate. 
NOTE: I have repeatedly requested all billing records, including "Discovery" requests 
and Smith has repeatedly ignored said requests! 
Smith charged Greenfield excessive fees for conferences, wherein Greenfield informed 
Smith of missed deadlines and concerns with his failure to act upon pre-trial deadlines. 
24. Violation of RULE 1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client 
gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (]2). 
NOTE: In mediation opposing counsel knew the exact figure that I had paid Smith to 
represent me in the civil case. Opposing counsel was informed by Smith of the fees I 
paid Smith prior to mediation WITHOUT my consent! 
Greenfield was concerned that Smith was too "friendly" with Defendants counsel, John 
Riseborough and later found out that Smith had been represented by Riseboroughs 
partner, Peter Erbland, as Smith's attorney of record on a different civil case. 
Smith hid the fact that he was represented by Erbland during his May 2015 deposition 
then later recanted after Greenfield informed Kulisch of the deception! 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
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(1) to prevent the client from committing a crime, including disclosure of the intention to 
commit a crime,· 
NOTE: Pam Wallace was a client of Smith who was continually vandalizing the 
Wurmlinger residence, whereas I was being accused of said vandalism during the 
course of representation by Smith on both criminal and civil cases. Smith NEVER 
contacted Wallace or law enforcement to disclose said confession by Wallace regarding 
vandalism. The accusations of alleged vandalism was extremely damaging to 
Greenfield when disclosed during trial as Defendants were utilizing said alleged 
vandalism to criminalize Greenfield in front of the jury to prejudice them against 
Greenfield. 
(2) to secure legal advice about the lawyer :S compliance with these Rules,· 
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the 
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against 
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to 
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation ofa client,· 
(4) to comply with other law or a court order,· or 
(5) to detect and resolve conflicts ofinterest arising from the lawyers change of employment 
or from changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed 
information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice 
the client. 
25. RULE 1.7: CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS 
Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons: 
(9) In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and 
independence may be materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 
1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising 
from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director. 
NOTE: Greenfield believes that Smith did NOT want to disclose material facts 
about his client Pam Wallace ( confession) to law enforcement as Wallace and her 
family members (brother) were being represented by Smith during the time that 
Smith was representing Greenfield. 
26. RULE 1.16: DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION 
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where 
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: 
(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law; 
(b) Except as stated in paragraph ( c ), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if: 
(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the 
client; 
( c) (Did not apply to this case) 
( d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably 
practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, 
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which 
the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been 
PLAINTIFFS SECOND RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 10 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 374 of 710
earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted 
by other law 
27. RULE 3.1: MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless 
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant 
in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, 
may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be 
established. 
28. RULE 3.2: EXPEDITING LITIGATION 
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the 
client. (Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a 
legitimate interest of the client) 
29. RULE 4.1: TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(a) ... fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or 
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6 
NOTE: Pam Wallace confession to committing vandalism on Defendants property. 
TIMELINE of EVENTS 
12/2/2010 
• Defendants in civil case were sent discovery request. Defendants refused to submit to said 
request by deadline. 
12/27/2010 
• Defendants in civil case dismissed their frivolous counter-claim for "Tortuous Interference with 
Prospective Economic Advantage." Smith did NOT respond. 
1/19/2011 
• Smith MISSED the deadline to disclose Greenfield's "Expert" witnesses per Pre-trial ORDER in 
civil case. 
2/14/2011 
• Smith responded to Defendant's non-compliance of discovery requests. This is approximately 
seventy (70) Days after initial request was sent to Defendants. 
• Smith Filed "Motion For Order Permitting Entry Upon Defendant's Real Property" in civil case. 
• Smith NEVER completed said GRANTED Order! 
2/15/2011 
• Defendants in civil case dismissed their second frivolous counter-claim for "Negligent Infliction 
of Emotional Distress." 
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• I informed Smith that I wanted to impose a sanction on Defendants for wasting my time and 
money on frivolous counter-claims. Smith ignored my request. 
2/18/2011 
• Smith MISSED the pre-trial deadline to file a "Notice of Hearing for Motion for Summary 
Judgment" and "Motion for Summary Judgment" against the Defendants Counter-claim 
"Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress" in civil case. 
4/19/2011 
• Smith MISSED the pre-trial deadline to hear my "Motion for Summary Judgment" against the 
Defendants Counter-claim in civil case. 
• I instructed Smith to draft "Protection Order" before releasing my medical records to 
Defendants. Smith did NOT comply with said request. 
• Smith had drafted protection order and signed it on January 9, 2012, yet did NOT submit said 
order to the court until February 16, 2012, ten (10) months later! 
5/24/2011 
• Defendants sent incomplete discovery documents eight (8) months after the original request was 
sent to them. 
• Smith was aware of my time restraints in getting the case tried on time without further frivolous 
actions by the Defendants. 
6/13/2011 
• Smith MISSED the pre-trial deadline to complete discovery in civil case. 
6/20/2011 
• Smith incorrectly states in his transcript "The alleged victim has sworn under oath that he 
planted the bushes on his property, not on the property line, and not on the defendants 
property." (See,· Affidavit of Smith dated June 20, 2011, Pg. 3, Paragraph 5 (A) Criminal Case) 
• Smith had misrepresented the fact that the Defendants stated in their deposition transcripts that 
"they are unaware ofthe relationship o(the shrubbery to the property line" (See,· Letter dated 
April 18, 2011, Criminal Case). 
6/21/2011 
• Court hearing, Judge Haynes recommended that Smith consider "Contempt of Court" motion 
against Defendants in civil case for non-compliance of his Court Order. (See,· Minutes from 
hearing) 
6/23/2011 
• Per my fourth request, Smith finally submitted "Motion for Sanctions" against the Defendants in 
the civil case for non-compliance of Court Order. 
• Judge Haynes granted sanctions. 
6/27/2011 
• Smith MISSED pre-trial deadline to file Pre-trial Motions in civil case. 
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• Smith MISSED the pre-trial deadline to complete Defendant Rosalyn Wurmlingers deposition in 
civil case. 
7/11/2011 
• Smith did NOT respond to the late disclosure of documents presented to the court by state deputy 
prosecutor, Amy Borgman, for the pre-scheduled criminal hearing set on July 12, 2011. It is 
further noted that the State Prosecutor stated that Smith " ... has NOT presented facts or 
arguments to support" his Motion to Dismiss my case. (See,· June 20, 2011, Motion in Criminal 
Case and July 11, 2011, States Opposition to Motion to Dismiss) 
7/12/2011 
• Smith was NOT prepared for my criminal hearing as Smith was gone on vacation for 
approximately two weeks and had NOT reviewed the prosecutor's documents prior to the court 
hearing. 
• Smith misrepresents the facts AGAIN by stating at the July 12, 2011, court hearing" .. . we can 
prove that bushes are not mutually owed ... not iointlv owned!" (See,· Minutes from hearing) 
• I asked Smith again to recuse Judge Gibler as I felt obvious bias from him during the court 
proceedings. Smith did NOT respond to rny request! 
• After the Hearing Smith demanded an additional $17,000 to proceed with my civil case. 
7/13/2011 
• Smith called me at home and attempted to coerce me into taking an agreement that was offered 
to Smith by Defendants attorney, Doug Marfice, wherein if I "dropped" the civil action against 
the Defendants, then the Defendants " .. . would make the criminal case go away ... " When I 
refused to "drop" my civil case, Smith became extremely irritated and once again demanded that 
I pay an additional $15,000 or Smith would "Quit!" I informed Smith that I did NOT have any 
additional funds and his fees were seven times more from his original estimate. (See,· Smith Fee 
Schedule dated 8/4/2011) 
8/11/2011 
• Smith had agreed to help me pursue a lawsuit against the City of Post Falls for Malicious 
Prosecution and other claims if my felony charge was dismissed. (See,· correspondence dated 
8/11/2011 labeled "Fee Agreement") 
8/15/2011 
• Smith finally scheduled a "Motion for Contempt" hearing for 9/7/2011, against the Defendants in 
the civil case per my request. 
• Smith vacated said hearing and did NOT follow-up on the "Motion for Contempt." 
8/16/2011 
• Defendants filed a "Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim" by adding "Trespass and 
Timber Trespass" to counter-claims in civil case. 
• Hearing was scheduled for August 23, 2011. 
• Hearing was vacated and re-scheduled for October 13, 2011. 
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10/4/2011 
• Criminal Trial today for my "Malicious Injury to Property" charge. 
• Smith was NOT prepared for trial. 
• Smith did NOT hire an investigator. 
• Smith did NOT "find" any expert witnesses. 
• Smith only subpoenaed one (1) expert witness (John Wilhelm). 
• Smith had NOT subpoenaed ANY of my witnesses. 
• Smith had NOT deposed any of my witnesses. 
• Smith presented a "case study" to the trial court that could have potentially damaged my case, 
wherein state deputy prosecutor, Arny Borgman, thanked Smith for "helping her case!" See 
minutes 
• When Judge Gibler acquitted me of the bogus charge, Gibler informed the Court that this matter 
was a civil matter NOT a criminal action! 
• Smith stated that he "would help me seal my case at no charge since the trial only lasted 
approximately an hour." Greenfield paid Smith $7500 to defend the spurious criminal charge. 
10/10/2011 
• I notified Smith that I saw a surveyor on Defendants property who was surveying the property 
line separating both properties, as well as the easement and other property corners and points. 
• Smith did NOT request discovery on said survey from Defendants in civil case. 
10/13/2011 
• Court Hearing 
• Smith knew of the counter-claims for "Trespass and Timber Trespass" for approximately four ( 4) 
months. 
• Smith NEVER responded to the Defendants counter-claims submitted by Riseborough! 
11/7/2011 
• Smith MISSED the deadline to respond to Defendants "Amended Answer & Amended 
Counterclaim" which was filed by the Defendants on 10/17/2011 in civil case. 
11/10/2011 
• I met with Smith to discuss his failure to submit a timely response to Defendants counter-claims 
and inquire as to why he wanted an extension to respond to Defendants discovery requests. 
NOTE: At this point Smith had been my attorney for fourteen (14) months and knew what the 
pre-trial deadlines were as Julie Vetter, paralegal to Smith, had clearly written out said "Pre-trial 
Compliance Worksheet." 
• I was extremely distraught that Smith did NOT appear to be protecting me and was neglecting 
his responsibilities and duties as my attorney. 
• Smith submitted a "Motion to Enlarge time" and inscribed the wrong date on document. 
11/22/2011 
• Smith MISSED the 2nd deadline to file and serve "Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment" 
against the Defendants counter-claims in my civil case per pre-trial order. 
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11/23/2011 
• Judge Haynes Ordered judgment for a sanction in the amount of $1224 to Greenfield. Smith did 
NOT surrender the sanction to Greenfield. 
12/7/2011 
• Smith's para-legal, Julie Vetter, quits. 
12/8/2011 
• I met with Smith to remind him again that I wanted a Protection Order for my medical records. 
• I informed Smith that I had contacted my Insurance carrier to see if I qualified for any assistance 
from them regarding the Defendants counter-claims since Smith was failing to protect me from 
said claims. 
• My Insurance Carrier did NOT "Notice Up" until 12/13/2011, after Smith had negligently and or 
intentionally MISSED the deadline to file a response to said "Motion to Amend" and six (6) days 
prior to Judge Haynes "Order for Defendants Motion to Amend Answer and Counter-claims" in 
civil case. 
12/9/2011 
• I sent Smith an email detailing my demands and verifying what Smith and I had communicated 
about in prior meetings, etc. 
12/13/2011 
• I met with Smith at his office. When I passed by the communal conference room I noticed what 
appeared to be my file sitting on the table. I looked at the file and verified that it was my entire 
file sprawled out on the conference table in plain sight for everyone to view who either utilized 
or passed by the conference room. I asked Smith to conceal my highly sensitive records to 
which he replied " ... no one can see them ... don't worry about it!" 
12/14/2011 
• Smith departed on vacation until 1/4/2012, leaving several crucial matters unattended including: 
failure to draft my Protection Order, disclosing my expert witnesses, finishing Defendants 
depositions, filing and serving my Motion for Summary Judgment, viewing the Defendants 
home, requesting the Defendants survey, adding new claims I had advised him to do (Abuse of 
Process, Slander, and Libel), and assisting me with sealing my felony case. 
• Defendant's attorney Riseborough sent letter to Smith verifying my request to "Amend my 
complaint for slander." Riseborough also stated that Smith had until January 9, 2012, to identify 
my expert witnesses. Smith MISSED the deadline and did NOT disclose my expert witnesses! 
12/19/2011 
• Since Smith had NOT responded to the Defendants counter-claims, two (2) months later, Judge 
Haynes allowed the Defendants to amend their Counter-claims and add "Timber Trespass and 
Trespass" due to Smith's negligence for failure to submit a timely Objection and or Motion. 
• Smith knew of the counter-claims for "Trespass and Timber Trespass" approximately six (6) 
months prior to Judge Haynes ORDER dated December 19, 2011. 
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NOTE: Said Order was NOT signed by either Smith or Defendants attorney, Riesborough, and 
was submitted 2 months after the Motion was heard. Above Smith's signature line on Order it 
reads: "APPROVED AS TO FORM. NOTICE OF PRESENTMENT WAIVED" 
12/22/2011 
• Smith MISSED the 2nd deadline to disclose my expert witnesses per Pre-trial ORDER. 
1/4/2012 
• I met with Smith to discuss my "Protection Order" and noticed that my entire file was still sitting 
on the table in the conference room exposed to clients and other staff. 
• Defendants' attorney was scheduled to review my file on January 9, 2012. 
• Smith has NOT sent in a protection order on my medical documents per my demand. 
• Violation of ethics rule. 
1/9/2012 
• I went to Smith's office and saw the Defendants attorney and assistant viewing and copying my 
entire file, which contained sensitive privileged information. Smith was in his office and did 
NOT assist with the copying. Blatant violation of ethics rule. 
• Smith handed me the protection order he drafted to view and then had Defendants attorney 
Riseborough sign it last minute. 
NOTE: Smith did NOT submit protection order to the court until February 16, 2012! 
• Amber Melom, legal assistant to another attorney (Steve), informed me that clients and staff 
were using the conference room on a daily basis while my file was exposed on the table for 
anyone to view. 
• Smith shares an office with three (3) other attorneys who all share the conference room! 
• Smith missed the deadline to disclose my expert witness list. 
NOTE: There is no "Notice of Service of Disclosure of Plaintiff's Expert Witnesses" in file or 
noted on Respository. 
1/27/2012 
• Defendants in civil case file "Motion for Summary Judgment" against me stating that my Statute 
of Limitations had expired. 
NOTE: The Defendants Motion is over a month past the pre-trial deadline of December 22, 
2011. 
• Smith NEVER informed me of possible Statute of Limitations expiration deadlines on my civil 
claims and that they may be barred due to Statute of Limitation guidelines. 
2/1/2012 
• Last day I received any court related documents from Smith. 
2/13/2012 
• Smith sends a letter to me stating that he is quitting my case. This decision is suspiciously 
initiated after several emails have gone back and forth between Smith and I discussing his 
negligent actions and mishandling of my case. 
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2/14/2012 
• Smith submitted a "Notice of Hearing for Motion to Withdraw" from my civil case for 2/27/2012 
(13 - day notice violates I.R.C.P.) 
NOTE: This Hearing was originally scheduled to hear Defendants MSJ. 
2/20/2012 
• Smith missed the 2nd deadline for "Summary Judgment" against the Defendant's counter-claims 
in civil case. 
2/27/2012 
• Smith DID NOT respond to Defendants request " ... to wait until after mediation ... " to deal with 
summary judgement matters in civil case. 
• I informed Judge Haynes that I could NOT afford other legal counsel and Smith had been paid to 
finish my civil suit through trial. 
• Judge Haynes allowed Smith to withdraw approximately sixty-seven (67) days prior to my civil 
trial. 
• Smith MISSED several Pre-trial Motions, discovery cut-off, disclosure of expert witnesses, 
depositions, etc., in my civil case. 
3/9/2012 
• Twenty (20) day stay becomes effective as of March 9, 2012. 
3/29/2012 
• I submitted my "Notice of Self-representation" in civil case as I could NOT find another attorney 
to represent me on such short notice prior to trial. 
• Filed my "Motion to Continue" 
1. Smith withdrew with time sensitive matters pending: 
a.) My response to Defendants MSJ is due by 3/30/2012, ONE day after I become Pro Se 
Litigant! 
b.) All discovery due by 4/15/2012 
c.) All depositions due by 4/30/2012 
d.) Fifty-three (53) days before civil trial scheduled for May 21, 2012. 
e.) Mediation canceled > Need to Reschedule. 
4/9/2012 
• Affidavit by Defendants attorney John Riseborough stating that "Mr. Smith did not respond to 
my letter" See #5 in Affidavit. 
4/10/2012 
• Court Hearing wherein Judge Haynes REFUSES to amend pre-trial deadlines. 
• New trial reset for November 26, 2012, with SAME Pre-trial orders! 
4/20/2012 
• See Court ORDER where Judge Haynes REFUSES to amend the Pre-trial Scheduling Order. 
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4/30/2012 
• Defendants REFUSE to stipulate to new Pre-trial order! 
• MOTION> Discovery Issues! I request for production from Defendants #3, #4, #5, #8, #9, #11, 
#18, #19. Smith DID NOT follow-up on these requested non-disclosed documents! 
5/4/2012 
• Defendants disclose their "List of Exhibits" which included the October 10, 2011 survey that 
Smith NEVER followed up on. 
5/8/2012 
• Letter from Riseborough stating Defendants " ... will not allow an inspection ... " since Smith 
MISSED deadline to set up home inspection prior to Pre-trial cut-off date. (See,· Letter dated 
May 8, 2012) (See,· Affidavit from Defendants attorney John Riseborough, Pg 2 (4) on 
September 1, 2011, wherein Smith never responded) 
5/16/2012 
• Court hearing wherein Judge Haynes REFUSES to modify pre-trial order! (See,· Court minutes 
from hearing) 
5/17/2012 
• I submitted a "Motion to Amend Pre-trial Order" to depose Defendant Eric Wurmlinger after he 
submitted NEW evidence on May 4, 2012, containing photos of alleged vandalism. 
• Smith NEVER addressed the bogus vandalism reports which began in July 2011, wherein I was a 
"Suspect" for said vandalism! (See,· Defendants trial Exhibits lists submitted on May 4, 2012) 
5/24/2012 
• Judge Haynes dismissed all of my trial exhibits ( except #BB) in response to Defendants "Motion 
for Summary Judgment" 
• If Smith had NOT withdrawn during the pre-trial scheduled MSJ, I am confident that my 
evidence would have been properly submitted and allowed. 
6/6/2012 
• My "Motion to Amend Pre-trial Order" is granted in part to depose Defendant based on evidence 
of reported vandalism, which Smith had REFUSED to address prior to his leave. 
11/30/2012 
• I lose at trial! 
5/21/2015 
• I lose my appeal! 
TOTAL LOSS approximately $275,000 in legal costs and fees! /"' 
M ,.,., / I/ 
Dated this · / day of July 2015. / ·· '' ,/,. / .~/ ,,, 
.I /; /...- .'/ €2,.c ...... j I I 
(I v_.....-1' )/ ~!. r·· ,.y I '-+------ J ,,af'.~-_L_ ~'.:::;,/.~_,J___,:ll 
Pro Se' Litigant . . u 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 7 day of July 2015, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by{ the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
David Kulisch 
Attorney at Law 
1500 Bank of America Financial Center 
601 West Riverside Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0626 
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[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
CHRISTINA J. GREENF'IELD 
Pro Se Litigant 





























David A. Kulisch 
Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
Troy Y. Nelson, ISB #5851 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Telephone: (509) 747-2052 
Attorneys for Defendant 
) 
STATE OF IOAHO 1 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAlr SS 
FILED: 
2015 JUL 30 AH 9: 25 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
~Ju~utA· ,. · OEPU Y 7~
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
No. CV-14-8801 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED 
FACTS 
The defendant has moved the Court for entry of summary judgment pursuant to 
IRCP 56. The following is the Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts. 
1. On September 15, 2010, Plaintiff Greenfield ("Plaintiff") hired attorney 
Ian Smith ("Defendant") on an hourly basis to represent her in a civil suit against her 
neighbors Eric and Rosalynn Wurmlinger ("Wurmlinger"). Aff. of Ian Smith. 
2. On January 19, 2011, Plaintiff retained Defendant to represent her in a 
criminal case. Aff. of Ian Smith. 
3. The underlying criminal and civil cases have a common factual 
background. Aff. of Ian Smith. 
4. In the criminal matter against Plaintiff, the day before the trial was to 
begin, on October 3, 2011, the deputy prosecuting attorney filed a motion to dismiss 
the charge without prejudice stating that "the state does not yet have an official survey 
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of the property at issue identifying the location of the subject trees." Aff. of Ian Smith. 
5. On the morning of trial, October 4, 2011, Defendant argued against the 
motion to dismiss without prejudice. Significantly, the court denied the state's motion 
to dismiss without prejudice. Defendant prepared in order for the court to sign and 
which was signed by Judge Gibler on October 4, 2011. The state was then required to 
go forward with its evidence. However, the state failed to produce any evidence or 
testimony at trial. As a result, Defendant obtained a judgment of acquittal for Plaintiff. 
Aff. of Ian Smith. 
6. On February 14, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw from 
representation of Plaintiff in a civil case. The basis for the motion was that the attorney-
client relationship had broken down to such an extent that it would be impossible for 
Defendant to continue representing Plaintiff. Erbland Report., Ex. 38. Aff. of Ian 
Smith. 
7. The motion to withdraw was later granted on March 8, 2012 by the 
Court and Plaintiff began representing herself on her civil claims against the 
Wurmlingers. Erbland Report, p. 10; Aff. of Ian Smith, Ex. 1. 
8. On November 30, 2012, the civil jury returned a special verdict in favor 
of the Wurmlingers on each of Plaintiff's claims, and found in favor of the 
Wurmlingers on their counterclaims. Er bland Report, p. 11. As to Plaintiff's claims, 
the jury found that the Wurmlingers' maintenance of the arborvitae and/or operation of 
the bed-and-breakfast did not constitute nuisances. Additionally the jury found that the 
Wurmlingers had not inflicted emotional distress upon Plaintiff. Id. 
9. Following the verdict, on October 4, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint 
against the city of Post Falls, its mayor and various administrators and employees (past 
and present), as well as members of the Post Falls Police Department, seeking damages 
for the defendants' alleged failure to enforce its zoning laws to her detriment. Aff. of 
Troy Y. Nelson, Ex 1. 
10. That complaint was dismissed with prejudice on April 3, 2014, by Hon. 
Candy W. Dale, United States Magistrate Judge. Aff. of Troy Y. Nelson, Ex 1. 
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11. On May 21, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the civil court 
judgment and awarded attorney fees and costs against Plaintiff in favor of the 
Wurmlingers. Aff. of Troy Y. Nelson, Ex 2. 
12. Plaintiff initiated the present civil suit by filing a complaint on December 




A Modified Complaint was filed on December 4, 2014. See Modified 
On April 13, 2013, 2015 Plaintiff responded to Defendant's first set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Aff. of Troy Y. Nelson, Ex. 
3. 
15. Plaintiff failed to designate any experts in response to Defendant's 
discovery request to identify experts. Id. 
16. On July 8, 2015, Plaintiff served "Plaintiffs Second Response to 
Defendants Request for Production." Aff. of Troy Y. Nelson, Ex. 4. There, Plaintiff 
had a second opportunity to identify experts and she did not. Id. 
17. Plaintiff's deadline for disclosing experts was July 21, 2015. See Case 
Scheduling Order, p. 4. Defendant was not served with any expert disclosure by 
Plaintiff. Aff. of Troy Y. Nelson. 
DATED this 2-t day of July, 2015. 
RANDALL J DANSKIN, P.S. 
~ 
By: ~ ) . /}1 (c_,,/ 
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David A. Kulisch 
Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
Troy Y. Nelson, ISB #5851 
Attorneys for Defendant 






























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the Z °r 
Plaintiff Pro Se: 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 









Troy Y. Nelson 
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Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
201S t.UG 18 PM 12: 24 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
vs. 
IAN D. SMITH 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF 
FACTS AND MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, being duly sworn under oath do state the following: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter. 
2. I hired Ian D. Smith to represent me in a civil action against my neighbors, the 
Wurmlingers, on September 15, 2010, (CV-10-8209). (See Erbland Exhibit #31, 
"Complaint") 
3. Ian D. Smith agreed to represent me through the entirety of the civil action per written 
agreement, which states under "Withdrawal of Attorney" "Upon conclusion or 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT 
OF FACTS AND MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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disposition of the engagement involving the matter(s) outlined in this agreement in 
section I ... "(See Er bland Exhibit #30 (4), "Written Contract") 
4. Smith did not timely respond to Wurmlingers non-compliance regarding discovery 
requests. (See Greenfield Exhibit #A, "Pre-trial Compliance Worksheet" for Trial July 
18 - 21, 2011 and Exhibit #B "ROA/or Case CV-I 0-8209) 
5. I attended a deposition on December 6, 2010, for Rosalyn Wurmlinger. (See Greenfield 
Exhibits #A, #B, #C "Excerpt from Rosalyn Wurmlinger deposition dated December 6, 
2010" and #D Pre-trial Compliance Worksheet" for Trial May 21, 2012" and See 
Erbland Exhibit #34, "Order regarding Ms. Wurmlinergs Deposition") 
6. On January 19, 2011, I retained Ian D. Smith to represent me in my criminal case (CR-
10-10624). (See Erbland Exhibit #17, "Written Contract") 
7. On May 19, 2011, Smith filed a "Motion for Sanctions" on my behalf. I was awarded 
sanctions for $1224.00 on June 24, 2011. (See Greenfield Exhibit #E "Sanction Check" 
"Satisfaction of Judgment dated December 9, 2011 and "Satisfaction of Judgment" dated 
January 23, 2012) 
8. Smith repeatedly and negligently misstated the facts regarding the location of the 
arborvitae shrubs. The Wurmlingers have repeatedly stated that the arborvitae are planted 
on the adjoining parties' property line. (See Greenfield Exhibits #F "Affidavit of Smith" 
dated June 20, 2011, Pg 3, Paragraph 5 (A) in Criminal Case" and #G "Memorandum 
In Support of Motion to Amend" dated August 16, 2011, Pg 4, Paragraph I, in civil case, 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
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and #H "Affidavit of Eric Wurmlinger ... " dated August 16, 2011, Pg. 2, Paragraph 3, in 
civil case and #1 "Minutes from criminal hearing dated July 12, 2011, Pg. 2) 
9. On July 11, 2011, Smith was on vacation and did NOT respond to the late disclosures of 
documents presented by state deputy prosecutor, Amy Borgman. (See Greenfield 
Exhibits #J "State :S Opposition to Motion to Dismiss" Pg. 6, Paragraph 3, dated July 11, 
2011) 
10. On July 12, 2011, Smith demanded an additional $17,000 from me to proceed with my 
civil case. I had informed Smith on several occasions that I was financiaily destroyed 
and that he had well exceeded his original quote of $5000.00 to $7500.00 to litigate the 
civil case. (See Greenfield Exhibits #K "Email from Greenfield dated May 6, 2011) 
11. On July 13, 2011, I received a call from Smith demanding that I settle my criminal case 
by dropping my civil case against the Wurmlingers. (See Greenfield Exhibits #L "Smith 
Fee Schedule showing phone call to Marfice" dated 8/4/2011) 
12. On August 11, 2011, after a conversation with Smith, I received confirmation of our 
discussion regarding a legal action against the City of Post Falls. (See Greenfield 
Exhibits #M "Correspondence" dated August 11, 2011, "Fee Agreement") 
13. On October 4, 2011, my criminal trial commenced. I was acquitted of the spurious crime. 
(See Erbland Exhibit #27 "Judgment of Acquittal") 
14. On October 13, 2011, the Wurmlingers presented two (2) additional counter claims for 
"Trespass and Timber Trespass" against Greenfield nine (9) days after my acquittal. (See 
Greenfield Exhibits #N "Correspondence from Smith" dated October 27, 2011, and #0 
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"Correspondence from Riseborough to Smith regarding an answer to amended counter-
claims" dated November JI, 2011, and #P Correspondence from Riseborough to Smith 
regarding an answer to amended counter-claims" dated December 12, 2011) 
15. On December 8, 2011, I sent an email to Smith regarding my concerns with several 
issues. (See Greenfield Exhibits #R "Email" dated December 8, 2011) 
16. On December 13, 2011, my Insurance Company agreed to assist with the counter-claims 
if it wasn't too late. I met with Smith to discuss issues at hand and noticed that my entire 
file was sitting on the conference table. (See Greenfield Exhibit #Q "Notice of 
Appearance" dated December 12, 2011) 
1 7. While Smith was away on vacation, Riseborough sent a letter to Smith dated December 
14, 2011, regarding compliance deadlines and other issues. Smith MISSED the pre-trial 
compliance deadline for disclosing my expert witnesses. (See Greenfield Exhibits #B and 
#S "Letter" dated December 14, 2011, and Erblands Exhibit #36 "Smiths Expert Witness 
Disclosure" which does not bare a stamp from the court) 
18. On January 9, 2011, Smith drafted my "Protection Order" and had Riseborough sign said 
"Stipulation" yet Smith did NOT submit said "Stipulation" to the Court until February 16, 
2012. (See Greenfield Exhibits #Band #T "Stipulation For Entry of Protection Order" 
dated January 9, 2012, and Erblands Exhibit #37) 
19. On February 10, 2012, I sent emails to Smith regarding deadlines and other issues. (See 
Greenfield Exhibits #U "Email" dated February 10,2012) 
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20. On February 13, 2012, Smith sent me an email stating he was quitting! (See Greenfield 
Exhibits #V "Email" dated February 13, 2012) 
21. On February 14, 2014, Smith submits his "Notice to Withdraw" to the Court. (See 
Erblands Exhibit #38 "Motion To Withdraw") 
22. On February 27, 2012, I attended the hearing for Smith's "Motion to Withdraw" and 
informed the Court of my financial situation if Smith is allowed to quit. Mediation is 
also canceled to which I was hoping for a resolution to ending the civil case. (See 
Greenfield Exhibits #W "Hearing Minutes" from February 27, 2012) 
23. On March 29, 2012, I submitted my "Notice of Self-representation" to the Court. 
DATED this 17th day of August, 2015. 
t_j STINA J. GREENFlELD 
Pro Se Litigant (_,./ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 17th day of Augus 
fl. ERN'< 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STAiE OF IDAHO l 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTINA I. GREENFIELD 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT 
OF FACTS AND MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
5 
lie 
ission Expires: r [,( tU { 0 2/)20 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of August, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Brown & Kulisch 
Attorneys at Law 
1500 Bank of America Financial Center 
601 West Riverside Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0626 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT 
OF FACTS AND MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 




Christina). Gre'en~eld / .___. '~ u 
























1.;11 t:t:ll llt:IU V. V VU rrrn 1nger 
Case No. CV-10-8209 
Kootenai County 
Judge Haynes 
TRIAL: July 18-21, 2011 
4 days 
Pretrial Compliance Worksheet 
Description 
FIRST DAY .OF TRIAL 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
TRIAL BRIEFS 
PROPOSED FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
EXHIBITS & EXHIBIT LISTS 
WITNESS LISTS 
Reminder: WEL (7 days) 
PRETRIAL·MOTIONS CUTOFF(must be heard) 
DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS 
Reminder: Schedule Depositions (30 days) 
Reminder: Schedule Depositions (60 days) 
DISCOVERY CUTOFF 
Reminder: Last Day to Serve Discovery (30 days) 
Reminder: Discovery (35 days) 
Reminder: Discovery (45 days) 
MEDIATION DEADLINE 
.MSJ CUTOFF (must be heard) 
Defendant's DISCLOSURE OF EXPERTS 
Reminder: file & serve MSJ & NOH 
Reminder: Expert Witnesses (one week) 
Plalntlff's DISCLOSURE OF EXPERTS 
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Christina June Greenfield vs. Eric J Wurrnlinger, etal 
CV-2010-
Case: 0008209 District Filed: 09/23/2010 
Other 
Subtype: Claims Judge: 
Defendants: Wurrnlinger, Eric J Wurmlinger, Rosalynd D 
Plaintiffs: Greenfield, Christina June 
Disposition: Date Judgment Disposition Disposition Parties In Favor 
Type Date Type Of 
I 1/25/2011 Money O 1/23/2012 Satisfied Wurmlinger, Plaintiff 



































Comment: Order Denying Plaintifrs Motion To Alter Or 
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action 
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09/23/20 IO Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not listed in 
categories B-H, or the other A listings below Paid by: Smith, 
Ian (attorney for Greenfield, Christina J) Receipt number: 
0041566 Dated: 9/23/2010 Amount $88.00 (Check) For: 
Greenfield, Christina J (plaintiff) 
09/23/2010 Summons Issued 
09/23/2010 Summons Issued 
09/29/20 IO Affidavit Of Service - 9/26/10 - w/Eric Wurmilinger 
Filing: I I - Initial Appearance by persons other than the 
plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Amendola, Gary I. (attorney for 
10/14/2010 Wurmilinger, Eric J) Receipt number: 0044767 Dated: 
10/14/2010 Amount $58.00 (Check) For: Wurmilinger, Eric J 
(defendant) and Wurmlinger, Rosalynd D (defendant) 
10/14/2010 Notice Of Appearance -- Gary Amendola 
1011812010 
Three Day Notice Oflntent To Take Default & Default 
Judgment 
1012112010 
Defendant's Answer To Complaint For Declaratory Judgment, 
Injnnctive Relief And Damages And Counter Claim 
11/01/2010 Notice Of Deposition of Defendant rosalynd D Wurmlinger 
11/01/2010 Notice Of Deposition of Defendant Eric J Wurmlinger 




Amended Notice Of Deposition of Defendant Rosalynd D 
Wurmlrnger 
11/03/2010 Amended Notice OfDeposition of Eric J Wurmlinger 
11/05/2010 Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 12/01/2010 03:30 PM) 
11/05/20 IO Notice of Hearing 
11/30/2010 Response to Status Conference Notice 
11/30/2010 Response to Status Conference Notice 
12/01/20 IO Response to Status Conference Notice - Gary Amendola 
1210112010 
Hearing result fmStatus Conference held on 12/01/2010 03:30 
PM: lntenm Heanng Held 
Hearing result for Status Conference held on 12/01/2010 03:30 
1210 
l/20 IO PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: LAURIE 
JOHNSON Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: LESS THAN JOO PAGES 
1210112010 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 07/18/2011 09:00 
AM)4 DAYS 
12/01/2010 Notice ofTrial 
12/02/20 IO Notice Of Service Of Discovery 
1211412010 
Notice Of Transcript Delivery/Eric Wurmlinger/Deposition 
Taken 11-22-10 
1211712010 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to River Park Property Owners 
Associatton Inc 
1211712010 
Notice Of Deposition Of River Park Property Owners 
Association Inc on 01/10/11 at 1:00 pm 
1212212010 
Notice Of Transcript Delivery/Rosalynd 
Wurmlinger/Deposition Taken 12-06-10 
12/27/2010 Motion To Dismiss 
12/27/2010 Notice Of Hearing 
1212812010 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 01/26/2011 03:30 PM) 
Amendola 
1213012010 
Notice Of Service Defendants Response to Plaintiffs !st Set of 
· Requests for Product10n of Documents 
Ol/11/2011 AMENDED Notice Of Deposition Of River Park Property 
Owners Association Inc on 02/03/11 at 9:30 am 
0 
l/l l/20 11 AMENDED Subpoena Onces Tecum Issued to River Park 
Property Owners 
Ol/12/20l l Notice Of Service Defendants Supplemental Response to 
Plaintiffs !st set of Requests for Production of Documents 
01/21/2011 Notice Of Transcript Delivery Eric Wurmlinger 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim held on 
0112612011 
01/26/2011 03 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court 
Reporter: KERI VEARE Number of Transcript Pages for this 
hearing estimated: Amendola 
01/26/2011 
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Affidavit Of Service/Rose Francis obo River Park Property 
Owners Association, Inc./01-1 7-11 
01/27/2011 Order Of Dismissal (counterclaim) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/17/2011 03:30 PM) Motion to 
02/14/2011 Amend PTO, Motion Permitting Entry Upon Property, Motion 




Motion For Sanctions And For Order Requiring Compliance 
With Rule 30(c) 
0211412011 
Motion For Order Permitting Entry Upon Defendants' Real 
Property 
0211412011 
Motion To Amend Pre-Trial Order RE Disclosure Of Expert 
Witnesses 




Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 03/17/2011 03:30 PM) 
Amendola 
02/15/2011 Motion to Dismiss 
02/15/2011 Notice Of Hearing 
02/24/2011 Motion To Compel Response To Discovery 
02/24/2011 Notice Of Hearing on 03/17/11 at 3:30 pm 
Hearing result for Motion held on 03/17/2011 03 :30 PM: 




JOHNSON Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion to Amend PTO, Motion Permitting Entry 
Upon Property, Motion for Sanctions, Motion to Compel, 
Smith 






0 l l PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: LAURIE 
JOHNSON Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Amendola 
03/18/2011 Notice Of Service 
03/24/2011 Order of Dismissal 
0410712011 
Order RE: Motion to Amend/Motion for Sanctions/Motion to 
Compel 
0411412011 
Stipulation To Amend Pretrial Order And Extend Time To 




Order Amending Pretrial Order and Extending Time to 
Complete Mediation and to File Joint Mediation Report 
04/18/2011 Plaintiffs Notice Of Service Of Discovery 
04/27/2011 Stipulation for Entry ofa Protective Order 
05/02/2011 Protective Order Re: Documents 
0511912011 
Motion for Sanctions & Attorney Fees for Defendants Failure 
to Comply with Order Compellrng Discovery 
0512312011 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw 06/21/2011 03:30 
PM) Amendola 
05/24/2011 Notice Of Service 
0512512011 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/21/2011 03:30 PM) for 
Sanct10ns and Attorney Fees, Smith 
0512512011 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider 06/21/2011 03:30 
PM) Amendola 
05/25/2011 Notice Of Hearing 
05/25/2011 Notice Of Hearing 
05/26/2011 Motion For Reconsideration 
05/26/2011 Notice Of Hearing on 06/21/11 at 3:30 pm 
05/27/2011 New File Created **********FILE #2********** 
0610612011 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue 06/21/2011 03:30 PM) 
Smith - continue trial and Amend Pretrial Order 
06/06/2011 Notice Of Hearing 
0610612011 
Motion To Amend Pretrial Order & Motion to Continue 
Hearrng 
06/06/2011 Notice Of Hearing 
06/06/2011 Motion for Leave to Withdraw 
06/17/2011 Objection to Motion for Reconsideration 
06/17/2011 No Objection to Motion To Withdraw 
06/21/2011 
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Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on 07/18/2011 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4 DAYS 
Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on 06/21/2011 
03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: 
06/21/2011 LAURIE JOHNSON Number ofTranscript Pages for this 
hearing estimated: Smith - continue trial and Amend Pretrial 
Order 
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/21/2011 03 :30 PM: 
0612112011 
District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: LAURIE 
JOHNSON Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: for Sanctions and Attorney Fees, Smith 
Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on 06/21/2011 
0612112011 
03 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: 
LAURIE JOHNSON Number ofTranscript Pages for this 
hearing estimated: Amendola 
Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw held on 06/21/2011 
0612112011 
03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: 
LAURIE JOHNSON Number of Transcript Pages for this 
hearing estimated: Amendola 
06/22/2011 Order Granting Leave to Withdraw 
06/23/2011 Memorandum & Affidavit RE: Costs And Attorney Fees 
Filing: I 1 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the 
0612412011 
plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Ramsden Lyons Receipt number: 
0026847 Dated: 6/24/2011 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: 
Wurmilinger, Eric J (defendant) 
06/24/2011 Notice Of Appearance 
06/24/2011 Affidavit Of Mailing/E.W. & R. W./mailed 06-23-11 
Order Re: Motion for Sanctions and Attorney Fees for 
06/27/2011 Defendant's Failure to Comply With Order Compelling 
Discovery 
06/27/2011 Order Re: Motion to Continue Trial 
0710712011 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 08/24/2011 03:30 PM) 
RESET TRIAL 
07/07/2011 Notice of Hearing 
07/19/2011 Notice Of Service of Discovery Responses - CJG 
07/26/2011 Stipulation 
0811212011 
AMENDED Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
08/23/2011 09:30 AM) RESET TRIAL 
0811212011 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 08/24/2011 
03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated RESET TRIAL 
08/12/2011 AMENDED Notice of Hearing 
0811512011 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Contempt 09/07/2011 03:30 
PM) & Attorneys Fees - Smith 30 min 
0811612011 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Amend 08/23/2011 09:30 AM) 
Marfice 
08/16/2011 Ex Parte Motion to Vacate & Continue Status Conference 
08/16/2011 Objection to Hearing on Motion to Amend as Untimely 
08/17/2011 Notice Of Hearing 
08/17/2011 Motion To Amend Answer & Counterclaim 
08/17/2011 Memorandum In Support Of Motion to Amend 
0811712011 
Affidavit of Eric Wurmlinger in Support of Defendants Motion 
to Amend Answer & Counterclallll 
0811712011 
Hearing result for Motion to Amend scheduled on 08/23/2011 
09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated Marfice 
0811712011 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 08/23/2011 
09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated RESET TRIAL 
0811812011 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 10/13/2011 03:30 PM) 
RESETTRlAL 
0811812011 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/13/2011 03:30 PM) Motion for 
Sanct10ns and Attorney Fees. Smith 
Hearing result for Motion for Contempt scheduled on 
08/18/2011 09/07/2011 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated & Attorneys Fees -
Smith 30 min 
0811812011 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Amend 10/13/2011 03:30 PM) 
Marfice 
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08/18/2011 Notice of Hearing 
08/18/2011 Order to Vacate and Continue August 23, 2011 Hearing 
08/18/2011 Amended Notice Of Hearing 
08/19/2011 Amended Notice Of Hearing 
09/0l/ZOl l Notice Of Withdrawal and Substitution of Counsel - Douglas 
Marfice WD's - John Riseborough Substitutes 
0913012011 
Defendants Motion for Reconsideration Re Order opn 
Sanctions/Attorneys Fees 
10/06/2011 Affidavit of John C. Riseborough 
10/06/2011 Affidavit of Eric Wurrnlinger 
10/06/2011 Objection to Motion for Leave to File AMENDED Complaint 
1011112011 
Defendant Wurrnlingers' Reply to Plaintiffs Objection RE: 
AMENDED Answer 
Notice Of Service of Defendants Wurrnlingers 2nd Set of 
I 0/11/2011 Interrogatories & Requests for Production of Documents to 
Plaintiff 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 10/13/2011 03:30 PM: 
10/13/2011 Motion Granted Motion for Sanctions and Attorney Fees. 
Smith 
1011312011 
Hearing result for Motion to Amend scheduled on 10/13/2011 
03:30 PM: Motion Granted Riseborough 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 10/13/2011 
I0/! 3/ZOI l 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: 
LAURIE JOHNSON Number of Transcript Pages for this 
hearing estimated: RESET TRIAL 
1011312011 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 05/21/2012 09:00 
AM) 5 DAYS 
10/13/2011 Notice of Trial 
10/17/2011 Amended Answer & Amended Counterclaim 
11/10/2011 Motion to Enlarge Time 
11/18/2011 Plaintiffs Notice Of Service Of Discovery 
11/22/2011 Motion for Relief from Protective Order 
11/25/2011 Judgment 
1113012011 
Hearing Scheduled _(Motion 01/05/2012 04:00 PM) Motion for 
Rehef from Protectlve Order, Smith 
11/30/2011 Notice Of Hearing 
1211312011 
Notice Of Appearance for Counter-Defendant Christina J. 
Greenfield 
1211912011 
Order: Defendant's Motion To Amend Answer and 
Countercialfll 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 01/05/2012 04:00 PM: 
01/05/2012 Hearing Vacated Motion for Relief from Protective Order, 
Smith 
Ol/lS/ZOIZ Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 
02/27/2012 03:30 PM) Riseborough 
01/23/2012 Satisfaction Of Judgment - $1,224.00 
01/24/2012 ********New File Created**** #3 
Ol/
2612012 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/17/2012 11 :30 AM) Motion for 
Leave,Riseborough 
01/27/2012 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
01/27/2012 Defendants' Motion for Leave to Set Hearing 
0112712012 
Affidavit of Eric J Wurrnlinger in Support of Defendants' 
Motwn for Summary Judgment 
0112712012 
Affidavit of Counsel In Support of Defendants' Motion for 
summary Judgment 
0112712012 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Leave to Set 
Hearing 
0112712012 




Notice Of Hearing: Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgement 
0112712012 
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**************New File Created**************** 
Expando created with Judges Copies File #4 
02/09/2012 Notice Of Service 




Objection To Defendant's Motion For Sunnnary Judgment, Or 
In The Alternative, Motion To Amend Pre-Trial Order 
02/14/2012 Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Attorney 
0211412012 
Defendants Wurmlingers Reply re: Motion for Leave to Set 
Heanng 









Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 
02/27/2012 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Riseborough 
0
..,117/"'0P Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/17/2012 11:30 AM: 
~ ~ ~ Hearing Held Motion for Leave, Riseborough 
02/17/2012 Stipulated Protective Order 
0212412012 
Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel in support of Defendants 
Mallon for Sunnnary Judgment 
0212412012 
Defendants Substituted Memorandum In Support Of Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
0212412012 
Defendants Statement of Undisputed Facts: Motion For 
Summary Judgment 
0212712012 
Order: Defendants' Motion for Relief From Pretrial Scheduling 
Order 
0212712012 
Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw scheduled on 
02/27/2012 03:30 PM: Hearing Held Smith - Grant 
0212712012 
District Court Hearing Held Court.Reporter: Keri Veare 
Number ofTranscnpt Pages for this hearmg estrmated: 
0212812012 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 
04/13/2012 03:30 PM) Riseborough 
0212912012 
Amended Notice Of Hearing on Defendants' Motion for 
summary Judgment 
03/09/2012 Order Permitting Withdrawal Of Attorney 
0311212012 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue 04/10/2012 04:00 PM) 
Motion to Cont. MSJ hearing, trial and PTO deadlines, pit 
03/1612012 Certificate Of Service 
03/17/2012 New File Created****#4**** 
03/29/2012 Plaintiffs Notice of Self Representation 
Motion To Continue and/or Amend Hearing on Motion for 
03/29/2012 Sunnnary Judgment; Briefing Schedule on Motion for 
Summaiy judgment; Jury Trial and Pretrial Scheduling Order 
03/29/2012 Notice Of Hearing 
Plaintiffs Statement ofFacts in Support of Plaintiffs 
0313012012 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment Substitutetd & In Support of Plaintiffs 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion 
03/30/2012 for Summary Judgment as Substituted & Plaintiffs Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
03/30/2012 New File Created*** 5*** Expando 
Affidavit Of Christina J Greenfield in Opposition to 
0313012012 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as Substituted & In 
Support of Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (in 
file # 5 exp an do) 
0410512012 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 04/20/2012 10:00 AM) 
Riseborough 
04/05/2012 Defendant's Objection To Plaintiffs Motion To Continue 
0410612012 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Modify 04/20/2012 10:00 AM) 
Motion to Modify Deadline, Risborough 
Motion to Strike Specific Exhibits Attached to Affidavit of 
04/06/2012 Christina J Greenfield in Opposition to Defendants Motion For 
Summary Judgment 
0410612012 
Defendants Memorandum In Support Of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
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04/09/2012 Hearing result for Motion to Modify scheduled on 04/20/2012 
10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Motion to Modify Deadline, 
Risborough 
04/09/2012 Notice Of Hearing Motion to Shorten Time 
Motion to Shorten Time RE:Motion to CompelPlaintiff's 
04/09/2012 Responses to Defendant's first and second set of interrogatories 
and request for production of documents 
0410912012 
Affidavit of fohn C Riseborough in Support of Motion and 
Order Shortenrng time 
Notice Of Hearing On Defendants' Motion To Compel 
04/09/2012 Plaintiffs Responses To Defendants' Requests For Production 
Of Documents (04/20/12 at 10:00 am) 
Defendant's Motion To Compel Plaintiff's Responses To 
04/09/2012 Defendants' Interrogatories And Requests For Production Of 
Documents 
Affidavit Of John C Riseborough In Support Of Defendant's 
0410912012 
Motion To Compel Plaintiffs Responses To Defendants' First 
And Second Interrogatories And Requests For Production Of 
Documents 
0411012012 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled on 
05/21/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 5 DAYS 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 
0411012012 
04/13/2012 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Riseborough 
RJSBOROUGH APPEARING TELEPHONICALL Y (509) 
868-9153 
Hearing result for Motion to Continue scheduled on 04/10/2012 
04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: VAL 
0411012012 
NUNEMACHER Number ofTranscript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion to Cont. MSJ hearing, trial and PTO 
deadlines, plt JOSHUA JOHNSON TELEPHONIC 208-855-
9082 
0411012012 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 11/26/2012 09:00 
AM) 5 DAYS 
0411012012 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 
05/16/2012 04:00 PM) Riseborough 
04/10/2012 AMENDED Notice of Trial 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/16/2012 04:00 PM) Motion to 
04/12/2012 Compel, Motion for Contempt and Sanctions, Motion to 
Modify PTO, Pit 
04/12/2012 Amended Notice Of Hearing 
04/12/2012 Affidavit of Attempted Service 
04/13/2012 Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled on 04/20/2012 
0412012012 
10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: 
ANITA SELF Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Riseborough 
04/20/2012 Order After Hearing 
04/20/2012 Order on Motion to Shorten Time 
0412512012 
Orde.r After Hearing on Defendants' Motion to Compel 
Medical Records 
0412712012 
Plaintiffs Notice Of Service of Discovery of Medical 
Documents 
04/28/2012 ************ New File Created************** File #6 
Affidavit Of Plaintiff Christina J. Greenfield In Support Of 
04/30/2012 Motions For Sanctions And For Order Requiring Compliance 
With Rule 37(a)(2)(c)(e) and Contempt Rule 75(c)(2)(3) 
04/30/2012 Stipulation To Modify Pre-Trial Order 
0413012012 
Motions For Sanctions And For Order Requiring Compliance 
With Rule 37(a)(2)(c)( e) and Contempt Rule 75(c)(2)(3) 
0510112012 
Motion For Withdrawal Of Attorneys For Christina J 
Greenfield 
0510112012 
Affidavit Of Joshua D Johnson In Support Of Motion For 
Withdrawal Of Attorneys For Christina J Greenfield 
05/01/2012 Substituted Affidavit Of Plaintiff Christina J Greenfield In 
Support Of Motion For Sanctions And For Order Requriing 
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Compliance With Rule 37(a)(2)(c)(e) And Contempt Rule 75 
( c)(2)(3) 
Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants Motion to Strike Specific 
05/02/2012 Exhibits to Plaintiffs Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
0510312012 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Withdraw 05/16/2012 04:00 
PM)JoshuaJohnson 
0510312012 
Notice Of Hearing re Miotion for Withdrawal of Attorneys for 
Chnstma J Greenfield 
05/04/2012 Defendant's Trial Witness List 
05/04/2012 Defendant's List OfExhibits 
0510712012 
Defentant's Response to Joshua Johnson's Motion for Leave to 
Withdraw 
05/07/2012 Plaintiffs Trial Witness & Exhibit List 
05/08/2012 Affidavit of John C. Rise borough 
05/08/2012 Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
0510912012 
Objection to Defendant's Supplemental Disclosure of Expert 
Witness 
05/11/2012 Affidavit Of Service - 5/9/2012 - C.J. G.( defendant's response) 
05/11/2012 Affidavit Of Service - 5/9/2012 C.J.G.(motin and affidavit) 
0511112012 
Affidavit Of Service - 5/7/2012 - C.J.G.(defendant' witness list 
and hst of exh1b1ts) 
05/11/2012 Defendant's Trial Brief 
0511112012 
Defendants Motion In Lirnine to Exclude Plaintiffs Experts 
Patncia Easton & Dr Fredenck Ambrose 
0511112012 
Affidavit of John C Rise borough in Support of Motion in 
Lnmne 
05/14/2012 Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions 
0511412012 
Affidavit Of Christina J Greenfield In Support Of Motion In 
Llmme 
0511412012 
Plaintiffs Motion In Lirnine To Exclude Defendants List Of 
Exhibits Declared On May 4, 2012 
05/14/2012 Plaintiffs Trial Brief 
05/16/2012 Plaintiffs Notice of Self Representation 
Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw scheduled on 
05/16/201205/16/2012 04:00 PM: Hearing Held Joshua Johnson 
TELEPHONIC 208-855-9082 - grant 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 05/16/2012 04:00 PM: 
05/16/2012 Hearing Held Motion to Compel, Motion for Contempt and 
Sanctions, Motion to Modify PTO, Pit 
0511612012 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 
05/16/2012 04:00 PM: Hearing Held Riseborough 
District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Valerie 
05/16/2012 Nunemacher Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Amend 06/06/2012 04:00 PM) 
05/17/2012 Motion to Amend PTO, Motion in Lirnine, Objection to 
Supplemental Disclosure, Pit 
05/17/2012 Affidavit Of Service-C.J.G.-5/15/12 
05/17/2012 Notice Of Hearing Motion to Amend Pretrial Order 
05/18/2012 **********FILE #7 CREATED********** 
05/21/2012 Motion To Amend Pretrial Order 
0512112012 
Notice Of Hearing Plaintiffs Motion in Limine to Exclude 
Defendants List of Exhibits 
0512112012 
Notice Of Hearing Obje.ction to Defendants Supplemental 
Disclosure of Expert Witness 
05/21/2012 Notice Of Hearing Objection to Defendants Motion in Lirnine 
05/22/2012 Affidavit Of Mailing (CG & JJ 5/22/12) 
05/22/2012 Order Permitting Withdrawal Of Attorney/Joshua Johnson 
0512412012 
Affidavit of Christina J Greenfield in Support of Objection to 
Defendants Mollon m L1mme 
05/24/2012 Amended Plaintiff Trial Witness and Exhibit List 
05/24/2012 Plaintiffs Amended Trial Brief 
05/24/2012 Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants Motion in Limine 
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I don ' t know. 
MR. AMENDOLA: Unbelievable. Look, I'm about 





MR. SMITH: (Laughing.) 
MR. AMENDOLA: You laugh. 
MR. SMITH: Yeah, I do laugh. 
MR. AMENDOLA: 95 percent of the questions 
8 you have asked today have no relevance to this lawsuit 
9 at all. I understand what a deposition is about. But 
10 you are wasting our time. 
11 
12 
MR. SMITH: Well, that's your opinion. 
MR. AMENDOLA: It matters what -- how many 
13 computers they have in their house? 
14 MR. SMITH: Yeah. If I want to do some 
15 discovery to get the computer, you bet. 
16 MR. AMENDOLA: You're not getting in their 
17 computer. Are you -- are you kidding me? 
18 
19 not you. 
20 
MR. SMITH: It's up to the judge to decide; 
MR. AMENDOLA: Okay. Well, all I'm saying is 
21 if you don't ask some relevant questions and get to 
22 what you're asking, we're leaving. I don't care. You 
2.3 can go to the judge. I don't care. Do you understand 
24 what I'm telling you? 
25 MR. SMITH: Mr. Amendola, discovery is 
www.mmcourt.com WURMLINGER, ROSALYND 
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1 broader than relevance, number one. 
2 MR. AMENDOLA: Do you understand what I'm 
3 telling you? 
4 MR. SMITH: I let you speak without 
5 interrupting you. 
6 MR. AMENDOLA: Well, no, you didn't. But go 
ahead. 7 
8 MR. SMITH: Hopefully you can afford me the 
9 same courtesy. 
MR. AMENDOLA: I will try. 10 
11 MR. SMITH: Number one, the scope of 
12 discovery is broader than what is relevant. 
13 MR. AMENDOLA: I don't care. 
14 MR. SMITH: And number two, this is my 
15 deposition, and I'll ask the questions that I want to 
16 ask. Now, if you want to leave, you do so at your own 
17 peril. And I will go to court. And I will seek 
18 sanctions against you and your client 
19 MR. AMENDOLA: I don't care if you want to go 
20 to court. When the judge reads the questions you're 
21 asking, good luck on the sanctions. 
22 MR. SMITH: And, again, I don't know what you 
23 perceive to be relevant. Obviously your idea of what 
24 is relevant and my idea of what is relevant are 
25 different. So when you tell me you want me to only ask 
www.rnrncourt.com WURMLINGER, ROSALYND 12/6/2010 
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1 relevant questions, I don't know what that means. 
2 MR. AMENDOLA: Okay. So from now on, if I 
3 think it's not relevant, I'm going to object and tell 
4 Rosalynd not to answer. If that's how you want to do 
5 it, we'll do it that way. 




MR. AMENDOLA: Then ask your questions. 
9 MR. SMITH: Again, please don't interrupt me 
10 when I'm speaking. That's not how I want to conduct 
11 this deposition, because I don't think that's 
12 appropriate for you to tell your client not to answer 
13 questions. 
14 MR. AMENDOLA: I don't care what you think is 
15 appropriate or not. I'm sick of this. 
16 MR. SMITH: Well, maybe your client should 
17 get another attorney then. 
18 So I'm going to continue with my deposition. 
19 
20 
MR. AMENDOLA: You ask your questions. 
MR. SMITH: All right. 
21 BY MR. SMITH: 
22 Q. So, ma'am, can you describe the computer for 
23 me that you wrote this compilation on. 
24 
25 
MR. AMENDOLA: There's no relevance. Don't 
answer. 
www.mmcourt.com WURMLINGER, ROSALYND 12/6/2010 
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1 BY MR. SMITH: 
2 Q. So 1 ma'am 1 I'm going to ask you are you 
3 refusing to answer the question? 
4 MR. AMENDOLA: I'm instructing -- she's not 
5 refusing; I'm instructing her not to answer. 






Are you refusing to answer the question 1 
MR. AMENDOLA: Don't answer the question. 
10 BY MR. SMITH: 
11 Q. So you're not going to answer my question as 
12 to whether or not you're refusing to answer the 
13 question? 
14 MR. AMENDOLA: Don't answer any questions 
15 unless I say it's okay to answer/ please. 
16 MR. SMITH: Okay. We're going to break then. 
17 I'd like to get a copy of this deposition 1 please. The 
18 deposition is completed for today. 
19 
20 
MR. AMENDOLA: Okay. That's your choice. 
MR. SMITH: No. You just told me your client 
21 is not going to answer any question unless you tell her 
22 to. That's not the appropriate way to conduct a 
23 deposition. If that's your position/ then we're going 
24 to cease this deposition now/ and I'll go to court and 
25 get an order. 
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1 MR. AMENDOLA: As soon as you ask a relevant 
2 question, she'll be happy to answer. 
3 MR. SMITH: We're done. 
4 (Whereupon, the deposition was adjourned at 
5 10:25 a.m.) 
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Greenfield v. Wurmlinger 
Case No. CV-10-8209 
Kootenai County 
Judge Haynes 
TRIAL: May 21, 2012 
5 days 
Pretrial Compliance Worksheet 
Desc:riotion 
FJRST DAY OF TRIAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
MOTIONS IN UMINE 
.. -
TRIAL BRiEFS 
PROPOSED ANDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
EXHIBITS & EXHIBIT LISTS 
WITNESS LISTS 
Reminder: WEL (7 days) 
PRETRIAL MOTIONS CUTOFF (must be heard) 
.•· ·DISCOVERY DEPOSmONS 
Reminder: Schedule Depositions (30 days) 
Reminder: Schedule Depositions (60 days) 
DISCOVERY CUTOFF 
Reminder: Lest Day to Serve Discovery (30 days) 
Reminder: Discovery (37 days) 
Reminder: Discovery (47 days) 
MEDIATION DEADLINE (REMINDER 30/60/90 DAYS PRIOR) 
MSJ CUTOFF= (must be heard) · 
Defendant's DISCLOSURE OF.£XPERTS 
Plalntlff'a DISCLOSURE OF EXPERTS 
Reminder: Expert Witnesses (one week) 
Reminder: file & serve MSJ & NOH 
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JOHN C. RISEBOROUGH, ISBA #7898 
SCOTT NASS, ISBA #4555 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 E. FRONT A VE., #101 
P.O. Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 83 8-0007 
) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 










ERIC J. WURMLINGER and ) 








Case No. CV 10-8209 
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that the Judgment entered on the 25th day of 
November, 2011, in the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-four Dollars 
($1,224.00), to CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD. has been FULLY SATISFIED AND 
DISCHA..RGED, and Plaintiff CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, does hereby authorize and direct 
the Kootenai County Recorder's office to record such Satisfaction of Judgment. 
DATED this day of , 2011. --- -------
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT - 1 
By __________ _ 
IAN D. SMITH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
.z:: 
L-
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PAINE HAMBLEN, LLP 
\ . TRUST ACCOUNT 
\717 W. SPRAGUE, STE 1200 
...... SPOKANE, WA 99201 
Inland Nonhwest Bank CBECKNO. 119898 
West 421 Riverside, Sufre 113 
Spokane, WA 99201 
28-3/1351 
VOID AFTER 90 DAYS 
DATE: 12-02-2011 CHECK AMOUNT 
$1,224.00 
PAY One Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Four DOLLAR and no cents ( · 
TO TIIE Ian D. Smith - Client Trust Account 
ORDER OF Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Blvd Suite 101 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
CHECK DATE; 12-02-2011 
PA YEE: Ian D. Smith-- Client Trust Account 
CHECK AMOUNT: $1,224.00 
DESCRIPTION: Ian D. Smith - Client Trust Account -
Satisfaction of Judgement 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
CHECK NO: 119898 
CLIENT: Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. 
MATTER It: 00170-00267 
MATTER NAME: Eric and Rosalynd WurrnJinger - Christina J 
L -=.,..: 
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) 
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IAND. SMnH 
Attomey at L*'w 
608 Nonhwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3018 
Caaur d'Alene, ID 83816-3018 
Telephantt: (208) 78~060 
F ~e&imile: (208) 766~9089 
ldahc State Sar No. 4686 




T-402 P.01/02 F•l89 
2011 JIJN 20 PM 2: ~9 
CLER.t< D;sTR1CT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE f JRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STAT£ OF IPAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRJSTINA JUNE GRSENFIELO, 
Defand11nt. 
STATE Of IPAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
CASE NO. CFR-10 .. 10124 
AFFIDAVIT OF IAN P, SMITH IN 
SUPPORT OF 08Jt;CTtON TO 
AMENDED INFORMATION ANC 
MOTrCN TO DISMISS 
It IAN 0. SMITH. being first duly swom upon oath, depcse and statu that: 
1. .1 am over the age Qf eighteen ( 18) years of age. 
AFf'IOAvtT a, IAN p, IMrrH 1H SUPPORT OF 
oa.,iCTIOH TO AMENOID INFORMATION 
AMP MOT'°" TO D18MIIS - 1 • 
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C. The States' investigator confirmed that the Defendant's 
predecessor in interest had not paid for any portion of the bushes 
and that the alleged victim had planted the bushes on his property, 
not on the property line and not on the Defendant's property. 
5. The Deposition transcript evidences that: 
A. The alleged victim has sworn under oath that he planted the 
bushes on his property, not on the property line, and not on the 
Defendant's property. 
6. There is no evidence to support the State's claim that the bushes were 
jointly owned by the alleged victim and the Defendant. 
DATED this 20th day of June, 2011. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 201h day of Jun , 2011. 
AFFIDAVIT OF IAN D. SMITH IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO AMENDED INFORMATION 
AND MOTION TO DISMISS 
-
03 · 13. ;J-o/.:i-
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 




No. 4271 P. 4 
IN TIIE P1STRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAH01 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff/Counter-defendant, 
VS. 
BRIC J. WURMLINGER and ROSALYND D. 
WURMLJNGE~ husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV-10-&209 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO AMEND 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this matter on September 23, 2010 and an Answer and 
Counterclaim were filed on October 21, 2010 by Defendants' prior counsel, Gary Amendola. 
Plaintiff has conducted discovery and has deposed the Defendants. Trial was scheduled to 
conunence on July 18, 2011. On June 6, 20111 Defendnnts1 prior counsel filed a Motion for 
Leave to Withdraw due to 0 break down in the allomey-client relationship." Leave was 
granted and on June 23, 2011, the undersigned counsel subsequently appeared on behalf of 
Defendants. On June 27, 2011, this Couit granted Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate the July 18, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND - I 
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Aug.16.2011 2:45PM ~o. 4271 P. 7 
The primary counterclaims (trespass) sought to be added are permissive 
countercJaims, as they do not arise out of the same occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
Plaintiff's primary claims. LR.C.P. 13{b). Plaintiff's claims arise from alleged violation of 
certain subdivision CC&R's related to the Plaintiff's dispute with Defendants is the issue-of 
th.e height/location of arborvitae trees which Defendants cultivated along the common 
property line. Defendants' proposed counterclaims are for the cutting of Defendant's 
arborvitae trees and trespass onto the Defendants1 property. These are different occun·ences 
and therefore, the counterclaims sought to be amended ai-e peimissive in nature. Defendants 
have the right to assert the trespass claims in a separate action. !.R.C.P. IJ(a){b). However, 
PJaintiffs claims end Defendants' proposed counterclaims do have commonalities and 
judicial economy would be best promoted by granting, leave to amend. Plaintiff is not 
substantially prejudiced by amendment of the counterclaims because in the discovery already 
conducted by the Plaintiff, considerable inquiry was made of issues surrounding the 
arborvitae trees, their height, location, etc. Justice requires Defendants be pennitted to make 
this amendment. Defendants' mo1ion to amend thejr CO'Unterclaims should be granted, 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is not prejudiced by amendment of the Defendants affilmative defenses and 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box. 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (20&) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Attorneys for Dcfendants/Counterclaimants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDIClAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD1 
P Jalntift7Counter-defendant, 
vs. 
ERIC j, WURMLTNGER and ROSALYND D. 
WUR.MLINGBR, husband and wife, 
'D0fendants/Counte1'Claimonts. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of .Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV-10-8209 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERJC 
WURMLJNGERIN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
AMEND ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
I, Eric Wurmlinger1 having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. Beginning in Spring 2005> my next door neighbor, Christina Greenfield began 
lodging complaints about trees (arborvitae) growing on my property which she claimed were 
bloc.king her v1ews. 
APP1DAVIT OFBIUC WURMLINOER IN SUPPORT OF DBPHNDANJ'S'MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER AND 
COUNTSRCLAlM · I 
I , I 1·- -I # fl , 
CJC!u.· i . f-~ /Jl' J ) ,--~/t / 
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2. In April 2009, while my family was on vacation, 1he arborvitae trees that Ms. 
Greenfield had previously complained about were cut down to approximately half their heighL 
without my pennission. 
3. On Apri1 18, 2010, the State of Idaho charged Plaintiff, Christina Greenfield 
with Felony Malicious Injury to property. See, Stale of Idaho v. Christina Greenfield: CR-
2010-0010624. The criminal charge against Ms. Greenfield is the result of het· intentional 
cutting of arborvitae trees which l planted approximately 10 years earlier as a border planting 
between our properties. The crimin11l trial is now set for September 27, 2011. The State of 
Idaho and Christina Greenfield are still conducting discovery. 
4. In September, 2010 this lawsuit was flied against me by Christina Greenfield, I 
believe in retaliation for the criminal charges she faces as a result of the damage to my trees. 
5. In October 2010, I hired Gary Amendola to represent my file and 1 in this 
lawsuit. I have never before been a party in a lawsuit and I know almost nothing about the 
process involved. I relied entirely upon Mr. Amendola in regard to the defense of this suic 
and the pleadJngs he prepared. 
6, Beginning in November 2010, depositions and written discovery were initiated 
by Ms. Greenfield. I did not understand the discovery process and I felt that Mr. Amendola 
did not communicate to me what was talcing place and what my responsibilities entailed. 
7. I attempted to comply with all requests from Mr. Amendola's office fo1· 
documents, infonnation and the like, but beginning early this year (20l1) Mr. Amendola 
became involved in the Edgar Steele criminal trial in Boise and after that communiciations 
from hlm to me about this case virtually ceased. 
APPIDAVJiO'P BRIC WURMLIN'OBR m SUPPORT OF DEFBNDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND ANS\VBRAN[) 
COUNIDRCLAIM • 2 
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Description CR 2010-10624 Greenfield, Kristina 20110712 Motion to Dismiss 
JUDGE Gibler 
Clerk Emily Hamilton 
Court Reporter Byrl Cinnamon 
I Date 117/12/2011 II Location II 1K-COURTROOM14 I 
Time II Speaker II Note I 
01:17:41 PM I Judge Defense Motion to Dismiss or alternative to have Preliminary 
Gibler Hearing, OF is present 
01:3437 PM I Amy IAmend Information to be filed 
I 
Borgman 
01 :34:47 PM I! 1an Smith II Now there is a 2nd Amended Information I 
01 :35:47 PM I Judge We are just talking about the 2nd Amended Information 
Gibler 
01 :36:03 PM I Amy Ives proposed information 
I 
Borgman 
01 :36:07 PM II Ian Smith I New allegation of mutual ownership, this case going on over a 
year 
01 :36:51 PM II This allegation of new ownership is a surprise to us 
01 :37:21 PM II Bushes owned entirely owned by the alleged victim is all we 
have been going by 
01 :37:38 PM I Now state alleging mutal ownership of the bushes I 
01 :37:53 PM I Now, what evidence does state have to proved mutal ownership 
01 :38:39 PM CJ Over a year ago the defendant requested statments by witnesses and any statements made by the defendant. I have not received any discovery regarding mutual ownership 
I 01 :39:51 PM II I State told me today, they have nothing more regarding mutal 
ownership 
I 01 :40:11 PM II 
01 :40:24 PM 
01 :40:35 PM Judge 
Gibler 
01 :40:41 PM Ian Smith 
01 :41:34 PM 
01 :42:10 PM Judge 
Giu!et 
I We would be prejudice if state brings more evidence regarding 
this 
This is trial by surprise 
Trial by no surprise 
Its been a year, now we have this new evidence, whay is it 
taking so long to get to us 
We are entitled to have a preliminary hearing for sufficient 
evidence to move forward on a felony charge 
She waived her prelim originally--right /\ / . 
. 1 11 (;:2 /f5) 
11-;£-~11rJfl///~I f V _,.,l:fu ) / t 
,-, '""' \T .'11,.T-L-- TT'T"'l.Tr\1'1.:_-',. __ :_.,r, .. =.--:. __ 1,ri.:L1_ .. \r"ln f"\f\1{\ 1f\r~A r"I ..•. . r ., 1 TT·.~· ,-,,-, f"\/l"'\A1 1 
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I 01 :42:24 PM II Ian Smith I Correct on the original charge. She is entitled to preliminary 
hearing on new allegations 
101:4331PMli I We are prejudice if state has more evidence. Client has legal 
right to preliminary hearing 
I 01 :43:50 PM II 16/20/11 alleged victim cut the bushes , now alleged victims has 
committed same crime and he faces no consequences for it 
I 01 :45:09 PM II I Also, state didn't get a survey, they still haven't obtained a 
survey 
I 01 :45:25 PM II II Can state prove case without a survey Ii 
I 01 :45:32 PM II II Primary is objection to the amended information I 
I 01 :45:41 PM I I and motion for preliminary hearing on new allegations 
I 01 :45:58 PM I If state says no more evidence than the letter of the defendant 
then we are not prejudice · 
I 01 :46:48 PM Judge If we reset for preliminary, magistrate will get the defendant's 
Gibler letter, 
I 01:47:18 PM lllan Smith I We can prove that bushes are not mutally owned. Not jointly 
owned 
I 01 :48:03 PM I I Ask to dismiss the amended information or allow preliminary 
hearing on the amended information 
I 01 :48:21 PM I Amy Ask court to take judicial notice of letter filed by defendant, file 
Borgman 2nd amended information and submit on brief 
I 01 :48:43 PM I Judge Legal issue governed in part by the rules 
Gibler 
I 01 :48:54 PM II I Objection is the proposed 2nd amended information re, trees in 
law suit, jointly owned 
I 01 :49:21 PM II II Reviews rule 7 I 
I 01 :49:47 PM II II State vs. Sever reviewed I 
I 01 :51 :29 PM II I Amended Information adds alternative circumastances to the 
original charge, not new crime 
I O 1 : 51 :4 3 PM II II State vs. Stewart reviewed I 
I 01 :52:38 PM II II Defendant has waived right to Preliminary Hearing, I 
I 01 :52:56 PM II II No prejudice to defendant I 
I 01:53:19 PM II j Can request continuance if defense needs more time 
I 01 :53:36 PM II II State is required to turn over to you any evidence I 
I 01 :53:54 PM II II Deny Motion, Keep trial as scheduled I 
I 01 :54:06 PM II II State to prepare order I 
I 01 :54: 15 PM I! Ian Smith II We want to have this triep. Jt has been a long time I 
II 11 
,, ....--, · · __ 1\ ri ~,_ 1 ___ \ nn r,n 1 f\ 1 Acri A t: __ ,....,...._..-h,....1,-1 V ..... ~,..,+~.,...,,,,, 7/1')/')(\11 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 418 of 710
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-1800 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 446-1833 
Assigned Attorney: 
AMY BORGMAN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 





CASE NUMBER CR 10-10624 
STATE'S OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
AMENDED INF0RMATI0N5 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, 
AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION ·FOR 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
COMES NOW, A.my Borgman, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, and 
hereby submits the State's Brief in Opposition to· the Defendant's Objection to the Amended 
Information, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and the Defendant's Motion for Preliminary 
· Hearing. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The underlying incident m this case took place ·in the Spring of 201 O". On August 16, 
2010, Deputy Prosecutor Terri Laird, who was formei)y .assigned to the case, ·filed an 
Information· with this Court alleging one count of Malicious 1rijury to Property, I. C. § § 18-7001., 
18-204. Therelevant language of the Information states as follows: 
STATE'S :BRIEF IN OPPOSITION-1. 
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) 
.· 201 J/JUL/! I/MOU J l: 14 KO CO huSECUTER FAX No. 208-446-184 l P. 006 
... ___ __ -·· to the o-p of-the trees, ~eh ;s • colml ma~ to ihe:ntjury i~lf .. Wheilierthe tr= .• • ·-
were ioint\Y owned bY1he parties ""d trimmed rut Wmmling&'s j,enni,sion: ;,, whether the 
· ·trees were wholly own~byWunnlinge_r, the su. dect of the malicious injury at issue. is the same. 
' ' . . 
.. In ihc Amended·. Information. the S is simply alleging .an _alternative 'theory of"., 
· ownership that m11;tches the language of 1he sta · te, and ·is more· consistent-with 1he Defend8Ile s · 
I > • • • • • 
position ·abo~t-the ·ownership of the tr~es. Specf oally, the Defendant,. Christina Greenfield,·. sent 
a letter to this. Court on _December 21,201 o, -in ·ch ·she expres~y states f4at " .. , there is/was no 
malfoious :intent to damage the shrubs; this is utual p1·operty, and it is. neither my nor my 
. neighbor's best inwest to d~g• the hedge 11" See Artached.1'-xhibU 1, L~tre; from Christina 
Greenfield to Judge Gibler dated December 21'.J 2010. Because 1he Defendant's position since 
Decerob~r 2010 has been that the trees are 'mmual property," it cannot be said that the 
amendmont'takcs Greenfield by surprise . 
. Additionally, under the Seve;son factors, , Greenfield cannot clah"n that.· the amendment 
subjetts ber to·double jeo~ardy. If-the. court Cr· Viets or acquits Greenfield ~der the original 
Information, she cannot later be tried on the ~ ended :information. Further, Greenfield, in her 
. ' ' . . ' 
. . 
motion and supporting brief, has not presented any facts or arguments to support the conclusion 
that the am~ent .rcsWll< in ]Jltjud;ce. ~ the .Am<llded lmonnotion doos not c~e . 
. Greenfield .with anew offense or resulCin'PrejJice, the amertdment is permissible under .!.C.R. 
:Rule7(c). . -~ J · :· · 
m~~ 
,'. . - ............. · ... .. : ···;·" •. -· .. 
: . 
'ST.f.\.TE'S:13RIEF IN OPP0S1Tl0N-·6 








Friday, May 6, 2011 12:22 PM 
More concerns; 
Print 
The Wurm is taking around a letter to have the home owners sign which will change the CC&Rs and allow his 
business to operate ... what if he succeeds? 
I called the Mayor, as well as Mason to confirm delivery of my letter and the docs attached showing all the wedding 
venue materials for the Wurm ... they never returned my calls ... I suspect, from what one of the neighbors informed 
me of ... they are waiting for the Wurm to bring them his letter. .. this still does not qualify under city ordinances or the 
home occupation permit.so what then??? He has been in violation for 2 years since Mason informed him via letter 
that he was in violation under city code, a misdemeanor offense, why hasn't he been charged ... hmmm ... actually 
time of violation is from 1995 or 1991 depending on city records. 
I still do not understand why no one on either case is turning over the docs we have requested 4 times??? They are 
costing me thousands of dollars in additional fees because of it. So what can be done? 
The emails back and forth between prosecutors and police show evidence that Arny knew quite some time ago that 
a survey was ordered by her boss, Mchugh, so why did she deny it in court? It looks like she was trying to buy more 
time (in email to Gunderson she mentions this) and the judge gave her almost two more months! Again, I feel this is 
corrupt as well ... along with all the other corruption you are seeing ... what else can you do? And why is everyone so 
concerned that the Wurm not pay for his own survey. He was the one that lied to police, shouldn't he have to 
provide the proof? Also, we all were somewhat amused when Gunderson said he was taking photos, so no need to 
document notes ... hello ... he must be a surveyor too! 
I received a letter today, after waiting weeks anticipating what to pay with my tax retum ... electricity, taxes, etc .. .to 
find out that the court had my refund deposited into their account for the costs of my felony case ... how can they do 
this? We are still in litigation, how, why??? I do not understand any of this. I have been unemployed since the end 
of August, 9 months now and I asked the court for a public defender (Who did nothing) Judge Gibler is aware of 
this. Do I write him a letter asking for the money from my tax return? 
Because of the felony charge ... 
My impeccable, outstanding credit for the past 30 years is now suffering because of late fees, etc ... 
I will be filing bankruptcy because I have not been able to pay my bills. At this point,in 12 months time, I have over 
$40,000 in debt. It will only get worse! 
I have borrowed money from several people to pay for legal fees. 
I owe $500 on my electricity, which could be turned off at any time. 
I pay for incidentals on a credit card that had a $10,000 limit that is almost depleted. 
You know the rest. .. 
Chris 
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IAN 0. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
Phone: (208) 765-4050 Fax: (208) 765-9089 
email: lanSmithLaw@gmail.com 
Invoice submitted to: 
Christina J. Greenfield 
21 O S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls ID 83854 
Invoice# 20270 
In Reference To: Greenfield v. Wurmlinger 
Case No. CV-10-8209 
Professional Services 
Greenfield v. Wurmlinger / CV-10-8209 
7/7/2011 JRV Draft email letter to client regarding Affidavit of 
Mailing from attorney G. Amendola, Notice of 
August 04, 2011 
Thank you! We appreciate your business. 
For your convenience we accept Visa, MasterCard, 
Discover and American Express payments over the 
phone. Accounts 30+ days past due will be charged 





Appearance by attorney D. Marfice, Order Re: Motion 
for Sanctions, Order Re: Motion to Continue Trial and 
regarding Memorandum and Affidavit for Attorney 
Fees and Costs 
7/12/2011 IDS Meeting with Chris 1.00 240.00 
$240.00 
JRV Review Notice of Hearing for Status Conference on 0.10 6.00 
August 24; calendar same $60.00 
7/13/2011 IDS Teleconference with attorney D. Marfice and 1.00 240.00 
teleconference with Chris $240.00 
7/15/2011 IDS Meeting with Chris 2.00 480.00 
$240.00 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 422 of 710
3/212015 Print 
) 




Ian Smith Law (iansmithlaw@gmail.com) 
crystalgreens@yahoo.com; 
Thursday, August 11, 2011 1 :23 PM 
Ian D. Smith 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, Id 83854 
Re: Greenfield v. City of Post Falls 
Greenfield v. Wurmlinger 
Dear Chris: 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Please excuse the business-like nature of this letter. The business liability policy for this office requires that we send 
out a Fee Agreement for the matters in which we represent you. This allows both of us to fully understand the 
expectations and agreements regarding billing arrangements at the commencement of the engagement, and we also 
want to set forth our understanding of the scope of the engagement, and the services you expect us to perform. It 
has been our experience that our clients are more comfortable knowing in advance the exact terms of the 
engagement. 
Therefore, · .. ., -- ·· · -····---· ·· ··· -·· -· · ·-· · · · ····· -· · ·· ·· · ·-·· · -· -~· ···· ·-- in detail. Please acknowledge your approval of 
the terms and conditions outlined by signing the Agreement and returning the signature page to me at your 
earliest convenience. At your option, you may fax, mail or scan and e-mail the signature page this office. I will 
provide you with a fully executed copy for your records upon return of the signature page. We sincerely appreciate 
and look forward to the opportunity to work with you in connection with this matter. 
In the meantime, please give our office a call if you have any questions or concerns. 
Julie R. Vetter, Legal Assistant 
Ian D. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 76~050 phone 
(208) 765-9089 fax 
This message is private and/or privileged. If you are not the person for whom this message is intended, please 
t,rfrJ; f P/11 
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Subject: Greenfield v. Wurmiinger / l~uiice of Trial & Amended Answer and Gou, ,t'.~rclaim 
From: 
To: 
Ian Smith Law (iansmithlaw@gmail.com) 
crystalgreens@yahoo.com; 
Date: Thursday, October 27, 2011 11 : 34 AM 
Ian D. Smith 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, Id 83854 
Re: Greenfield v. Wurmlinger 
Case No. CV-10-8209 
Dear Chris: 
ATIORNEY AT LAW 
Attached in PDF format are the following items in connection with your case, as referenced above: 
1. Notice of Trial - May 21, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. {5 days) with Pretrial Order 
2. Interoffice Pretrial Compliance Worksheet 
,, ... .,'3. Wurmlingers' Amended Answer and Amended Counterclaim (your Reply to the Counterclaim is due 
November 7, 2011) 
'--/4. October 14, 2011 letter from attorney John Riseborough 
I believe the attached documents are self-explanatory. Of course, please let me know if you have any questions. 
I included our interoffice Pretrial Compliance Worksheet for your reference, which provides the pretrial 
deadlines (and reminders) in chronological order. 
Julie R. Vetter, Legal Assistant 
Ian D. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P .0. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 765-4050 phone 
(208) 765-9089 fax 
This message is private and/or privileged. If you are not the person for whom this message is intended, please 
delete it and immediately notify me, and please do not copy or send this message to anyone else. 
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John C. Rise borough 
Partner 
( S09 J 455-5065 
john.riseborough@painehamblen.com 
Ian D. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northv.1est Boulevard,.Sui!e 101 
PO Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
ATTORNEYS 
November 11, 2011 
Re: Christina J. Greenfield v. Eric and Rosalynn Wunnlinger 
Dear Mr. Smith: 
I have no objection to an enlargement of time to November 18, 2011. I am enclosing a 
Stipulated Order to that effect. 
Sometime ago I provided you with the Order allowing amendment of the Answer. I 
would like to get it entered. Please review it and let me know if you have any objections. In the 
interim I will note it for presentment. Thank you for your attention to these matters. 
l:\Spodocs\00170\00267\LTR\00968296.DOCX:lg 
Enclosure 
Very truly yours, 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 Spokane, WA 99201 T (509) 455-6000 F (509) 838-0007 www.painehamblen.com 
A Limited Liability Partnership with offices in Spokane, Coeur d'Alene, Priest River and Tri-Cities 
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Kootenai County District Court 
Attention Suzi, Judge Haynes Clerk 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Ian D. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite l 01 
PO Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
I i \ J.'. ! y 
December 12, 2011 
Re: Christina J. Greenfield v. Eric and Rosalynn Wum1linger 
Cause No.: CV 10-8209 
Dear Clerk and Mr. Smith: 
Enclosed is an Order on Defendant's Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim in this 
matter. Mr. Smith has had an opportunity to review and has made no objections. Please present 
this to Judge Haynes for signature and filing. 
Very truly yours, 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
Enclosure 
I \Spodocs\0017CJ1002671L TR\00975327.DOCX 
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 Spokane, WA 9920 I T (509) 455-6000 F (509) 83~-0007 www.painehamblen.com 
A Limited Liability Partnership with offices in Spokanc.1 Coeur d'Alene. Priest River and Tri-Cities 
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Dec.'13. 2011 2:39PM 
Joshua D. Johnson (ISB #: 7019) 
RACINE OLSON NYE 
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 300 
Boise1 Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 395-001] 
Facsimile: (208) 433-0167 
Attorneys for Cozmter-Defendrmt Christina I Greenfield 
N o. 6 6 9 6 P. 2/ 4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAl 
CHRISTINA J, GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
ERIC J. WURMLINGER and ROSALYNN 
D. WURMLINGER, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
ERIC J, WURMLINGER and ROSALYNN 
D. WURMLINGER, husband and wife, 
Counter~ Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Counter~Defendan t. 
NOTICE OF AP.PEARANCE 
Page 1. of 3 
CASE NO.: CV 2010-8209 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR 
COUNTER-DEFENDANT CHRISTlNA 
J. GREENFIELD 
t_j· t j I f :1f Q 







Thursday, December 8, 2011 10:05 PM 
December 9, 2011 
Good morning Ian, 
Print 
Since Julie is gone now, I am concerned about my privacy when it comes to my medical documents. She 
handled all the documents coming and going so I want to make sure we are all on the same page. 
Wurmlinger would divulge my personal info to anyone if he gets his hands on it. So with that said I want 
a protection order on them before you send anything out We talked about the docs staying in your office 
and being viewed there but with the recent changes in your office I am not confident that my privacy is 
protected. I called Julie and she informed me that nothing has been sent over to Wurmlingers attorney as 
of now. 
I want to get the survey docs back that I gave you so you aren't compelled to tum those over either. No 
payment has been made to company so nothing has been given to me or finished ... unless you have any 
thoughts on this issue??? Don't want Wurmlingers attorney to get the survey doc I gave you. 
Per our conversation on December 7, 2011 : 
I am forwarding the new deposition questions for both Mr. and Mrs. Wurmlinger. 
As we have discussed on several occasions, it is crucial that the jury hear how many lies this couple, 
especially Eric, is capable of spinning. 
We also discussed amending the civil suit with slander and libel after receiving the new police reports 
where Eric Wurmlinger claims that I am maliciously damaging his property on several occasions starting 
from July 2011 thru present. I gave you the copies of the police reports 2 weeks ago. 
John Glinksi deposition ... the guy Eric Wurmlinger said he used for 'Over-flow' for his business??? 
Chad Johnson ... where are the survey results??? And other pertinent questions??? 
We also discussed the urgency in viewing Wurmlingers resident during the busy season ... holiday ... to see 
which rooms he is actually renting out In his deposition he quoted less room usuage than what he was 
advertising. 
We need to do a new discovery request with all the recent changes ... survey by Wurmlinger last month, 
new guest records, new account info, mal injury reports, etc ... 
Also, don't talk to Maxey about my civil suit against the City of Post Falls and the County. I want him to 
come to his own conclusion. You are too negative on the matter .. .I am smiling as I say this '·JI-, .. .I want to 
see what he comes up with on his own. 
,-
tjdl( Ii, I ~K (;2--111,;) 
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, I am s'till working on the felony c ~ issue ... getting it sealed ... will get b } to you on that soon with 
, documentation as we discussed. 
Thanks 
Chris Greenfield 
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l PAINE 11!111 HAMB 
John C. Rise borough 
Partner 
(509) 455-5065 
john. riseboroug h@painehamblen.com 
Ian D. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
608 Nmthwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
PO Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
ATTOl!~l[YS 
December 14, 2011 
Re: Ch1istina J. Greenfield v. Eric and Rosalynn Wurmlinger 
Dear Mr. Smith: 
It was a pleasure speaking with you today. Pending approval of Mutual of Enumclaw, we 
have resolved our dis'co·~er; dispute ~s follows: ' . . 
You have advised that your client feels there has been additional actionable conduct by 
the Wunnlingers since the commencement of this litigation. Accordingly, you wish to amend the 
Complaint to allege slander. Further, because of staffing difficulties and the holiday season, you 
have requested an extension in identifying experts. We have agreed that, pending client approval, 
the defense will not object to the amendment of the Complaint. We have further agreed to an 
extension of time for you to identify experts to January 9, 2012. 
In exchange you have agreed to have your client answer the remaining Interrogatories 
(19-24) which went unanswered. We have agreed that those responses will be provided on or 
before January 9, 2012. We have agreed to move the document review and production date in 
your offices to that time as well with a corresponding extension of the defense's deadline for 
naming experts to February 9th. 
On the issue of your motion to lift the Stipulated Order Re Confidentiality applicable to 
the Wurmlinger's tax returns, we have agreed that use of the tax returns themselves is not 
necessary for you to conduct the line of questioning you desire with the City representative. The 
questioning can occur either by way of hypothetical or by a stipulation as to what the specific 
language of the .pro0ision ofthe tax return you wish to use which should suffice. 
. . .'• ·' '· .. ' . .. . - . . 
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200 Spokane, WA 99201 T (509) 455-6000 F (509) 838-0007 www.painehamblen.com 
"· T : ....... a,,ri T 1':1.hil-it-v P~rlnershio with offices in Spokane, Coeur d'Alene, Priest River and TriRCilies 
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IAN D. SMITH 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.0.Box3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019 
Telephone: (208) 765-4050 
Facsimile: (208) 765-9089 
Idaho State Bar No. 4696 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IOAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
cRIC J. WURMLINGER and 
ROSALYND D. WURMLINGER, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-10-8209 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
COMES I\JOW, the above-named Plaintiff, CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
(hereinafter: "Greenfield"), by and through her attorney of record, IAN D. SMITH, and 
the above-named Defendants, ERIC J. WURMLINGER and ROSALYND D. 
WURMLINGER, husband and wife (hereinafter: "Wurmlinger"), by and through their 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF 
PROTECTIVE ORDER - 1 -
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Su~ject: [No Subject] 
From: CJ (crystalgreens@yahoo.com) 
To: iansmithlaw@gmail.com; 
Date: Friday, February 10, 2012 2:47 AM 
Ian, Monday, February 13, 2012, is the deadline to file your objection to the 
motion for summary judgment filed by Riseborough last week. After our 
conversation today, I am concerned that we may not be prepared as you are 
expecting the judge to rule in favor of your objection which you have not yet filed. 
What is your backup plan if your expectations fail? 
Thought, if the judge does allow the summary judgment from Riseborough, 
then why don't you ask for more time to file our summary judgment that you missed 
the deadline on??? 
Thanks 
C Greenfield 
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Subject: [No Subject] 
From: CJ (crystalgreens@yahoo.com) 
To: iansmithlaw@gmail.com; 
Date: Friday, February 10, 2012 2:49 AM 
February 9, 2012 
Ian, in reviewing my file at home, I came across the 'Stipulation for Entry of 
Protection Order' for my medical records that both you and Riseborough signed on 
January 9, 2012. I then reviewed the online county repository and noticed that there 
was no protective order in my court file. When are you going to submit an order of 
protection to the court? I am very concerned at this point that my medical records 
are not fully protected by the court. 
We need to scheduile a heari.ng date ASAP to get on the court calender prior to the 
dead.iilflle of April 30, 2012 to ask for sanctions imposed on. WuirmHnger for not 
compllyi111g with jmdlge 's ordler months ago to tuir111 over discovery docmrnentation as 
requies1ted which is c211L11SRJn1g mmAe rllefay, fni.!!stration~ etc ... 
Thanks 
C Greenfield 
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,Subject: Follow-up 
From: CJ (crystalgreens@yahoo.com) 
To: iansmithlaw@gmail.com; 
Date: Friday, February 10, 2012 2:54 AM 
February 10, 2012 
When I met with you on January 9, 2012, to discuss the protection order on 
my medical documents before allowing opposing counsel to copy them, you arranged 
for me to put my file in order as it was spread out between your office and the 
paralegals office. We discussed after my observation that several documents were 
missing. I left my file in the conference room and assumed that the file would be 
placed back in the locked file cabinet for my protection after the opposing council 
had copied the medical records. 
I have visited with you twice since January 9, 2012, to find my file still 
sprawled out in the conference room in full view of staff, clients, and janitorial 
personnel. I was very distraught after observing this as it is visible to anyone 
utilizing the conference room. I asked for a protection order to protect my medical 
records from any invasion of privacy yet they were clearly visible when I entered the 
room. 
On January 24, 2012, when I called you at your office I inquired as to the 
whereabouts of my file. You informed me that my file was still in the conference 
room. On February 8, 2012, I observed my file and requested that you secure my 
documents in the locked file cabinet from this point on. 
You also informed me last Monday that the civil trial " ... may not happen in 
May ... " It is crucial that every effort is made to keep this deadline for my trial date. 
There have been numerous attempts to delay this trial by the defendant. Vacations 
have also caused delays. This case began in September 2010, 17 months ago. These 
unnecessary delays are causing me financial ruin and extreme anxiety. Setting aside 
all excuses, we have discussed numerous motions and judgments that need to be 
addressed as soon as possible. See below. 
Supplemental discovery requests: We have been waiting since February 14, 2011 for 
Wurmlinger to come into compliance with a court order. 
1. Insurance declaration page from Insurance Company which 
shows coverage amount per Production #11. Never received! 
2. Wurmlinger surveys: 
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bctober 10, 2011 ; 
December 16, 2010 
2005 survey conducted by INC 
3. Bank Accounts that were previously blacked out on docs. 
4. CC&R Changes that Wurmlinger attempted to change. 
5. All surveillance photos of me, my property, etc. etc. 
6. All records, photos, tapes, CDs, emails, websites, obtained 
which pertain to me (Business info, etc.) Basically anything they 
have that refers to my LIFE! 
7. Location of all cameras along with all CDs, Tapes, Photos, and 
surveillance video captured on these 
devices. 
8. Medical records for his emotional distress claim. 
9. Closed bank accounts, etc. 
10. Original home builders name??? 
This is all I can think of for now. You may have more thoughts on other documents 
that need to be obtained from the Wurmlingers. 
******************************************************************* 
Issue a subpoena duces tecum on Post Falls Police department to turn over all 
records, tapes, pictures, etc. in regard to Wurmlinger accusations against me stating 
that I am a suspect in all the malicious injury reports dating back to July 2011 until 
present. 
******************************************************************* 
Issue a subpoena duces tecum to Inland Northwest Contractors for survey 
documents, pictures, etc. etc. for December 16, 2010 on Wurmlinger property. 
******************************************************************* 
Wurminger claims that he has no " ... Business receipts ... " So what if an audit from 




Eric Wurmlinger (Many more questions ... see attached document) 
Rosalynd Wurmlinger ( As we discussed, her deposition was incomplete) 
Chad Johnson???( Survey results ... we need to ask him ... not assume) 
John Glinksi (Wurmlinger claims this is a secondary property for the B & B 
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· ~perations. Wurmlinger h .Jenying the use of his home c,._Jming he uses another off 
site residence ( for overflow). This second residence has never been licensed as a B & 
B (Per city). 
******************************************************************* 
The judge allowed us to enter the Wurmlinger property and Home. When are you 
going to inspect property? 
March 16, 2012 we need all discovery completed! That is only a month away. 
Thanks C Greenfield 
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CJ ( crystalgreens@yahoo.com) 
pearalegal@gmail.com; 
Monday, February 13, 2012 6:45 PM 
- Forwarded Message -
From: Ian Smith <iansmithlaw@gmail.com> 
To: CJ <crystalgreens@yahoo.com> 
Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 4:50 PM 
Subject: Withdrawal 
Please see attached letter. 
Print 
a• , • :if r cxh 1/1 V 
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\ 
Description CV 2010-8209 Greenfiel "" 
Judge Haynes "'" 
Court Reporter Keri Veare 
Clerk Shari Rohrbach · 
:Motion to Withdraw 
' /) 
~___,4-{__£32__-\_~ 1::__l;;----/l .\___ 
Datej\2127/2012 II Location jj 1 K-COURTROOM9 
j Time II Speaker JI Note 
I 03 31 :28 PM II J I Calls, Ian Smith and J Johnson for PL, J. Roseborough for def _ present. 





I haven't heard an objection to my motion, I don't want to 
prejudice Ms Greenfield, there have been some circumstances 
that have arisen that make it difficult to continue. She's told me 
she doesn't feel comfortable for me to speak to opposing 
without her present. We have some disagreement about 
discovery and how the case should be presented. At the last 
hearing we discussed briefly my motion, she indicated she 
wanted me to continue through mediation, then minutes later 
she said she was looking at malpractice and I'd missed 
deadlines. Based on the Motion and my statements, I think 
there is good cause. EJ I don't really have a position, my representation is limited to the two causes. I haven't filed a Motion to continue but I may ask 
for that, and her new counsel may ask for more time. 
Greenfield 
I didn't hire Mr Smith because of the particular case. Under the 
code of Ethics, he's to pursue my interest. For months I've 
asked him if he's on board with this case, he's missed 
deadlines. He's made comments. On Feb 10 I gave him a letter 
on all things that were missed. 
I 03 37:40 PM II J 1
1 don't want you to go over those, this is not the time or form. 
_ The question is do you want Mr Smith to continue? 
03:38:05 PM 
Greenfield 
He quoted a price, and it's quadrupled, he's got all of my 
money, I will have to represent myself if he leaves. I'll be left at 
the mercy of the court, I do not have another means. He had 
opportunity to pull out if he wanted to. Now we're at this point. 
I 03:39:02 PM I R b u h No objection to withdrawal. It appears there might be prejudice ise oro g but that can be taken up if and when it occurs. 
j 03:39:32 PM !I Smith Ii I've agreed to refund 10,000 upon my withdrawal. 
03:39:45 PM 
J 
The standard for review is good cause, this court is satisfied 
that there is good cause. The Court would like to keep the trial 
date if at all possible. I heard what Ms Greenfiled had to say, 
and I hear Mr Smith's ability to represent Ms Greenfield. The 
relationship between atty and client is delicate, comments. I will 
'--l'I -L~ (:_j{,/ (,( /) ( i 
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sign an Order allowing Mr Smith to withdraw, Mr Smith should 
serve the Order indicating she has 20 days for new counsel or 
if she will represent herself, the matters are stayed for that 
period. 
I 03:42:50 PM II JI in terms of the summary judgment? 
J 03:43:05 PM JI Riseborough JI I don't have a position on that, we have the 20 days. 
I 03:43:22 PM JI Johnson 
I 03:43:49 PM II Greenfield 
I 03:44:02 PM II J 
I 03:45:15 PM JI Greenfield 
I 03:45:21 PM llj 
03:45:26 PM 
Rise borough 
I 03:46:13 PM IIJ 
I 03:46:49 PM II 
j 03:46:49 PM jj End 
JI As far as the MSJ, I read it and I wasn't planning on briefing. 
JI I'm probably going to have to ask for a new trial date. 
II We will set a new MSJ trial date, set for April 13 at 3: 30. 
II Keep mediation? 
IIYes, that's still on. 
After our hearing I contacted our mediator and said it's liikely 
Mr Smith would withdraw, I learned this morning that that letter 
was not copied to counsel, the mediator did receive it. It's my 
understanding the mediation is not going forward. 
j OK, that makes sense, first step is to decide about an atty. 
I 
I 
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Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
2015 f,UG 18 PM f2: 24 
gRK 'I~ :-F:':, JUi~ T 
.· ( 'O ~ I 1 /lfi)/t 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DffrfRICT OF \ t)'J 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
vs. 
IAND. SMITH 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant. 
The Plaintiff Christina J. Greenfield ("Greenfield") hereby submits the following facts in 
response to the Defendants Ian D. Smith ("Smith") Motion for Summary Judgment: 
1. On September 15, 2015, Greenfield hired the Defendant, Ian D. Smith, to represent her in 
a civil complaint against her neighbors, the Wurmlingers. (See Erblands Exhibits #31, 
"Complaint" and #30 "Written Contract") 
2. On December 2, 2010, Smith sent the Wurmlingers a discovery request, which was not 
properly responded to by the Wurmlingers pursuant to the thirty (30) day deadline, and 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(d)(e). (See Exhibits #A and #B to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
3. Smith had scheduled a deposition for Rosalyn Wurmlinger on December 6, 2010. During 
said deposition Smith and opposing counsel Gary Amendola, got into a heated argument, 
therefore the deposition was shut down. Smith NEVER completed the deposition prior to 
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trial and missed both pre-trial compliance deadlines. Judge Haynes ordered a new 
deposition for Ms. Wurmlinger at the March 17, 2011, hearing. Smith did not properly 
object to the behavior by Amendola on record pursuant to I.R.C.P. 30(c) or finish Mrs. 
Wurmlingers deposition per Court Order. (See Exhibits #A, #B, #C and #D to Affidavit of 
Greenfield and Erbland Exhibit #34) 
4. On December 27, 2010, Wurmlingers motioned the court to dismiss their frivolous 
counter-claim for "Tortuous Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage." 
5. Smith MISSED the deadline to disclose Greenfield's "Expert" witnesses by January 19, 
2011, per pre-trial compliance order in her civil case. (See Exhibits #A and #B to 
Affidavit of Greenfield) 
6. On February 14, 2011, Smith filed a "Motion for Order Permitting Entry Upon 
Defendants (Wurmlingers) Real Property". Smith did NOT complete the inspection as 
requested by Greenfield and per Court Order rendered on April 7, 2011. (See Exhibits #A 
and #B to Affidavit of Greenfield and Erbland Exhibit #34) 
7. Wurmlingers dismissed their second frivolous counter-claim for "Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress." I informed Smith that I wanted to pursue imposing a sanction on 
Wurmlingers for wasting my time and money on two (2) frivolous counter-claims. Smith 
ignored my request. 
8. Smith MISSED the February 18, 2011, pre-trial compliance deadline to file a "Notice of 
Hearing for Motion for Summary Judgment" and "Motion for Summary Judgment" 
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against the Wurmlingers counter-claim for "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress." 
(See Exhibits #A and #B to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
9. On April 17, 2011, I instructed Smith to draft a "Protection Order" before releasing my 
medical records to the Wurmlingers. Smith did NOT comply with said request until 
January 9, 2012 and did not submit said "Stipulated Protection Order" to the court until 
February 17, 2012. (See Exhibit #B to Affidavit of Greenfield and Erblands Exhibit #37) 
10. Smith MISSED the April 19, 2011, pre-trial compliance deadline to have my "Motion for 
Summary Judgment" heard against the Wurmlingers counter-claim for "Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress." (See Exhibits #A and #B to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
11. Wurmlingers did NOT comply with the discovery Order, so Greenfield asked Smith to 
submit a "Motion for Sanctions." Smith submitted said "Motion for Sanctions" on May 
19, 2011, to the court. The Court awarded sanctions to Greenfield on June 24, 2011. 
Greenfield did not receive the $1224.00 sanction money from Smith, wherein Smith 
deposited said sanction money into his account on December 9, 2011. Smith never 
submitted the original "Satisfaction of Judgment" dated December 9, 2011, to the Court 
until January 23, 2012. (See Exhibit #E to Affidavit of Greenfield and Erblands Exhibit 
#35) 
12. Smith MISSED the June 13, 2011, pre-trial compliance deadline to complete discovery in 
Greenfields civil case. (See Exhibits #A and #B to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
13. Smith negligently misstates information in his affidavit dated June 20, 2011, "The alleged 
victim (Eric Wurmlinger) has sworn under oath that he planted the bushes on his 
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property, not on the property line, and not on the defendant's property." (See Exhibit #F 
to Affidavit of Greenfield) Smith once again misrepresented the facts at the criminal 
hearing on July 12, 2011, where he states '"' ... we can prove that bushes are not mutually 
owed ... not jointly owned!" (See Exhibit #I to Affidavit of Greenfield) Smith viewed 
Greenfield's legal survey describing the exact location of the arborvitae shrubs, which are 
located on Greenfield property. Smith was well aware of several statements made by the 
Wurmlingers stating that the arborvitae shrubs were planted along the common property 
line. Eric Wurmlinger stated "arborvitae ... cultivated along the common property line." 
(See Exhibit #G, to Affidavit of Greenfield) and " .. .I planted approximately 10 years 
earlier as a border planting between our properties." (See Exhibit #H to Affidavit of 
Greenfield) 
14. Smith MISSED the June 27, 2011, pre-trial compliance deadline to file "Pre-trial 
Motions" in civil case. (See Exhibits #A and #B to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
15. On July 11, 2011, Smith did NOT respond to the late disclosure of documents presented 
to the criminal court by state deputy prosecutor, Amy Borgman, for the pre-scheduled 
criminal hearing set on July 12, 2011, because Smith was on vacation. Smith did not 
meet with Greenfield prior to the hearing and was obviously not prepared for said 
hearing. It is further noted that the State Prosecutor stated that Smith " ... has NOT 
presented facts or arguments to support" his "Motion to Dismiss" the Greenfield 
criminal matter. (See Exhibit #J to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
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) 
16. On July 12, 2011, after the above mentioned hearing, Greenfield asked Smith once again 
to recuse Judge Gibler as Greenfield felt obvious bias from Judge Gibler during the court 
proceedings. Smith did NOT adhere to Greenfield's request. Greenfield met Smith at his 
office after the hearing, wherein Smith demanded an additional $17,000 to proceed with 
Greenfield's civil case. (See Exhibit #K to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
17. On July 13, 2011, Smith called Greenfield at home and attempted to coerce Greenfield 
into taking a bribe that offered to Smith by Wurmlingers attorney, Doug Marfice, wherein 
if Greenfield "dropped" the civil action against the Wurmlingers, then the Wurmlingers 
" ... would make the criminal case go away .. . " When Greenfield refused to "drop" her 
civil case, Smith became extremely irritated and once again demanded that Greenfield 
pay an additional $15,000 or Smith would "Quit!" Greenfield informed Smith that she 
did NOT have any additional funds and his fees were seven times more than his original 
estimate. (See Exhibit #L to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
18. On August 11, 2011, Greenfield received a correspondence outlining a "Fee Agreement" 
from Smith regarding future representation by Smith in pursuing a legal action against 
the City of Post Falls. Greenfield had asked Smith to help her pursue a lawsuit against 
the City of Post Falls for Malicious Prosecution and other claims, if Greenfield's bogus 
felony charge was dismissed. (See Exhibit #M to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
19. On August 15, 2011, per Greenfield's request, Smith scheduled a "Motion for Contempt" 
hearing for September 7, 2011, against the Wurmlingers for non-compliance of Judge 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
5 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 444 of 710
Haynes prior Orders. Smith vacated said hearing without notice to Greenfield and did 
NOT follow-up on the "Motion for Contempt." (See Exhibit #B to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
20. On August 16, 2011, the Wurmlingers filed a "Motion to Amend Answer and 
Counterclaim" by adding "Trespass and Timber Trespass" to their counter-claims. The 
Hearing was scheduled for August 23, 2011. Wurmlingers had a substitution of counsel 
and said hearing was vacated and re-scheduled for October 13, 2011. (See Exhibit #B to 
Affidavit of Greenfield) 
21. Off October 4, 2011, Greenfield's Criminal Trial commenced for the felony "Malicious 
Injury to Property" charge against her. Greenfield arrived early and could not find Smith 
and had NO communication from Smith prior to trial. Greenfield noticed that the 
prosecutor had NO witnesses present in the courtroom, including the Wurmlingers. Eric 
Wurmlinger had attended every hearing to date. When Smith stepped out of the judge's 
chamber he appeared to be unprepared. Smith did NOT have any of Greenfield's 
witnesses present in the courtroom. Smith had NOT subpoenaed ANY of Greenfield's 
witnesses except for John Wilhelm, who was scheduled to appear on October 5, 2011. 
Smith presented a "case study" to the trial court that could have potentially damaged 
Greenfield's case, wherein the state deputy prosecutor, Amy Borgman, thanked Smith for 
"helping her case!" Trial lasted approximately forty-five minutes. Greenfield was 
acquitted of the bogus crime. (See Erbland Exhibit #27) 
22. On October 13, 2011, the Wurmlingers presented two (2) additional counter claims for 
"Trespass and Timber Trespass" against Greenfield just days after her acquittal. 
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Essentially the two claims were identical to the malicious injury to property charge under 
Idaho Criminal Statutes in Title 18. Greenfield's reply to the counter-claims was due by 
November 7, 2011. Smith was aware of said counter-claims for approximately four ( 4) 
months prior. Smith had plenty of time to prepare a response to said counter-claims, yet 
Smith did NOT timely respond to said counter-claims. (See Exhibits #B, #N, #0, #P, to 
Affidavit of Greenfield) 
23. On November 10, 2011, Greenfield met with Smith to discuss his failure to submit a 
timely response to Defendants counter-claims and inquire as to why he wanted an 
extension to respond to Defendants discovery requests when Smith had all of 
Greenfield's documents for approximately nine (9) months prior. 
24. Smith MISSED the 2nd pre-trial compliance deadline of November 22, 2011, to schedule 
a "Motion for Summary Judgment" hearing against the Wurmlingers counter-claims. 
(See Exhibits #D to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
25. On December 7, 2011, Smith's para-legal, Julie Vetter, quits! 
26. On December 8, 2011, Greenfield met with Smith to remind him again that she wanted a 
"Protection Order" for her medical records before releasing them to Wurmlinger. 
Greenfield also informed Smith that she had contacted her Insurance carrier to see if she 
qualified for any assistance from them regarding the Wurmlingers counter-claims since 
Smith was failing to protect Greenfield from said claims. 
27. Greenfield's Insurance Carrier agreed to assist Smith and sent their notice on December 
13, 2011. Smith had negligently and or intentionally MISSED the deadline to file a 
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response to said "Motion to Amend" on Wurmlingers counter-claims, and six (6) days 
prior to Judge Haynes "Order for Defendants (Wurmlingers) Motion to Amend Answer 
and Counter-claims" dated December 19, 2011. (See Exhibits #Band #Q to Affidavit of 
Greenfield) 
28. On December 13, 2011, Greenfield met with Smith at his office. When Greenfield passed 
by the communal conference room she noticed what appeared to be her file sitting on the 
table. Greenfield looked at the file and verified that it was her entire file sprawled out on 
the conference table, in plain sight for everyone to view said file, who either utilized or 
passed by the conference room. Greenfield had previously asked Smith to conceal her 
highly sensitive records to which he replied " ... no one can see them ... don't worry about 
it!" (See Exhibit #R to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
29. On December 14, 2011, Smith informed Greenfield that he was going to be gone until 
January 4, 2012, on vacation. Several crucial matters were left unattended too, including 
but limited to: failure to draft Greenfield's Protection Order, disclosing Greenfield's 
expert witnesses, finishing Wurmlinger depositions, filing and serving Greenfield's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, viewing the Wurmlingers home, requesting the 
Wurmlingers survey and deposing the surveyor, adding additional claims that Greenfield 
had advised Smith of (Abuse of Process, Slander, and Libel), and assisting Greenfield 
with sealing her felony case. Riseborough also sent a letter to Smith regarding several 
issues. (See Exhibits #Band #S to Affidavit of Greenfield and Erb lands Exhibit #36) 
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30. On January 4, 2012, Greenfield met with Smith to discuss filing her "Protection Order" 
prior to Wurmlingers viewing of her medical documents and noticed that her entire file 
was still sitting on the table in the conference room exposed to clients and other staff 
members. Wurmlingers attorney was scheduled to review Greenfield's file on January 9, 
2012. 
31. Riseborough sent a letter to Smith confirming the fact that Greenfield was preparing to 
amend her complaint by adding "slander." Riseborough also stated that Smith had until 
January 9, 2012, to identify Greenfield's "expert" witnesses. Smith MISSED the pre-trial 
compliance deadline and did NOT disclose Greenfield's expert witnesses. (See Exhibits 
#Band #S to Affidavit of Greenfield and Erblands Exhibit #36) 
32. On January 9, 2012, Greenfield went to Smith's office and noticed that Riseborough, 
along with his assistant, were viewing and copying Greenfield's file, which contained 
sensitive privileged information. Smith was in his private office and did NOT assist with 
the copying. Smith came out of his office and handed Greenfield the "Stipulation for 
Entry of Protection Order" he had just drafted. Greenfield reviewed said Protection 
Order and then Riseborough signed it. Smith did NOT submit said "Protection Order" to 
the court until February 16, 2012. Amber Melom, another legal assistant, informed 
Greenfield that her file had been in the conference room for weeks and that clients and 
staff were using the conference room on a daily basis. (See Exhibits #B and #T to 
Affidavit of Greenfield and Erblands Exhibit #37) 
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33. On January 27, 2012, the Wurmlingers filed their "Motion for Summary Judgment" 
stating that Greenfield's Statute of Limitations had expired. The Wurmlingers Motion 
was "late" and had exceeded the pre-trial compliance deadline of December 22, 2011. 
(See Exhibit #B to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
34. February 1, 2012, was the last day I received any court related documents from Smith. 
35. On February 13, 2012, Smith sent Greenfield a letter stating that he was quitting her case 
after several emails had gone back and forth between Smith and Greenfield, wherein 
Greenfield was expressing her concerns over Smith's negligence and the mishandling of 
Greenfield's case. (See Exhibits #U and #V to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
36. On February 14, 2012, Smith submitted his "Motion to Withdraw" from Greenfield's 
civil case and set a hearing for February 27, 2012, which was the same day scheduled to 
hear Wurmlingers "Motion for Summary Judgment." (See Exhibits #B to Affidavit of 
Greenfield and Erblands Exhibit #38) 
3 7. Smith MISSED the second deadline for "Summary Judgment" against the Wurmlingers 
counter-claims pursuant to the February 20, 2012, pre-trial compliance date. (See 
Exhibits #Band #D to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
38. On February 27, 2012, at the hearing for Smith's "Motion to Withdraw" Greenfield 
informed Judge Haynes that she could NOT afford other legal counsel and Smith had 
been paid to finish her civil suit through the end of her case. Judge Haynes allowed 
Smith to withdraw approximately sixty-seven (67) days prior to Greenfield's civil trial. A 
twenty (20) day stay became effective as of March 9, 2012. The Court re-scheduled the 
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Wurmlingers "Motion for Summary Judgment" to be heard on April 13, 2012, fourteen 
(14) days after the twenty (20) day stay elapsed. Mediation was also canceled for May 
7, 2012. (See Exhibits #B, #D, and #W to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
39. On March 29, 2012, Greenfield submitted her "Notice of Self-representation" in the civil 
case as Greenfield could NOT find another attorney to represent her on such short notice 
prior to trial. (See Exhibits #B, to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
40. Greenfield's response to Wurmlingers "Motion for Summary Judgment" was due by 
March 30, 2012, ONE (1) day after Greenfield become a Pro Se litigant! All discovery 
was due by April 15, 2012, fifteen (15) days after Greenfield become a Pro Se litigant! 
All depositions were due by April 30, 2012, thirty (30) days after Greenfield become a 
Pro Se litigant, and Fifty-three (53) days before the trial was scheduled to begin on May 
21, 2012. 
41. On April 10, 2012, Judge Haynes REFUSED to amend the pre-trial deadlines. A new 
trial was scheduled for November 26, 2012. (See Exhibit #B, to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
42. On April 20, 2012, Judge Haynes REFUSED to amend the Pre-trial Scheduling Order per 
Greenfield's request. (See Exhibit #B, to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
43. On April 30, 2012, the Wurmlingers REFUSE to stipulate to new Pre-trial order. 
Greenfield submitted a "Motion for Sanctions and Order Requiring Compliance with 
Rule 37(a)(2)(c)(e) for production of#3, #4, #5, #8, #9, #11, #18, #19, from Wurmlingers 
as Smith DID NOT follow-up prior requested non-disclosed documents. (See Exhibit #B, 
to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
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44. On May 4, 2012, Wurmlingers disclosed their "List of Exhibits" which included their 
October 10, 2011, survey that Smith NEVER followed up on. (See Exhibit #B, to 
Affidavit of Greenfield) 
45. On May 16, 2012, Judge Haynes REFUSED to modify the pre-trial order. (See Exhibit 
#B, to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
46. On May 17, 2012, Greenfield submitted a "Motion to Amend Pre-trial Order" in order to 
depose Eric Wurmlinger after Wurmlinger submitted NEW evidence on May 4, 2012, 
violating the pre-trial compliance deadline. Said evidence included photos of alleged 
vandalism to Wurmlinger property. Smith NEVER addressed the bogus vandalism 
complaints, which began in July 2011, wherein Greenfield was a "suspect" for said 
vandalism. (See Exhibit #B, to Affidavit of Greenfield) 
47. On December 30, 2012, the civil trial ended and Greenfield suffered damages in excess 
of $168,000.00 
48. Greenfield timely appealed her case to the Idaho Supreme Court, wherein a decision was 
rendered to AFFIRM the Districts Court decision. A final judgment has not been 
submitted. Greenfield suffered additional damages totaling approximately $199,000.00 
to date. 
DATED this 17th day of August, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of August, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Brown & Kulisch 
Attorneys at Law 
1500 Bank of America Financial Center 
601 West Riverside Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0626 
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Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
2015 AUG l 8 Prl 12: 24 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, Christina J. Greenfield, hereby presents her 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff's claims against her former attorney of record, Ian D. Smith (Hereafter: "Smith"), are 
supported by facts and are presented within the Statute of Limitations timeline pursuant to I.C. §5-216 
and I.C. §5-219. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff has filed concurrently herewith a separate and concise Statement of Facts entitled 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
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Motion for Summary Judgment, as Substituted (hereinafter: "Plaintiff's Statement of Facts"), which is 
hereby incorporated by this reference as if fully set forth herein. 
III. LEGALARGUMENT 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS 
Plaintiff agrees with the standard for summary judgment in that summary judgment should be 
granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law pursuant I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
Plaintiff also agrees that when the Court considers summary judgment, the Court must construe 
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
See; Loomis v. City o(Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991), citing Palmer v. Idaho Bank 
& Trust, 100 Idaho 642, 603 P.2d 597 (1979); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 587 (1986). A factual 
dispute is "genuine" where a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See; Crowe 
v. Henry, 115 F.3d 294, 296 ( 5th Cir.1997). 
It is clear from the Plaintiff's Statement of Facts that there are volumes of "genuine issues of 
material facts" most all of which is supported by documentary evidence. Plaintiff, as the nonmoving 
party, is afforded the most favorable light of interpretation. The scores of documentary evidence 
presented by the Plaintiff greatly outweigh the allegations and denials made in Defendants' supporting 
affidavits. 
The burden of proof is upon the Defendants and they must present the absence of genuine issue 
of material facts. Clearly, Defendants have not met their burden when presented with Plaintiff's 
Statement of Facts and supporting evidence to the contrary, as will be argued further in this 
Memorandum. Plaintiff hereby moves this Court for Summary Judgment in her favor, affirmed by her 
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affidavit, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(e). See; Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335, 337, 
689 P.2d 227, 229 (1984); Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 
(1986), citing Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 549, 691 P.2d 787, 795 (1984 ); 
Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 175, 923 P.2d 416, 420 (1996), citing Farm Credit 
Bank o(Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272-273, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367-68 (1994). 
Summary judgment is improper where the court merely believes it unlikely that the non-moving 
party will prevail at trial. See; National Screen Serv. Corp. v. Poster Exchange, Inc., 305 F.2d 647, 651 
(5th Cir. 1962). 
B. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF PLAINTIFF'S MALPRACTISE CLAIM 
The Plaintiff has the burden of (1) proving the existence of any attorney-client relationship, 
which was validated by a contractual agreement between Defendant and Plaintiff on September 15, 
2010. See; Johnson v. Jones, l 03 Idaho 702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 654 (1982). An attorney-client 
relationship begins when an attorney agrees to render professional services for a client; (2) Defendant 
Smith agreed to diligently represent the Plaintiff through her civil trial per said written agreement. "The 
relationship of client and attorney is one of trust, binding an attorney to the utmost good faith in dealing 
with his client. In the discharge of that trust, an attorney must act with complete fairness, honor, 
honesty, loyalty, fidelity and due diligence in all his dealings with his client. An attorney is held to strict 
accountability for the performance and observance of those professional duties and for a breach or 
violation thereof, the client may hold the attorney liable or accountable." See; Beal v. Mars Larsen 
Ranch Corp., Inc., 99 Idaho 662, 667- 668, 586 P.2d 1378, 1383-1384 (1978) (citation omitted). The 
determination of whether an attorney-client relationship exists must be based on an objective standard, 
not on the parties' subjective beliefs. See; SMWNPF Holdings, Inc. v. Devore, 165 F.3d 360, 364-65 
( 5th Cir. 1999); (3) that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff injury; and to establish a breach of 
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duty giving rise to a claim for legal malpractice, the client must show that the lawyer failed to comply 
with the applicable standard of care. In general terms, an attorney breaches the duty of care when the 
lawyer does something an ordinarily prudent lawyer would not have done, or fails to do something an 
ordinarily prudent lawyer would have done, under the same or similar circumstances; and ( 4) caused the 
plaintiff's injury and that damages occurred. See,· Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662,665 (Tex.1989). 
'"'The Plaintiff in a legal malpractice case must prove that the alleged malpractice was the 
proximate cause of injury. See,· Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662,665 (Tex. 1989). Proximate cause 
consists of two elements: (1) cause in fact; and (2) foreseeability. See,· McClure v. Allied Stores of Tex., 
Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1980). "Cause in fact means that the act or omission was a substantial 
factor in bringing about the injury and without which no harm would have occurred." The cause in fact 
requirement has also been referred to as the "but for" test, because the Plaintiff must show that the injury 
would not have occurred "but for" the alleged breach of duty. The untimely departure of Defendant just 
prior to the civil trial was a breach of duty and a substantial factor as to why the Plaintiff's case derailed. 
To qualify as cause in fact the negligence must also have been a substantial factor in bringing about the 
Plaintiff's harm. See,· Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995). The 
foreseeability element of proximate cause requires proof that the Defendant, as a person of ordinary 
intelligence, should have anticipated the danger to others by his negligent act. See,· e.g., Dyer v. Shafer, 
Gilliland, Davis, McCollum & Ashley, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ 
denied)."" Smith was cognizant of pre-trial deadlines, pending trial date, Plaintiff's financial quandary, 
and time constrictions in preparing the Plaintiff's case for trial. 
Once the parties entered into an attorney-client relationship, Smith owed fiduciary duties to the 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff's submits that the Defendant was negligent. If the Defendant had not been negligent 
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or otherwise acted wrongfully, Plaintiff believes she would have been successful in the underlying civil 
case. 
Though it can be challenging to prove the outcome of a legal proceeding, the obvious derailment 
of the Plaintiff's case occurred when Defendant quit just prior to trial, missing crucial deadlines, and 
abandoning several expiring pre-trial matters. For Plaintiff to prevail in a legal malpractice action, 
Plaintiff must establish that settlement of the underlying lawsuit would have resulted in a better 
outcome. See; Viner v. Sweet, supra, 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1244; Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2009) 171 
Cal.App.4th 336, 357 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 71 O]; Lazy Acres Market, Inc. v. Tseng (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 
1431, 1436 [62 Cal.Rptr.3d 378]; Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 1057; 
Marshak v. Ballesteros, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 1514, 1518; Hinshaw, Winkler, Draa, Marsh & Still v. 
Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 233, 239 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 791]; Thompson v. Halvonik, supra, 36 
Cal.App.4th 657, 663; Campbell v. Magana (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 751, 754 [8 Cal.Rptr. 32]) "Thus, a 
plaintiff who alleges an inadequate settlement in the underlying action must prove that, if not for the 
malpractice, she would certainly have received more money in settlement or at trial." See; Slovensky v. 
Friedman, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1528, italics added. ""A Plaintiff in a legal malpractice case 
may seek to recover foreseeable damages proximately caused by the negligent act or omission. In the 
litigation context, this is usually the amount that the client would have collected, or would have avoided 
paying, if the litigation had been properly handled. See,· e.g., Keck, Mahin & Cate v. National Union 
Fire Ins. Co., 20 S.W.3d 692, 703 (Tex. 2000) (damages were to be calculated by comparing amount 
paid to settle case with amount that would have been lost at competently defended trial); See,· Cosgrove 
v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662,666 (Tex. 1989). 
Therefore, due to the extreme negligent actions of the Defendant, Plaintiff believes that 
exemplary damages (Punitive Damages) should also be awarded as they are recoverable in a legal 
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malpractice case if the plaintiff proves by "clear and convincing evidence" that the harm resulted from 
fraud, malice or gross negligence. "Malice" means a specific intent to cause the Plaintiff substantial 
injury or harm. "Gross negligence" means an act or commission involving an "extreme degree of risk," 
carried out with actual, subjective awareness of the risk and conscious indifference to the rights, safety 
or welfare of others. 
The Defendant's responsibility to the Plaintiff was to apply the care, skill, and diligence that are 
required and commonly exercised by other attorneys in similar conditions and circumstances. Smith 
boasted to the Plaintiff, of his skills, competence level, and dedication that was essential to pursue the 
Plaintiff's civil action and to provide her with expert legal representation through the entirety of her 
case. 
Defendant's failure to follow Plaintiff's instructions, failure to meet filing deadlines, failure to 
file legal motions, failure to acquire evidence through discovery, inconsistent statements of fact, failure 
to investigate, failure to notify Plaintiff of modifications, failure to follow Court orders, failure to 
respond to motions, failure to give sufficient notice of withdrawal from representation in a civil case, 
failure to follow-up on key issues during the litigation process, failure to sue within the statute of 
limitations, failure to perform a conflicts check, failure to apply the law correctly to Defendants bogus 
counter-claims, abuse of a client's trust account, all undermined both of Plaintiff's civil and criminal 
cases. See; Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 1194, 1199 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 25 P.3d 
670]), (Budd v. Nixen (1971) 6 Cal.3d 195, 200 [98 Cal.Rptr. 849, 491 P.2d 433]), (Hecht, Solberg, 
Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley LLP v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 579, 591 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 
446]). 
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C. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 
1) DEFENDANTS PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTISE FALLS UNDER BREACH OF 
CONTRACT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Pursuant to LC. § 5-216, "an action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing" is subject to a five (5) year statute of limitations. Plaintiff disagrees with the 
Defendants as to when the statute of limitations begins to run and submits that "a cause of action for 
breach of contract accrues upon breach." See; Cuevas v. Barraza, 1446 Idaho 511, 517, 194 P.3d 740 
(2008), citing Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 11 P.3d 20 (2000); Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 484 
P.2d 728 (1971). 
When applying the statute of limitations from a commencing date of breach, the "instrument in 
writing" referring to the agreement made between Defendants and Plaintiff, was breached on March 9, 
2012. Plaintiff is clearly within the five-year statute of limitations. Defendants' argument fails in the 
face of a genuine issue of material facts in dispute. When applying Defendants' own argument of the 
implication of the five-year statute of limitations imposed by LC. §5-216 as to an "obligation and 
liability" Plaintiff is within the five-year statutory limitation and is not barred by the statute of 
limitations. The "obligation" is the agreement made between Defendant and Plaintiff, wherein the 
Defendant was to diligently (liablity) represent the Plaintiff throughout her case including trial 
proceedings. The Plaintiff's malpractice claim against the Defendant is within the Statute of Limitations 
time period as it was launched two years after Plaintiff's defeat at her civil trial, which ended on 
November 30, 2012. Plaintiff alleges that due to Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff lost, wherein a 
judgment was entered against the Plaintiff for damages totaling $168, 755, 37.00. 
The Plaintiff timely appealed the decision of the district court to the Idaho Supreme Court and 
was hopeful that the District Court decision would be overturned. The Idaho Supreme Court finalized 
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their decision on May 20, 2015, affirming the District Courts decision. Additional attorney fees totaling 
over $27,000.00, were granted to Defendants in said case, with an amended final judgment (still 
pending) against the Plaintiff totaling over $195,000.00, in damages. The Plaintiff, after receipt of said 
additional damages relating to Defendants negligence in her civil case, is within the statute of limitations 
time period. 
2) DATE OF ACCRUAL FOR PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT 
LC. §5-219(4) provides that the cause of action accrues at the time of the occurrence, act, or 
omission complained of causing Plaintiff's damages. See; Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 867 P 2d 
960 (1994 ). Idaho case law extends the time of the accrual to the date when the Plaintiff incurs 
damages. See; Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 232, 775 P. 2d 120, 124-25 (1989). After the November 
30, 2012, civil trial, a judgment was entered against the Plaintiff for $168,755, 37.00, wherein the 
Plaintiff was assessed damages for "Timber Trespass" because Plaintiff elected to trim ten (10) 
arborvitae shrubs that are located on her property. Defendant Smith had an opportunity to address the 
"Timber Trespass" counter-claim (a similar claim to malicious injury to property) in the civil case, but 
neglected to do so. Plaintiff was acquitted of malicious injury to property for trimming the arborvitae 
shrubs in the criminal case due to NO evidence that Plaintiff committed a crime. Defendant Smith did 
not file a Motion for Summary Judgment regarding said counter-claims for "Timber Trespass" and 
"Trespass" nor did Smith respond to said claims prior to trial. 
After the trial ended, Plaintiff filed a J.N.O.V. and a Motion for Reconsideration from the 
irrational jury verdict finding that the Plaintiff was guilty of "Timber Trespass" for trimming ten (10) 
arborvitae shrubs Gury believing that they were trees) she was previously acquitted of. 
Plaintiff is submitting that the damages against her accrued after the November 30. 2012, trial 
ended. The Defendant is calculating the day of trial on November 30, 2012, as the starting point for 
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Plaintiff's damages, wherein the correct starting date would be calculated from December 1, 2012, 
pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 6(a); Time Computation as defined: 
"In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or by 
any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default a-fter which the designated period of 
time begins to run is not to be included." 
The District Court did not over-tum the jury verdict, so Plaintiff timely appealed the decision of 
the District Court to the Idaho Supreme Court who recently rendered their decision on May 20, 2015. 
Due to additional damages to Plaintiff as of the May 20, 2015, decision, a new accrual date has extended 
the time period for filing a claim against the Defendant, which falls under statute of limitations time 
lines. 
D. PLAINTIFF'S MALPRACTISE CAUSES OF ACTION ARE NOT TIME BARRED 
It is true that the Plaintiff was acquitted of malicious injury to property, but NOT because of 
Smith's representation. The trial lasted under an hour due to the fact that the prosecutor had NO 
witnesses and NO evidence to produce at trial to prove that the Plaintiff had actually committed the 
alleged crime. 
Due to Defendants negligence in the mishandling of Plaintiff's criminal case, the Plaintiff has 
continued to suffer damages, wherein several excerpts from the criminal case are and have been 
exploited by opposing counsel during Plaintiff's civil trial proceedings. Even now, the Defendant is still 
denying the fact that the Plaintiff was innocent of any crime. Defendant's failure to improperly validate 
and purge the state's bogus evidence during the criminal proceedings has significantly damaged the 
Plaintiff's civil case. 
The Defendant knew that the Plaintiff had been falsely accused on multiple occasions spanning 
over a five year period, due to vindictive malice from the contentious neighbor. Absolutely NO 
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evidence was ever submitted to law enforcement confirming that the Plaintiff had actually committed 
any crimes, just accusations from the neighbor. Post Falls Police Department personnel exploited 
massive amounts of costs, time and man power to purportedly catch the Plaintiff, a fifty-three year old 
woman with major health issues, who had never been accused or prosecuted for any crimes, in an 
alleged crime spree trumped up by her neighbor. 
The Defendant was well aware that the State Prosecutor, Bernard (Barry) McHugh along with 
Post Falls Police Chief, Scot Haug, paid for a survey of the adjoining parties' property line separating 
the Plaintiff's property, to determine the location of the arborvitae shrubs, mysteriously disappeared and 
was never produced into evidence. 
Defendant Smith was informed of said survey in December 2010, eleven (11) months prior to the 
criminal trial. The State refused to submit the survey because said survey would obviously identify that 
the arborvitae shrubs were actually located on Plaintiff's property. The State did however amend their 
charge against the Plaintiff, after the survey was conducted, and claimed a "mutual ownership of the 
hedge existed." 
The aforementioned Defendant (neighbor) refused to submit his survey conducted in October 
2011, and denied the Plaintiff access to perform her own survey on two (2) occasions, in an attempt to 
conceal evidence of a mutually owned arborvitae hedge. Defendant Smith NEVER obtained the 
oppositions survey, missed the pre-trial deadline for discovery of said survey and did not depose the 
surveyor who was commissioned to perform the survey. 
Defendant Smith neglected to act on obvious due process violations that the City of Post Falls 
Municipality and /or its agents, as well as the Kootenai County Prosecutor, were undertaking to 
maliciously prosecute the Plaintiff for spurious crimes. The Post Falls Police Department and 
prosecutors continued to harass the Plaintiff throughout the criminal court proceedings while Defendant 
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Smith did nothing to suppress the illegal persecution. Defendant Smith refused to address several 
procedural defects during the criminal proceedings. Smith did not address the fact that Plaintiff had not 
been read her Miranda warning when she was questioned by law enforcement without representation by 
her attorney, a due process violation of her Fifth Amendment rights. Smith did not pursue legal remedy 
when he was informed that the presiding Judge, Penny Friedlander, was the wife of the City of Post 
Falls Attorney, Jerry Mason, who had assisted in prosecuting Greenfield for the alleged felony. All of 
these events occurred during the criminal proceedings, yet the Defendant, who was acting under a 
written contract to diligently represent the Plaintiff with an applicable standard of care, never addressed 
the obvious violations which continued throughout the proceedings. 
Post Falls Police Department (Hereinafter: "PFPD") along with Kootenai County Prosecutor 
Barry McHugh submitted a counterfeit FBI NCIC criminal report into evidence, which did not identify 
the Plaintiff, but another individual with the same first and last name who resided in California. The 
Defendant never objected or responded to said report during the criminal proceedings (Greenfield was 
unaware of said report until May 2012, tvvo months after Smith quit the civil case, when said report was 
requested by Greenfield). 
Greenfield was under constant surveillance by the PFPD who had installed cameras on the 
neighbor's property and confiscated Greenfield's garbage, after the hostile neighbor, Eric Wurmlinger, 
continued to falsely accuse Greenfield of causing additional damage to his property before and after the 
criminal trial. 
On October 12, 2011, the Plaintiff was in her yard watering when she caught Pam Wallace, a 
neighbor, in her yard at approximately 10:00 PM. When Plaintiff approached Ms. Wallace and asked 
her "what are you doing in my yard?" a conversation ensued, wherein Ms. Wallace proclaimed that she 
was "vandalizing the neighbor's house with paint ... just for fun!" The next morning, Plaintiff called the 
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Defendant to inform him of the irrational conversation and confession from Ms. Wallace. The 
Defendant did NOT inform the Plaintiff that Ms. Wallace was a previous client. It was the Defendant's 
legal assistant, Julie Vetter, who informed the Plaintiff of the prior representation. It should be further 
noted that Plaintiff had reported Pam Wallace to PFPD earlier in the year after Ms. Wallace unloaded a 
large berm of snow in front of Plaintiff's driveway using a pick-up truck with a blade attached. 
The alleged vandalism continued on the neighbor's property with Plaintiff being named as a 
suspect in every complaint. Plaintiff suspected that Pam Wallace was continuing to maliciously damage 
the neighbor's property, yet the Defendant refused to address the Plaintiff's concerns regarding the 
vandalism. 
The alleged damage to the neighbor's home was introduced at Plaintiff's civil trial, to undermine 
the Plaintiff's good character and make her out to be a villain. This character assassination derailed the 
Plaintiff's court proceedings due to Defendants negligence to appropriately attack the false allegations 
and investigate facts surrounding Pam Wallace's involvement. 
Plaintiff attempted to recover some damages by initiating a tort claim against the City of Post 
Falls Municipality including Prosecutor Bernard (Barry) McHugh, for Malicious Prosecution and other 
viable claims. Due to Defendants negligence in the handling of Plaintiff's criminal case, Plaintiff lost 
the aforementioned case against the City of Post Falls, on April 3, 2014. Plaintiff timely appealed said 
case, which is still pending in the Ninth (91h) Circuit. The Defendant's "expert" witness, Peter Erbland, 
is also lead counsel for the City of Post Falls said pending civil case. 
E. DEFENDANTS "OBVIOUS" MALPRACTICE CLAIMS SHOULD NOT BE 
DISMISSED DUE TO LACK OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Plaintiff is a "layperson" not an experienced attorney, yet she fully understands the "obvious," 
blatant negligent actions of the Defendant in handling both of her cases. The fact that Plaintiff was not 
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equipped with the legal background to litigate a civil action is why she hired Smith. The Plaintiff never 
anticipated that Smith would quit just prior to her civil trial, abandoning her at the most crucial point of 
her case. 
Generally, an expert witness may produce evidence showing negligence and causation in a 
malpractice case, but there are exceptions to the rule where the attorney's alleged breach of duty of care 
is so "obvious" that it is within the ordinary knowledge and experience of laymen, wherein expert 
testimony has not been required. Where the negligence consists of the failure of an attorney to follow 
with reasonable promptness and care of explicit instructions of his client, expert testimony may not be 
necessary. 
""Courts in jurisdictions across the country have held that if an attorney's breach is so clear that 
even a layperson can determine that it fails to meet the appropriate standard of care, a court may permit 
a plaintiff to proceed to trial without presenting expert testimony to establish the requisite standard of 
care or that an attorney breached the standard. This is often called the "common sense exception," 
though different jurisdictions use different terms to describe it."" See; e.g. Keeney v. Osborne, S.W.3d, 
2010 WL 743671, *4 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2010) ("sufficiently apparent"); Davis v. Enget, 779 N.W.2d 
126, 129 (N.D. 2010) ("egregious and obvious"); Byrne v. Grasso, 985 A.2d 1064, 1067 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2009) ("obvious and gross want of care"); Storey v. Leonas, 904 N.E.2d 229, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) 
("grossly apparent"); Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 120 (Kan. 1984) ("clear and obvious"); Hughes 
v. Malone, 247 S.E.2d 107, lll(Ga. Ct.App. 1978)("clearandpalpable"). 
Based on a review of case law, the situations in which courts have applied the common sense 
exception generally fell into three categories: (1) failure to file; (2) failure to communicate; and (3) 
failure to follow instructions, all of which the Defendant Smith is guilty of. However, as the cases 
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discussed above illustrate, legal malpractice cases often involve more than one of these three situations, 
which creates more reason for a court to find an apparent breach of the standard of care in this case. 
F. PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT IS VALID 
"The relationship of client and attorney is one of trust, binding an attorney to the utmost good 
faith in dealing with his client. In the discharge of that trust, an attorney must act with complete 
fairness, honor, honesty, loyalty, and fidelity in all his dealings with his client. An attorney is held to 
strict accountability for the performance and observance of those professional duties and for a breach or 
violation thereof, the client may hold the attorney liable or accountable." See,· Beal v. Mars Larsen 
Ranch Corp., Inc., 99 Idaho 662, 667- 668, 586 P.2d 1378, 1383-1384 (1978) (citation omitted). 
Plaintiff was deceived by Defendant when he misrepresented the fact that he had the skills and 
knowledge needed to pursue her civil case and defend her in the criminal case. Defendant Smith had 
represented himself to be an attorney in good standing, licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho, 
was competent, without mental or emotional defect, qualified to perform legal services as an attorney 
and capable of representing Greenfield in the pending civil and criminal actions. Plaintiff relied heavily 
on Smith's expertise. Defendant's negligence affected the course of Plaintiffs court proceedings. 
Plaintiff suffered damages because of the Defendant's misrepresentation of his skills and negligence in 
performing them. 
The Defendant committed fraud when he failed to disclose and / or concealed the FBI NCIC 
Report from the Plaintiff, which was utilized by prosecutors to denigrate the Plaintiff's character for a 
stiffer conviction of a spurious crime. The Defendant knew the Plaintiff was unaware of the phony FBI 
NCIC Report and did nothing to quash it from the prosecutors list of evidence. After the Plaintiff was 
acquitted of felony malicious hedge trimming, during a hearing wherein the Plaintiff's attempted to 
"seal" her file, Smith did absolutely nothing to address the bogus FBI NCIC Report, which was once 
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again presented at the hearing to besmirch the Plaintiff. It was the Plaintiff who succeeded in rebuking 
the report and sealing her own case from public viewing, not the Defendant who had previously agreed 
to assist the Plaintiff, per Judge Gibler's request, at said hearing. 
The Plaintiff was perplexed as to why the Defendant did not attempt to either contact Pam 
Wallace or law enforcement to address Ms. Wallace's confession, and from continuing her rampage of 
destruction to the neighbor's property, to which the Plaintiff was being falsely accused of said crimes. It 
was obvious that both the District Court and Idaho Appellate Court utilized said alleged reports of 
"vandalism" against the Plaintiff during court proceedings as their opinions stated the same. 
The Defendant obviously concealed said facts because Pam Wallace was a financial asset for the 
Defendant and he did not want to uncouple their relationship. 
When an attorney breaches his fiduciary duty, the attorney's conduct constitutes fraud. 
G. PLAINTIFF'S REMAINING TORT CLAIMS ARE WITHIN THE FIVE (5) YEAR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO I.C. § 5-216 AND LC. §5-219(4) 
Plaintiff disagrees that her intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are 
barred as such actions for injury to the person accrue at the date of the "occurrence, act or omission." 
See,· Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 463, 201 P.3d 563 (2009). Plaintiff contends that her claims 
are continuing torts and the date of the "occurrence" is continually running, as a new statute of 
limitations begin to run after each separate nuisance. See,· Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 
139 P.3d 732 (2006). The Court also held in the Cobbley case, citing Curtis v. Firth, the "Court held that 
in the case of a continuing tort, the statute of limitations does not begin to run upon the commencement 
of the tortious conduct, but rather, is tolled until the tortious behavior has ceased. See; Curtis v. Firth, 
123 Idaho 598, 603, 850 P.2d 749, 754 (1993). In addition, Plaintiff's claim for emotional distress 
damages will survive summary judgment as long as they allege physical manifestations of the emotional 
distress, because such allegations reveal "at a minimum that a genuine issue of fact exists with respect to 
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the (plaintiff's) claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See; Cook v. Skyline 
Corporation, 13 P.3d 857 (2000), citing Czaplicki v. Gooding Join School District No. 231, 116 Idaho 
326). Here, Plaintiff's claims for sleeplessness, depression, heart stress, nightmares, night sweats, etc. 
are the same as those discussed in Cook and Czaplicki as being sufficient to withstand summary 
judgment. Once again, Plaintiff's supporting evidence supports that summary judgment should be 
granted in her favor. Wherefore, Plaintiff hereby moves this Court for Summary Judgment in her favor 
on her claims of intentional and negligence infliction of emotional distress. 
Plaintiff's claim for Legal Malpractice has a two (2) year statute oflimitation per I.C. §5-219(4), 
and the Personal Injury claim has a two (2) year statute of limitations per I.C. §5-219(4), which are 
applied after Plaintiff's Civil Case Trial ended on November 30, 2012, and Plaintiff was assessed 
damages. Said time accrual began on December 1, 2012 and is valid through December 1, 2014, to 
which Plaintiff submitted present claims against Defendant Smith within the specified time period. 
An Amended Final Judgment was entered on July 8, 2013, against the Plaintiff, for damages 
totaling $168,755, 37.00. 
The Idaho Supreme Court rendered their decision on May 20, 2015, wherein Plaintiff suffered 
additional damages. 
H. PLAINTIFF HAS DEMONSTRATED BY FACTUAL DOCUMENTED EVENTS 
THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT MEET THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE. 
The Defendant is "bound to exercise a reasonable degree of skill and care in all his professional 
undertakings." See; Woodru-fJ::V. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 930 (6th Cir. 1980). Consequently, an attorney 
must exercise due care and diligence when pursuing or preparing for a case. The attorney must also 
display a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge when trying a case. See Herston v. Whitesell, 348 
So.2d 1054, 1057 (Ala.1977). An attorney who fails to exercise reasonable skill and diligence when 
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investigating the merits of his opponent's position on an issue is not immune from liability. See,· 
Woodruff, 616 F.2d at 933-34 (finding allegations of an attorney's failure to contact or interview a 
potentially valuable witness to present a question for a jury). An attorney who is unfamiliar with or 
disregards controlling points of law when presenting his client's case is also not immune from liability. 
The Defendant had a fiduciary duty and obligation to the Plaintiff to perform tasks in utmost 
good faith. The Defendant must place the interests of the client above the interests of the attorney; the 
attorney must make full and fair disclosure about the representation; and the attorney cannot take 
advantage of his position to gain a profit at the expense of his client. See,· Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 
387, 393, 797 P.2d 95, 101 (1990). But, in determining the standard of excusable neglect, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals has held that the applicable inquiry "is not, strictly speaking, what a lawyer would 
have done. Rather, we consider whether the movant's conduct was that which 'might be expected of a 
reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances"'. See,· State Dept. of Law Enforcement By 
and Through Cade v. One 1990 Geo Metro, 126 Idaho 675, 681, 889 P.2d 109, 115 (Ct. App. 1195) 
(quoting Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 11, 592 P.2d 66, 67 (1979)). 
Smith notified Greenfield that he was "quitting" his representation from Plaintiff's civil action, 
after Plaintiff made assertions regarding concerns about Defendant's negligent actions as mentioned 
above. 
Defendant Smith officially ended his representation on March 9, 2012, a few weeks before trial, 
which was scheduled for May 21, 2012, after a majority of the pre-trial deadlines had passed. The 
evidence in this case is clear that the Defendant failed to properly work up the case, failed to properly 
prepare his experts; and failed to properly represent the Plaintiff. The Defendant abandoned the 
Plaintiff, stole all of her money, left her to find new counsel and get new counsel up to speed, all of 
which Plaintiff was unable to do with such short notice. Plaintiff was forced to continue as a pro-se 
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litigant at trial. Plaintiff lost at trial due to Defendants negligence for failure to use reasonable care in 
preparing Plaintiff's case for trial and proceeding at said trial. 
I. A REASONABLE JURY COULD NOT CONCLUDE THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
GUILTY OF TIMBER TRESPASS AND/ OR TRESPASS WHEN AN EQUAL 
OWNERSHIP OF THE ARBORVITAE SHRUBS (TREES) WAS EVIDENT. 
Evidence in the record supported the fact that Plaintiff was a mutual owner of the arborvitae 
shrubs. Plaintiff's survey confirmed that several of the arborvitae shrubs (trees) were planted on 
Plaintiff's property. Post Falls Police Detective Rodney Gunderson, submitted statements in his official 
report stating that "several of the trees were Yz onto Greenfield property." 
A reasonable jury, would find that the Plaintiff was NOT guilty of "Timber Trespass" and or 
"Trespass" if a qualified attorney would have presented the case in its entirety through trial with all the 
overwhelming evidence in favor of the Plaintiff. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff was denied adequate legal representation to defend her claims at trial due to Defendants 
obvious negligence. The various actions by the attorney were below the standard of professional care 
and caused Greenfield to suffer damages exceeding $195,000.00. 
Idaho Supreme Court Justices utilized immaterial unsubstantiated facts that were presented by 
opposing attorneys in determining Plaintiff's fate in their decision. Opposing attorney's had utilized 
unsupported documents from Plaintiff's civil and criminal court proceedings alleging that Greenfield 
was maliciously damaging the neighbor's property. 
Plaintiff's supporting evidence overwhelmingly shows the illegal, intentional and negligent acts 
of the Defendant and the damages perpetrated by the Defendant upon Plaintiff. The Defendant has not 
met his burden to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See; Tingley v. Harrison, 125 
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Idaho 86 (1994). Furthermore, Summary Judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach 
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Joint School District 
No. 2, 128 Idaho 714 (1996). 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court deny the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
in its entirety, and grant Summary Judgment in favor of Plaintiff on all claims asserted by the Defendant 
herein. 
Dated this 17th day of August, 2015. / 
Christina Gr~enfiehl.' 
l 
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[X] U.S. Mail 
[X] FAX 
[X] EMAIL 
CERISTINA J. GREE~LD 





























David A. Kulisch 
Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
Troy Y. Nelson, ISB ##5851 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 





Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
TO: The above-named Plaintiff; 
CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURE 
Defendant, pursuant to the Court's scheduling order, hereby discloses the expert 
witnesses that may be called at the time of trial. Discovery is on-going and incomplete, 
so defendant reserves the right to supplement this disclosure with additional expert 
witnesses as additional discovery warrants. Defendants also reserve the right to withdraw 
witnesses from this disclosure list as warranted by further discovery and trial planning. 
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURE - 1 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 
1500 BANK OF AMERICA FINANGAL CENTER 
601 WEST RIVERSIDE A VENUE 
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON 99201-0653 
(509) 747-2052 































Peter Erbland, J.D. 
A complete statement of all opinions and/or conclusions to be 
expressed and the basis and reasons therefore: A copy of Mr. Erbland's CV and 
expert witness report are attached hereto. 
B. The data or other information considered by the witness in forming 
his opinions and/or conclusions: A copy of Mr. Erbland's expert witness report is 
attached hereto. A copy of Mr. Erbland's declaration was filed in conjunction with 
Defendant's motion and memorandum in support of summary judgment and the 
declaration is referenced herein and incorporated herewith. In addition, it is anticipated 
.that Mr. Erbland wiHtestify regarding damages and causation. Mr. Erbland is expected 
to testify that Ms. Greenfield asserted that her past iost earnings, future lost earnings and 
lost earning capacity were caused by the criminal charges brought against her by the 
Wurmlingers in the prior civil action. It is Mr. Erbland's opinion that if any past 
earnings, lost earnings or future lost earning capacity are attributable to the criminal 
charges that the defendant is not liable for those damages. Mr. Erbland reserves the right 
to amend or supplement these opinions as further discovery is completed and information 
made available to him. 
C. Any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions: 
A copy of Mr. Erbland's expert witness report is attached hereto and if he prepares any 
exhibits at a later time, those document will be shared with the plaintiff within a 
reasonable time. 
D. Any qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications 
authored by the witness within the proceeding ten years: Mr. Erbland is an attorney, 
licensed in Idaho, and he has practiced in Idaho for approximately 30 years. He is 
qualified by education, experience and training to provide and express the opinions stated 
in his report and he is familiar with the standard of practice in the legal community that 
was applicable at all times in question. 
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURE - 2 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 
1500 BANK OF AMERICA FINANCIAL CENTER 
601 WEST RIVERSIDE A VENUE 
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON 99201-0653 
(509) 747-2052 





























E. The compensation to be paid for the testimony: Mr. Erbland is being 
compensated at the rate of $295.00 per hour. 
F. A listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an 
expert at trial or by deposition within the proceeding four years: Mr. Erbland has not 
testified as an expert witness at trial or deposition in the past four ( 4) years. 
2. Scott Martin, CPA 
Anastasi I Moore I Martin 
104 S. Division St. 
Spokane. WA 99202 
A. A complete statement of all opinions and/or . conclusions to be 
expressed and the basis and reasons therefore: It is anticipated that Mr. Martin will 
offer his opinions on a more probable than not accounting basis. It is Mr. Martins' 
opinion that Ms. Greenfield's employment history is sporadic and does not demonstrate a 
basis for lost earnings, future lost earnings or lost earnings capacity. Moreover, Ms. 
Greenfield asserted in the prior civil case that the Wurmlingers' suit and the criminal 
action caused her to file, or consider filing bankruptcy, because she was unable to obtain 
a job in the banking industry because she was unable to obtain a bond. Mr. Martin will 
testify that Ms. Greenfield's inability to obtain bonding was not caused by Mr. Smith or 
Mr. Smith's conduct and Ms. Greenfield has not sustained any compensable lost 
earnings, any lost earnings capacity or future loss of earnings that relate to or arise from 
the claims asserted in plaintiffs complaint or modified complaint based upon his review 
of her employment information, the pleadings in the case and the information in the file. 
Mr. Martin reserves the right to amend or supplement these opinions as further discovery 
is completed and information made available to him. 
B. The data or other information considered by the witness in forming 
his opinions and/or conclusions: Mr. Martin bases his opinions on his education, 
training and experience as a certified public accountant practicing in Washington and 
Idaho. Mr. Martin has reviewed plaintiffs original and modified complaint, her 
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURE - 3 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S . . 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 
1500 BANK OF AMERICA FINANCIAL CENTER 
601 WEST RIVERSIDE A VENUE 
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON 99201-0653 
(509) 747-2052 









discovery responses and the documents produced by the plaintiff and documents 
provided from Mr. Smith's billings and he has reviewed the retainer agreements. 
C. Any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions: 
It is anticipated that Mr. Martin will prefer graphs and spreadsheets that reflect his 
opinions. When those documents are finalized, we will provide them to the plaintiff 
within a reasonable time. 
D. Any qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications 
8 authored by the witness within the proceeding ten years: Mr. Martin is qualified to 
9 serve as an expert witness based on his education, training and experience as a certified 
10 public accountant. A copy of Mr. Martin's C. V. is incorporated by reference for further 


















E. The compensation to be paid for the testimony: Mr. Martin is a 
retained expert. Mr. Martin is charging $300.00 per hour for his time and at the trial of 
this matter. 
F. A listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an 
expert at trial or by deposition within the proceeding four years: See attached. 
DATED this /~- day of August, 2015. 
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURE - 4 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
DAVID A. KULIS CH 
KEITH D. BROWN, ISB No. 3635 
Attorneys for Defendant 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 
1500 BANK OF AMERICA FINANCIAL CENTER 
601 WEST RIVERSIDE A VENUE 
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON 99201-0653 
(509) 747-2052 






























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document on the 19th day of August, 2015, addressed to the following: 
Plaintiff Pro Se: 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
\31731 \DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE 
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS 
DISCLOSURE - 5 
Hand Delivered 
X U.S. Mail --
__ Overnight Mail 
Fax Transmission 
David A. Kulisch 
Keith D. Brown 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 
1500 BANK OF AMERICA FINANCIAL CENTER 
601 WEST RIVERSIDE A VENUE 
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON 99201-0653 
(509) 747-2052 
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Coeur d'Alene, ID 
perbland@lclattornevs.com 
Licensed to practice in Idaho 
PRACTICE AREAS 
Commercial & Complex Litigation 
Insurance Law & Tort Claims 
Mediation 
PRACTICE SUMMARY 
Civil litigation practice emphasizes the defense of individuals, business entities, insurance 
companies and governmental entities in state and federal courts, both at the trial and appellate 
levels. Regularly serves as a mediator and arbitrator in all areas of civil disputes. 
BAR ADMISSIONS 
Idaho State Bar, 1979 
U.S. District Court, District ofidaho, 1979 
U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 1991 
U.S. Supreme Court, 1994 
EDUCATION 
Gonzaga University, J.D., cum laude, 1978 
Saint Bonaventure University, B.A., cum laude, 1975 
MEMBERSHIPS 
Idaho State Bar Association 
American College of Trial Lawyers 
GOVERNMENT SERVICE 
Formerly served as Chief of the Criminal Justice Division of the Office of the Idaho Attorney 
General; former Chief Deputy Prosecutor for Kootenai County, Idaho 
HONORS & AWARDS 
Martindale Hubbell rating of "AV" 
Peer-selected for listing in "Best Lawyers in America" and "Mountain States Super Lawyers." 
From 2005 to present. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICAL DISTRICT OF 




IAN D. SMITH, 
DEFENDANT. 
------·- -·-- ·-- ---------·-
REPORT OF EXPERT OPINION 
OF 
PETER C. ERBLAND 
JULY 21, 2015 
PREPARED FOR 
LAW OFFICES OF 
RANDALL/DANSKIN PS 
601 W. RIVERSIDE A VE, STE 1500 
SPOKANE, WA 99201-0653 
--· ·-. - - -· ·- -· ·-- -· 
CASE NO. CV 14-8801 





. I have been retained to provide a report and, if required, expert testimony concerning the 
matter of Christina J. Greenfield, Plaintiff v. Ian D. Smith, Defendant, in the District 
Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho,Jn and For the County of 
Kootenai, case no. CV 14-8801. 
,\:!, 
· l.2 ·· PURPOSE 
'· :: ... \~ ".-:;:· ;_ 
I hav~ been asked to review case documents in tvvo underlying cases: 
1) State of Idaho v. Christina J. Greenfield, case no. CR. 10-10624 in the District Court 
of the First Judicial District of the State ofidaho, In and For the County of Kootenai 
(the Criminal Case) and 
2) Christina J. Greenfield v. Eric J. Wurmlinger and Rosalynd D. Wunnlinger,husband 
and wife, Defendants, case no. CV 10-8209 in the District Court of the First Judicial 
District ofthe State of Idaho, In and For the County of Kootenai (the Civil Case). ______ _ 
I have also been asked to render one or more opinions relating to the applicable standard 
of care as it relates to Ian D. Smith's representation of Ms. Greenfield in both the criminal 
and civil cases identified above. 
1.3 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 
I have been provided with copies of documents in the following matters: 
• Case of Christina J. Greenfield v. Ian D. Smith including the Complaint, Answer, 
Modified Complaint and Discovery Responses. 
• The files and records of Ian D. Smith in both the Criminal and Civil Cases identified 
above. 
I have also reviewed and considered the following documents: 
• The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in the appeal of Greenfield v. Wunnlinger 
issued on May 21, 2015 in the Supreme Court ofthe State ofldaho Docket No. 
41178-2013. 
• The Memorandum Decision and Order issued by the Honorable Candy W. Dale, 
United States Magistrate Judge in the case of Christina J. Greenfield v. City of Post 
Falls, et al. case no. 2:13-cv-'00437-CWD. 
In addition to the documents listed above, I have reviewed the applicable standards and 
case law on the standard ofcare for Idaho attorneys in providing representation to clients 
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in civil and criminal matters and have used these as well as my own education, 
experience and training for the basis of my opinions. 
1.4 QUALIFICATION 
A copy of my current resume is attached as Exhibit "1." I am a graduate of Saint Bonaverture 
University where I earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in English, graduating with honors in 1975. 
I then attended Gonzaga University where I obtained a Juris Doctor degree with honors in 1978. 
I have over 3 5 years of professional experience in criminal and civil litigation. I held the 
position of deputy proseguting attorney and eventually chiefdeputy prosecuting attorney for . 
Kootenai County, Idaho from the years of 1980-19 87. I then held the position ofchief of the· 
criminal justice division of the office of the Attorney Genei·al from 1987-1989. During the first 
nine years ofmy career.as a lawyer, I worked fulltime as a prosecutor handling hundreds of 
criminal cases. In 1989 I entered private practice and began representation of clients in civil and 
criminal matters. In the last approximately ten years, my litigation practice has focused on 
co~ercial and complex litigation, insurance law and tort claims, including civil rights claims. I 
have also represented attorneys and law firms in the defense oflegal malpractice claims. I am 
familiar with the applicable standard of care for Idaho attorneys in the representation of criminal 
____ __oa=n,.,,,d,__,c=i~v1-·1~c-as_e.s.. _________________________________ _ 
I am admitted to practice in all Idaho State courts, the Idaho Federal District Court, the Ninth 
Circuit Court ofAppeals, and the United States Supreme Court. I hold an "A V1' rating with 
Martindale Hubbell. I have also been peer selected for a listing in "Best Lawyers in America" 
and ''Mountain State Super Lawyers" from 2005 to the present. 
1.5 COMPENSATION 
Compensation for work performed in this matter is at the rate of $295.00 per hour, including any 
testimony at deposition or trial. 
1.6 PRIOR TESTIMONY 
I have not testified by deposition or at trial as an expert witness within the past four years. 
1.7 DISCLOSURE 
I am professionally acquainted with Ian Smith, having litigated cases with him on a number of 
occasions over the past approximately 20 years. I briefly represented Mr. Smith in an unrelated 
matter many years ago. I am also the attorney for the defendants in Ms. Greenfield's claim filed 
in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho vs. the City of Post Falls, et al. Those 
claims were dismissed as mentioned above. The dismissal is currently on appeal before the 
Ninth Circuit. Finally, my former partner, John Riseborough, of Paine Hamblen LLP 
represented the Wurmlingers in the underlying civil case that is the subject of this lawsuit. I 
withdrew from Paine Hamblen LLP effective December 31, 2014. I have not personally 
represented the Wunnlingers. 
3 
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SECTI0N2.0 
STANDARD OF CARE 
In order to reach my opinions and conclusions regarding this matter, I have reviewed the law 
relating to the standard of care for an Idaho attorney in the representation of clients in both 
criminal and civil matters. Attorneys are held to that degree of care, skill, diligence and 
lmowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent attorney. 
Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson and Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 981 P .2d 236 (1999). 
While the rules of professional conduct cannot be used as a basis to impose civil liability, they 
are informative of the standard of care that an attorney owes to his or her client. Stephen v. 
Sallaz and Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521,248 P.3d 1256 (2011). 
The Idaho Rules of Profossional Conduct define the contours of the duties owed by an attorney 
to his or her client. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 P .3d 124 7 (2012). For example, IRCP 
l '. l provides that a lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation· requi;rGs the legal knowledge, sldll, thoroughness and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation. The rnles also provide that a lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing the client. IRPC 1.3. And, while the lawyer must 
_____ provide zealnus_ad:smcacy,-he-0-t-she-shall-not-bri11g-er-defencl--a-pr0eeeding;-or-assert-or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not 
frivolous. IRPC 3 .1. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding may nevertheless so 
defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established. Id. 
I have also considered the requirements for establishing a claim oflegal malpractice. The 
elements required to establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out ofa civil action are: 
(1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the party of the 
lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or of the standard of care by the lawyer; and (4) the failure to 
perform the duty must have been a proximate cause of the damages suffered by the client. Lamb 
v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269,923 P.2d 976 (1996). Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13, 813 
P.2d 350, 352 (1991). Without proximate cause there is no liability for negligence in a 
malpractice action. Id. In a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish that he or she 
would have "some chance of success" in the underlying action before he or she would be entitled 
to recover from the attorney. Id. Additionally, in a criminal proceeding, the person pursuing the 
claim must establish the additional element of actual innocence of the·underlying criminal 
charges. Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho at 272. 
I have also considered applicable standards on pleading and proof in a legal malpractice claim. 
Generally, a lay witness does not have the experience, knowledge and wisdom to opinionate on 
the complexities of trial practice, including the verdict that a jury will render. Therefore, as a 
general rule, for a plaintiff to establish aprimafacie case oflegal malpractice at trial, he or she 
must produce expert evidence showing negligence and causation. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 
270,731 P.2d 813 (Ct.App., 1986). There are exceptions to this ntle. For example, where the 
attorney's alleged breach of duty of care is so obvious that it is within the ordinary knowledge 
and experience oflaymen, expert testimony has not been required. Id. Also, where the alleged 
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negligence consists of the failure of an attorney to follow with reasonable promptness and care of 
explicit instructions of his client, expert testimony may not be necessary. Id. Nevertheless, in all 
cases a plaintiff in a legal malpractice claim involving criminal or civil litigation must prove that 
the trial attorney was negligent in the preparation, investigation, or trial of a case; and that his 
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. See Annot. 14 A.LR.4th 170 (1982). Jarman 
v. Hale, Id. 
SECTION 3.0 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The underlying criminal and civil cases have a common factual background. Those facts are 
summarized in both the federal civil rights decision by the U.S. District Court and the recently 
issued opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court. I will quote from the Supreme Court Decision as 
follows: 
In 1994, Eric and Rosalynn Wunnlinger (Defendants) built their 
home in the Park Wood Place subdivision in Post Falls, Idaho, on a 
lot next to the home of Judy Richardson. The Defendants operated 
a bed and breakfast from their home, and they planted a row of 
arborvitaes near the property line between their lot and the lot 
owned by Ms. Richardson. In 2005, Christina Greenfield 
(Plaintiff) purchased the Richardson property. The following year, 
Plaintiff had an attorney write to the Defendants, stating that the 
operation of their bed and breakfast violated the subdivision's 
protective ,covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R's) and 
that the height of the arborvitaes violated the height restrictions on 
fences contained in the CC&R's and the height restrictions on 
hedges contained in a city ordinance. Therefore, the dispute 
between Plaintiff and Defendants centered on the operation of 
Defendants' bed and breakfast in their home and the height of their 
arborvitaes near the boundary between the two properties. 
On April 12, 2006, Post Falls sent Mr. Wurmlinger a letter stating 
that the city had received a complaint regarding a hedge on his 
property and that the city code required fences and hedges within a 
side yard setback to be no higher than six feet. The letter quoted 
the relevant ordinance and asked that the hedge he brought into 
compliance within thirty days. Defendants trimmed their 
arborvitaes to bring them into compliance, and in June 2006 the 
city amended its ordinance to remove the limitation on the height 
of hedges. Thereafter, Defendant allowed their arborvitaes to grow 
taller than six feet. 
By 2010, the arborvitaes had grown to a height often to twelve 
feet. In April 2010, Defendants returned from a vacation and 
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discovered that about four to six feet had been cut from ten of their 
arborvitaes. It is undisputed that Plaintiff had her agent cut the 
trees. Plaintiff was charged criminally, but the charges were later 
dismissed. Thereafter, Defendants began experiencing vandalism 
to their property. Over a period of about eighteen months, there 
were fourteen incidents of paint being splashed or poured on 
improvements to their property, with the last incident occurring 
about four months before the jury trial in this case. 
On September 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed this action alleging four 
claims against Defendants. First, Plaintiff asked for a declaratory 
judgment that Defendants were violating the CC&R's by operating 
the bed and breakfast, allowing their arborvitaes to grown higher 
than five feet, and obstmcting a pedestrian easement across their 
property. She sought an injunction requiring Defendants to cease 
the alleged violations. Second, Plaintiff alleged that the plants and 
trees on Defendants' property that blocked her view of the 
Spokane River constituted a nuisance. She sought damages and an 
---~o~rd_er_..r.e.quiring-Defendants-to-rc~m0ve-the-0ffend-ing-fo1iage-:-'Fhird-, ----------
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had agreed to maintain their 
foliage along the common boundary line at a height of six feet; that 
Plaintiff had the foliage trimmed to the agreed height when 
Defendants breached that agreement; and the Defendants then 
contacted law enforcement which resulted in Plaintiff being 
charged with a misdemeanor. As a result, Plaintiff claimed that 
Defendants intentionally caused her emotional distress, for which 
she was entitled to recover damages. Fourth, Plaintiff alleged that 
Defendants breached their agreement with her and made false and 
defamatory statements about her to law enforcement, which 
negligently caused her emotional distress. She requested an award 
of damages on that claim. Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking 
damages for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, common law trespass, and timber trespass. 
Prior to trial, Plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress was dismissed upon Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. Plaintiffs claim for nuisance and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and Defendants' claim were tried to 
a Jury. It returned a special verdict finding that Plaintiff had failed 
to prove her claims of nuisance and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. The jury also found the Defendants had proved 
their claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, for which 
it awarded them $52,000 in damages-, and their claim of timber 
trespass, for which it awarded them $17,000 in damages .. The jury 
-·- ... -·-· .. - - _,, . --· - .. _ 
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also fOlmd that Defendants have proved that Plaintiff committed a 
common law trespass, but Defendants did not prove any damages 
for that claim. Plaintiffs action for declaratory judgment that 
Defendants were in violation of the CC&R' s was tried to the 
district court, and it later entered a decision finding that Plaintiff 
had failed to prove that claim. 
The timber trespass damages were trebled to $51,000 pursuant to 
Idaho Code section 6-202, and the court awarded Defendants court 
costs and a reasonable attorney fee totaling $65,755.37. It entered 
a judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of $168,755.37, and she 
timely appealed. 
SECTION 4.0 
DISCUSSION AND OPINIONS RELATING TO THE CRIMINAL CASE 
On June 3, 2010 Ms. Greenfield was charged with the felony offense of malicious injury to 
property. Exhibit "2." A summons was issued. Id. Ms. Greenfield was represented by the 
Kootenai County public defender. Exhibit "3 ." On August 10, 2010 Judge Penny~F-"-'n=· e=dl=a=n=de=r _____ _ 
disqualified herself. Exhibit "4." On August 12, 2010 Ms. Greenfield, while being represented 
by Deputy Public Defender Anne Taylor, waived her right to a preliminary hearing in writing. 
Exhibit "5." The presiding magistrate, Jndge Harden, entered an order holding Ms. Greenfield to 
answer to the charge based upon her waiver of the preliminary hearing. The case was then 
assigned to district judge Fred Gibler. Exhibit "6.i1 A trial was scheduled for January 25, 2011. 
Ms. Greenfield was still represented by the public defender. Exhibit "7." On December 21, 
2010 Ms. Greenfield sent a letter to Judge Gibler asking him to dismiss the charges and 
complaining about the representation provided to her by Deputy Public Defender Taylor. 
Exhibit "8." 
On January 19, 2011 Mr. Smith filed a stipulation substituting as counsel for Ms. Greenfield. 
Exhibit "9." The trial scheduled for January 25, 2011 was reset for April 26~ 201 l. Exhibit "10. 
Thereafter, Mr. Smith instituted a vigorous plan ofdefense including taking the following steps: 
• Filing a Motion to Compel Discovery seeldng all documentation including a survey 
believed to have been conducted by the State. Exhibit 11 11. 11 The issues surrounding the 
survey related to the location of the arborvitae in relation to the property line between 
Ms. Greenfield's and Mr. Wunnlinger's parcels. Mr. Smith recognize that the survey 
was material evidence relative to the guilt or innocence of Ms. Greenfield. Id. 
• The Motion to Compel was preceded by a letter from Mr. Smith to the deputy prosecutor 
dated Febrnary 8, 2011 demanding the same materials. Exhibit "12." 
• Mr. Smith then set a hearing on the Motion to Compel and also sought an order 
permitting inspection of the real property and an order requiring public funds to be used 
to pay for the defendant's.survey. Exhibits "13"and "14." 
7 
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• Mr. Smith provided discovery to the prosecutor on Febrnary 14, 2011 disclosing 
potential trial witnesses including potential experts. Exhibit "15." 
On March 29, 2011 Mr. Smith had a telephone conversation with Ms. Greenfield memorializing 
their fee a1rangement. He agreed to take her case at a flat fee of$7,500.00 after estimating that 
what she currently owed and the anticipated trial time would exceed $11,000.00. He advised her 
that the flat fee risk to her was if the prosecutor dismissed the case, he would still eam the entire 
flat fee. Exhibit "16." Their agreement was memorialized in writing. As it turns out, Ian 
Smith's time devoted to the criminal matter exceeded the flat fee amount. However, he charged 
her only the agreed upon of $7,500.00. Exhibit "17 ." 
On April 4, 2011 Ian Smith successfully obtained an order compelling a response to discovery. 
The court required that the State provide any survey commissioned,. accessed by or in possession 
of the State to the defendant no later than May 15, 2011. The court also ordered that if the State 
had not yet commissioned the survey that it had until May 15, 2011 to obtain such a survey. The 
court also ordered that should the State fail to produce the survey in the time allotted, the 
defendant would be pennitted to enter upon the alleged victim's real property to conduct a 
survey. The motion for public funds to pay for the survey-was reserved for a later date. Exhibit 
"18." 
A new trial date would need to be set. On June 6, Ms. Greenfield signed a waiver of right to jury 
trial requesting that the matter be tried as a court trial before Judge Gibler. Exhibit "19." In the 
meantime, Ian Smith continued a vigorous plan of defense including filing an objection to a 
proposed Amended Information and Motion to Dismiss. Exhibit "20." 
A new trial date was scheduled for September 27, 2011 as a court trial before Judge Gibler. 
Exhibit "21." 
The Motion to Dismiss was heard but denied by the court. Exhibit "22." Ian Smith continued 
with his plan of defense, including seeking a deposition of the State's surveyor. Exhibit 1123 .11 
Mr. Smith continued to provide discovery responses including an additional defense witness, 
residential appraiser John Wilhelm. Exhibit 1124." On September 7, 2011 Judge Gibler entered 
an order allowing the deposition sought by Mr. Smith, and it was scheduled for September 20, 
2011. Exhibit ''25." The trial date was moved Octa ber 4, 2011. 
The day before the trial was to begin, on October 3, 2011, the deputy prosecuting attorney filed a 
Motion to Dismiss the charge without prejudice stating that "the State does not yet have an 
official survey ofthe property at issue identifying the location of the subject trees." On the 
morning of trial, October 4, 2011 Mr. Smith argued against the Motion to Dismiss Without 
Prejudice. Significantly, the court denied the State's Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice. Mr. 
Smith prepared an Order for the court to sign and which was signed by Judge Gibler on October 
4, 2011. Exhibit "26." The State was then re.quired to go forward with this evidence. However, 
the State failed to produce any evidence or testimony at trial. As a result, Mr. Smith obtained a 
judgment of acquittal for Ms, Greenfield. Exhibit 1'27." A hearing on Ms. Greenfield's Motion 
to Seal the Case was scheduled for February 27, 2012. Exhibit "28." The Idaho-repository 
shows that Ms .. Greenfield's case has be·en sealed by court rule or judicial order. Exhibit "29 ." 
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I have reviewed these exhibits in light of the claims made by Ms. Greenfield against Mr. Smith 
relating to the Criminal Case. In my opinion, Ms. Greenfield's claims that Mr. Smith breached 
the applicable standard of care in representing her in the Criminal Case are without merit. In my 
opinion, Ian Smith's representation of Ms. Greenfield in the Criminal Case was well within the 
applicable standard of care. In my opinion Mr. Smith provided excellent representation to Ms. 
Greenfield in her Criminal Case. Highlights of that representation are as follows: 
• Upon substituting into the case for the public defender, Mr. Smith began aggressively 
pursuing discovery from the prosecutor, focusing upon the critical elements of the 
underlying charge of malicious injury to property. It is evident that Mr. Smith realized 
immediately that the ownership of the property upon which the arborvitae were locating 
was a critical element of the State's case. He properly focused upon the proof of that 
element. 
• When Mr. Smith did not receive satisfactory responses, he vigorously sought .to compel 
responsive evidence relating to the survey and included a request to enter upon the 
adjoining property and obtain a survey at public expense as opposed to having Ms. 
Greenfield expend additional funds. 
• When the survey information was not provided, Mr. Smith obtained an order setting a 
---------Eleadl-i-ne-frem-the-eeurt-;--8-ensing-an-advantage-with-ha-vingtne courtclecidetlie case, li_e ____ _ 
obtained a concession from the prosecutor for a waiver of jury trial. Judge Gibler would 
therefore be the sole trier of fact, requiring the State to prove its case to him beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
• Mr. Smith obtained an order for the deposition of the State's witness who performed 
survey related work. It is unusual for a deposition to be provided in a criminal case and 
is not a matter of automatic right. Mr. Smith convinced the court that a deposition of this 
State's witness was called for. 
• When the trial date arrived and the State sought to dismiss the charges without prejudice, 
Mr. Smith argued that the motion should be denied and the State should be required to go 
forward. In effect, Mr. Smith placed the State in the position of not being able to prove 
its case .. This resulted in a judgment of acquittal, which is equivalent to a finding of not 
guilty. 
The result that Mr. Smith obtained for Ms. Greenfield in the criminal case is remarkably positive 
and rare. Prosecutors have broad discretion in the dismissal of charges and refiling at a later 
date. Idaho Criminal Rule 48 allows for dismissal of a criminal action upon the court's own 
motion or upon the motion of any party. However, an order for dismissal of a criminal action is 
a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense if it is a misdemeanor, but it is not a bar if the 
offense is a felony. Normally, a prosecutor who finds himself or herself unprepared to proceed 
to trial, can dismiss the charge and refile it as long as it is a felony and it is within the applicable 
statute of limitations. See also Idaho Code§ 19-3506. A dismissal without prejudice does not 
bar the refiling of a felony offense. Id. Indeed, once refi.led, the six month speedy trial 
provisions of Idaho Code§ 19-3501 is renewed. State v. Horsley, 117 Idaho 920, 792 P.2d 945 
(1990). 
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In summary, even though Ms. Greenfield waived her right to a preliminary hearing while 
represented by prior counsel, Mr. Smith successfully and vigorously defended Ms. Greenfield to 
the point where he convinced the court to deny a motion to dismiss without prejudice and forced 
the State to go to trial without the critical evidence of an element of the offense of malicious 
injury to property. This resulted in Ms. Greenfield being acquitted and found not guilty without 
ever having to present any evidence or testify on her own behalf. 
SECTI0N5.0 
DISCUSSION AND OPINIONS RELATING TO THE CIVIL CASE 
On September 15, 2010 Ms. Greenfield hired Ian Smith on an hourly basis to represent her in 
claims she made against the Wurmlingers. Exhibit "30." Mr. Smith immediately began pursuing 
the claims by filing a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Damages. 
Exhibit 11 31. 11 The Wurmlingers filed an Answer and Counterclaim. Mr. Smith began pursuing 
discovery, including depositions of the plaintiffs. Exhibit 1132." He also filed a Reply to 
Counterclaim. Exhibit 113 3. 11 The file also shows that Mr. Smith conducted written discovery 
and a Motion to Compel when he did not receive timely or thorough responses. Exhibit 11 34. 11 As 
a result of one of the discovery motions, Mr. Smith successfully obtained an Order granting 
_____ .attome.y_foes_and_c.osts~to-Ms.,-GreenfielcLfor-pursuing-the-m0tion.-EX-hibi~~-'-'.11-----------
In addition to pursuing discovery, the files demonstrate that Mr. Smith obtained and disclosed 
expert witnesses for the case. Exhibit 11 36. 11 Mr. Smith also obtained a Stipulated Protective 
Order regarding Ms. Greenfield's medical history and records. Exhibit 11 3 7. 11 
On February 14, 2012 Mr. Smith filed a Motion to Withdraw from representation of Ms. 
Greenfield in the civil case. Exhibit 113 8. 11 The motion demonstrates that the attorney-client 
relationship had broken down to such an extent that it would be impossible for Mr. Smith to 
continue representing Ms. Greenfield. Id. The Motion to Withdraw was later granted by the 
court and Ms. Greenfield began representing herself on her claims against the Wurmlingers. 
Concerning Mr. Smith's fees, the records show that by October, 2011 the arrangement between 
Mr. Smith and Ms. Greenfield had been conve1ied to a flat fee going forward. At that time, Ms. 
Greenfield owed $1,128.00. That amount was written off. Ms. Greenfield then paid Mr. Smith 
the $10,000.00 flat fee for his efforts going forward from October, 2011. Exhibit "39." When 
Mr. Smith withdrew :from representing Ms. Greenfield in March 2012, he refunded the entire flat 
fee of $10,000.00. Exhibit "40. 11 
After Mr; Smith withdrew, Ms. Greenfield represented herself through the remaining pretrial 
proceedings, through trial and on appeal. 
I have reviewed the files and records in the Civil Case in light of the claims made by Ms. 
Greenfield against Mr. Smith. In my opinion, Ms. Greenfield's claims that Mr. Smith Breached 
the applicable standard of care in representing her in the Civil Case are also without merit. In 
my opinion, Mr. Smith's representation of Ms. Greenfield in the Civil Case was well within the 
applicable standard of care and he provided excellent representation. Highlights of that 
representation are as follows: 
10 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 487 of 710
) 
• Shortly after being retained, Mr. Smith filed a comprehensive and thorough Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and for Damages. He then immediately began 
pursuing discovery depositions of the plaintiffs. 
• When Mr. Smith did not receive adequate or thorough responses to written discovery, he 
vigorously fought to compel thorough responses and successfully obtained orders 
compelling those responses along with sanctions for noncompliance. 
• Mr. Smith obtained and disclosed expert witnesses to provide testimony on all aspects of 
Ms. Greenfield's claims and defenses. 
Concerning the Motion to Withdraw, once the relationship with Ms. Greenfield had broken down 
to such an extent that it was impossible for Mr. Smith to continue to represent her; he was 
obligated to withdraw and seek leave of court to do so. The motion demonstrates that Ms. 
Greenfield and Mr. Smith had fundamental differences on how the claims should be prosecuted 
and how the defense should be advanced. The motion also demonstrates that there was a 
disagreement concerning the nature and extent of discovery and that Ms. Greenfield had 
expressed a lack of trnst and anger relative to her representation. IRCP 1 J 6 allows for 
withdrawal under the circumstances described by Mr. Smith. In my opinion, it would be 
inappropriate for Mr. Smith to continue representing Ms. Greenfield under the circumstances 
-----descrihedjn-the-Motion-to-Withdra-w~1'G-his-Gl'.edi-t,Ivlr---.--£mi-th-re-fonded-the-fol-l-'-$lG,GGGJ)G-f-1-at-----
fee payment that had been made in the fall of 2011. This resulted in Mr. Smith providing 
representation for many months going forward ,vithout compensation. 
It is also my opinion that Mr. Smith's withdrawal and handling of the case up until that point had 
no adverse effect on Ms. Greenfield's claims or defenses. This opinion is supported by the 
orders and decisions of the trial court during the time in which Ms. Greenfield represented 
herself. For example, on May 24, 2012 the court entered its decision regarding defendant's 
Motion forSummary Judgment and Motion to Strike. Exhibit "41." Contrary to Ms. 
Greenfield's claims, her exltibits (other than Exhibit BB) were stricken as they had no evidentiary 
value to the issues before the court on summary judgment. Id. Moreover, defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was denied except for the claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The court mled that the conduct alleged by Ms. Greenfield, even viewed in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff, simply does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous acts. 
There is nothing that Mr. Smith could have reasonably done to prevent that decision. Moreover, 
Ms. Greenfield's claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress remained intact after the 
summary judgment decision. She was able to present that claim at trial. 
On November 28, 2012 the court entered a Directed Verdict and Order concerning the testimony 
of medical expert Dr. Ambrose. Exhibit "42." As shown by the order, Dr. Ambrose did testify 
but did not offer the opinion that Ms. Greenfield's physical manifestations were caused by her 
alleged emotional distress. Again, this failure of proof on the part of Ms. Greenfield was not 
caused by any act or omission on the part ofMr. Smith. 
Ms. Greenfield's case went to trial on November 26, 2012 lasting for five days. On November 
30, 2012 the jury returned a special verdict in favor of the Wurmlingers on each of Greenfield's 
claims and found in favor of the Wurmlingers on the counterclaims. Ms. Greenfield filed a 
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Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. On 
March 20, 2013 the court issued its decision denying those motions. Exhibit "43." A review of 
that decision shows that Ms. Greenfield's claims and defenses were rejected by the jury. Mr. 
Smith appropriately did not file a Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. Greenfield's claims. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment would only have succeeded upon the finding of a lack of 
any material issue of fact. The jury's verdict finding against Ms. Greenfield's claims 
demonstrates just the opposite. In my opinion, filing a Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. 
Greenfield's claims would have been a wasted effort on the part of Mr. Smith and approaching 
frivolous. 
011 March 25, 2013 the court entered a Post Court Trial Memorandum Decision and Order. 
Exhibit "44." In that decision, the court dismissed Ms. Greenfield's claim for declaratory 
judgment and injlmctive relief. Again, the decision demonstrates that Ms. Greenfield was able to 
present the evidence concerning those claims. The court simply did not find in her favor. Again, 
in my opinion, the decision demonstrates that the result was not due to any act or omission on the 
part of Mr. Smith. 
Finally, the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court rejecting Ms. Greenfield's appeal also 
demonstrates that Ms. Greenfield's case was simply unsuccessful. The opinion lends no support 
tu-any-argument-tlratth-e-fatlureorMr.<3m:ftetd'-s case was dne to any act or omission on tne 
part of Ms. Smith. Mr. Smith never guaranteed a favorable result. In litigation there is often a 
clear winner and loser. 
SECTION 6.0 
CONCLUSION 
In my opinion, Mr. Smith met and exceeded the applicable standard of care in representing Ms. 
Greenfield in both the Criminal and Civil Cases. 
DATED this 2l8t day ofJuly, 2015. 
PETER C. BRELAND 
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP PLLC 
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~ Anastasi I Moore I Martrn. 
'.;, Certified Public Accountana [J Consultants l'i.tc 
Curriculum Vitae - Scott H. Martin, CPA/ ABV, ASA 
Scott Martin is a Member with Anastasi, Moore & Martin, PLLC. He has been active in 
public accounting, business valuations, and corporate finance for over twenty-seven 
years. He has a BA in Business Administration with a concentration in accounting 
from the University of Washington. 
Scott manages business valuations for financing, mergers and acquisitions, purchase 
price allocation, estate and gift tax planning, litigation support, insurance placement, 
and corporate planning. Scott also consults and assists with merger and acquisition 
transactions. He has lectured on valuation, tax, and merger and acquisition topics 
before relevant professional groups throughout the Northwest and Canada. 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
2013 -Present 
2012 - Present 
1999- 2011 
NAI Black/Waypoint Capital LLC 
Member - Business Brokerage 
Scott is a licensed real estate broker with NAI Black in 
Spokane, and his responsibilities include project management, 
transaction consulting, and sales development. Although he 
represents buyers, he primarily represents sellers in the sale of 
their business to financial or strategic buyers. 
Anastasi, Moore & Martin, PLLC 
Member - Valuation/Litigation Support 
Scott's responsibilities include project management, financial 
consulting and sales development. He supervises business 
valuation assignments, provides litigation support services, 
and consults regarding merger and acquisition transactions. 
Moss Adams LLP 
Partner-Tax, Valuation/Litigation Support 
At Moss Adams, Scott's responsibilities included tax 
compliance, tax planning, business valuation, and litigation 
support services. He specialized in auto dealerships and was a 
frequent speaker for the National Automobile Dealers 
Association (NADA) and was selected to speak at the 2012 
national NADA convention in Las Vegas. 
104 South Division Spok,rne, Washington 99202 
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Windswept Capital, LLC 
CFO and Project Manager 
Windswept Capital was a boutique Investment Banking firm 
which has since merged with Alexander Hutton. At 
Windswept Capital, Scott valued middle-market companies 
for sale or acquisition and performed an integral role in the 
merger or acquisition of numerous middle-market companies 
with values ranging from $1.5 million to $80 million. 
LeMaster & Daniels, PLLC 
Tax Manager 
Responsible for the preparation and review of tax returns for 
the firm's major corporate, individual, and Partnership clients. 
Scott was a frequent speaker on various tax topics in 
Washington and Idaho. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Tax Senior 
Performed tax consulting for corporate, partnership, and 
individual clients including planning, return preparation, 
review, and related tax research. 
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DESIGNATIONS 
1988 - Present - A minimum of 40 hours per year of CPE to meet AICPA, ASA, 
and Washington State continuing professional education requirements 
2002 - Accredited Senior Appraiser (ASA), American Society of Appraisers 
2001 - Accredited in Business Valuation (ABV) 
1998 - Certified Valuation Analyst (CVA) - discontinued in 2006 
1988-Certified Public Accountant (CPA) 
1988- BA in Business Administration with a concentration in Accounting from the 
University of Washington 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS AND COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Washington Society of Certified Public Accountants 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
American Society of Appraisers 
Board member of a non-profit organization 
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Anastasi I Moore I Marhn 
~ C~rtifi~d Public Accountants & Consultants rue 
Case List - Scott H. Martin, CPA/ ABV, ASA 
Quick Freight Brokers v. Steven Morford 
Trial Testimony 
Marriage of Bliss 
Trial Testimony 
Quick Silver Audio v. City of Kennewick 
Deposition Testimony 
Marriage of Jones 
Trial Testimony 
Marriage of Goicoechea 
Trial Testimony 
Marriage of Powers 
Trial Testimony 
Marriage of Aldrich 
Trial Testimony 
Marriage of Heitzmann 
Trial Testimony 
Marriage of Swoboda 
Trial Testimony 
Marriage of Roark 
Trial Testimony 
Marriage of Butt 
Trial Testimony 
Marriage of Whitley 
Trial Testimony 
Muffet v. City of Yakima 
Trial Testimony 
Munson v. Munson 
Trial Testimony 
Heller v. Goff 
Deposition and Trial Testimony 
Dutyv. Duty 
Trial Testimony 
Kanenwischer v. Kanenwischer 
Trial Testimony 
Tri-River v. Richland and Kennewick 
Deposition Testimony 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Yakima, 2008 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2008 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Benton, 2008 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Lincoln, 2009 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2009 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Snohomish, 2010 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2010 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Walla Walla, 2011 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2011 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2011 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2012 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Okanogan, 2012 
United States District Court, Eastern District of Washington 
Yakima, WA 2012 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2012 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2012 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2013 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2013 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Benton, 2013 
l 04 South Division Spokane, Washington 99202 
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Case List - Scott H. Martin, CPA/ ABV, ASA ( continued) 
Estate of McNulty 
Trial Testimony 
Rieger v. Rieger 
Deposition Testimony 
Schlegel v. Schlegel 
Trial Testimony 
McTaggert v. Sternberg 
Trial Testimony 
Agidius v. Agidius 
Trial Testimony 
Dein v. Dein 
Deposition Testimony 
Olander v. Olander 
Trial Testimony 
Dein v. Dein 
Trial Testimony 
Paulson v. Paulson 
Trial Testimony 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2013 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2014 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2014 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Kootenai, 2014 
Superior Court of State of Washington; 
County of Walla Walla, 2014 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2014 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2015 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2015 
Superior Court of State of Washington, 
County of Spokane, 2015 
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Publications (Presentations) Authored - Scott H. Martin1 CPA/ABV1 ASA 
• Business Valuation Methods and Succession Planning - Financial Planning 
Association, November 15, 2011 
• Key Issues in a Business Divorce and Other Litigation Related Matters - Spokane 
County Bar Association1 October 141 2011 
• Dealership Valuation and Succession Strategies - National Automobile Dealer's 
Association, October 2011 
• Dealership Valuation: A Current Wealth Transfer Opportunity - National 
Automobile Dealer's Association, June 2011 
• Valuing the Privately Held Business - Spokane County Bar Association, April 
2011 
• What is My Business Worth, North Idaho College, March and November 2009 
• Valuation1 Intermountain Community Bank, April 2008 
• The Importance of Financial Literacy ( and its impact on the value of your 
business) - Whitworth University, February 2007 
• Succession Strategies, American West Bank, April 2006 
• Business Valuation: If I Only Had a Ticker Symbol, Risk Management 
Associates, March 2005 
• Understanding the Value of a Business1 Inland Northwest Bank, February 2005 
• The Importance of Accounting (and its impact on the value of your business) -
Eastern Washington University1 February 2005 
e Understanding the Value of Your Business, Risk Management Associates, 
January 2005 
• Effective Financial Analysis, Paine Hamblen1 March and April 2004 
• Understanding the Value of Your Business, DA Davidson, April 2004 
• How to Optimize the Value of a Business, American Express1 April 2004 
• Financial Management for the Closely Held Business, Inland Northwest Bank, 
September 2003 
• Practical Considerations in Valuing a Business1 Spokane Estate Planning 
Councit March 2002 
• Moss Adams Advisory Services Valuation Services Group, The Network, May 
2002 
• Moss Adams Advisory Services Valuation Services Group1 September 2002 
• Application of Business Valuation Theory, Washington Society of CP As, 
December 2002 
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David A. Kulisch 
Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
Troy Y. Nelson, ISB #5851 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Telephone: (509) 747-2052 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
No. CV-14-8801 
OBJECTION TO GREENFIELD 
AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION TO 
STRIKE 
OBJECTION 
The defendant objects to paragraphs 4, 8, 9, 16, 17 and 18. Those paragraphs of 
plaintiffs affidavit lack sufficient foundation to be admissible at trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
Those paragraphs do not demonstrate that the statements are based on personal 
knowledge and they contain inadmissible conclusions. Paragraphs 8 and 16 also contain 
inadmissible hearsay. 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
Based on the above objections, defendant moves the courtto strike paragraphs 4, 
8, 9, 16, 17 and 18 of plaintiffs affidavit. 
OBJECTION TO GREENFIELD AFFIDAVIT 
AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 1 
































DATED this L--< day of August, 2015. 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
/ I... ! l _ .....-,, .. 
By:. __ /_··'-+--'-!_· _r'Z_"/_> __ · ------
OBJECTION TO GREENFIELD AFFIDAVIT 
AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 2 
David A. Kulisch 
Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
Troy Y. Nelson, ISB #5851 
Attorneys for Defendant 





























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document on the zo day of August, 2015, addressed to the following: 
Plaintiff Pro Se: 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 










Troy Y. Nelson 
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Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
Troy Y. Nelson, ISB #5851 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Telephone: (509) 747-2052 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The defendant has moved the Court for entry of summary judgment pursuant to 
IRCP 56. The defendant demonstrated plaintiff had not established essential elements of 
her claim. Under Idaho law, the burden then shifted to plaintiff to show that a genuine 
issue did exist. In her response, plaintiff failed to produce any testimony establishing that 
defendant's conduct in any instance fell below the applicable standard of care. 
Moreover, plaintiff has failed to produce any testimony establishing causation; therefore, 
summary judgment is proper. 
II. ESSENTIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS 
• Defendant moved to withdraw from representing plaintiff on February 14, 2012 
and that motion was granted by Judge Haynes, after a hearing, on March 9, 2012. 
Greenfield Aff., Exhibits Band W. 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 1 
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• Following the withdrawal, the court stayed the matter for 20 days to allow 
plaintiff to find another attorney. Greenfield Aff., Exhibit W. After the stay, 
Plaintiff began representing herself and filed a Notice of Self-Representation on 
March 29, 2012. Greenfield Aff., Exhibit B. 
• At the time of the withdrawal, the case was scheduled for trial commencing on 
May 21, 2012. Greenfield Aff., Exhibit B. 
• On April 10, 2012, the trial date was continued to November 26, 2012. 
Greenfield Aff, Exhibit B 
• From that point forward, plaintiff and the original defendants Wurmlinger 
engaged in significant motion practice, filing at least 15 separate motions between 
the initiation of h~r self-representation and trial. Greenfield Aff., Exhibit B. 
• Plaintiff filed expert witness lists, motions in limine and jury instructions. 
Greenfield Aff., Exhibit B. 
• At trial, plaintiff called lay and expert witnesses and argued her case to the jury. 
See Supreme Court Opinion, p. 9. 
• The jury returned a verdict against plaintiff and for defendants Wurmlinger on 
November 30, 2012. Id. 
• Plaintiff filed the present action on December 1, 2014. 
Ill. LAW AND ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
When assessing the motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the nonrnoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. G&M Farms v. 
Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851,854 (1991). 
A. Plaintiff Has Failed to Establish Two Essential Elements of Her 
Claim. 
Plaintiff has not submitted any testimony to raise a question of fact concerning a 
breach of a duty or causation, both essential elements to her claim against defendant 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 2 






























herein. The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish 
there is no "genuine issue of material fact" and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a 
matter oflaw. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App.1992). 
When the party moving for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or 
proof at trial, the "genuine issue of material fact" burden may be met by establishing the 
absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at 
trial. Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the 
party opposing the motion to establish, via further depositions, discovery responses or 
affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial, or to offer a valid justification for 
the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f). 
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56( c ), which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.R. C.P. 56( c ), stated: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56( c) mandates the entry of 
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that 
party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can 
be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure 
of proof concerning an essential element of the nornnoving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is 
"entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving 
party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of 
her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. "[T]h[e] 
standard [for granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a 
directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) .... " 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 
( 1986) ( citations omitted) .. 
The language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted by the appellate courts 
of Idaho. See, e.g., G & M Farms, supra; Barab v. Plumleigh, 123 Idaho 890, 892, 853 
P.2d 635,637 (Ct.App.1993); Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 
941,854 P.2d 280,284 (Ct.App.1993). 
In this case, plaintiff would bear the burden of proof at trial to establish the 
elements of negligence. In Idaho, a cause of action in negligence requires proof of the 
following: (1) the existence of a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to 
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conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal 
connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and ( 4) actual loss 
or damage. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho FirstNat'l Bank, N.A., 119 
Idaho 171, 175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-05 (1991). 
In a claim for attorney malpractice/professional negligence, the plaintiff must 
show: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the 
part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or the standard of care by the lawyer; and 
(4) that the failure to perform the duty was a proximate cause of the damages suffered by 
the client. McColrn-Traska v. Baker, 139 Idaho 948, 88 P.3d 767, 770 (2004)(citing 
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 590, 21 P.3d 908, 912 (2001). 
In other words, to establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of a civil 
action, the plaintiff must show that the attorney's negligence proximately caused the 
plaintiff to lose the right to recover in the underlying case. Samuel v. Hepworth, 
Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 996 P.2d 303 (2000). 
In the present case, plaintiffs affidavit recites a series of events involving alleged 
actions and alleged inactions of defendant Smith during the course of his representation 
of plaintiff. She failed to submit any expert testimony concerning how any of these 
alleged incidents were negligent and whether any of the incidents caused damage. Then, 
in her memorandum, she simply concludes, without any evidentiary support, that the 
alleged incidents represented negligent acts which caused her to lose her civil case. 
Memorandum, P. 6, last paragraph. Conclusory allegations of negligence are insufficient 
to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237, 280 
P.3d 740 (2012) (Summary judgment rule, requiring that supporting and opposing 
affidavits be made on personal knowledge, is not satisfied by an affidavit that is 
conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by personal knowledge.). 
There is no evidence that defendant Smith's alleged negligence caused plaintiff to 
lose her civil case. There is no evidence that defendant Smith's withdrawal or handling 
of the case up to that point had any adverse impact on her claims or defenses. There is no 
evidence submitted that suggests the outcome at plaintiffs trial would.have been any 
different if plaintiff had hired another attorney or if defendant Smith had continued his 
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representation through trial. It is more probable that plaintiff's case was simply 
unsuccessful, a proposition that is demonstrated by the Idaho Supreme Court decision 
rejecting plaintiffs appeal. See Erbland Rpt., p. 9. That opinion lends no support to any 
argument that the failure of plaintiffs case was due to any act or omission on the part of 
defendant. 
B. Plaintiffs Failure To Produce Expert Testimony Is Fatal To Her 
Claims. 
The plaintiff must normally produce expert evidence of negligence and causation 
of damages to establish a prima facie case oflegal malpractice. Jarman v. Hale, 112 
Idaho 270,273, 731 P.2d 813,816 (Ct. App 1986)(Jarman I). Where a defendant 
attorney moves for summary judgment in a malpractice case, the plaintiff must ordinarily 
provide affidavits of expert witnesses to resist the motion. Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 
952, 961, 842 P.2d 288,297 (Ct.App 1992) (Jarman II). The reasons for these 
requirements, as in malpractice actions against other professionals, are that "the factors 
involved ordinarily are not within the knowledge or experience of laymen composing the 
jury." Corey v. Wilson, 93 Idaho 54, 58, 454 P.2d 951, 955 (1969). 
In this case, it is outside the experience of a lay person to determine whether any 
of the specific instances of conduct complained of by plaintiff actually fell short of the 
applicable standard of care for an attorney. Further, it is not within the common 
experience of the average person to know whether a far removed antecedent negligence 
act caused an otherwise meritorious claim to be defeated in a jury trial. See Samuel, 
134 Idaho at 89, 996 P .2d at 308 (holding that whether a law firm breached the standard 
of care and whether any such breach caused damages are issues outside the ordinary 
knowledge and experience oflay persons). 
Without sufficient evidence on how the actions or inactions of defendant Smith 
robbed plaintiff of the right to recover against the Wurmlingers, no reasonable jury could 
infer causation under the facts as presented in this case. Likewise, with no evidence as to 
how any specific instance of negligence resulted in the unfavorable verdict, a jury would 
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be left to speculate as what might have caused the verdict. Plaintiffs inability to present 
expert testimony establishing negligence and causation requires the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of defendant Smith. 
C. Plaintiff's Claims are Time Barred 
The Supreme Court of Idaho has showed us how to calculate the accrual of a legal 
malpractice claim. 
In this case, as a matter of law, the latest possible date that Tingley's 
malpractice cause of action accrued under I.C. 5-219( 4) is November 
16, 1983, the date the underlying personal injury action was dismissed. 
It was only on that day, following either a far removed antecedent 
negligence act or the continuing negligence of the respondents, that 
Tingley was damaged. (Citation omitted) The I.C. 5-219(4) limitation 
period applicable to this malpractice action expired November 16, 
1985, and, consequently, bars Tingley's complaint, which he did not 
file until March 1987. 
Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 90, 867 P.2d 960, 963-64 (1994). 
Here, at the latest, plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the day the jury returned 
its verdict, which was on November 30, 2012. See City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 
656, 661,210 P.3d 629, 634 (2009) (objective proof of damage did not occur until there 
was a court decision adverse to the client caused by the attorney's negligence). The LC. 
5-219( 4) limitation period applicable to this malpractice action therefore expired on 
November 30, 2014. Plaintiffs complaint, which was filed on December 1, 2014, is time-
barred. 
D. Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment Should be Denied. 
In her response, plaintiff brought a cross motion for summary judgment. 1 
Plaintiffs Response, p. 2-3. The only evidence relied upon by plaintiff is her own 
affidavit, which fails to demonstrate negligence or causation, as described in detail above. 
1 Plaintiff also brought a motion for punitive damages. The defense objects to that motion as it is untimely 
and not brought pursuant to the proper procedure per Idaho Code 6-1604(2). The motion for punitive 
damages, at a minimum, is not properly before the court on September 1, 2015. 
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Plaintiffs motion for cross summary judgment must be denied because the only 
evidence in the record relating to plaintiffs allegations of negligence against defendant 
Smith is contained in the affidavit and report of Mr. Erbland. Mr. Erbland expressed the 
opinion that Mr. Smith provided excellent representation to plaintiff and his 
representation in both the civil and criminal cases was well within the standard of care. 
Further, he expressed the opinion that plaintiffs case was simply unsuccessful, and that 
Mr. Smith's representation of plaintiff prior to his withdrawal had no adverse impact on 
plaintiffs claims or defenses. Erbland Rpt., p. 11. 
Based on that evidence, plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment must be 
denied. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has elected to argue that she does not need expert testimony to establish 
her causes of action against defendant Smith, rather than producing expert testimony on 
the breach of a standard of care and causation. Whether any of the factual allegations 
violate the standard of care required of an attorney is not within the knowledge and 
experience of lay persons. Moreover, all the negligence in the world means nothing if a 
plaintiff cannot demonstrate the negligence caused her damage. Here, plaintiff has failed 
to produce proper affidavit testimony establishing the essential elements of breach and 
causation. Consequently, defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted. 
DATED this "2 u day of August, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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document on the 1, 0 
Plaintiff Pro Se: 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
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Chfr:s,tina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
STATE Of IDAHO l 
COUNTY OF ,mo TENA! 1 ss 
FILED: 
2015 SEP 15 PM 3: 54 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
vs. 
IAND. SMITH 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN 
FURTHER OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant. PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 56(f) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, being duly sworn under oath do state the following: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter. 
2. On January 21, 2015, I sent Defendant Smith my "Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for 
Production of Documents." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit #1) 
3. On February 25, 2015, I received "Defendant's Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Requests for Production" wherein Smith did NOT respond to a majority of my requests. 
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit #2) 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN 
FURTHER OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 56(f) 
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4. On February 25, 2015, I sent a letter to Defendant's counsel requesting an availability 
schedule to proceed with Smith's deposition in March 2015. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit #3) 
(Note: Smith's only available dates were on the 18 & 19 of March 2015) 
5. On March 4, 2015, I sent a letter to Defendant's counsel requesting an availability 
schedule to proceed with Smith's deposition in April 2015 or May 2015. (See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit #4) (Note: Smith was available from May 4 -8, 2015. NO April appointments 
were available due to "unavailability" on Defendants side) 
6. On March 9, 2015, I received a letter from Smith's legal counsel regarding Smith's 
deposition for May 2015. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit #5) 
7. On March 20, 2015, I responded to Smith's legal counsel to confirm Smith's deposition 
on May 6, 2015. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit #6) 
8. On March 24, 2015, I received a letter from Smith's legal counsel confirming Smith's 
deposition on May 6, 2015, and a notice to depose me on May 13, 2015. 
9. On April 9, 2015, I submitted a "Notice of Intention to Depose Defendant Ian D. Smith" 
to the court and Smith. 
10. On May 6, 2015, I deposed Smith. Smith answered a majority of the questions with "I 
don't know" or "I don't remember" or "I don't recall" even though Smith had stated he 
had "reviewed" the court files prior to his deposition. There were several inconsistencies 
in Smith's testimony when compared to his discovery and MSJ responses. (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #7) 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN 
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11. Due to Smith denials and objections relating to his personal emails; the following 
exhibits are attached to this affidavit that will clarify documents and / or statements that 
were submitted in my response to Smith's MSJ. 
12. On December 20, 2010, I had received an email from Smith, wherein a "Notice of Trial 
with Uniform Pretrial Order" (See Plaintiff's Exhibit #8) was attached to said email along 
with a "Pretrial Compliance Worksheet" which was previously disclosed in my "Affidavit 
of Christina J. Greenfield In Support of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts and Memorandum 
In Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Hereafter "Affidavit")" as 
Greenfield's Exhibit #A. 
13. On October 27, 2011, I received an email from Smith, wherein a "Notice of Trial with 
Pretrial Order" (See Plaintiff's Exhibit #9) was attached to said email along with an 
"Interoffice Pretrial Compliance Worksheet" which was previously disclosed in my 
"Affidavit" as Greenfield Exhibit #D. 
14. On July 28, 2015, I received the Defendant's "Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment" along with supporting documents, wherein Defendant's 
"Expert Witness" Peter Erbland, submitted a copy of an "email" from Smith regarding a 
"recording" of a conversation between Smith and I. (See Er bland Exhibit # 16) Smith 
DENIED having any "recording's" in his discovery responses that were submitted on 
February 19, 2015. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit #2) 
15. On Sunday, October 16, 2011, Smith sent an email to Brad Andrews, attorney with the 
Idaho State Bar, inquiring about Smith's "obligations" regarding a former client of 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTINAJ. GREENFIELD 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN 
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Smith's, Pamela Rilliet Wallace. I received a copy of said email for the first time on 
February 21, 2015, in Smith's discovery responses. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit #JO) 
16. Smith had missed the deadline to respond to Defendants MSJ in my civil case so when 
Smith QUIT just prior to the MSJ hearing, I had approximately 20 days to respond to said 
MSJ, which was due on March 30, 2012, the day my stay ended! 
17. I have requested Smith's phone records along with phone logs in order to validate 
specific dates, wherein conversations that took place between Smith and other individuals 
occurred. Smith is "denying" said conversations "exist" in his discovery responses, yet I 
was billed for said conversations. Smith has not complied with said request. 
18. I have requested the exact dates that Smith was out of the office either on vacation, 
attending classes, or "other" to validate my allegations that Smith missed crucial 
deadlines because he was "out of town" and or "not prepared" and or "unavailable" when 
deadlines, motions, etc. were due. Smith has not complied with said request. 
19. I have requested which witnesses Smith intends to call at trial so I may have the chance 
to depose said witnesses prior to pretrial deadlines. Smith has refused to disclose said 
witnesses. 
20. Smith disclosed a "new" expert witness just days before the summary judgment hearing, 
wherein I had no prior notice and now I need to depose this witness as well. 
21. Smith "denied" that he possesses any "recordings" of conversations regarding my cases 
in his discovery responses, yet his "expert" witness, Peter Erbland, recently disclosed the 
fact that there is at least one (1) recording that I have not yet received. 
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22. I need to see Smith's compiled notes, data, "work product," time-sheets, etc. to verify his 
actual documented billable hours, wherein Smith excessively charged me for said alleged 
billable hours. 
23. I attempted to depose Julie Vetter, Smith's "legal assistant" in April 2015 to verify 
personal statements made to me by Vetter during the course of litigation in both cases, but 
Smith and or his legal counsel was not available in April for said deposition, wherein said 
deposition is vital to my case. 
24. I am compelled to depose Smith for a second time as he was "unwilling" to cooperate and 
wasted my time by failing to answer my questions during his deposition by claiming he 
"did not remember" and or using other commonly used evasive answers to my questions. 
25. I am filing a "Motion To Compel Discovery" against the Defendant for his failure to 
comply with discovery requests in a timely manner. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2015. 
Pro Se Litigant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 15th day of Septembe 
A.ERNY 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of September, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
David Kulisch 
Attorney at Law 
1500 Bank of America Financial Center 
601 West Riverside Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0626 
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) CASE NO: CV-2014-8801 
) 
) PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS 
) FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
) 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, Christina J. Greenfield (Hereafter: "Greenfield"), 
hereby provides notice and submits the following First Set of Request for Production of 
Documents to the above-na..'Iled Defendai"lt, Ian D. Smith (hereafter: "Smith") and his attorney of 
record, Keith D. Brown. 
DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS APPLICABLE TO EACH REOUEST 
A. In responding to these Requests for Production of Documents and other items of 
evidence, you are required to provide all information asked for, and to furnish all 
documents, items of evidence, and information that is available to you or subject to your 
reasonable inquiry, including all documents, items of evidence, items of information, and 
information in the possession of your attorneys, accountants, advisers, or other persons 
directly or indirectly employed by, or connected with, you or your attorney's and anyone 
else otherwise subject to your control. 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS Page 1 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 512 of 710
B. In responding to these Requests for Production of Documents and other items of 
evidence, you must make a diligent search of your records and of other paper and 
materials in your possession or available to you or your attorney's or representatives. 
C. In a request, respond to each part separately and in full, and do not limit your answer to 
the interrogatory or request as a whole. If these requests cannot be answered in full, 
answer to the extent possible, specify the reason for your inability to respond to the 
remainder, and state whatever information and knowledge you have regarding the 
unanswered portion. 
· D. These requests for Production of Documents are deemed to be continuing in nature and 
your responses thereto must be supplemented to the maximum extent authorized by law 
and the applicable rules. 
E. "Documents" shall mean all written or graphic matter of every kind or description, 
however, produced or reproduced, whether draft or final, original or reproduction signed 
or unsigned, and regardless of whether approved, signed, sent, received, redrafted, or 
executed, including but not limited to: written communications, letters, correspondence, 
facsimiles, e-mail, memoranda, minutes, notes, films, recordings, of any type, transcripts, 
contracts, agreements, purchase or sales orders, memoranda of telephone conversations 
of personal conversations, diaries, desk calendars, interoffice communications, reports, 
studies, bills, receipts, checks, checkbooks, invoices, requisitions or material similar to 
any of the foregoing however denominated, by whomever prepared, and to whomever 
addressed, which are in your possession, custody or control or to which you have had or 
ca.11 obtain access. 
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F. "Person(s)" shall mean and include: A natural person, partnership, firm, or corporation or 
any other kind of business or legal entity, its agents, or employees. In each instance 
where you are asked to identify or list a name of a person, state with respect to each such 
person or persons his name, last known residence, and business addresses, and telephone 
numbers. 
G. "Communications" shall mean all inquiries, discussions, conversations, negotiations, 
agreements, understandings, meetings, telephone conversations, letters, correspondence, 
notes, telegrams, telexes, advertisements, facsimiles, e-mail, or other forms of verbal 
and/ or communicative contact. 
H. "You" or "your" refers to Defendant herein and to all other persons acting or purporting 
to act on behalf of Defendant, including agents and employees. 
I. The period of time encompassed by these requests shall be from the date of the attorney 
client relationsh.ip begun between Plaintiff and Defendant until the final dissolution of all 
facts and findings. 
J. Every document submitted under this request shall be certified and signed under Rule 
26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and every discovery response, or objection must be signed by at least 
one attorney of record in the attorney's own name or by the party personally, and must 
state the signer's address, e-mail address, and telephone number. By signing, ari attorney 
or party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge that the information with 
respect to a disclosure, is complete and correct as of the time it is made. 
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REOUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Request for Production No. 1: Do you intend to call any expert witnesses at the trial of this 
case? If so, state as to each such witness the name and business address of the witness, the 
witness's qualifications as an expert, the subject matter upon which the witness is expected to 
testify, the substance of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify, and a 
summary of the grounds for each opinion. Produce all learned treatises (published treatises, 
periodicals, or pamphlets on the subject of history, or other science or art, as defmed in rule 803 
(18) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence) upon which any of your expert witness base their opinions, 
or may rely upon in rendering their opinions in this action. Produce all other documents upon 
which any of your expert witnesses base their opinions, or may rely upon in rendering their 
opinions in this action. 
Request for Production No. 2: Produce any written statements, reports or memoranda, 
signed, made by any person which support: 
a. Any and all of your denials to the allegations contained within the Plaintiff's Complaint 
herein; 
b. Any and all of your affirmative defenses to the Plaintiff's claims contained m the 
Plaintiff's complaint herein. 
Request for Production No. 3: List all witnesses that you intend to call at the trial in this 
matter and produce each and every exhibit, document, motion picture, photograph, drawing, 
sketch, diagram or other item that you intend to offer for introduction into evidence or otherwise 
to use for demonstrative purposes at any pre-trial motion or at the trial of this matter. 
Request for Production No. 4: Produce any and all documents containing any notes or 
other writings generated by you which describe: 
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a. Any incident which forms a basis for any of your denials to the allegations contained 
within the Plaintiff's complaint herein. 
Request for Production No. 5: State the name, address, and telephone number of each 
person with personal knowledge regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the events of 
the occurrences referred to in the complaint. 
Request for Production No. 6: Produce, identify, and describe in detail all evidence 
including documents, affidavits, statements, reports, photos, memoranda, or other, utilized in the 
investigation, upon which the Plaintiff was officially charged with Felony Malicious Injury to 
Property on June 3, 2010, that you obtained from the Ann Taylor, Plaintiff's Public Defender and 
I or State Prosecutor's and / or others in regard to the Plaintiff. 
Request for Production No. 7: Identify and describe all communications you have had with 
any other person regarding the Plaintiff, the subject matter of this litigation, or any individual or 
entity believed by you to be associated with the Plaintiff, and include in your response the date of 
the communication, the method of communication, and the identity of the individual or entity 
who received or sent the communication. 
Request for Production No. 8: Identify any legal claims or lawsuits filed by or against you 
in the last ten (10) years, including the case style, case number, parties, and jurisdiction, agency, 
or other entity in which such claim or suit was filed. 
Request for Production No. 9: Produce any recordings made by or with your involvement 
regarding the Plaintiff, the subject matter of this litigation, or any individual or entity believed by 
you to be associated with the Plaintiff, including, but not limiting your response to the date, 
location and reasons any such recording was made. 
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Request for Production No. 10: If you claim that any statement or docwnent responsive to 
any interrogatory or request for production has been destroyed, deleted, or is otherwise 
unavailable, identify each such statement or document, providing the date such statement or 
document was made or published, the last date that statement or document is known to have 
existed, what happened to that statement or document, and provide a summary of the content and 
meaning of that statement or document. 
Request for Production No. 11: Identify any oral, written, or recorded statements taken by 
you or on your behalf in connection with the claims or defenses raised in this matter, providing 
the identity of anyone who heard or received such statement, the date of any such statement, how 
such statement was made, where each such statement was made, a summary of the content and 
meaning of that statement and the identity of anyone in possession of a copy of each statement. 
Request for Production No. 12: To provide the background of the Defendant including: 
age, date of birth, address, marital status, military status, criminal history, education, church 
affiliation, memberships in any organization, employer and position of employment if an 
individual. If you own a business, to provide the type of business structure, date of formation, 
place of formation and the names and addresses of all partners, owners, managers, shareholders 
or officers. 
Request for Production No. 13: Produce each and every exhibit, document, motion picture, 
photograph, drawing, sketch, diagram, voice recordings, email(s), reports, or any other item in 
your possession during your representation for both the Plaintiff's criminal and civil 
proceedings. 
Request for Production No. 14: Produce any and all emails that were exchanged by you 
and any other persons during the period you represented the Plaintiff or thereafter. 
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Request for Production No. 15: Produce any and all documents, written statements, reports 
or memoranda containing all correspondence between you and the Plaintiff during the period you 
represented the Plaintiff or thereafter. 
Request for Production No. 16: Produce any and all photographs, video recordings, audio 
recordings, drawings, charts, diagrams, emails, facsimile, texts, or other, containing 
communication that transpired between you and attorney's Gary Amendola, Douglas Marfice, 
and John Riseborough in regard to the Plaintiff. 
Request for Production No. 17: Produce any and all photographs, video recordings, audio 
recordings, drawings, charts, diagrams, emails, facsimile, texts, or other, containing 
communication that transpired between you and the State Prosecuting Attorney( s ), in regard to 
the Plaintiff's criminal proceedings. 
Request for Production No. 18: Produce any and all documents, written statements, reports 
or memoranda containing all of your reported and / or documented hours that were charged to 
the Plaintiff on both the criminal and civil proceedings for which you represented and / or 
defended the Plaintiff, including all payments made on behalf of the Plaintiff toward said 
services. 
Request for Production No. 19: Describe your personal and/ or professional relationship 
with Pamela Rilliet Wallace. 
Request for Production No. 20: Produce any and all video recordings, audio recordings, 
drawings, charts, diagrams, emails, facsimile, texts, or other, containing communication that 
transpired between you and the Idaho State Bar Association in regard to the Plaintiff and / or 
Pamela Rilliet Wallace. 
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Request for Production No. 21: Produce any and all dates that you were not available 
during the period from September 2010 through April 2012, due to absences, vacations, and/ or 
out of town excursions while you were representing the Plaintiff. 
Request for Production No. 22: Produce any and all of your business phone records that 
refer to telephone number (208) 765-4050, during the period from September 2010 through April 
2012, or thereafter, including conversations between opposing counsel, prosecutors, and yourself 
and / or Julie Vetter, your former paralegal, in regard to phone conversations involving the 
Plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of January, 2015 
C 
Pro Se Litigant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of January, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keith D. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
1500 Bank of America Financial Center 
601 West Riverside Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0626 
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David A Kulisch 
RAJIDALL I DANSKJN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Telephone: 509-747-2052 
E-mail: dak@randalldanskin.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Telephone: 509-747-2052 
E-mail: kdb@randalldanskin.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
CASENO. CV-14-8801 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS AND 
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET 
OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, Christina J. Greenfield (Hereafter: 11 Greenfield 11), 
hereby prnvides notice and submits the following First Set of Request for Production of 
Documents to the above-named Defendant, Ian D. Smith (hereafter: "Smith") and his attorney of 
record, Keith]), Brown and David A. Kulisch. 
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DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS APPLICABLE TO EACH REQUEST 
A. In responding to these Requests for Production of Documents and other items of 
evidence, you are required to provide all information asked for, and to furnish all 
documents, items of evidence, and infomiation that is available to you or subject to your 
reasonable inqui1y, including all documents, items of evidence, items of inf01mation, and 
information in the possession of your attorneys, accountants, advisers, or other persons 
directly or indirectly employed by, or connected with, you or your attorney's and anyone 
else otherwise subject to your control. 
B. In responding to these Requests for Production of Documents and other items of 
evidence, you must make a diligent search of your records and of other paper and 
materials :in your possession or available to you or your attorney's or representatives. 
C. In a request, respond to each part separately a..'1d in full, and do not lintlt your answer to the 
:interrogatory or request as a whole. If these requests cannot be answered in full, answer to 
the extent possible, specify the reason for your inability to respond to the remainder, and 
srate whatever information and knowledge you have regarding the unanswered portion. 
D. These requests for Production of Documents are deemed to be continuing in nature rmd your 
responses the!'eto must be supplemented to· the maximum extent authorized by law and the 
applicable rules. 
E. "Documents" shall mean all Wtitten or graphic matter of every kind or descliption, 
however, produced or reproduc~ whether draft or fin~ original or reproduction signed or 
uusigned, and regardless of whether approved, signed, sent, received, redrafted, or executed, 
:includmg but not limited to: written communications, letters, conespondence, facsimiles, e-mail, 
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memoranda, minutes, notes, films, recordings, of any type, transc1ipts, contracts, agreements, 
purchase or sales orders, memoranda of telephone conversations of personal conversations, 
diaries, desk calendars, interoffice communications, reports, studies, bills, receipts, checks, 
checkbooks, invoices, requisitions or material similar to any of the foregoing however 
denominated, by whomever prepared, and to whomever addressed, which are in your 
possession, custody or control or to which you have had or can obtain access. 
F. 1'Person(s)" shall mea:p and include: A natural person, partnership, :finn, or corporation or any 
other kind of business 01· legal entity, its agents, or employees. In each instance where you 
are asked to identify or list a name of a person, state with respect to each such pers-0n or persons 
his n rune, last lrnown residence, and business addi:esses, and telephone numbers. 
G. 11 Communications" shall mean all inquities, discussions, conversations, negotiations, 
agreements, understandings, meetings, telephone conversations, letters, correspondence, notes, 
telegrams, telexes, advertisements, facsimiles, e-mail, or other forms of verbal and/or 
communicative contact. 
H. "You" or "your" refers to Defendant herein and to all other persons acting orputpo1ting to act on 
behalf of Defendant, including agents and employees. 
I. TI1e pe1iod of time encompassed by these requests shall be from the date of the attomcy client 
. relationship begun behveen Plaintiff and Defendant until the :final dissolution of nil facts and 
:findings. 
J. Every document submitted under this request shall be certified and signed under Rule 26(a)(l) 
or (a)(3) and every discovery respo~se, or objection must be signed by at least one attorney of 
record in the attorneyts own name or by the party personally, and must state the signer's 
address, e-mail :tddress, and telephone number: By signing, an attorney or party certifies that 
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to the best of the person's knowledge that the information with respect to a disclosure, is 
complete and correct as of the time it is made. 
REQUESTS FORPRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Defendant's Prefatory Objection to Plaintiff's Discovery 
Plaintiff se1ved these "Requests for Production" upon the Defendant pursuant to 1RCP 34. Plaintiff 
has included ce1tain "Requests for Production" which do not comply with IRCP 34 and Defendant objects to 
the improper form of the ''Requests for Production" and advises Plaintiff that responses to those ce1tain 
"Requests for Production" which are not truly Requests for Production are not required. Without waiving 
this objection, Defendant will treat those certain ''Requests for Production" as Intenogatories as allowed by 
IRCP 33 and will provide responses and objections, as required by the 1RCP. 
Request for Production No. 1: Do you intend to call any expe1t witnesses at the trial of this case? If 
so, state as to each such witness the name and business address of the witness, the witness's qualifications 
as an expe1t, the subject matter upon which the witness is expected to testif}1, the subst~nce of the facts and 
opinions to which the witness is expected to testify, and a Slllllill3.I.Y of the grounds for each opinion. Produce 
all lea.med treatises (published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on the subject of history, or other science or 
rut, as defined in rnle 803 (18) of the Jdaho Rules of Evidence) upon which any of your expeLt witness base 
their opinions, or may rely upon in rendering their opinions in this action. Produce all other documents upon 
which any of your expe1t witnesses base their opinions, or may rely upon in rendering their opinions in this 
action. 
Response: Peter Erbland, Lake City Law Group, P.O. Box E, Coeur D Alene, ID 83816. Mr. 
Erbland is a practicing attorney in Coeur d'Alene, ID and is experienced in civil and criminal law. 
Mr. Erbland will testify regarding the standard of care for practicing civil and criminal lawyers in 
Ida110 and he will testify that Ian Smith did not breach the standard of care and he will fmther 
testify regarding the handling of the plaintiff's criminal and civil matter by Mx. Smith. Mr. 
Erbland will rely upon his experience as a practicing attorney for over 25 years and if he relies 
upon any additional documents, those documents will be identified at a later time. In addition, 
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if Mr. Erbland authors a report in the future, a copy of the repott will be provided to the Plaintiff. 
Since this case is relatively new and discovery has not been accomplished, the Defendant reserves 
his right to amend this response when additional factual information is available. 
Request for Production No. 2: Produce any wiitten statements, reports or memoranda, signed, made 
by any person which suppo1t: 
a. Any and all_ofyour denials to the allegations contained within the Plaintiffs Complaint herein; 
b. Any and all of your affirmative defenses to the Plaintifl's claims contained in the Plaintiff's 
complaint herein. 
Response: Defendant has not obtained any statements, reports or memoranda :from any person at this 
time to support any denials in the Plaintiff's complaint or his affinnative defenses. The Defendant reserves 
his right to amend this response when additional factual information is available. 
Request for Prnduction No. 3: List all witnesses that you intend to call at the trial in this matter and 
produce each and every exhibit, documen~ motion picture, photograph, drawing, sketch, diagram or other 
item that you intend to offer for introduction into evidence or othetwise to use for demonstrative puiposes at 
any pre-trial motion or at the trial of this matter. 
Response: Defendant objects to the disclosure of trial witnesses and the disclosure 
on trial exhibits, documents, motion pictures, photographs, drawings, sketches, 
diagrams or other items on the basis that these requests seek to invade the attorney/client 
privilege and most of this information will be subject to the Court's scheduling order in this 
matter. Without waiving said objections, it has not yet been determined which individuals 
will be called as witnesses at trial or what exhibits, documents, motion pictures, 
photographs, drawings, sketches, diagrams or other items will be offered for introduction 
into evidence at trial. However, the Defendant has provided the Plaintiff with a complete copy of 
his files in her prior representation in the criminal matter and civil matter. Notwithstanding the above 
objections, the Defendant reserves his right to amend these responses when additional factual 
information is available. 
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Request for Production No. 4: Produce any and all documents containing any notes or other 
wdtings generated by you which describe: 
a. Any incident which forms a basis for any of your denials to the allegations contained 
within the Plaintiffs complaint herein. 
Response: This request for production is overbroad and would include info1mation prepared by the 
Defendant at the advice of counsel and these notes and w1itings are protected by the attorney client p1ivilege. 
Without waiving these objections, the Defendant provided the Plaintiff with a complete copy of his files from 
his prior representation of the Plaintiff in the criminal matter and civil matter and these :files contain notes and 
other writings that will be relied upon by Defendant in defending this action and these support the denials set 
fmth in his Answer. The Defendant reserves his right to amend this response when additional 
factual information is available. 
Request fol' Production No. 5: State the name, address, and telephone number of each person 
with personal knowledge regarding the facts and circumstances smTOunding the events of the 
occruTences referxed to in the complaint. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34. Without waiving this objection, the Defendant identifies those 
individuals presently known to the Defend,i"nt. However, the Defendant reserves hjs right to 
amend this response wlien additional factual infmmation is available. 
Chris Greenfield; 
Dwight Greenfield - address unknown; 
I an Smith, 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019; 
Julie Vetter - address unknown; 
Judge Gibler, Coeur d'Alene District Court; 
Judge Haynes, Coeur d'Alene District Court; 
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Buck Bennington, address unknown; 
Josh Studor ~2501 E. Sherman Avenue, Coeur d'Alene, ID.; 
Amy Bergman - address unknown; 
Anne Taylor - 401 Y2 Sherman Avenue, Suite 207, Coeur d'Alene, 
ID.; 
Jason Johnson -Greenchain Loop, Coeur d'Alene, ID.; 
Kacey Wall- 1110 W. Park Place, Ste. 212, Coeur d'Alene, 
ID.; 
Chad Johnson -address unknown; 
Eric Wurmlinger- Plaintiff knows his address; 
Peter Erb land - Lake City Law Grnup, P.O. Box E, Coeur D Alene, ID 83816. 
Pam Wallace - address unknown; 
B. Andrews, Idaho Bar Counsel -525 W. Jefferson, Boise, ID. 
Doug Marfice - 700 Northwest Blvd., Coeur d'Alene,ID.; 
Gary Amendola -702 N. 4 1h Avenue, Coeurd' Alene, ID.; and, 
John Risbourogh - 717 W. Sprague Avenue, Spokane, WA. 
The Defendant reserves the right to amend this response and add any person identified in 
any of the documents, pleadings, emails, letters, monthly billing statements or discovery 
obtained during the defense of this litigation. 
Request for Production No. 6: Produce, identify, and describe in detail all evidence 
including documents, affidavits, statements, reports, photos, memoranda, or other, utilized in the 
investigation, upon which the Plaintiff was officially charged with Felony Malicious Injury to 
Property on June 3, 2010, that you obtained from the Ann Taylor, Plaintiffs Public Defender and/ 
or State Prosecutor1s and/ or others in regard to the Plaintiff. 
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Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34. Without waiving this objection, see Defendant's objection and 
response to Request No. 4. The Defendant reserves his right to amend this response when 
additional factual info1mation is available. 
Request for Production No. 7: Identify and describe all communications you have had with any 
other person regarding the Plaintiff', the subject matter of this litigation, or any individual or entity 
believed by you to be associated with the Plaintiff, and include in your response the date of the 
communication, the method of communication, and the identity of the individual or entity who 
received or sent the communication. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34 and i:he request is overbroad and invades the attorney-client privilege. 
Without waiving these objections, the Defendant had in person conversations, telephone calls, 
and exchanged letters, facsimile transmissions and emails with the Plaintiff, opposing counsel, 
potential witnesses, as identified above, and the plaintiffs in the prior civil case. The defendant 
is unable to recall the dates of all of these communications but some of the dates are 
reflected in the billing records, which were previously provided to the Plaintiff. In 
addition, Defendant incorporates his response to Request for Production No. 2 and the 
Defendant reserves his right to amend this response when additional factual information is 
available. 
Request for Production No. 8: Identify any legal claims or lawsuits filed by or against you in 
the last ten (10) years, including the case style, case number, parties, and jurisdiction, agency, or 
other entity in which such claim or suit was filed. 
Response: Defendant objects that th.is request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under lRCP 34 and the request is overbroad and seeks information that is not likely to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving these objections, the Defendant 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINlliF'S 
FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS - Page 8 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 527 of 710
I . 
was sued in Idaho Distiict Com1, Case No. CV06-04583, Maria Emerson v. Ian D. Smith and the 
matter was dismissed on May 2, 2007. The only other cases Defendant has filed against clients 
are for unpaid fees are not relevant to this htigation. 
Request for Production No. 9: Produce any recordings made by or with your involvement 
regarding the Plaintiff, the subject matter of this litigation, or any individual or entity believed by you 
to be associated with the Plaintiff, including, but not limiting your response to the date, location and 
reasons any such recording was made. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34. Without waiving this objection, none. 
Request for Production No. 10: If you claim that any statement or document responsive to any 
intenogatory or request for production has been destroyed, deleted, or is otherwise unavailable, 
identify each such statement or document, providing the date such statement or document was made 
or published, the last date that statement or document is known to have exfated, what happened to that . 
statement or document, and provide a summmy of the content and meaning of that statement or 
document. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34. Without waiving this objection, the Defendant isn't aware of any at 
this time but reserves the right to amend this ·response should such information be discovered 
during the course of the litigation. 
Request for Production No. 11: Identify any oral, written, or recorded statements taken by you 
or on your behalf in connection with the claims or defenses raised in this matter, providing the 
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identity of anyone who heard or received such statement, the date of any such statement, how such 
statement was made, where each such statement was made, a summary of the content and meaning of 
that statement and the identity of anyone in possession of a c_opy of each statement. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34 and the request is overbroad and invades the attorney-client privilege. 
Without waiving these objections, none. 
Request for Production No. 12: To provide the background of the Defendant including: age, 
date of biith, address, maiital status, militaty status, criminal history, education, church affiliation, 
memberships in any organization, employer and position of employment if an individual. If you 
own a business, to provide the type of business structure, date of fmmation, place of fo1mation and 
the names and addresses of all partners, owners, managers, shareholders or officers. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34 and the request is overbroad, requests information that is not likely to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, violates the 1 si Amendment to the U.S. and Idaho 
Constitutions regarding the free exercise of religion and the Defendant's right of freedom of 
association. Without waiving these objections, the Defendant is Age: 52. Date of Birth: 
Address: PO Box 3019, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816. Married. No military service. 
Criminal History: No felony convictions. Education: High School, College, Law School. 
Member ofldaho State Bar. Self employed. Sole proprietor. Formed 1997. Formed in Coeur 
d'Alene. Ian D. Smith, PO Box 3019 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816. 
Request for Production No. 13: Produce each and eve1y exhibit, document, motion picture, 
photograph, drawing, sketch, diagram, voice recordings, email(s), repmts, or any other item in your 
possession during your repTesentation for both the Plaintiff's criminal and civil proceedings. 
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Response: The Defendant provided the Plaintiff with a complete copy of his files from his p1ior 
representation of the Plaintiff in the c1iminal matter and civil matter and these files contain notes and other 
writings that will be relied upon by Defendant in defending this action and these support the denials set forth 
in his Answer. The Defendant reserves his right to amend this response when additional factual 
information is available. 
Request for Production No. 14: Produce any and all emails that were exchanged by you and 
any other persons dming the period you represented the Plaintiff or thereafter. 
Response: Defendant objects that request is overbroad, requests infonnation that is not 
likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, seeks infonnation that would invade the 
attorney client privilege and the Defendant's 1·epresentation of clients in other cases, and seeks 
information that is not likely to lead to the discove1y of admissible evidence. Without waiving 
these objections, see Response to Request for Production No. 13. 
Request for Production No. 15: Produce any and all documents, written statements, reports or 
memoranda containing all c01respondence between you and the PJaintiff during tl-ie period you represented the 
Plaintiff or thereafter. 
Response: See Response to Request for Production No. 13. 
Request for Production No.16: Produce any and all photographs, video recordings, audio recordings, 
drawings, charts, diagrams, emails, facsimile, texts, or other, containing communication that 
transpired between you and attorneys Gaiy Amendola, Douglas Marfice, and John Riseborough in regard to 
the Plaintiff. 
Response: See Response to Request for Production No. 13. 
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Request for P.roouctionNo.17: Produce any and all photographs, video recordings, audio recordings, 
drawings, charts, diagrams, emails, facsimile, texts, or other, containing communication that 
transpired between you and the State Prosecuting Attomey(s), in regard Lo the Plaintiff's criminal 
proceedings. 
Response: See Response to Request for Production No. 13. 
Request for Production No. 18: Produce any and all documents, ,vritten statements, reports or 
memoranda containing all of your repo1ted and / or docmnented homs that were charged to the Plaintiff on 
both the criminal and civil proceedings for which you represented and/ or def ended the Plaintiff, including 
all payments made on behalfof the Plaintiff toward said services. 
Response: See Response to Request for Production No. 13. 
Request for Production No. 19: Describe your personal and / or professional relationship with 
Pamela Rilliet Wallace. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34. Without waiving this objection, I have no personal relationship with 
Pamela Wallace. I represented Pamela Wallace in a legal matter. 
Reguest for Production No. 20: Produce any and all video recordings, audio recordings, drawings, 
chmts, diagrams, emails, facsimile, texts, or other, containing communication that transpired between you and 
the Idaho State Bar Association in regard to the Plaintiff and/ or Pamela Rilliet Wallace. 
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Response: See attached redacted email. 
Request for Production No. 21: Produce a_ny and all dates that you were not available during the 
period from September 2010 tlnuugh April 2012, due to absences, vacations, and/ or out of town excursions 
while you were representing the Plaintiff. · 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under lRCP 34. Without waiving this objection, Request for Production No. 21 is 
vague and ambiguous as the words "available", "absences" and "out of town excursions", 
because these terms are not defined. Without waiving said objection, typically, I do not 
communicate with Clients before 9:00 a.m. and after 5 :00 p.m., on weekends and national 
holidays. If I am in preparing for trial, drafting a brief, in court, in a deposition, or otherwise 
involved in a task requiring my full attention on a client's matter, typically, I do not 
communicate with clients during these business hours. If I am out of the office during the 
work week, typically, I communicate with clients by telephone, email or through my assistant. 
During my representation of the Plaintiff, I am certain that one or more of the above 
circumstances occw:red although it is impossible for me to detail every date or time that such 
may have occuffed. Moreover, I am certain that I did take vacation during that time and I am 
usually able to communicate with my office and, occasionally with clients, by telephone, email 
or facsimile. 1 don't recall not having the ability to cormnunicate with the Plaintiff during the 
period of time in question. 
Request for Production No. 22: Produce any and all of your business phone records that refer to 
telephone munber (208) 765-4050, dming the pe1iod fium September 2010 tbmugh April 2012, or thereafter, 
including conve1sations between opposing counsel, prosecutors, and yourself and/ or Julie Vetter, your former 
paralegal, in regard to phone conversations involving the Plaintiff. 
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Response: Defendant objects that this request is overbroad, vague and burdensome. 
Moreover, the Defendant asserts that the phone records are not likely to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence as any phone call with "opposing counsel", "prosecutors" or "Julie Vetter" 
during this time could be related to another client and I would have no way of determining that 
fact. Without waiving these objections, the Defendant will attempt .to obtain these records from 
his archives and, if necessmy, from his phone carrier. 
CERTIFICATION 
THE UNDERSIGNED ATTOR.J.~EY for plaintiff bas read the foregoing Answers to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents in compliance with IRCP 26(f). 
DATED this,49"1ay ofFebrnary, 2015. 
STATE OF IDAHO 




KEITH D. BROWN, ISB #3635' 
DAVID A. KULISCH 
1\ttorneys for Defendant 
IAN D. SMITH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: I am the person 
answering the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET 9E-REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS; I have read the same, 7,atftents ~, _ , and beli~v: the same to be true, 
- Ian D. S 
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February 25, 2015 
Keith D. Brown 
Attorney At Law 
601 W. Riverside Ave 
Suite# 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Dear Mr. Brown: 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
PRO SE L!T!GANT 
210 S. PARK WOOD PLACE 
POST FALLS, IDAHO 83854 
Telephone: (208) 773-0400 
RE: Greenfield v. Smith / Case No. CV-14-8801 
I wouid like to depose Ian D. Smith. Please provide me with you and Mr. Smith's respective available 
dates through the month of March 2015, no later than Wednesday March 4, 2015. 




Pro Se Litigant 
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March 4, 2015 
Keith D. Brown 
Attorney At Law 
601 W. Riverside Ave 
Suite# 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Dear Mr. Brown: 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
PRO SE UTJGANT 
210 S. PARK WOOD PLACE 
POST FALLS, IDAHO 83854 
Telephone: (208) 773-0400 
RE: Greenfield v. Smith/ Case No. CV-14~8801 
I would like to depose Ian D. Smith. Please provide me with you and Mr. Smith's respective available 
dates through the month of May 2015. 
I understand neither you nor Mr. Smith is available during the month of March 2015 (except for March 
19, 2015 per conversation with Debbie/ Paralegal) or April 2015. 
I am attempting to depose Ms. Julie Vetter in April 2015 should you plan on attending said depo. 
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Ms. Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, Idaho 83854 
RANDALL I DANSKIN 
ATTORNEYS 
March 9, 2015 
David A Kulisch 
dak@randalldans kin. com 
RE: Response to your March 4, 2015 letter 
Dear Ms. Greenfield: 
I received your letter of March 4, 2015 on March 9, 2015. Your letter misstates the 
content of your conversation with Ms. King and fmiher misstates Mr. Smith's and my 
availability in March. On February 27, 2015, I advised you that Mr. Smith and I were available 
on March 13, 18 and 19. Then, I learned on March 2, 2015 that Mr. Smith was no longer 
available on March 13, 2015. I asked my paralegal, Debbie, to call and advise you that we were 
still available on March 18 and March 19. She further advised you that we were also available 
on March 16, 2015 in the morning and on March 17, 2015 in the afternoon. You advised Ms. 
King that you were thinking about taking the deposition on March 19, 2015 but you would get 
back to her. When we didn't hear back from you, I asked Ms. King to contact you and find out if 
the deposition was going forward on March 19, 2015. You advised Ms. King that you were not 
prepared to proceed on March 19, 2015 and you would like dates in May 2015. 
However, I want to be very clear here about correspondence and discussions between us. 
I will not misrepresent facts that I relay to you or hear from you. Please do not misrepresent 
facts that we relate to you or that you relate to us. Mr. Smith and I provided you multiple dates 
in March when we were available. You elected not to schedule his deposition on the dates that 
we provided. (Previously, I advised you of my unavailability due to a vacation that was planned 
long ago and I will be unavailable from April 4, 2015 to April 22, 2015.) So, the statement in 
your letter is untrue that "I understand neither you nor Mr. Smith is available during the month of 
March (except for March 19, 2015 per conversation with Debbie/Paralegal) or April 2015). 
Mr. Smith and I are still available on those March dates that we provided to you but you 
elected not to schedule his deposition on those dates. Notwithstanding the above, Mr. Smith and 
I are available May 4th through May 8tl1, 2015. However, if you don't provide us with the date 
that you would like to take his deposition, those dates are likely to fill in with our busy litigation 
schedules, which is what happened for Mr. Smith on March 13, 2015. So, please do not wait too 
long to get back to me with your preferred date for Mr. Smith's deposition. 
A Professional Service Corporation 
1500 BANK OF AMERICA FINANCIAL CENTER I 601 WEST RrVERSIDE AVENUE I SPOKANE, WASHfNGTON 99201 
P: 509 747-2052 I F: 509 624-2528 I randalldanskin.com , 
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As for Ms. Vetter' s deposition, Mr. Brown or I will attend any depositions that you 
provide notice to us. You should be aware that you are obligated to provide written notice of any 
deposition that you intend to take. As a courtesy, it is typical to contact opposing counsel and 
coordinate the deposition with opposing counsel's schedule. I intend to provide you the same 
courtesies that I would provide to any opposing attorney and I am hopeful that you will do the 
same. I provided you with a notice of unavailability for the dates between April 4, 2015 and 
April 21, 2015. You should not schedule Ms. Vetter's deposition during that time frame as I had 
scheduled a vacation long ago and I cmmot change my flight or hotel plans. I would like to 
attend Ms. Vetter's deposition and I will have questions for her. 
If you schedule Ms. Vetter' s deposition during my absence, I will assume that you have 
no intent to extend corniesies to this office and I will respond accordingly. I understand that you 
do not litigate for a living so I have tried to treat you with respect, recognize that you may not 
understand all of the legal procedures and I advised Mr. Smith that I would answer all of your 
"Requests for Production" even though some of the questions were actually interrogatories, 
which are propounded under a different section of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. 
Brown and I try very hard to treat all attorneys and litigants with respect and we will do that here 
so long as you do the same. Please let me know what date will work best for Mr. Smith's 
deposition. As stated previously, I prefer to do the deposition in our office or in Mr. Smith's 
office. Obviously, I would prefer here because the entire file is here and it's difficult to transfer. 
Just a reminder again that you will need to contact and arrange for a corni repo1ier. 
I would like to take your deposition in two paiis as it appears that I will have at least two 
days of questions for you. For simplicity's sake, I would like to spend the first day going 
through your claims and complaints against Mr. Smith and get those issues tied down. Then, I 
would probably schedule your 211d deposition day to cover all of your damages and medical 
records. I can't schedule the 2nd deposition day until I receive responses to the interrogatories 
and requests for production that we propounded and we have the opportunity to obtain your 
medical records. In addition, I will also question you at this 211d deposition regarding your 
multiple bankruptcy filings. You stated in discovery responses in the Wurmlinger litigation that 
you filed for bankruptcy and you made another statement in the current complaint that you filed 
for bankruptcy as a result of Mr. Smith's alleged negligence. Please provide me with the dates 
of filing and U.S. District Bankrnptcy Court location where the bankruptcies were filed so I can 
obtain those records. 
Please provide several dates in March that you would be available for your 1st deposition 
day. Please do not hesitate to call me with any questions. 
Very Truly Yours, 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
Keith D. Brown 
David A. Kulisch 
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March 20, 2015 
Keith D. Brown and David Kulisch 
Attorneys At Law 
601 W. Riverside Ave 
Suite# 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
) CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
PRO SE LITIGANT 
210 S. PARK WOOD PLACE 
POST FALLS, IDAHO 83854 
Telephone: {208} 773-0400 
RE: Greenfield v. Smith / Case No. CV-14-8801 
Dear Mr. Brown and Mr. Kulisch: 
I would like to depose Ian D. Smith on May 6, 2015, at 1:00 PM in Mr. Smith's conference room in Coeur d'Alene, 
Idaho. 
I am not available for my deposition during the few remaining days of March 2015. 
I am available for my deposition during April 8 through April 25, 2015, and May 8 through May 31, 2015. 
I am receiving conflicting correspondence from your office. A letter dated March 9, 2015, which utilizes Kulisch 
letter-head, appears to be a reply from David Kulisch in response to my letter dated March 4, 2015, and refers to 
Kulisch' April absences, yet the letter is signed by Mr. Brown. Are you both out of the office during April 2015? 
I would like to depose Ms. Julie Vetter during April 2015, and would like to know your available dates. I do not 
understand why Mr. Kulisch' absence (per Notice of David Kuiisch Unavailability) will affect the April 2015 
deposition scheduling when it is apparent that both Mr. Brown and Mr. Kulisch are assisting in Mr. Smith's case. 
As for a conversation that took place between Ms. King and I via telephone, I would prefer to correspond ONLY by 
letter so another "he-says ... she-says" is avoided in future communications. 
Please DO NOT question my honesty. I will respond with the truth as I know it and have NO intentions of acting 
with any deceit during the court proceedings of this case. I have personally witnessed so-called law abiding 
citizens as well as attorneys who have twisted the truth and misrepresented the facts on many occasions. I am not 
an attorney and do NOT pretend to be one, nor do I have any aspirations of ever being an attorney, so forgive me 
if my "lingo" is not up to par. 
In response to your questioning my "Bankruptcy", I spoke to my attorney, Jeff Andrews, yesterday, who informed 
me that my verbiage was wrong. I have "Petitioned for a Bankruptcy'', signed the documents, but it has not yet 
been finalized and filed with the Court. My apologies for the misunderstanding. 
I will be responding to your discovery as scheduled. I presume that my request for discovery has been completed 
prior to my inspection set for March 25, 2015, at your office. 
Sincerely, 
Christina Greenfield 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 










Case No. CV-2014-8801 
DEPOSITION OF IAN D. SMITH 
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AT 608 NORTHWEST BOULEVARD, COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 
MAY 6, 2015, AT 1:00 P.M. 
REPORTED BY: 
JOLIE MCCAUGHAN, C.S.R. NO. 684 
Notary Public 
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TESTIMONY OF IAN D. SMITH 
Examination by Ms. Greenfield 
DEPOSITION EXHIBITS: 
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1 THE DEPOSITION OF IAN D. SMITH, was taken on 
2 behalf of the PLAINTIFF, on MAY 6, 2015, at the law 
3 offices of IAN D. SMITH, 608 NORTHWEST BOULEVARD, COEUR 
4 D'ALENE, IDAHO, before M & M Court Reporting, LLC, by 
5 JULIE MCCAUGHAN, Court Reporter and Notary Public within 
6 and for the State of Idaho, to be used in an action 
7 pending in the District Court of the First Judicial 
8 District for the State of Idaho, in and for the County 
9 of Kootenai, said cause being Case No. CV-2014-8801 in 
10 said Court. 
11 AND THEREUPON, the following testimony was 
12 adduced, to wit: 
13 IAN D. SMITH, 
14 having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the 
15 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, relating to said 
16 cause, deposes and says: 
17 EXAMINATION 
















Okay. Could you please state your full 
Ian Douglas Smith. 
And Mr. Smith, where do you currently 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. 
And for how long? 
SMITH, IAN D. 5/6/2015 

























1993? And how long have you lived in 
Since 1993. 
Okay. And where did you move from? 
Moscow, Idaho. 
Moscow? And what is your college 
Page 5 
I have a law degree from the University of 
How long have you been in practice? 
Since 1993. 
Okay. So that's when you started? And 




















Your law practice. 
In Coeur d'Alene. 




Could you explain what type of what did 
You said you started practicing law in '93. 
24 What were you doing? 
25 A. I worked for the public defender's office. 
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1 Q. Oh, public defender? Okay. How long were 










In Kootenai County? 
Correct. 
Have you ever applied with any firms in 



















Have you ever worked with any firms in 
Worked for? 
Yes. 
In Spokane County? 
No. 
Did you ever apply at any firms in 





Q. In the Wurmlinger case, Paine, Hamblen was 
the attorney representing Wurmlingers. Have you ever 





I don't understand the question. 
Paine, Hamblen -- John Riseborough was 
24 employed with Paine, Hamblen & Associates. Have you 
25 ever personally worked with any Paine, Hamblen & 
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1 Associates attorneys? 
2 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form of the question. 
3 You can answer. 
4 THE WITNESS: I don't understand the question. 















Have you ever been represented by Peter 
In what fashion? 
Civil case. 
No. 
Do you have a special practice area? 
No. 
How many clients would you say roughly 
14 that you've represented with property line disputes? 



















Malicious injury to property cases? 
No idea. 
Do you know how many civil cases you have 
I don't. 
How many you've won? 
I don't. 
Criminal cases you've tried? 
SMITH, IAN D. 5/6/2015 













I don't know. 
Criminal cases you've won? 
I don't know. 
Can you get that information? 
I don't know. 
Page 8 
Are there any specific rules that you must 
7 follow when you withdraw off of a client's case? 
8 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form of the question. 
9 THE WITNESS: I don't understand the question. 











Q. Have you ever withdrawn from a client's 
case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are there particular rules that you must 
follow when you do that? 
A. Again, I don't understand the question. 
Q. When you withdraw off of a case, what's 
your procedure? 
A. File a motion to withdraw. 
Q. Have you ever withdrawn from a civil suit 











Do you know how many? 
I don't. 
Can you tell me why you would withdraw 
SMITH I IAN D. 5/6/2015 
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1 from a case? 
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2 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form of a question. 
3 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
4 Q. When you withdraw from a case, is there 














There are a variety of reasons. 
Can you give me any examples? 
Nonpayment. 
Anything else? 
Communication with the client has 
Do you ever settle cases through 
14 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form of the question. 
15 You can answer. 
16 THE WITNESS: I don't settle them, no. 
17 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
18 Q. Have you ever attempted to try mediation 












I have been involved in mediation with my 




SMITH, IAN D. 5/6/2015 







There was one other case, and I can't 
3 recall the plaintiff's name. 















That sounds right. 
Was Peter Erbland your attorney on that 
Not to my knowledge. 
Were you represented by counsel on that 
I don't recall. 
On March 9, 2005, you filed several claims 
13 against individuals all on the same date. Were those 


















March 9, 2005. 
I can't recall. 
There's approximately 10. 
Do you know Sue Jones? 
I believe so. 
Was she a client of yours? 
I can't disclose that. 
Okay. You realize that's public record, 






I still can't disclose it. 
Do you know Pamela Wallace? 
SMITH, IAN D. 5/6/2015 









Did you represent her? 
I can't disclose that. 
MR. KULISCH: I'm going to give you a little 
Page 11 
5 leeway here, but you understand that we're here for a 
6 case that involves your prior cases. 
7 
8 
MS. GREENFIELD: Correct. 
MR. KULISCH: And he's going to be put in a 
9 position -- you can ask him about every person he ever 
10 represented, but he's not entitled to disclose 
11 information regarding those folks without a waiver from 
12 them, which obviously he could not obtain because he 
13 wouldn't know who you were going to ask about. So I'll 
14 give you leeway and I probably won't object to all of 
15 them, but at some point I will and I'll just tell him, 
16 "You don't need to answer that." 
17 MS. GREENFIELD: You do realize that Pamela is in 
18 the case that we presented? 
19 
20 
MR. KULISCH: I do understand that. 
MS. GREENFIELD: And there was disclosure that was 
21 given in that case through an e-mail. 
22 
23 
MR. KULISCH: Yes. And that's why I didn't object 
to that. But I'm just telling you if we're going to 
24 start asking about every client he's got or had, I am 
25 going to jump in at some point. 
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Okay. Did you represent Pamela Wallace? 
I can't answer that. 
Q. What is your method of determining and 
5 dealing with conflicts of interest with your clients? 
I don't understand the question. 6 
7 
A. 
Q. For instance, if you were representing 
8 Pamela Wallace and myself at the same time, and I had a 
9 problem with Pamela Wallace, how would you deal with 
10 that? 
11 MR. KOLISCH: Object to the form of the question. 
12 You can answer. 
13 THE WITNESS: I can't answer 
14 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
15 Q. How do you determine and deal with 
16 conflicts of interest with your clients? 
17 
18 
A. Again, I don't understand the question. 
Q. I think it's pretty simple. Did you 
19 contact the Idaho Bar via e-mail about the Pamela 
20 Wallace issue that we discussed? 
21 A. I contacted the Idaho Bar regarding Pamela 
22 Wallace, yes. 
23 Q. Do you remember a conversation I had with 
24 you on October 14, 2011 regarding a confession from 
25 Pamela Wallace? 
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A. I don't recall the date. 
Q. Do you remember that we had a discussion 
about a confession from Pamela Wallace? 
A. I recall we had a conversation about 
Pamela Wallace. 
Q. Do you remember what it referred to? 
A. You were -- you informed me that you had a 
conversation with Pamela Wallace whereby she admitted to 
you that she had vandalized the Wurmlinger residence. 
Q. 
A. 
What did you do at that point? 
I advised you that Pamela Wallace was a 
12 former client and that I could not take any action until 
13 I had spoken with Idaho Bar counsel. 
14 Q. What did Idaho Bar counsel inform you that 
15 you could do? 
16 A. They told me that I had no -- at that 
17 time -- current obligation to Ms. Wallace and that I 
18 could disclose what you had told me to other parties. 






I did not. 
Did you feel obligated to talk to law 






No, I asked you to do it. 
Is that typical where you would ask a 
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1 client to do something like that rather than yourself? 
2 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form of the question. 
3 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
4 Q. Do you normally ask your client -- if 
5 there's a police action that needs to be taken, do you 
6 ask your client that you're representing to make that 
7 call? 
8 MR. KULISCH: Same objection. 
9 THE WITNESS: It depends. In this particular 
10 case, since I did not personally receive the information 
11 from Pamela Wallace, I thought it was better suited that 
12 you would speak with law enforcement directly. 
13 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
14 Q. Do you keep a phone log? 
15 A. I don't understand the question. 
16 Q. How do you keep track of your clients when 
17 they call in? 
18 
19 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. You can answer. 
THE WITNESS: I don't understand what you mean. 












If I were to call you and you weren't 
you know that I called? 
It depends. Would you leave a message? 
If I left a message. 
Then I would know that you called because 
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keep a list of your clients when 
log that time? 
a regular basis. 
your telephone provider? 
what period of time? 
the time you represented me, from 










It was Verizon and Frontier. 
Do you keep your phone records? 
From that period of time, I do. 
How are you compensated from your clients? 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 





Are you compensated from your clients? 
I think that would -- I think if I 
17 answered that, I would be violating my attorney/client 
18 privilege. 
19 Q. How were you -- if I came to you and I 
20 wanted you to be my attorney, what kind of arrangements 









It depends on the kind of case. 
What is normal? 
I don't know what other people do. 
SMITH, IAN D. 
I know 
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That's why I'm asking you, what do you do? 
I just told you. 
Q. So flat or hourly, are those your two 
options? 
A. Contingency, also. 
Q. How do you keep track of your clients' 
billable hours? 
A. I write it down. 
Q. 
A. 
You write it down on a piece of paper? 
It's varied over time. I do it on the 













Do you keep those records? 
The ones I'm doing now? 
Q. From September 10 -- during my time, 
September 10, 2010 through March 9, 2012. 
A. I may have them. I don't know. 
Q. So when you record that time, where are 




You mean right now? 
Uh-huh. 
Like I said, I don't know if I have them 






Where would you have kept them? 
In the office. 
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In a file? 
Or a box. 
Are you required to keep them for a time? 
No. 
How do you keep track of your court 
On a calendar. 
Hard copy calendar? On your computer? 
9 A. What period of time are we talking? 
10 Q. During the time -- this will be during the 
11 time that you represented me, September of 2010 through 
12 March of 2012. 
13 A. I believe it was both for a period of 











20 and software. 
21 Q. 
How do you schedule your pre-trial 
On a calendar. 
Back then, it was a calendar only? 
When I say calendar, I mean both hard copy 
Okay. What type of system do you use to 








I don't understand your question. 
Word? What type of program? 
I still don't understand your question. 
SMITH, IAN D. 5/6/2015 
















How do you keep track of all your files? 
They're in my filing cabinet. 
Have you produced every written document 
and communication between you and I during the time that 
you represented me? 
A. I believe so, but I haven't seen the 
documents that you've taken, so I'm not -- I mean, I 
have given what I believe to be the entirety of our 
communication to my counsel, and I'm assuming he has 
provided you with the same. 
Q. How do you communicate or correspond 
12 between attorneys on the cases? 







THE WITNESS: In what cases? 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Q. My case in particular. Phone, e-mail, fax 
is what I'm looking for. 
A. Phone, e-mail -- I believe there was some 
e-mail communication -- fax was significant at that 









Did you prepare for this deposition today? 
Uh-huh. 
What did you do to prepare for it? 
I reviewed your modified complaint and I 
25 reviewed some of the file from both the criminal and 
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Q. Did you bring any documents with you 
today? 
A. I did not. 
Q. How do you expect to remember everything? 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: I don't. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Q. What are the claims that I brought against 
10 the Wurmlingers? Do you remember? 
11 A. It was a violation of the CC&Rs, it was a 









infliction of emotional distress. 
Can you be more specific on the CC&R 
Yeah. The allegation was that they were 








I don't understand your question. 
Were there anything else under CC&R 
21 violations that you were representing for me, claims? 




Q. Do you recall if there was a claim brought 
against an arborvitae hedge issue as being a fence? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
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Q. In one of the claims that I brought 
against the Wurmlingers, did it address an arborvitae 
hedge? 
A. Oh, there may have been a claim for 
declaratory judgment. 
Q. Did you assert a claim for breach of 
contract? 
A. I don't recall. 
9 Q. Okay. I'm going to ask you questions 
10 regarding the criminal case right now. The felony 
11 malicious injury to property that you represented me on. 
12 Did you read over the discovery responses that came from 















Do you remember what I was charged with? 
I believe it was felony malicious injury 
Do you remember what documents the 




In any of his discovery responses. Do you 
22 remember anything that was turned over to you? 
23 A. I remember there were police reports, 
24 there were photographs. 
25 Q. Anything else? 
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Not that I can recall. 
Do you remember seeing an FBI NCIC report 





A. I did, yes. Well, we received an NCIC. 
don't think it referred to you, however. 
Q. 
A. 
Could you clarify that? 
Well, my recollection is that it was in 












Did you address that with the prosecutor? 
In what way? 
Did you ask why there was an FBI NCIC 







Because I'd seen that frequently from the 
17 prosecutor's office. Many individuals have the same 
18 name. And when the prosecutor runs the NCIC and sends 
19 out their response to discovery, on more than one 
20 occasion I've seen that there's the wrong people listed 









So what's your procedure on that? 
Nothing. 
You just ignore it? 
It's not prejudicial to the client. 
I 
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Q. If it's ln another name, it's not 
prejudicial to your client? Is that what you're saying? 
Prejudicial? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
Q. The prosecutor was accusing me of a crime 
and was stating in that report, if I remember, that I 
was accused of other crimes. Do you remember that? 
A. No. The purpose of the NCIC is to just 
advise the defendant of other potential crimes that they 
may have committed previously. Since you were not the 
11 person named in the NCIC report, those crimes were not 
12 attached to you. 
13 Q. And you felt -- once again, you felt that 
14 you did not need to make any type of notice to the 
15 prosecutor that he had the wrong person in that report? 










Q. Who was the detective for the Post Falls 




I don't recall his name. 
Does Rodney Gunderson sound familiar? 
He was at least one of the individuals 
from Post Falls that were involved. 
Q. Did you look over the entire report after 
you received it from the public defender's office? 
A. I reviewed what I received from the public 
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1 defender's office. 
2 Q. Did you review the order affidavit for 
3 probable cause? 
4 A. I did. 
5 Q. Do you remember what was on that? 
6 A. Not with specificity, no. 
7 Q. Did you read Officer Gunderson's report? 
8 A. I did. 
9 Q. Do you remember what his report contained? 
10 A. Generally, he received a telephone call, I 
11 believe, from the Wurmlingers, your neighbors, who I 
12 believe had been out of town, and they returned to find 
13 a row of bushes that had been 1:Jot cut down; but 
14 the tops had been cut to a specific level. And I 
15 believe that Gunderson was speaking to the Wurmlingers 
16 outside of their home and you were backing out of your 
17 driveway, and Gunderson approached you and engaged you 
18 in conversation. And I think you said that it was a 
19 civil matter and it was taken care of and you had a 
20 legal basis to do what you had done, that you had a 
21 third party do the trimming, that you didn't do it, you 
22 would not disclose who actually did do the trimming, and 
23 ultimately you left, and I think Gunderson went back to 
24 talk to the Wurmlingers. And I think you also said 
25 something to Gunderson about the prior owner of your 
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1 house having had a survey conducted, and I ~hink in that 
2 report you're speaking of, Gunderson followed up on 
3 that, and I think was told by the prior owner there was 





more communication with you after that or not. I know 
that he did ultimately, but whether or not in that 
initial report there was any communication with you ... 
Q. When you read the report, did you 
9 notice -- and I quote -- "that Gunderson said a few of 
10 the trees appeared to evenly share the property line and 





14 to trial? 
I don't recall that, no. 
Did you depose Detective Gunderson prior 
15 A. Which trial? 
16 Q. We're talking about the criminal case. 
17 A. I'm not allowed to depose witnesses in a 
18 criminal case. 
19 Q. Are you aware if the Wurmlingers ever 
20 submitted any evidence that identified where the 
21 property line was actually located in relationship to 








In which case? Criminal case? 
Yes. 
Not to my knowledge, no. In fact, the 
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1 lack of that information, I believe, is what ultimately 


















Did you request a survey to determine 
arborvitae hedge was actually located? 
We did. 
Who is "we"? 
Well, you and I. 
Who actually called the surveyor? 
You did. 
Was there a court order that allowed us 







In the criminal case? 
Yes. 
I don't believe so. I think what Judge 
15 Gibler did is he ordered the state to produce their 
to 
16 survey. And if they didn't, then the judge was going to 
17 take up the issue of having the state pay for your 
18 survey to be done, and we never got to that point. 
19 Q. Did you ever talk to Dusty Overmeyer 
20 excuse me. When I had the survey done, Dusty Overmeyer 
21 was the surveyor. Did you ever talk to Dusty Overmeyer 








I believe I did. 
Are you sure that you did? 
I said I believe I did. 
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1 Q. Have you had any other cases where an 
2 individual was arrested for trimming a hedge? 
3 A. I'm not going to answer that. That 
4 violates my attorney/client privilege. 
5 Q. Did I inform you of where the arborvitae 
6 hedge was located? 
7 MR. KULISCH: I'm sorry. Could you restate that? 
8 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
9 Q. Did I inform you of where the arborvitae 
10 hedge was located in relationship to the properties? 
11 A. I believe you told me you weren't 
12 positive. 
13 Q. Did I inform you that it was located on my 
14 property? 
15 A. I don't think you were definitive in that 
16 regard, no. 
17 Q. Did Eric Wurmlinger, in his deposition, 






I don't recall his exact wording. 
Do you remember him saying anything about 
22 it being on the border? 
23 A. I recall him testifying at the deposition 
24 that the root balls he believed were on his side of the 
25 property and that as the shrubs grew, that some of the 
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growth a.Love ground may have gone onto your property. 
Q. Okay. Are you guessing right now or is 
that because I asked you if you remember him saying 
it as a border planting? 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: I don't recall his exact language, 
no. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Q. Do you remember when the state and the 
10 city procured a survey on the property? 















Q. They had a survey on the property line. 
A. I never saw a survey. That was the reason 
your criminal case was dismissed, because they never 
disclosed the survey. 
Q. Do you remember that the prosecutor 
amended the charge against me? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember what it stated? 
A. I don't recall specifically, no. 
Q. Do you know if it stated that the property 





I don't recall. 
Did you visit my property to actually view 
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Did you ask -- did you locate the property 









located? Excuse me. Did you locate property stakes in 
the ground that were located between the hedge? 
A. I did not place any stakes, no. 
Q. No. Did you see stakes in the ground, in 




I believe I saw some stakes. 









A. Not specifically. 
Q. Did you ask Judge Gibler to allow for a 
site visit to see the condition of the arborvitae hedge? 
A. I can't recall with certainty. 
Q. When you viewed the arborvitae hedge, did 
you notice if it was damaged or destroyed? 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form, but you can 
20 answer. 
21 THE WITNESS: I don't understand the question. 








When you viewed the arborvitae, were they 
They did not appear to be dead, no. 
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Q. What WdS their condition? 
MR. KULISCH: Again, object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: They appeared to be bushes. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Q. Were they green? 
A. I believe so. 
Page 29 
Q. Did you hire an arborist to assess the 






No, you did. 
Do you remember his name? 
I think it was Joe Zaboli. 
Did you personally talk to Joe? 
I did. 
Q. When did you talk to him? 
A. When we met him at your house. And I 
think I spoke with him on the phone after that. I might 
have spoken with him on the phone before we met at your 
house, also. 
19 Q. You were informed that Chad Johnson was a 
20 surveyor, who was hired by the city -- were you informed 
21 that Chad Johnson was a surveyor who performed a survey 
22 on the Wurmlinger property when they viewed the hedge, 






I'm sorry. Can you restate the question? 
Did Amy Boardman inform you that Chad 
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1 Johnson was d surveyor who was in charge of the survey 
2 that was done on behalf of Wurmlinger? 
3 A. Well, I don't know that the state had a 
4 survey done. That was the big issue, because they never 
5 disclosed it. So I know that Chad Johnson did 

























Did you depose Chad Johnson? 
Not that I recall. 
Do you remember why? 
I don't. 
Did you hire an investigator during the 







I didn't see the need for one. 
Did you talk to any of my witnesses prior 





I talked to you, I talked to Joe, I'm 
trying to remember who the witnesses were in the 
criminal case. I can't recall others. 
Q. Do you recall who my expert witnesses 
were? 
A. Well, Joe was one of them. But without 
www.mmcourt.com SMITH, IAN D. 5/6/2015 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 569 of 710
Page 31 
1 seeing the expert witness disclosure or the discovery 
2 response to the state, I can't recall with certainty. 
3 Q. Okay. So at this point you don't remember 
4 if you talked to any expert witnesses? 
5 A. No, I said I did talk to expert witnesses. 
6 I talked to Joe Zaboli. 
7 Q. To Joe. And you don't remember who the 
















I can't, as I sit here. 
Did you Subpoena any of my witnesses for 
I don't recall. 
What's normal standard for that? 
Depends. 
Would you call witnesses in at trial? 
Well, your case was not normal or standard 
17 in terms of the nature of the trial setting, so I don't 
18 know that there is a normal or standard procedure. 




MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: Well, I don't recall whether I did 
2.3 or not. 
24 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
25 Q. So you're saying at trial you would not 
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2 clarify? 
Page 32 
3 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. It misstates 
4 his prior testimony. 
5 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
6 Q. Did you call any of my witnesses in for 
7 trial, Subpoena any of my witnesses in for trial? 







Did you Subpoena Joe Zaboli for trial? 
Asked and answered. 
John Wilhelm? Q. 
A. Asked and answered. Oh. And I did speak 
13 with l ' nim, also. He the assessor, or with the 
14 assessor's office. 
15 Q. Do you remember when? 
16 A. When what? 
1 7 Q. When you talked to John Wilhelm? 
18 A. It was before the trial. 
19 Q. Were you ever contacted by Kootenai County 
20 Prosecutor Barry McHugh? 
21 A. I don't believe Barry contacted me 
22 directly. 
23 Q. Do you remember who the prosecutor was for 
24 my case? 
25 A. The deputy prosecutor? 
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Amy Boardman. 











A. I don't know with certainty. I didn't 
represent you the entirety of your criminal case. 
Q. In which part did you represent me? 
7 A. After you decided that you wanted me to 
8 represent you. 
9 Q. Do you remember when that was? 
10 A. Dates? 
11 Q. Uh-huh. 
12 A. I don't. 
13 Q. Did you assist me with my motion to seal 
14 my criminal case? 








Were you still my attorney of record? 
Yes. 
Did you submit a motion to withdraw prior 
19 to the hearing? 
20 A. What hearing? 
21 Q. The motion to seal my case? 
22 A. Did I file a motion to withdraw in your 
23 criminal case? 
24 Q. Yes. 
25 A. I don't believe I did, no. 
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Are you required to do so? 
No. 
Page 34 
During my hearing for the motion to seal 
my case, did Judge Gibler ask you to assist me if I 
needed help? 
A. I don't recall. What I recall is that you 
filed the motion to seal yourself. I didn't have 
knowledge of it. The matter was scheduled for hearing, 
and I believe the clerk sent me a copy of the notice of 
hearing, along with potentially the motion. So I 
appeared. 
Q. Did we have a discussion after my 
acquittal of you helping to seal my case for me? 
A. I recall that you asked me to assist you 
with that, and I informed you that I would need 
additional funds to do that, because the retainer 
agreement we had on the criminal case specifically said 
that it didn't include any post-trial or post-verdict 
motions. And I viewed the motion to seal as a 
post-trial or post-verdict motion. 
Q. Did you remember after trial informing me 
that, since we did not have a week-long trial, that you 




Object to the form. You can answer. 
I don't recall that. 
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Did you assist me during that hearing? 
I don't recall. I recall being present, 
like I said, but I think you presented it pretty well, 
from what I remember, and the judge, I believe, ended up 
granting your motion. 
Q. Okay. And so you never submitted a motion 
to withdraw from my criminal case, then, is what you 
said earlier. Is that correct? 
A. Correct. I might have filed a notice 
11 of -- what is it? A notice of withdrawal, after the 













Would that be normal procedure? 
I generally do that in criminal cases. 
Okay. I'm going to switch over now to the 
civil case against the Wurmlingers, so these questions 
will pertain to that. 
Did you timely submit responses to 
discovery requests? 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: I believe I did. 
22 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
23 Q. Did you timely submit responses to the 
24 attorneys when prompted? 
25 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
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I don't understand the question. 





















Did you stick to the pretrial order 
I don't understand the question. 
On the pretrial order, when it had 
timelines that you were to adhere to for motions for 
surmnary judgment, discoveries and expert witnesses and 
whatnot, did you stick to those deadlines? 
MR. KULISCH: I'm going to object to the form and 
I'm going to try to help you out. There was more than 
one scheduling order, because there were continuances of 
the trial. 
MS. GREENFIELD: Correct. 
MR. KULISCH: So when you ask him that, there 
could be three or four of them. 
MS. GREENFIELD: Okay. I'll be more specific. 
Q. When was my final trial date scheduled? 






Does May 21, 2012 sound familiar? 
22 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form, and that's 
23 inaccurate. That was not your final trial date. 
24 MS. GREENFIELD: During his reign is what I'm 
25 referring to. 
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So during your time as my attorney, was 
date scheduled for May 21, 2012? 
I don't recall the specific date. 
And when did you quit on my civil case? 
I don't recall the specific date. 
Does March 9, 2012 sound familiar? 
That could be correct. As I stated, I 
the specific date. 
And what was your reason for quitting? 
It's set forth in the motion. I don't 
11 recall the exact grounds, but the motion and the letter 
12 I sent to you before filing it, they laid out all the 
13 grounds for the withdrawal. 
14 Q. Did I inform you that I could not afford 
15 to pay for any more fees? 
16 A. That's why we converted it to a flat-fee 
17 case before I withdrew. 
18 Q. When we were standing in front of Judge 
19 Haynes on the hearing for your motion to withdraw, do 
20 you remember me telling you that I could not afford 
21 another attorney? 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 22 
23 THE WITNESS: That's why I returned the $10,000 
24 flat fee to you. 
25 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
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Q. Do you know who was paying for my fees 
during your representation? 
3 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
4 THE WITNESS: Not specifically, but I think it was 
5 your ex-husband. 





Q. Do you remember if anybody attended the 
meetings that I had with you during the course of the 
civil litigation? 
A. Yeah, there were a number on different 
11 occasions. 
















That's your ex-husband. 
Correct. 
Is that correct? 
Yeah. Dwight was here on occasion. I 
don't think he was here at every meeting. 
Q. Did you ask the court for an order to 







Were you granted that request? 
Yes. 
Did you set up an appointment to enter 
25 upon the defendants' property per that order? 
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Well, I withdrew before trial, and so 
there was certainly still time to do it. 
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Q. On that particular case, the civil case, 
did you contact any expert witnesses on my behalf? 
A. I did. 
Q. Who? 
9 A. Some of them were the same as the criminal 
10 case. It was the assessor -- or the employee at the 
11 
12 
assessor's office Mr. Zaboli, there was a social 
worker, a physician, and there was another -- at least 









Q. Did you depose any of those witnesses 
prior to trial? 









Because I talked to them on the phone. 









I don't know. 
Is that something you can find? 
I don't know. 
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Q. How hard would it be? 
A. Well, I can't tell you that I can find 
something that I don't know if it exists or not. 
Q. Are you required to keep those records? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you disclose my expert witnesses per 





Do you remember when? 
I don't know the specific date. 
Did you request summary judgment on my 
12 behalf for the defendants' counterclaims of trespass and 















You had counsel that was provided by your 
insurance company on those claims. 





I don't recall his name. 
Do you remember when he came on? 
I don't. 
And you're stating that he was there 






I don't understand the question. 
The summary judgment on the pretrial sheet 
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had to be performed by a certain point. 
correct? 
Is that 
A. That's generally correct, yes. 
Page 41 
Q. Was this person that you said I hired, was 
he there during that time frame or did he come in after 
the fact? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Are you the lead counsel? 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Q. Were you the lead counsel in that case? 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
attorneys? 
I mean, between the two 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Q. Yes. Do you remember why he was brought 
in? 
A. Because your insurance company was 









You originally were on those claims. 
I don't know. I thought that those claims 
There was a motion to amend the answer and 
24 include some counterclaims, and I thought those claims 
25 came in then. And your insurance company provided 
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defense for those. 
Q. Did you remember when Riseborough came on, 
I believe in October of 2011, that he was the one that 
amended those claims? 
A. Yeah, that's my recollection, that there 




Did you respond to those claims? 
Well, again, I think you had counsel 
through the insurance company for that. 
Q. In October of 2011? 
MR. KULISCH: Can I clarify, if I may? Are you 
asking whether or not he had counsel -- whether or not 
14 you had counsel to defend against those claims? Because 
15 obviously he's counsel for you. 
16 MS. GREENFIELD: Exactly. And he's saying that 
17 there's another counsel that came in to take care of 
18 those. 
19 MR. KULISCH: But I hadn't finished. So you're 
20 saying, "Did you defend against those claims?" And the 
21 problem I have with the form -- are you talking about 




MS. GREENFIELD: Did he respond to the motion to 
amend? 
MR. KULISCH: Let me finish. Or are you talking 
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2 answered. 
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3 MS. GREENFIELD: No. Did he respond to the motion 
4 to amend the claims? 
5 THE WITNESS: Yes. 




Q. Did you take off time during Thanksgiving 
of 2011? 






13 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
I probably didn't work on 
14 Q. Thanksgiving usually falls on a Thursday. 
15 Does that mean you would be gone Thursday-Friday? 
16 A. It depends. Sometimes I work on the 









Q. Do you keep track of your vacations or 
time off? 
A. It's usually on my calendar. 
Q. Did you take time off during the Christmas 
December 2011 time period? 
A. Probably. I usually do. 
Do you remember how long? Q. 
A. I don't. Might have been a couple weeks. 
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The reporting period is every three years. 
How long are the classes? Like a day? 
Three days? 
It depends. Some of them are an hour, 




Q. Did you attend a continuing education 
class during the week of October 17, 2011? 
A. I don't recall. I know when I talked to 
14 bar counsel or I e-mailed bar counsel, I was taking some 
15 
16 
CLEs. I remember that. 
Q. I believe in the e-mail you submitted in, 
17 that you talked to the state bar, it said you were gone 







It does not. I'd have to review the 
Is it a priority to you to -- how can I 
22 say this? Is it a priority for you to attend class or 
23 assist a client? Which would take more of a priority? 
24 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. You can answer. 
25 THE WITNESS: I mean, they're equal. I mean, I 
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1 don't ignore a client to go to a CLE and I don't go to a 
2 
3 
CLE to ignore a client. I mean, you have to take care 
of business and you do what needs to be done. So 
4 neither is a priority. 
5 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
6 Q. On the pretrial order that was slated for 
7 May 21, 2012, there are deadlines that you must make in 
8 order to qualify under this pretrial order. Do you try 






On November 10, 2011, did I ask you to 
12 amend my civil case and add slander, libel and abuse of 
13 process to my claims? 













Do you remember any discussion on that? 
Vaguely. 
Did you comply with my request? 
No. 
Why not? 
That was one of the reasons I ended up 




see eye to eye on the facts of the claims. 
Q. Do you remember when you withdrew? 
A. Again, I answered that previously. 
25 don't remember exactly. 
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So I have March 9 of 2012. And I just 
on November 10, 2011, I asked you to amend. 
3 So there's quite a few months in that span. Are you 






MR. KULISCH: Go ahead. Object to the form of the 
question if you're done. 
it. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
If not, I'll let you finish 
Q. So that's approximately -- what? Six 
10 months out. So in November you were disagreeing, but 
11 you stayed on through March 9 of 2012? 
12 
13 
A. Well, our relationship --
MR. KULISCH: Just for the record, four months by 
14 my math. 
15 THE WITNESS: So over that four-month period, our 
16 relationship began to deteriorate more and more. 





Did you inform me of that in November? 
I believe -- well, I don't know if I 
20 specifically said that, but when we would have 
21 discussions, I think I made it clear to you that when 
22 you wanted me to do something that I didn't think was 
23 appropriate for your case, that it wasn't appropriate 
24 for your case. 
25 Q. And did you ask me for $5,000 more in 
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1 December of 2011? 



















Do you have records that would show that? 
That I asked you for additional funds? 
Correct. 
You don't keep track of that? 
You don't keep track of what your clients 
That's a different question. 
Do you keep track of what your clients pay 
14 Of course. A. 
Q. 
A. 
How long do you keep those records? 
I don't have any standard policy. 
Q. So if I gave you $5,000 in December of 






Okay. Did I send you e-mails throughout 







Do you remember what they were referring 
25 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
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1 THE WITNESS: Many subjects. 
2 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Q. Did you reply to those e-mails? 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
3 
4 
5 THE WITNESS: I can't recall with specificity, but 
6 generally I try to. 
7 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
8 Q. Okay. Did I inform you that the 
9 Wurmlingers were filing false malicious injury reports 


















I believe you did. 
Did I inform you that they were installing 
were facing my property? 
You did. 
Did I tell you that the police were 
garbage? 
You did. 
Did I tell you that the police were 





I can't recall that one, but you may have. 
What did you do when you heard this 
22 information from me? What was your thought? 
23 A. Well, I told you that I wasn't interested 
24 in filing a civil rights action against the police 
25 department on your behalf, that that was beyond the 
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what you felt was necessary. 
Q. And during that time, as I asked you, I 
talked about abuse of process. Would abuse of 
process -- if that was happening, would you say that was 
an abuse of process claim by the Wurmlingers? 
MR. KULISCH: Object to form. Calls for a legal 
conclusion. He's not being called as an expert. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Q. Okay. Did I inform you that Eric 
11 Wurmlinger interfered with my surveyors on September 1, 
12 2011? 
13 A. I don't recall the date, but I recall that 
14 there was an incident at the location regarding the 
15 survey. And you had a copy of the court order 
16 permitting the survey. And I think -- I don't know if 
17 it was Gunderson that responded, but I think, if I 
18 recall correctly, the matter was resolved as a result of 
19 you having a copy of the order. 
20 Q. Okay. So you don't remember if these 










I don't recall that, no. 
Was the survey completed? 
I believe so. 
Was the survey completed for the easement? 
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I don't believe it was. 
Did you follow up on that? 
No. 
Q. Why not? 
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A. Well, my recollection is that the survey 
that you paid for, you claimed after the fact that it 
was not a survey. And when I told you I was going to 
disclose it in discovery, you asked me not to and 






Well, let me clarify. 
Wait. I'm answering your question. And 
13 so it didn't seem to me that there was any point in 
14 going forward on the easement survey if it wasn't going 
15 to be used as evidence. 
16 Q. Okay. So the survey that was commenced 
17 was for the arborvitae hedge, and then there was also a 
18 claim that you didn't remember prior about an easement, 










So being that that was a claim, would it 
be important to have a survey done for that easement? 
A. Well, if you were going to actually use 
that survey for purposes of your litigation, yes. 
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Q. And I believe, if I'm not mistaken, the 
survey that I showed you was not the final copy and it 
was only addressing the arborvitae edge. 
MR. KULISCH: Object to form. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Q. Do you recall the survey just referred to 




And it did not say ''final copy" on it, it 
10 was a draft? 
11 A. Well, I'm not a surveyor, so I don't know 
12 exactly what constitutes a final copy or a draft. My 


















Do you remember seeing across --
Hang on. I'm still talking here. 
Go ahead. 
A. With respect to the easement survey, there 
was nothing preventing you from getting that survey 
after I withdrew. 
Q. Did you notice across the top of the 




I don't recall that, no. 
So with trial being slated for May 21, 
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1 2012 and you quitting March 9, 2012, when did you think 
2 that survey was going to be turned in when discovery 
3 cutoff was in March? 
4 
5 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: Well, I knew the 20-day stay would 
6 go into effect if the motion to withdraw was granted, so 
7 that would effectively bump the trial date out, so you 
8 would have had time. 





the easement, then. 
So you didn't order a survey for 
Correct? 
A. Well, again, you were kind of handling the 
13 survey side of it, because your ex-husband, if I recall, 
14 works for a survey company, and so it seemed to me that 
15 you kind of wanted to be in control of what was going on 
16 there. And that was fine with me. You were paying for 
17 it. And so you didn't get Dwight or the company that he 













25 Ruen Yeager? 
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Ruen Yeager, maybe. 
Do you know who Dwight works for? 
I don't. 
You're just assuming that he worked for 
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No, I'm assuming he worked for a surveyor. 





























Okay. Was Julie Vetter employed with you? 
Yes, she was. 
And what was her title? 
I never gave her a title. 
Was she a paralegal? Legal assistant? 
I guess you could call her legal 
How long had she been with you? 
I don't know that. 
No approximate? 
I'd just be guessing. 
Do you remember when she quit? 
I believe it was December of 2011 maybe. 
Do you remember notifying John 
17 Riseborough, defendant's attorney, that you were having 
18 staff issues and vacation issues on why you couldn't 






23 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Object to the form. Go ahead. 





Did you hire somebody to replace Julie? 
Not in the same capacity, no. 
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So you stated that you were out of the 
2 office in December of 2011 for approximately two weeks. 
3 Was anybody here that could take calls for you or do any 
4 type of work for you? Was anybody here handling the 
office for you? 5 
6 MR. KULISCH: I'll object to the form. You can 
7 answer. 
8 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I believe I had somebody in 
9 the office. 
10 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Do you remember who that was? 11 
12 
Q. 
A. I don't with specificity. I mean, I --
13 it's probable it was a person by the name of Cheryl 
14 Brandon, but I can't recall if it was Cheryl or not. 
15 Q. When you have deadlines that are due 
16 during, you know, a Christmas vacation, do you normally 
17 take off on vacation? 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 18 
19 THE WITNESS: I don't normally do anything, but 
20 usually I take care of things, yeah. 
21 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
22 Q. So if you had some pretrial orders that 
23 you had to comply with as far as dates that needed to 
24 be -- you know, like disclosure of expert witnesses and 
25 whatnot -- and they were due, let's say, 12-22-2011, and 
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1 you hadn't disclosed those experts, what would be your 
2 typical protocol on that? 
3 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form, but you can 
4 answer. 







protocol, but generally I try to get my work done. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 





Did you ever inform Julie Vetter that you 
12 were, quote, "sick of the Greenfield case"? 








Q. Were you sick of the Greenfield case? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever written any articles bearing 
on the subject matter of the underlying issues, for 
instance, on my case? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't understand the question. 
Have you written any articles ever about 









You mean like for publication? 
Exactly. 
No. 
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On what courses? 
Criminal procedure and civil procedure. 
And when was that? 
I don't recall the dates. 
Have you conducted any seminars? 
You mean put on a seminar? 
Yes. 
No. 
How would you define the scope of your 
representation for my civil complaint? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't understand the question. 
What was my view of the expectations for 
18 the outcome of my civil case? 
19 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 






A. We talked about the value of your -- what 
24 I'll refer to as personal injury claims, the intentional 
25 infliction and negligent infliction, and you valued them 
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1 quite high. 
2 Q. Did you give me an estimate of the chances 






A. I don't believe I did. That's not 




What was your impression of my civil case? 
I don't understand the question. 
What did you think when I came to you with 










MR. KULISCH: I'm going to object to the form. 
You can answer. 
THE WITNESS: I don't understand. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Q. What were your expectations of the outcome 
of my civil case? 
MR. KULISCH: Again, object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: I don't understand the question. 
19 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
20 Q. Did you advise me of a possible outcome of 





A. Generally, I advise people that I don't 
control the jury or a judge, and I can't control 
outcomes. 
Q. Do you take cases if you don't think 
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1 they're going to have a high probability of winning? 
2 MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
3 THE WITNESS: When a client comes to see me 
4 initially, I hear one side of the story, so it's very 
5 difficult to size up a case in its entirety without 
6 hearing the other side. And so I guess I don't 
7 really -- it's difficult to answer your question. 
8 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
9 Q. Why did you decide to take my case, 
10 referring to the civil? 
11 A. You seemed like somebody who needed some 
12 assistance for the situation with your neighbor. 
13 Q. When the Wurmlingers brought in their 
14 counterclaims, did you think they were frivolous? 
15 
16 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: That would be the timber trespass? 









Q. The original claims. He brought 
tortious interference, negative infliction and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
in 
A. I believe we -- I can't recall if we moved 
to have those dismissed. 
weak claims. 
They did seem to be relatively 
Q. If a defendant brings in a frivolous 
current claim, what's typical that you would do on that? 
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MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: Well, again, I mean, there's no 
typical. Every case is different. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Q. The Wurmlingers, to refresh your memory, 
dismissed two of their claims, and we talked about them 
being frivolous. Is there anything else you would have 
done as far as charging them for sanctions or what would 
be typical if they wasted the court's time and your time 
and my money? 
MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: Well, again, there's no typical. 






different. So it's difficult to answer that question. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
Q. When they dismissed their claims, did you 
ask them for sanctions? 
A. I can't recall. But typically in a case 
19 when you have a number of claims and some of them fall 
20 away before the case is finally adjudicated, sometimes 
21 you wait until the case is finally adjudicated when 
22 you're making your request for fees and costs, you add 
23 in the fact that these claims were dismissed early on. 
24 So you don't -- I mean, I guess maybe there is a typical 
25 situation, but when claims go away in a multi-claim 
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1 action, I don't know that I usually request fees and 
2 costs at that time. I know I have done that and the 
3 general response I get from the court is, "Well, we'll 
































Were the Wurmlingers sanctioned in my 
They were. 
Do you remember when? 
I don't recall the specific date. 
Did you receive a check for that sanction? 
I did. 




Why did you wait? 
Because that became part of your flat fee 
Do you know when you accepted that for 







Payment from whom? 
That the sanction check when did you 
apply it to my account? Do you remember when that was? 
A. I don't recall, no. 
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Does your retainer clearly set forth the 
2 terms and scope of your representation for me? 







Does it set forth the structure of the 
What do you mean by that? 
7 Q. Do you adjust what you'll be charging? 






So we've agreed that the trial that was 










MR. KULISCH: Object to the form. I don't believe 
we agreed to that. 
BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
I think that's what you told him. 
Q. Does this look familiar? And this is the 
May 21, 2012 pretrial order. 
A. It does. 





22 So is this the pretrial order that you 
23 would be following, then, to make sure that you are 
24 
25 
following all the deadlines? 
A. May I see that again? 
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1 is part of the pretrial order. 
2 Q. Okay. This is what I received from your 
3 office, on the dates that you were to adhere to for MSJ 
4 hearings and everything. So is this what you would 





















A. May I see that again? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yeah, I believe this is a form that my 
prior assistant, Ms. Vetter, created. So that looks 
like -- you know, each case has different 
unfortunately, all the judges do somewhat different 
things relative to what they require and when the dates 
are. So the general form is what she created, and I 
think she would have filled in the various categories 
based on the actual pretrial order that was issued by 
the court. 
Q. Okay. So keep that in front of you, 









So at the bottom, it says 11-22-2011. 
Okay. 
And that's to schedule the MSJ hearing. 
Yes. 
Do you know if that was done? 
There was no motion for summary judgment 
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Q. Okay. So you did not file a motion for 
summary judgment against the defendants' claims? 
A. I did not. 
Q. On 12-22-11, it says, "Plaintiff's 
disclosure of expert witnesses." Did you do that? 
A. 
Q. 
I believe I did. 






I don't understand the question. 
It says, "Reminder: Discovery." And it 














that point when you had quit my case, was it your 
understanding that all discovery was done? 
A. From the plaintiff's side or the 
defendants' side? 
Q. From both. 
A. Well, I don't know what the defendants 
were going to do. 
Q. 
A. 
How about my side, plaintiff's side? 
I don't believe that there was any 
outstanding discovery at that time. 
Q. Okay. Thank you. Do you remember how 
many times this trial was continued? 
A. I don't. 
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1 Q. Do you remember when you took over my 











6 Q. When I was in your attorney's office, I 
7 was allowed to copy files, and in your files, you had 
8 these -- it's just titled "Documents." Can you tell me 
9 what these are? 
10 A. I haven't seen them. 
11 Q. These came out of your file. I'll show 
12 them to you. What are these? 
13 MR. KULISCH: Just for the record, do you want him 
14 to go through them and identify each document? 
15 MS. GREENFIELD: No. I'm just asking if it's a 
16 work document or what it is. Because it looks like 
17 they're notes on what you may be addressing at perhaps 
18 sometime in the future when you're looking at trial, 
19 whatnot. I'm just asking what they are. 
20 THE WITNESS: Well, there's a number of documents 
21 here. 
22 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
23 Q. And these are all together in one packet 
24 in your file. 
25 A. Well, as I testified previously, I 
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How they organized 
























is outside of my knowledge. But it appears that there 
are -- so on top, there's five pages which appear to be 
typewritten notes. 
Q. Okay. Let's stop there, because this is 
what I'd like to address first. 
A. All right. 




Q. So you have it titled "Documents," and 
then you have "certified copy of subdivision CC&Rs" and 
you have "witnesses" and below you have "assessor," and 
then you have some notes. Can you tell me if the notes 
that are on here are what you are planning to -- are 
these notes that you took directly off police reports or 




Is this your only copy? 
Yes. Unfortunately. 
A. Well, I can't recall with specificity, but 
there's a category of witnesses, and it says, 
"Assessor." And then below that, it says, "Officer 
Tucker." And I believe that's what's written here 
behind officer Tucker's name is what came off his police 
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1 report. As far as -- and then the next one down is 







source of this information, but it looks like I can't 
tell you if that came from Gunderson's report or not. 
Then below that it says Barry McHugh, below that Dusty 
Overmeyer, Joe Zaboli and Kacey Wall. 
another witness, also. 
So Kacey Wall was 
Q. So under Gunderson, you had some notes 
9 here, and it says that Dwight was the one that cut the 






That Dwight cut the trees, or the bushes. 
Okay. So do you remember me telling you 
14 that his brother Monroe Greenfield cut the trees? 
15 A. Vaguely, but I think I also remember you 
16 telling me that Dwight cut the trees. 
17 Q. Do you remember that Monroe Greenfield was 
18 a witness that I disclosed to you that would be 







A. I recall -- I think I met him, but I can't 
recall if you wanted to use him as a witness or not. 
Q. Did I tell you that the arborvitae shrubs 
were on my property? 
A. I think you asked me that question 
already. 
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1 MR. KULISCH: Asked and answered. 
2 BY MS. GREENFIELD: 
3 Q. Okay. Do you remember telling Judge 















I don't recall that. And there would be a 
that if that's the case. 
Did you ever talk to Kacey Wall? 
I did. 
Do you remember your conversation? 
I don't remember the specifics of it, no. 
talking to her generally about the letter 
12 that she had written to the Wurmlingers on your behalf. 
13 Q. Now, earlier you didn't remember talking 







her name on this paper. Is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
MS. GREENFIELD: Okay. I believe we're done. 
MR. KULISCH: I don't have any questions. 
THE WITNESS: Read and sign. 
MS. GREENFIELD: I'm going to have Exhibit 1 as 





MR. KULISCH: No objection. 
(Exhibit 1 was marked.) 
(Whereupon, the deposition was concluded 
at 2:15 p.m.) 
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Ian Smith Law (iansmithlaw@gmail.com) 
crystalgreens@yahoo.com; 
Monday, December 20, 2010 1 :54 PM 
Ian D. Smith 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, Id 83854 
Re: Greenfield v. Wurmlinger 
Case No. CV-10-8209 
Dear Chris: 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Attached in PDF format are the following items in connection with your case as referenced above: 
1. Notice of Trial with Uniform Pretrial Order - July 18, 2011 at 9:00 a.rn. (4 days) 
2. Interoffice Pretrial Compliance Worksheet 
3. Notice of Deposition of River Park HOA - January 10, 2011 at 1 :00 p.m. 
4. Subpoena Duces Tecum for River Park HOA - January 10, 2011 at 1 :00 p.m. 
5. Proposed Stipulation to Dismiss Cause of Action from attorney Gary Amendola 
I believe the attached materials are self-explanatory. If not, please contact this office with any questions or concerns you may have. 
We have also received the Deposition Transcript of Rosalynd Wurmlinger. A copy is available for you to pick up at your 
convenience. 
Julie R. Vetter, Legal Assistant 
Ian D. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 765-4050 phone 
(208) 765-9089 fax 
iansmithlaw@gmail.com 
This message is private and/or privileged. If you are not the person for whom this message is intended, please delete it and 
immediately notify me, and please do not copy or send this message to anyone else. 
..,.--- /'- I 1 J-1.. er· Ck llt a Ir ?'f"'a' 
(1 /21S) 8/30/~015 4:07 PM 
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRlSTlliA J GREENFIELD 
vs. 
ERIC J WURMILINGER, ETAL. 
324 W. GARDEN A VENUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000 
RECEIVED 
OEC -- 'I 20'10 
Ian O. S111ith 
Attorney at Law 
FILED 12/1/2010 AT 04:22 PM 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OFKOOTENAl SS 
CL~ o:: J1 DISTRICT COURT 
BY---'---~:::,_ &Id~ Dh1\, DEPUTY 
•. , C 
) 




) NOTICE OF TRIAL 
) 
) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is sei: for: 
Jury Tri.al Scheduled Monday, July 18, 2011 at 09:00 AM / ~ 
4DAYS 
Judge: ~ L. Haynes 
Additional Presiding Judges: Benjamin R. Simpson; Charles W. Hosack; John P. Luster; John T. 11:itchell; Fred 
M. Gibler; Steven Yerby; George Reinhardt, ill; George D. Carey. 
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Wednesday, December 01, 2010. 
IAN SMITH 
P.O. BOX 3019 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-3019 
GARY I. AMENDOLA 
702 N. 4TH STREET 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814 
Notic':'. of Trial 
Mailed 
Mailed 
Dated: Wednesday, December 01, 2010 
Daniel J. English 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: Pamela Jokela, Deputy Clerk 
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UNIFORM PRETRIAL ORDER 
In order to assist with the trial of this matter IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. DISCOVERY: 
All written discovery shall be initiated so that timely res:ponses shall be completed/ ~/r3 
thirty-five (35) days before trial. · The last day for taking any disc·overy depositions shall , /. 
. ~~~ 
be twenty-one (21) days before trial. 
2. EXPERT WITNESSES: 
Y1(] Not later than one hundred eighty Q80) days before trial, Plaintiff(s) shall/ -i 
disclose all experts to be called at trial. Not later than one hundred :fifty (150) days v 
before, Defendant( s) shall disclose all experts to be call_ed at trial. Such disclosure shall 
consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
26(b)(4)(i). Notice of compliance shall be conte:r11poraneously filed with the Court. 
3. PRETRIAL MOTIONS: 
Motions for summary judgment shall be timely filed so as to be heard not later / L//tj 
than ninety (2_0) days before trial. (NOTICE: DUE TO COURT CONGESTION IT IS 
,r -
ADVISABLE TO CONTACT THE . COURT FOR SCHEDULING Sillv'IMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTIONS AT LEAST 90 DAYS PRIOR TO HEAR1NG.) Motions in 
~e concerning designated witnesses and exhibits shall be submitted in v~t:ing at lease / -=r/11 
seven (7) days before trial. The last day for hearing all other pretrial motions including 
other motions in lirn:ine shall be twenty-one (21) days before trial. / r,,/z 1-' -
4. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGM:ENT: 
There shall be served and filed with each motion for summary judgment a 
separate concise statement, together with a reference to the record, of each of the material 
facts as to which the moving party contends there are no genuine issues of dispute. Any 
party opposing the motion shall, not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of the 
motion for summary judgment and the statement of facts, serve and file a separate 
UNIFORM PRETRIAL ORDER 
(MEDIATION) 
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concise statement, together with a reference to the record, setting forth all material facts 
as to which it is contended there exist genuine issues necessary to be litigated. 
In determining any motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that the 
facts as claimed by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except 
and to the extend that such facts are asserted to be actually in good faith controverted by 
a statement :filed in opposition to the motion. 
5. DISCOVERY DISPUTES: 
Unless otherwise ordered, the Court will not entertain any discovery motion, 
except those brought by a person appearing pro se and those brought pmsuant to I.R.C.P. 
26(c) by a person who is not a party, unless counsel for the moving party files with the 
Court, at the time of filing the motion, a statement showing that the lavVJer making the 
motion has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing counsel on the 
matters set forth in the motion. The motion shall not refer the Court to other documents 
in the file. For example, if the sufficiency of an answer to an interrogatory is in issue, the 
motion shall contain, verbatim, both the interrogatory and the allegedly insufficient 
answer, followed by each party's contentions, separately stated. 
6. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: 
Exhibit lists and copies of exhibits. shall be prepared and exchanged between / 1-/~ 
parties at least fourteen (14) days before trial. The original exhibits and exhibit lists 
should be filed with the Clerk at the time of trial. Usmg the attached form, each party 
shall prepare a list of exhibits, it expects to offer. Two copies of the exhibit list are to be 
filed with the Clerk, and a copy is to be provided to opposing parties. Exhibits should be 
listed in the order that the party anticipates they will be offered. Exhibit labels can be 
obtained from the Court Clerk Each party shall affix labels to their exhibits before trial. 
After the labels are marked and attached to the original exhibit, copies should be made. 
Plaintiff's exhibits should be marked in numerical sequence. Defendant's exhibits should 
be marked in alphabetical sequence. The civil action number of the case and the date of 
the trial should also be placed on each of the exhibit labels. It is expected that each :party 
will have a copy of all exhibits to be used at trial. 
UNIFORM PRETRIAL ORDER 
(1vlED1A TION) 
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7. LIST OF WITNESSES: 
Witness lists shall be prepared and exchanged benveen parties and filed with the / y 5 
Clerk at least fourteen (14) days before trial. Each party shall provide opposing parties 
with a list of the party's witnesses and shall provide the Court with two copies of each list 
of witnesses. Witnesses should be listed in the order they are anticipated to be called. 
8. JURY INSTRUCTIONS; IF JURY TRIAL REQUESTED: 
Jury instructions shall be prepared and exchanged benveen the parties and filed 
with the Clerk at least seven (7) days before trial. The Court has prepared stock 
instructions; copies may be obtained from the Comi. The parties shall meet in good faith 
to agree on a statement of claims instruction which shall be submitted to the Court with 
the other proposed instructions. In the absence of agreement, each party sha11 submit 
their own statement of claims instruction. All instructions shall be prepared in 
accordance with I.R.C.P. 51(a). 
9. BRIEFS AND MEMORANDA: 
In addition to any original brief or memorandum filed with the Clerk of Court, a 
copy shall be provided to the Court. To the extent counsel rely on legal authorities not 
contained in the Idaho Reports, a copy of each case or authority cited shaD be attached to 
the Court's copy of the brief or memorandum. 
10. TRIAL BRIEFS: 
Trial biiefs shall be prepared and exchanged between the parties and filed with /-::i.--/1, 
the Clerk at least seven (7) days before trial. 
11. PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
If the tiial is to the Court, each party shall at least seven (72 days prior to trial file ~ 
with the opposing parties and the Court, proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
~Supporting their position. 
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12. MODIFICATION: 
This Pretrial Order may be modified by stipulation of the parties upon entry of an 
order by the Court approving such stipulation. Any party may, upon motion and for good 
cause shown, seek leave of Court modifying the terms of this order, upon such terms and 
conditions as the Court deems fit. Any party may request a pretrial conference pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 16(i). 
13. SANCTIONS FOR NONCONFORMANCE: 
Failure to timely comply in all respects vyith ~he provisions of this order shall 
subject non-complying parties to sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 16(i), which may 
include: 
(a) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting such party from introducing 
designated matters n1 evidence; 
(b) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part 
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
( c) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in -addition thereto, an 
order threatening as a contempt of Court the failure to comply; 
( d) In lieu or in addition to any other sanction, the Judge shall require 
the party or the attorney representing such party or both to pay the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless 
the Judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
14. MEDIATION: 
The parties to this lawsuit are hereby ordered to participate in good faith 
mediation at a mutually agreeable date and report jointly to the Court in writing at least 
sixty ( 60) days prior to the trial date, setting forth the results of the mediation session. 
UNIFORM PRETRIAL ORDER 
(MEDIATION) 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any vacation or continuation of the trial date 
shall not change or alter any of the discovery or disclosure dates established by the initial 
trial setting. Any party may, upon motion and for good cause shown, request that the 
discovery and disclosure dates be altered on vacation or continuance of the trial date. 
UN1FORM PRETRIAL ORDER 
(NlED1ATI0N) 
s 
Lansing L.~ynes, Distdct Judge 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 621 of 710
LIST OF EXHIBITS 
CASE NUMBER: ________ _ DATE --------
TITLE OF CASE VS. ------------"'--=-'------------
Plaintiffs Exhibits (List Nume1ically) 
Defendant's Exbibits (List Alphabetically) 
Third Party Exhibits (State Party) 
Additional Defendants (Contact Judge's Clerk for Directions) 
# 
Admitted/ 
Description Admitted By Stip 






























Greenfield v. Wurmlinger 
Case No. CV-10-8209 
Kootenai County 
Judge Haynes 
TRIAL: July 18-21, 2011 
4 days 
Pretrial Compliance Worksheet 
Description 
FIRST DAY OF TRIAL 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
TRIAL BRIEFS 
PROPOSED FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
EXHIBITS & EXHIBIT LISTS 
WITNESS LISTS 
Reminder: WEL (7 days) 
PRETRIAL MOTIONS CUTOFF (must be heard) 
DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS 
Reminder: Schedule Depositions (30 days) 
Reminder: Schedule Depositions (60 days) 
DISCOVERY CUTOFF 
Reminder: Last Day to Serve Discovery (30 days) 
Reminder: Discovery (35 days) 
Reminder: Discovery (45 days) 
MEDIATION DEADLINE 
MSJ CUTOFF (must be heard) 
Defendant's DISCLOSURE OF EXPERTS 
Reminder: file & serve MSJ & NOH 
Reminder: Expert Witnesses (one week) 
Plafntltrs DISCLOSURE OF EXPERTS 
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Subject: Greenfield v. Wurmlinger / Notice of Trial & Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
From: Ian Smith Law (iansmithlaw@gmail.com) 
To: crystalgreens@yahoo.com; 
Date: Thursday, October 27, 2011 11 :34 AM 
Ian D. Smith 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, Id 83854 
Re: Greenfield v. Wurmlinger 
Case No. CV-10-8209 
Dear Chris: 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
Attached in PDF format are the following items in connection with your case, as referenced above: 
1. Notice of Trial - May 21, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. (5 days) with Pretrial Order 
2. Interoffice Pretrial Compliance Worksheet 
3. Wurmlingers' Amended Answer and Amended Counterclaim (your Reply to the Counterclaim is due November 7, 2011) 
4. October 14, 2011 letter from attorney John Riseborough 
I believe the attached documents are self-explanatory. Of course, please let me know if you have any questions. 
I included our interoffice Pretrial Compliance Worksheet for your reference, which provides the pretrial deadlines (and 
reminders) in chronological order. 
Julie R. Vetter, Legal Assistant 
Ian D. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
P.O. Box 3019 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 765-4050 phone 
(208) 765-9089 fax 
iansmithlaw@gmail.com 
This message is private and/or privileged. If you are not the person for whom this message is intended, please delete it and 
immediately notify me, and please do not copy or send this message to anyone else. 
£_eL:-1i t 4:1 
(~ f!x!ri) 8/30/2015 4:37 PM 
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000 
CHRISTINA J GREENFIELD 
vs. 
ERIC J WURMILlNGER, ETAL. 
RECEIVED 
OCT l 'I° 2011 
Ian D. S1nith 
/-\ttorney al Law 
) 
FILED IOflJ/2011 AT 04:57 PM 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
CLERQ: THE" D!Sr!CT COURT 
BY ....,[ ~ t'y~)::~ DEPUTY 




) NOTICE OF TRIAL 
) 
) 
NOTICE JS HERF.BY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is set for: 
Jury Trial Scheduled Monday, May 21, 2012 llt 09:00 AM 
5DAYS 
Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Additional Presiding Judges: Benjamin R. Simpson; Charles W. Hosack; John P. Luster; John T. Mitchell; 
Fred M. Gibler; Steven Yerby; George Reinhardt, lll; George D. Carey, Jeff Brudie, Carl Kerrick, Michael 
Griffin, John Stegner. 
I certify that copies of th is Notice were served as fol!ows on Thursday, October 13, 20 l l. 
IAN SMITH 
P.O. BOX 3019 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-3019 
FAX: (208) 765-9089 
JOHN C. RISEBOROUGH 
717 WEST SPRAGUE AVE, STE 1200 
SPOKANE, WA 99201~3505 
FAX: (509) 838-0007 
Notice of Trial 
p(l Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered ( ] Faxed 
(~ailed [ J Hand Delivered [ ) Faxed 
Dated: Thursday, October 13, 2011 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: Suzi Sverdsten, Deputy Clerk 
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UNIFORM PRETRIAL ORDER 
In order to assist with the trial of this matter IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
1. DISCOVERY: 
::: o/Ho 
All written discovery shall be initiated so that timely responses shall be completed 
thirty-five {35) days before trial. The last day for taking any discov~ry depositions shall ;:f,, tf /:3o 
be twenty-one ~l) days before trial. 
2. EXPERT WITNESSES: )flv 
....-/. ft-~ "t, 
Not later than one hundred fifty (150) days before trial, Plaintiff(s) shall disclose 11 
all experts to be called at trial. Not later than one hundred twenty (!20) days befor~, ~ 1/z.o 
J?efendant(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trial. Such disclosure shall consist 
of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i). 
Notice of compliance shall be contemporaneously filed with the Court. 
3. PRETRJAL MOTIONS: 
Motions for summary judgment shall be timely filed so as to be heard not later ~ 2/:i-a 
than ninety (90) days before trial. (NOTICE: DUE TO COURT CONGESTION IT IS 
ADVISABLE TO CONTACT THE COURT FOR SCHEDULING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTIONS AT LEAST 90 DAYS PRIOR TO HEARING.) Motions in 
limine concerning designated witnesses and exhibits shall be submitted in writing at lease 
se.ven (7) days before trial. The last day for hearing all other pretrial motions including 
other motions in limine shall be twenty-one (21) days before trial. 
4. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 
There shall be served and filed with each motion for summary judgment a 
separate concise statement, together with a reference to the record, of each of the material 
facts as to which the moving party contends there are no genuine issues of dispute. Any 
party opposing the motion shall, not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of the 
motion for summary judgment and the statement of facts, serve and file a separate 
UNIFORM PRETRJAL ORDER 
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concise statement, together with a reference to the record, setting forth al1 material facts 
as to which it is contended there exist genuine issues necessary to be litigated. 
In detern1ining any motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that the 
facts as claimed by the moving party are admitted to exist ,vithout controversy, except 
and to the extend that such facts are asserted to be actually in good faith controverted by 
a statement filed in opposition to the motion. 
5. DISCOVERY DISPUTES: 
Unless otherwise ordered, the Court will not entertain any discoveJy motion, 
except those brought by a person appearing prose and those. brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
26( c) by a person who is not a party, uniess counsel for the moving pariy files with the 
Court, at the time of filing the motion, a statement showing that the lawyer making the 
motion has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing counsel on the 
matters set forth in the motion. The motion shaU not refer the Court to other documents 
in the file. For example, if the sufficiency of an answer to an interrogatory is in issue, the 
motion shall contain, verbatim, both the interrogatory and the allegedly insufficient 
answer, fo]}owed by each party's contentions, separately stated. 
6. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: _ 
Exhibit lists and copies of exhibits shall be prepared and exchanged between ~ 5 /:r 
parties at least fourteen Q 4) days before trial. The 01iginal exhibits and exhibit lists 
should be filed with the Clerk at the time of trial. Using the attached form, each party 
shall prepare a list of exhibits, it expects to offer. Two copies of the exhibit list are to be 
filed with the Clerk, and a copy is to be prnvided to opposing parties. Exhibits should be 
listed in the order that the party anticipates they wi11 be offered. Exhibit labels can be 
obtained from the Court Clerk. Each party shall affix Iabels to their exhibits before trial. 
After ihe labels are marked and attached to· the original exhibit, copies should be made. 
Plaintiff's exhibits should be marked in numerical sequence. Defendant's exhibits shoi..ild 
be marked in alphabetical sequence. The civil action number of the case and the date of 
the trial should also be placed on each of the exhibit,labe!s. It is expected that each party 
will have a copy of all exhibits to be used at trial. 
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7. LIST OF WITNESSES: 
Witness lists shall be prepared and exchanged between parties and filed with the ~ S / "1' 
Clerk at least fourteen Q 4) days before trial. Each party shall provide opposjng parties 
with a list of the party's witnesses and shall provjde the Court with two copies of each list 
of witnesses. Witnesses should be listed in the order they are antidpated to be called. 
8. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, IF JURY TRIAL REQUESTED: 
Jury instructions shall be prepared and exchanged between the paiiies and filed · ~ 5" j l} 
with the Clerk at least seven (7) days before trial. The Court has prepared stock 
instructions; copies may be obtained from the Comt. The patties shall meet in good faith 
to agree on a statement of claims instruction which shall be submitted to the Court with 
the other proposed instructions. In the absence of agreement, each party shall submit 
thefr uwn statement of claims instruction. Al! instructions shall be prepared in 
accordance with I.R.C.P. 51(a). 
9. BRIEFS AND MEMORANDA: 
In addition to any original brief or memorandum filed with the Clerk of Court> a 
copy shall be provided to the Court To the extent counsel rely on legal authorities not 
contained in the Idaho Reports> a copy of each case or authority cited shall be attached to 
the Court's copy of the brief or memorandum. 
10. TRIAL BRIEFS: 
Trial briefs shall be prepared and exchanged between the parties and filed with 
the Clerk at least seven (7) days before tri~~· 
11. PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
If the trial is to the Comt, each party shall at least seven (7) days prior to trl~ _file 
with the opposing parties and the Court, proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions Qf 
Law Supporting their position. --
UNIFORM PRETRIAL ORDER 
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Greenfield v. Wurmlinger 
Case No. CV-10-8209 
Kootenai County 
Judge Haynes 
TRIAL: May 21, 2012 
5 days 
Pretrial Compliance Worksheet 
Description 
j FIRST DAY OF TRIAL 
JURY IN.STRUCTIONS 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
TRIAL BRIEFS 
PROPOSED FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
EXHIBITS & EXHIBIT LISTS 
WITNESS LISTS 
Reminder: WEL (7 days) 
PRETRIAL MOTIONS CUTOFF (must be heard) 
DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS 
Reminder: Schedule Depositions (30 days) 
Reminder: Schedule Depositions (60 days) 
DISCOVERY CUTOFF 
Reminder: Last Day to Serve Discovery (30 days) 
Reminder: Discovery (37 days) 
Reminder: Discovery (47 days) 
MEDIATION DEADLINE (REMINDER 30/60/90 DAYS PRIOR) 
MSJ CUTOFF (must be heard) 
Defendant's DISCLOSURE OF EXPERTS 
Plaintiff's DISCLOSURE OF EXPERTS 
Reminder: Expert Witnesses (one week) 
Reminder: file & serve MSJ & NOH 
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Gmail - Ethical Opinion Re: Former Client and Cur· '::lient 
j 
Ian Smith <iansmithlaw@gmail.com> 
Ethical Opinion Re: Former Client and Current Client 
2 messages 
l·an Smith <iansmithlaw@gmail.com> 
To: bandrews@isb,idaho.gov 
Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 12:20 PM 
My name is Ian Smith. My Bar No. Is 4696. I am writing to you because I will be in a CLE all week during the 
week of October 17, 2011, and I will have limited ability to contact you by telephone. I feel that this matter 
requires immediate attention. 
I currently represent another adult woman named Chris. I represent Chris in a criminal proceeding where she 
was alleged to have maliciously cut her neighbor's bushes. This charge was recently dismissed. I also 
represent Chris in a civil suit wherein we are alleging the same neighbor is operating a Bed and Breakfast in 
violation of the subdivision CC&R's. Recently said neighbor's house has been vandalized with paint on more 
than one occasion. Due to the perceived animosity between Chris and her neighbor, the local police department 
has stated that Chris is the prime suspect of this vandalism. The police have gone so far as to take Chris' trash 
and search the same looking for evidence against her and have installed digital cameras in the neighbor's yard 
pointing toward Chris' house. 
Pam and Chris live in the same neighborhood. Last week, Pam went to Chris' house and disclosed that it is 
she, Pam, who is vandalizing the neighbor's house and that she is doing it by going through Chris' backyard. 
Chris told Pam that Chris is the prime suspect in the vandalism and that she wants Pam to stop painting the 
neighbor's house and for Pam to stay out of her yard. Despite this demand, Chris believes that she saw Pam 
slip into the neighbors' property from Chris' backyard the same night.· It is unknown if any vandalism occurred 
on that night. 
Chris informed Pam of the criminal charges that the neighbor had brought against her for cutting the bushes as 
well as the pending civil lawsuit. Chris disclosed the fact that I currently represent her and Pam informed Chris 
that I had provided Pam with representation in the past. Pam instructed Chris not to disclose any of the facts of 
the vandalism to any other person. 
On Friday afternoon, October 14, 2011, Chris advised me of the above. I am seeking some direction relative to 
my ethical obligations to my former client Pam, and current client Chris. Clearly, I do not want to bring an 
investigation and potential charges against Pam. However, I do not want Chris to be the subject of an 
investigation, and possible charges, for acts she did not commit. For reasons that are not clear, Pam appears. 
to be committed to continuing her vandalism. Pam has gone so far as to state that it is her intent to splash 
paint on each side of the neighbor's house. Apparently she has one side left to vandalize and has indicated that 
this Halloween might be an opportune time to finish her task. 
I suspect Rule 1.6 would be applicabJe to this situation. Obviously, I do not currently represent Pam. Even if I 
did., Rule 1.6(b)(1) would appear to permit me to disclose her intention to commit a future crime. However, this 
situation goes beyond that because in order to get the police to stop considering Chris as the prime suspect in 
the vandalism, it would be necessary to disclose Pam's admission to all of the vandalism. Such a disclosure 
would presumably subject Pam to criminal prosecution. . lj_,l,i/f JI- 1,0 
Please advise at your earliest convenience. The best method to contact me is by calling my cell phone: 208-( ~f1S) 
L-.u.- ...... 11--:1 ................ 1 ............... ...,.., ,....,,~il Ii ,mr,, ii-')R.iV:::.A.f\Orlo.?1 A~R.R.,,ia.,Af:nt.R.n:inO/ .... 'J.Ac::t:1intO/ .. ?rnrl:::ihr•A/,, ?nc:t~t.c;:iO/,. ?nh.:::irR.r,c::::::tn IP~c:::.c.:::irr.h=nt 1.cn,R.th= 1~1n,c?rl~~pQ1.'iR.c::.i 1/? 






Gmail - Ethical Opinion Re: Former Client and Cur' "(, Client 
Brad Andrews <bandrews@isb.idaho.gov> 
To: "iansmithlaw@gmail.com" <iansmithlaw@gmail.com> 
Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 12:55 PM 
The conflict analysis is fact dependent and you should analyze and consider rules 1.9a and c, and 1.7a2. The 
1.6 issue is essentially 1.9c. A non-client has no confidence unless it's a prospective client situation under 
1.18. When Pam discloses information directly to your client,there is no confidence or privilege, it seems like 
it's a 1.7a2 issue. If you need to discuss, you can call today 2088616661, otherwise call the office when you 
can. 
Sent using BlackBerry 
From: Ian Smith [mailto: iansmithlaw@gmail.com] 
Sent: Sunday, October 16, 2011 01:20 PM 
To: Brad Andrews 
Subject: Ethical Opinion Re: Former Client and Current Client 
[Quoted text hidden] 
httos ://m ai I .,ioogl e. com /m ai I /u/0/?ui = 2&i k=809de21458&vi ew= pt&q= i ~%3Asent%20idaho%20state%20bar &qs=true&search= query&th= 133De2d48e4€e935&si. . . 2/2 
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Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
STATE OF IDAHO t 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
FILED: 
2015 SEP 15 PM 3: 54 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST WDICIAL DISTRICT 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IAN D. SMITH 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
MOTION IN FURTHER OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 56(f) 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, Christina J. Greenfield, hereby provides 
notice to the above-named Defendant Ian D. Smith (hereafter: "Smith") and his Attorney of 
record David Kulisch, that pursuant to I.R.C.P 56(f) Plaintiff submits the following Motion In 
Further Opposition To Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment. 
I. FACTS 
Plaintiff has sufficient factual information based on personal knowledge, as well as 
accurate documented evidence, but she lacks necessary discovery to properly support her 
Opposition to Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment, wherein the Defendant has refused to 
submit his responses to Plaintiff's requests for discovery. Without such basic discovery, many of 
Plaintiff's affirmative defenses of the facts surrounding her allegations against the Defendant 
MOTION IN FURTHER OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT 
TO I.R.C.P. 56(f) 
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become uncorroborated. Plaintiff has not been given the essential discovery, wherein Plaintiff 
must now submit a Motion to Compel, which is necessary to permit Plaintiff the opportunity to 
support her allegations against the Defendant. 
In addition, Plaintiff is seeking a "Motion to Compel Discovery" as there is a substantial 
need for the materials to prepare her case and she cannot, without undue hardship, as long as 
Defendant withholds said discovery. 
On January 21, 2015, Plaintiff submitted her "Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for 
Production of Documents" to the Defendant. 
On February 25, 2015, Plaintiff received "Defendants Objections and Responses to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Production." The Defendant did not respond to a majority of 
Plaintiff's requests and applied generic statements as "Defendant objects ... " " ... over broad ... " 
" .. . attorney/client privilege," in his responses. Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant's counsel 
requesting an availability schedule in order to schedule Defendant's deposition. The Defendant 
responded with three (3) available dates in March; the 13, 18, & 19. Smith later recanted 
availability on the 13th of March. 
On March 4, 2015, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant's counsel requesting an availability 
schedule to proceed with Smith's deposition in April 2015. Smith was unavailable in April. 
Smith was only available from May 4th - 81h, 2015. 
On March 20, 2015, Plaintiff responded to Smith's legal counsel to confirm Smith's 
deposition on May 6, 2015. 
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On March 24, 2015, Plaintiff received a letter from Smith's legal counsel confirming 
Smith's deposition on May 6, 2015, and a notice to depose Plaintiff on May 13, 2015. 
On April 9, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a "Notice of Intention to Depose Defendant Ian D. 
Smith" to the Court. 
On May 6, 2015, Plaintiff deposed Smith at Smith's Coeur d'Alene office. Smith 
answered a majority of the deposition questions with "I don't know" or "I don't remember" or "I 
don't recall" "I don't understand the question" even though Smith had stated he had "reviewed" 
the court files prior to his deposition. Plaintiff noted that there were several inconsistencies in 
Smith's testimony when compared to his discovery responses. Plaintiff is compelled to depose 
Smith for a second time as he was "unwilling" to cooperate and wasted Plaintiff's time and 
money by failing to answer deposition questions. 
In Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment responses, Smith objected to several of 
Plaintiff's exhibits stating that they were "hearsay" even though said alleged "hearsay" was 
presented to Plaintiff in personal emails sent by Smith. Two such emails sent by Smith on 
December 20, 2010, and October 27, 2011, contained a "Notice of Trial with Uniform Pretrial 
Order" and a "Pretrial Compliance Worksheet." 
On July 28, 2015, Plaintiff received the Defendant's "Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" along with supporting documents, wherein 
Defendant's "Expert Witness" Peter Erbland, submitted a copy of an "email" from Smith 
regarding a "recording" of a conversation between Smith and Greenfield, yet Smith DENIED 
having any "recordings" in his discovery responses. 
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On Sunday, October 16, 2011, Smith sent an email to Brad Andrews, an attorney acting 
on behalf of the Idaho State Bar, inquiring about Smith's "obligations" regarding a former client 
of Smith's, Pamela Rilliet Wallace. Plaintiff received a copy of said email for the first time on 
February 21, 2015, in Smith's discovery responses. 
Just prior to Smith's withdrawal from Plaintiff's civil case in March 2012, wherein Smith 
had missed the deadline to respond to prior Defendants MSJ in Plaintiff's civil case, Plaintiff was 
left with the overwhelming burden of responding to said Defendants MSJ, which was due to be 
heard approximately 20 days after Smith's departure. 
Smith's has refused to submit phone records along with phone logs to Plaintiff in order 
for Plaintiff to validate specific dates, wherein conversations that took place between Smith and 
other individuals occurred. Smith has denied said conversations "exist" in his discovery 
responses, yet Plaintiff was billed for said conversations. 
Plaintiff has requested the exact dates when Smith was out of the office either on 
vacation, attending classes, or "other" to validate Plaintiff's allegations that Smith missed crucial 
deadlines because Smith was "out of town" and or "not prepared'' and or "unavailable" when 
deadlines, motions, etc. were due. Smith has not complied with said discovery request. 
Plaintiff has requested that Smith reveal his witnesses that he intends to call at trial so 
Plaintiff may have the chance to depose said witnesses prior to pretrial deadlines. Smith has 
refused to disclose said witnesses. 
Smith recently disclosed a "new" expert witness just days before the summary judgment 
hearing, wherein Plaintiff had no prior notice. 
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Smith "denied" that he possesses any "recordings" of conversations regarding Plaintiff's 
cases in his discovery responses, yet his "expert" witness, Peter Erbland, recently disclosed the 
fact that there is at least one (1) recording that Plaintiff has not yet received. 
Plaintiff requested Smith's compiled notes, data, "work product," time-sheets, etc. to 
verify Smith's actual documented billable hours, wherein Smith excessively charged Greenfield 
for said alleged billable hours. Smith has NOT complied with said requests. 
Plaintiff attempted to depose Julie Vetter, Smith's "legal assistant" in April 2015, to 
verify personal statements made to Plaintiff by Vetter during the course of litigation in both 
cases, but Defendant was not available in April for said deposition, wherein said deposition is 
vital to Plaintiff's case. Plaintiff is attempting to reschedule a deposition for Ms. Vetter. 
The Defendant had ample opportunity to respond to Plaintiff's discovery requests 
regarding phone records, billing records and reconciliations, recorded conversations between 
Plaintiff and Defendant, vacation dates and or leaves of absence during the time Defendant was 
representing the Plaintiff, and other requests. 
Plaintiff attempted to set up deposition times with Defendant, and other individuals, yet 
Defendant repeatedly responded with "time constraints" etc. On two (2) occasions, Defendant 
requested Plaintiff's available dates to take Plaintiff's deposition and set a time on May 13, 2015, 
and July 29, 2015, then later canceled both dates. 
II. ARGUMENT 
In order for Plaintiff to oppose a summary judgment under Rule 56(f), she must file an 
affidavit explaining: (1) the information sought and how it is to be obtained; (2) how a genuine 
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issue of material fact will be raised by that information; (3) what efforts the affiant has made to 
obtain the information; and ( 4) why those efforts were unsuccessful. See; SE. C. v. Spence & 
Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1082, 66 L. Ed. 2d 
806 (1981); First Nat'! Bankv. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253,294, 20 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1968). 
"Fed R. Civ. P. 56(f) allows a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to seek 
deferral of a ruling pending discovery of essential facts. See; Committee for the First Amendment 
v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1521-22 (10th Cir. 1992). "A party requesting additional time must 
provide an affidavit identifying the probable facts that are not available, listing the steps taken to 
obtain these facts, and explaining how additional time will enable him to rebut movant's 
allegations of no genuine issue of fact, Committee for the First Amendment , 962 F.2d at 1522 
(quotation omitted)." The purpose of the affidavit is to ensure that the nonmoving party is 
invoking the protections of Rule 56(f) in good faith and to afford the trial court the showing 
necessary to assess the merit of a party's opposition." The rule protects a party opposing a 
motion for summary judgment if the party states reasons why he cannot present essential facts. 
See,· Starks v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 501 So. 2d 1214, 1216 (Ala. 1987). 
"Under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment cannot be 
granted where the party opposing the motion can show that he needs discovery in order to 
establish his defenses or to pierce the plainti:ff s allegations. Rule 56 requires discovery where 
the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to its 
opposition. See,· Metabolife Int'! v. Warnick, 264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986). The Supreme Court has restated this 
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rule as requiring, rather than merely permitting, refusal where the nonmoving party has not had 
the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition. See also; Vance by and 
through Hammons v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1148-1149 (6th Cir. 1996)." 
"Rule 56(f) provides that if the party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot 
yet submit evidence supporting its opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment 
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
'"'Because of the requirement that the nonmoving party be permitted to conduct 
necessary discovery, summary judgment is often considered inappropriate early in a case. See, 
e.g., 821 F.2d 461, 469 (8th Cir. 1987); Schwarzer, et al., supra, at P 14:66. In addition, federal 
courts take into account difficulties that the nonmoving party may have in developing the 
evidence he requires to defend the motion. For example, if the information needed to defend the 
motion is in the moving party's control, as is generally the case when a Plaintiff must prove 
malice, "most courts ... are lenient in granting further time for discovery .... " Wright, et al., 
supra, at s. 2740, p.409; See also,· International Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 898 
F.2d 946, 949 (3rd Cir. 1990) ('Where the facts are in possession of the moving party a 
continuance ... should be granted almost as a matter of course.'); Schwarzer, et al., supra, at P 
1466. This tendency toward leniency is strengthened when the summary judgment motion raises 
latent fact issues such as motive, intent, knowledge, or credibility and the moving party has 
exclusive control over those facts. Wright, et al., supra, s. 2741, at p.422; cf. Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9, 61 L. Ed. 2d 411, 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979) (noting that because 
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malice implicates the defendant's state of mind, it 'does not readily lend itself to summary 
disposition'). "These rules comport with the purpose of Rule 56(f), which is 'to provide an 
additional safeguard against an improvident or premature grant of summary judgment.' Wright, 
et al., supra, at s. 2740, p.402. Therefore, the provision permitting continuances 'should be 
applied with a spirit of liberality.' Id."'' 
During the MSJ hearing, Defendant argued that since the Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, lost at 
trial and the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts finding, then the Defendant, a 
"qualified" attorney, would have lost the case anyway, is absolutely preposterous! This appeared 
to be the Defendants basis for his summary judgment motion. 
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the factual findings of another court, otherwise 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel would be superfluous. See; Taylor v. Charter Med Corp., 162 
F.3d 827 (5th Cir. 1998). "Facts adjudicated in a prior case do not satisfy either test of 
indisputability contained in Rule 201(b). Thus, although a court can take judicial notice that a 
pleading or motion was filed or that a judgment was entered in another judicial proceeding, or 
that certain allegations were made in that proceeding, the court cannot take judicial notice of the 
truth of the allegations of findings." 
"This is so because (1) such findings do not constitute facts "not subject to reasonable 
dispute" within the meaning of Rule 201;13 and (2) "were [it] permissible for a court to take 
judicial notice of a fact merely because it had been found to be true in some other action, the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel would be superfluous." See; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork 
Packers, Jnc.,969 F.2d 1384, 1388-89 (2d Cir. 1992); Holloway v. A.L. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874, 
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878-79 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994); Lib. Mut. 
Ins., 969 F.2d at 1388; see also Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553; Colonial Leasing Co. o(New England v. 
Logistics Control Group, 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1985); Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553-54; Lib. Mut. 
Ins.,969 F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 878-79; see also Nipper v. Snipes,7 F.3d 415, 
415-417 ( 4th Cir. 1993) (holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court 
findings of fact). Id. at 1553; see also Lib. Mut. Ins., 969 F.2d at 1388-89; Holloway, 813 F.2d at 
879. 
""In General Electric Capital Corporation v. Lease Resolution Corporation, the Seventh 
Circuit adopted a rule similar, but not identical, to that of the Second and Eleventh Circuits. The 
court in General Electric held that the district court had erred in taking judicial notice of a 
finding that a settlement in a prior, unrelated proceeding was "fair, reasonable, and adequate." 
The Seventh Circuit held that these findings did not qualify as facts "not subject to reasonable 
dispute."" 
III.CONCLUSION 
Considering the facts and law stated above, Plaintiff respectfully urges the Court to grant 
Plaintiff's motion and deny Defendant's motion for summary judgment in its entirety, due to 
Defendants failure to produce discovery as so requested by the Plaintiff, which has harmed the 
Plaintiff in pursuing her case according to Court pretrial orders, ethical procedures, and Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of September, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
David Kulisch 
Attorney at Law 
1500 Bank of America Financial Center 
601 West Riverside Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0626 
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Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
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CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, Christina J. Greenfield (hereafter: "Greenfield"), 
and pursuant to Rule 37(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves the Court for an 
entry of an Order compelling the Defendant, Ian D. Smith (hereafter: "Smith"), to respond to 
Greenfields First Set of Requests for Production of Documents (hereafter "RFP") as more 
specifically set forth herein. Attached hereto as Exhibit A, and hereby incorporated herein by 
this reference, is a copy of the Defendants Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for 
Production of Documents as served on the February 25, 2015. 
The undersigned hereby certifies the pursuant to rule 37(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Greenfield has made a good faith attempt to confer with counsel for the Defendant to 
secure the disclosure of the information sought without the court's intervention. Plaintiff has 
been waiting for approximately eight (8) months to receive Defendants remaining responses. 
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Due to Defendants non-compliance, Plaintiff was not adequately prepared to respond to 
Defendants "Motion for Summary Judgment." 
1. RFP NO. 1: Greenfield asked Smith "Do you intend to call any expert witness at the trial 
of this case? Smith responded; "one expert ... Peter Erbland." No other expert witnesses 
were disclosed in said response. Greenfield received notice of a newly disclosed expert 
witness on August 22, 2015, nine days prior to the summary judgment hearing and nearly 
seven (7) months after discovery requests were sent to Smith. Due to such late 
disclosure, Greenfield was unable to depose Smith's expert witness, Scott Martin. 
2. RFP NO. 3: Greenfield requested a list of witnesses that Smith intended to call to testify 
at trial so Greenfield may depose said witnesses if needed. Smith refused to disclose any 
witnesses. 
3. RFP NO. 7: Greenfield requested that Smith disclose his communications "with any 
other person regarding the Plaintiff. .. subject matter of litigation ... " more specifically 
Plaintiff was seeking documents, notes, memo's or the like relating to "communications" 
with opposing attorneys regarding Greenfield's civil case and or criminal case. 
Greenfield received billing statements from Smith, wherein Greenfield was charged for 
"teleconference" calls to other individuals made and received by Smith. So where are 
those notes, minutes, etc., from said conversations? Greenfield requested documentation 
regarding ALL of Smith's conversational notes, memos, recordings, etc., which included 
communication with "Farmers Insurance" attorney, regarding legal assistance on the two 
counter-claims against Greenfield. Did Smith communicate with any of Greenfield's 
witnesses? Where are those notes, memos, recordings, or the like? 
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4. RFP NO. 9: Greenfield requested copies of any "recordings" that Smith may have made 
during her civil and or criminal proceedings. Smith replied "none" in his response, yet 
Smith's expert witness, Peter Erbland, submitted Exhibit #16, dated March 29, 2011, in 
his MSJ response, which is clearly an exhibit describing a "taped recording" of 
Greenfield. How many other recordings is Smith withholding? 
5. RFP NO. 13: Greenfield requested copies of "each and every exhibit, document, motion 
picture, photographs, drawing, sketches, diagrams, voice recordings, emails, report's, or 
any other item in your possession during a representation for both the Plaintiffs criminal 
and civil proceedings." Where are Smith's notes, etc. that Smith utilized for making his 
decisions regarding Plaintiff's cases??? Where are the subpoenas for trial witnesses? 
Where are his personal "notes" on phone conversations with opposing counsel, 
prosecutors, etc.? On October 5, 2011, Greenfield met with Smith at 2:00 PM to discuss 
several issues including Plaintiff's MSJ. Smith said he was "drafting the summary 
judgment" for Greenfield's case, so where are the documents? Was Greenfield charged 
for the so-called "MSJ draft?" Smith did not disclose any notes, memo's documents, or 
the like that Smith utilized to draft Motions, etc. During Smith's deposition, Smith stated 
that he documents on his computer. Where are those records? 
6. RFP NO. 14: Greenfield requested copies of any and all "emails" that Smith sent and or 
received during the representation of Greenfield. Smith did not produce copies of the 
emails that contained the "pretrial compliance worksheets" that were sent by Smith 
during the civil proceedings. During Smith's deposition, Smith acted "vague" when 
Greenfield asked Smith to verify said "pretrial compliance worksheet" when Plaintiff 
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submitted a copy of said email to Smith during the deposition. Smith rejected 
Greenfield's exhibits, which were copies of the "pretrial compliance worksheets." Why 
is Smith refusing to acknowledge said "pretrial compliance worksheets?" Greenfield has 
requested copies of ALL Smiths emails including the "pretrial compliance worksheets!" 
7. RFP NO. 16: Greenfield requested that Smith produce any and all forms of 
communication with opposing attorneys, Amendola, Marfice, and or Riseborough that 
may have been sent and or received during the representation of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
was charged for said communication. Where is the request for Defendants, Wurmlingers, 
October 10, 2011, survey results? Where is the request for a date and time to view the 
Defendants, Wurmlingers, home and property as so ordered by the Court? Did Smith 
draft up a document with additional claims per Greenfield's request? Smith discussed the 
additional claims with opposing counsel Riseborough. Why is Smith withholding 
information? 
8. RFP NO. 18: Greenfield requested that Smith produce any and all documented hours that 
Smith charged the Plaintiff during both the civil and criminal proceedings. On May 20, 
2011, Julie Vetter, Smith's legal assistant, informed Greenfield that Smith was "billing 
Greenfield for criminal hours under her civil case hours." Smith filed a "Memorandum 
and Affidavit RE: Attorney Fees and Costs" on June 23, 2011, with the Court, therefore 
Smith had "records" in order to verify said expenses in said memorandum. Where are 
those "records" and why hasn't Smith disclosed said "records" as requested by 
Greenfield. Smith stopped sending Greenfield "expenses records / billings" when 
Riseborough became opposing counsel of record in October 2011. Why? If Smith had 
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won a victory in Court regarding Plaintiff's case, then Smith would be required to submit 
a "Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees" to the court. 
9. RFP NO. 21: Greenfield requested that Smith produce any and all dates that Smith was 
absent due to sickness, vacations, attending and or teaching classes, etc., while Smith was 
representing the Plaintiff on both cases. On June 20, 2011, Julie Vetter informed 
Greenfield that Smith was on vacation. On July 11, 2011, Julie Vetter informed 
Greenfield that Smith has been on vacation for two weeks. On August 16, 2011, Smith 
"vacated" the hearing set for August 23, 2011, as Smith had " ... made arrangements to be 
out of state from August 19 through August 23, 2011, with his wife." On October 17 
through October 21 2011, Smith attended class and missed crucial deadlines for 
responses to Defendants Counter-Claims. On December 14, 2011, Smith informed 
Greenfield that he was departing on vacation to Mt. Hood, Oregon. Smith was gone until 
January 4, 2012. How many times was Smith gone for various reasons during crucial 
periods in Greenfield's cases? 
10. RFP NO. 22: Greenfield requested that Smith produce any and all phone records 
regarding both her civil and criminal cases regarding conversations between opposing 
attorneys, Post Falls City employees, Police Officers, Detectives, Prosecutors, Pam 
Wallace, etc. Smith's email dated December 2, 2010, states "Ian s usual first attempt is a 
telephone call to make an inquiry, followed by a letter of demand within one week of that 
telephone call. " How did Smith keep accurate records of phone conversations to and 
from individuals involved in Greenfield's cases? Some Billing statements Plaintiff 
received contained dates and times when Smith and or his legal assistant, Julie Vetter, had 
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conversations with various persons. Smith charged Greenfield over six thousand dollars 
($6000) in her civil case for "teleconferences" with Greenfield. Where are those phone 
records? Smith originally had the records in order to charge Greenfield for said 
teleconferences ... or did he? On July 20, 2011, Smith received a letter from Douglas S. 
Marfice, opposing counsel, wherein Marfice stated "Thanks for visiting with me last week 
regarding the above referenced case ... " Smith charged Greenfield for one (1) Hour on 
July 13, 2011, regarding said conversation, which involved discussion on counter claims 
against Greenfield for "trespass and timber trespass." Where are the minutes and phone 
records from said conversation? On September 2, 2011, Smith called Ruen-Yeager to 
discuss the findings on the survey, Dusty Obermayer, surveyor-employee, discovered. 
Smith also called PFPD Officer Dewitt who had interfered with the survey (Julie Vetter 
informed me that Smith had handled Dewitt's divorce). Where are the minutes and phone 
records from said conversations? On October 3, 2011, Smith called Greenfield and 
informed her that Deputy Prosecutor Amy Borgman had called him and stated; "Stop 
working on your trial briefs for tomorrow, I am asking for a 'Motion to Dismiss without 
Prejudice' for tomorrow ... " Where are the minutes and phone records from said 
conversation? On December 14, 2011, opposing counsel Riseborough sent Smith a letter 
which stated "It was a pleasure speaking with you today." Where are the minutes and 
phone records from said conversation? On December 13, 2011, Smith had a conversation 
with Riseborough. On December 22, 2011, Joshua Johnson, Attorney at Law, contacted 
Smith and stated "Thank you for taking the time to talk to me about this matter ... " Where 
are the minutes and phone records from said conversations? 
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According to Smith, Smith had several conversations with State Prosecutors and Public 
Defender, Ann Taylor, in Greenfields criminal proceedings; where are those records? 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed this action against Smith on December 1, 2014. On January 21, 2015, the 
Plaintiff submitted her "Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents" to the 
Defendant. In Defendants responses, Smith raised a number of erroneous objections, but agreed 
to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff's request. Defendant's attorney of record, David 
Kulisch repeatedly informed the Plaintiff that phone records and other responses were being 
produced and would be delivered to Plaintiff. 
Smith has failed to produce requested information and or documents, which has 
obstructed Plaintiff's discovery, preventing her from setting and preparing for depositions, 
inquisitions, summary judgment, and other pretrial requisites. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Rule 26(b)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides for liberal discovery. See; 
St. Paul Reins. Co., Ltd. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 512 (N.D. Iowa 2000) 
( citations omitted). In part, it provides that: 
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or 
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, 
including the existence, description, nature custody, condition and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having 
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knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information 
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if information sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 
See; also Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Centimark Corp., 08CV230-DJS, 2009 WL 539927, at* 1 
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2009) (holding that Rules 26(b) and 34 provide for broad discovery) ( citations 
omitted). "Thus, as long as the parties request information or documents relevant to the claims 
at issue in the case, and such requests are tendered in good faith and are not unduly burdensome, 
discovery shall proceed." St. Paul Reins. Co., 198 F.R.D. at 511 (citing M. Berenson Co., Inc. v. 
Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 635, 637 (D. Mass. 1984)). See also; Liberty Mut. 
Fire Ins., 2009 WL 539927, at * 1 (holding that requesting party need only make a "threshold 
showing of relevance" under Rule 26(b)). 
""The party resisting production bears the burden of establishing lack of relevance or 
undue burden. St. Paul Reins. Co., 198 F.R.D. at 511 (citations omitted). The objecting party 
"must demonstrate to the court 'that the requested documents either do not come within the 
broad scope of relevance defined pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 26(b)(l) or else are of such marginal 
relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary 
presumption in favor of broad disclosure."' Id. (quoting Burke v. New York City Police Dep 't, 
115 F.R.D. 220,224 (S.D.N.Y.1987)). Use of"boilerplate" objections such as: "the requested 
documents are neither relevant to the subject matter of this action nor reasonably calculated to 
lead to discovery of admissible evidence," "the request is overbroad," and "the request is 
oppressive, burdensome, and harassing," are insufficient and "are textbook examples of what 
federal courts have routinely deemed to be improper obiections."" Id. at 512. 
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""Instead, the party resisting discovery must show specifically how each request is overly 
broad, oppressive, irrelevant or unduly burdensome. Id ( citing Redland Soccer Club v. Dep 't of 
Army, 55 F.3d 827, 856 (3d Cir. 1995); McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Ap.ffel, PC v. Quarles, 894 
F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990); Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1996); 
Burns v. Imagine Films Entert., Inc., 164 F.R.D. 589, 592-93 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). Indeed, "general 
objections are not useful to the court ruling on a discovery motion. Nor does a general objection 
fulfill [a party's] burden to explain its objections." Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd v. Nat'! Bank of 
Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 58 (D.D.C. 1984)."" 
Smith's generalized, boilerplate objections are insufficient and not grounds for denying 
Plaintiff her discovery requests. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Therefore, based on the above, the files and records herein, and the evidence and 
testimony to be adduced at the time this Motion is heard, Plaintiff asks this Court to order 
Smith's prompt compliance and complete his responses to Plaintiff's First Request for 
Production of Documents by a date certain so that fact discovery can be completed in a timely 
manner. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of October, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
David Kulisch 
Attorney at Law 
1500 Bank of America Financial Center 
601 West Riverside Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0626 
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David A. Kulisch 
RANDALL I DANSKJN, P .S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Telephone: 509-747-2052 
E-mail: dak@randalldanskin.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Keith D. Brown, ISB #3635 
RANDALL I DANSKIN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Telephone: 509-747-2052 
E-mail: kdb@randalldanskin.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS AND 
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET 
OF REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, Christina J. Greenfield (Hereafter: "Greenfield"), 
hereby provides notice and submits the following First Set of Request for Production of 
Documents to the above-named Defendant, Ian D. Smith (hereafter: "Smith") and his attorney of 
record, Keith J), Brown and David A. Kulisch. 
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DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS APPLICABLE TO EACH REQUEST 
A. In responding to these Requests for Production of Documents and other items of 
evidence, you are required to provide all information asked for, and to furnish all 
documents, items of evidence, and infont1ation that is available to you or subject to your 
reasonable inquiiy, including all documents, items of evidence, items of infmmation, and 
information in the possession of your attorneys, accountants, advisers, or other persons 
directly or indirectly employed by, or connected with, you or your attorney's and anyone 
else otherwise subject to your control. 
B. In responding to these Requests for Production of Documents and other items of 
evidence, you must make a diligent seal'ch of your records and of other paper and 
materials in your possession or available to you or your attorney's or represenmtives. 
C. In a request, respond to each part separately and in full, and do not limit your answer to the 
:interrogatory or request as a whole. If these requests cannot be answered in full, answer to 
the extent possible, specify the reason for your inability to respond to the remainder, and 
state whatever information and knowledge you have regarding the unanswered portion. 
D. These requests for Production of Documents are deemed to be continuing in nature and your 
responses thereto must be supplemented to the maximum extent authorized by law and the 
applicable rules. 
E. "Documents" shall mean all wtitten or graphic matter of every kind or description, 
however, produced or reproduced, whether draft or final, original or reproduction signed or 
unsigned> and regardless of whether approved, signed, sent, received, redrafted, or executed, 
including but not limited to: w1itten communications, letters, conespondence, facsimiles, e-mail, 
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memoranda, minutes, notes, films, recordings, of any type, transclipts, contracts, agreements, 
purchase or sales orders, memoranda of telephone conversations of personal conversations, 
diaries, desk calendars, interoffice communications, reports, studies, bills, receipts, thecks, 
checkbooks, invoices, requisitions or material similar to any of the foregoing however 
denominated, by whomever prepared, and to whomever addressed, which are in your 
possession, custody or control or to which you have had or can obtain access. 
F. 11Person(s)11 shall mean and include: A natural peison, partnership, :finn, or corporation or any 
other kind of business or legal entity, its agents, or employees. In each instance where you 
are asked to identify or list a name of a person, state with respect to each such person or persons 
his name, last known residence, and business addresses, and telephone numbers. 
G. 11Communications" shall mean all inquiries, discussions, conversations, negotiations, 
agreements, understandings, meetings, telephone conversations, letters, correspondence, notes, 
telegrams, telexes, advertisements, facsimiles, e-mail, or other forms of verbal and/or 
communicative contact. 
H. "You" or "your" refers to Defendant herein and to all other persons acting or purporting to act on 
behalf of Defendant, including agents and employees. 
I. The period of time encompassed by these requests shall be from the date of the attorney client 
. relationship begun between Plaintiff and Defendant until the final dissolution of all facts and 
findings. 
J. Every document submitted under this request shall be certified and signed under Rule 26(a)(l) 
or (a)(3) and every discovery respo11:se, or objection must be signed by at least one attorney of 
record in the attorneyis o,vn name or by the party personally, and must state the signer's 
address, e-mail address, and telephone number. By signing, an attorney or party certifies that 
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to the best of the person's knowledge that the information with respect to a disclosure, is 
complete and correct as of the time it is made. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Defendant's Prefatory Objection to Plaintiff's Discovery 
Plaintiff served these "Requests for Production» upon the Defendant pursuant to IRCP 34. Plaintiff 
has included ce1iain "Requests for Production"which do not comply with IR.CF 34 and Defendant objects to 
the improper form of the "Requests for Production" and advises Plaintiff that responses to those ce1tain 
"Requests for Production" which are not truly Requests for Production are not required. Without waiving 
this objection, Defendant will treat those certain "Requests for Production" as Intenogatories as allowed by 
JRCP 33 and will provide responses and objections, as required by the IRCP. 
Request for Production No. 1: Do you intend to call any expe1t witnesses at the trial of this case? If 
so, state as to each such witness the name and business address of the witness, the witness's qualifications 
as an ex_pe1t, the subject matter upon which the witness is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and 
opinions to which the witness is expected to testify, and a SLllllill.aiy of the grounds for each opinion. Produce 
all learned treatises (published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on the subject of history, or other science or 
mt, as defined in rnle 803 (18) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence) upon which any ofyourexp€ttwitness base 
their opinions, or may rely upon in rendering their opinions in this action. Produce all other documents upon 
which any of your expe1t witnesses base their opinions, or may rely upon in rendering their opinions in this 
action. 
Response: Peter Erbland, Lake City Law Group, P .0. Box E, Coeur D Alene, ID 83816. Mr. 
Erbland is a practicing attorney in Coeur d'Alene, ID and is experienced in civil and criminal law. 
Mr. Erbland will testify regarding the standard of care for practicing civil and criminal lawyers in 
Ida110 and he will testify that Ian Smith did not breach the standard of care and he will fmther 
testify regarding the handling of the plaintiff's criminal and civil matter by Mr. Smith. Mr. 
Erb land will rely upon his experience as a practicing attorney for over 25 years and if he relies 
upon any additional documents, those documents will be identified at a later time. In addition, 
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if Mr. Erbland authors a report in the future, a copy of the repott will be provided to the Plaintiff. 
Since this case is relatively new and discovery has not been accomplished, the Defendant reserves 
his right to amend this response when additional factual information is available. 
Request for Production No. 2: Produce any mitten statements, reports or memoranda, signed, made 
by any person which suppo1t: 
a, Any and aUof your denials to the allegations contained within the Plaintiffs Complaint herein; 
b. Any and all of your affirmative defenses to the Plaintiff's claims contained in the Plaintiffs 
complaint herein. 
Response: Defendfillt has not obtained any statements, reports or memoranda from any person at this 
time to support any denials in the Plaintiff's complaint or his affumative defenses. The Defendant reserves 
his right to amend this response when additional factual information is available. 
Reguest for Production No. 3: List all witnesses that you intend to call at the trial in this matter and 
produce each and eve1y exhibit, document, motion picture, photograph, drawing, sketch, diagram or other 
item that you intend to offer for introduction into evidence or othe1wise to use for demonstrative purposes at 
any pre-trial motion or at the trial of this matter. 
Response: Defendant objects to the disclosure of trial witnesses and the disclosure 
on trial exhibits, documents, motion pictures, photographs, drawings, sketches, 
diagrams or other items on the basis that these requests seek to invade the attorney/client 
privilege and most of this information will be subject to the Court's scheduling order in this 
matter. Whhout waiving said objections, it has not yet been deter.mined which individuals 
will be called as witnesses at trial or what exhibits, documents, motion pictures, 
photographs, drawings, sketches, diagrams or other items will be offered for introduction 
into evidence at trial. However, the Defendant has provided the Plaintiff with a complete copy of 
his files in her prior representation .in the criminal matter and civil matter. Notwithstanding the above 
objections, the Defendant reserves his right to amend these responses when additional factual 
information is available. 
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Request for Production No. 4: Produce any and all documents containing any notes or other 
writings generated by you which describe: 
a. Any incident which forms a basis for any of your denials to the allegations contained 
within the Plaintiffs complaint herein. 
Response: This request for production is overbroad and would include infmmation prepared by the 
Defendant at the advice of counsel and these notes and wlitings are protected by the attomey client privilege. 
Without waiving these objections, the Defendant provided the Plaintiff with a complete copy of his files from 
his prior representation of the Plaintiff in the criminal matter and civil matter and these :files contain notes and 
other writings that will be relied upon by Defendant in defending this action and these support the denials set 
fo1th in his Answer. The Defendant reserves his right to amend this response when additional 
factual -information is available. 
Request for Production No. 5: State the name, address, and telephone number of each person 
with personal knowledge regarding the facts and circumstances smTounding the events of the 
occrnTences referred to in the complaint. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34. Without waiving this objection, the Defendant identifies those 
individuals presently known to the Defendant. However, the Defendant reserves his right to 
amend this response wlien additional factual info1mation is available. 
Chris Greenfield; 
Dwight Greenfield - address unknown; 
I an Smith, 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-3019; 
Julie Vetter - address unknown; 
Judge Gibler, Coeur d' Alene District Court; 
Judge Haynes, Coeur d'Alene District Court; 
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Buck Benning ton, address unknown; 
Josh Studor -2501 E. Sherman Avenue, Coeur d'Alene, ID.; 
Amy Bergman - address unknown; 
Anne Taylor- 401 Y2 Sherman Avenue, Suite 207, Coeur d'Alene, 
ID.; 
Jason Johnson -Greenchain Loop, Coeur d'Alene, ID.; 
Kacey Wall- 1110 W. Park Place, Ste. 212, Coeur d'Alene, 
ID.; 
Chad Johnson -address unknown; 
Eric Wurmlinger- Plaintiff knows his address; 
Peter Erb 1 and - Lake City Law Group, P .0. Box E, Coeur D Alene, ID 83816. 
Pam Wallace - address unknown; 
B. Andrews, Idaho Bar Counsel -525 W. Jefferson, Boise, ID. 
Doug Marfice - 700 Northwest Blvd., Coeur d' Alene,ID.; 
Gary Amendola -702 N. 4 1b Avenue, Coeurd' Alene,ID.;and, 
John Risbourogh - 7 17 W. Sprague A venue, Spokane, WA. 
The Defendant reserves the right to amend this response and add any person identified in 
any of the documents, pleadings, emails, letters, monthly billing statements or discovery 
obtained during the defense of this litigation. 
Request for Production No. 6: Produce, identify, and describe in detail all evidence 
including documents, affidavits, statements, reports, photos, memoranda, or other, utilized in the 
investigation, upon which the Plaintiff was officially charged with Felony Malicious Injury to 
Property on June 3, 2010, that you obtained from the Ann Taylor, Plaintiff's Public Defender and/ 
or State Prosecutor's and/ or others in regard to the Plaintiff. 
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Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34. Without waiving this objection, see Defendant's objection and 
response to Request No. 4. The Defendant reserves his right to amend this response when 
additional factual information is available. 
Request for Production No. 7: Identify and describe all communications you have had with any 
other person regarding the Plaintiff, the subject matter of this litigation, or any individual or entity 
believed by you to be associated with the Plaintiff, and include in your response the date of the 
communication, the method of communication, and the identity of the individual or entity who 
received or sent the communication. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34 and the request is overbroad and invades the attorney-client privilege. 
Without waiving these objections, the Defendant had in person conversations, telephone calls, 
and exchanged letters, facsimile transmissions and emails with the Plaintiff, opposing counsel, 
potential witnesses, as identified above, and the plaintiffs in the prior civil case. The defendant 
is unable to recall the dates of all of these communications but some of the dates are 
reflected in the billing records, which were previously provided to the Plaintiff. In 
addition, Defendant incorporates his response to Request for Production No. 2 and the 
Defendant reserves his right to amend this response when additional factual information is 
available. 
Request for Production No. 8: Identify any legal claims or lawsuits filed by or against you in 
the last ten (10) years, including the case style, case number, parties, and jurisdiction, agency, or 
other entity in which such claim or suit was filed. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34 and the request is overbroad and seeks information that is not likely to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving these objections, the Defendant 
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was sued in Idaho Dist1ict Court, Case No. CV06-04583, Maria Emerson v. Ian D. Smith and the 
matter was dismissed on May 2, 2007. The only other cases Defendant has filed against clients 
are for unpaid fees are not relevant to this litigation. 
Request for Production No. 9: Produce any recordings made by or with your involvement 
regarding the Plaintiff, the subject matter of this litigation, or any individual or entity believed by you 
to be associated with the Plaintiff, including, but not limiting your response to the date, location and 
reasons any such recording was made. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34. Without waiving this objection, none. 
Request for Production No. 10: If you claim that any statement or document responsive to any 
intenogatory or request for production has been destroyed, deleted, or is otherwise unavailable, 
identify each such statement or document, providing the date such statement or document was made 
or published, the last date that statement or document is known to have existed, what happened to that 
statement or document, and provide a smrunmy of the content and meaning of that statement or 
document. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34. Without waiving this objection, the Defendant isn't aware of any at 
this time but reserves the right to amend this response should such info1mation be discovered 
during the course of the litigation . 
Request for Production No. 11: Identify any oral, written, or recorded statements taken by you 
or on your behalf in connection with the claims or defenses raised in this matter, providing the 
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) 
identity of anyone who heard or received s11ch statement, the date of any such statement, how such 
statement was made, where each such statement was made, a summary of the content and meaning of 
that statement and the identity of anyone in possession of a c_opy of each statement. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34 and the request is overbroad and invades the attorney-client privilege. 
Without waiving these objections, none. 
Request for Production No. 12: To provide the background of the Defendant including: age, 
date of bii.th, address, marital status, military status, criminal history, education, church affiliation, 
memberships in any organization, employer and position of employment if an individual. If you 
own a business, to provide the type of business structure, date of fo1mation, place of fmmation and 
the names and addresses of all partners, owners, managers, shareholders or officers. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not prope1·ly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34 and the request is overbroad, requests information that is not likely to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, violates the 1'1 Amendment to the U.S. and Idaho 
Constitutions regarding the free exercise of religion and the Defendant's right of :freedom of 
association. Without waiving these objections, the Defendant is Age: 52. Date of Birth: 
Address: PO Box 3019, Coeur d'Alene, JD 83816. Married. No military service. 
Criminal History: No felony convictions. Education: High School, College, Law School. 
Member of Idaho State Bar. Self employed. Sole proprietor. Formed 1997. Formed in Coeur 
d'Alene. Ian D. Smith, PO Box 3019 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816. 
Request for Production No. 13: Produce each and eveiy exhibit, document, motion picture, 
photograph, drawing, sketch, diagram, voice recordings, email(s), rep01ts, or any other item in your 
possession during your representation for both the Plaintiff's criminal and civil proceedings. 
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Response: The Defendant provided the Plaintiff with a complete copy of his files from his p1ior 
representation of the Plaintiff in the criminal matter and civil matter and these files contain notes and other 
writings that will be relied upon by Defendant in defending this action and these supp01t the denials set fotth 
in his Answer. The Defendant reserves his right to amend this response when additional factual 
information is available. 
Request for Production No. 14: Produce any and all emails that were exchanged by you and 
any other persons during the period you represented the Plaintiff or thereafter. 
Response: Defendant objects that request is overbroad, requests infonnation that is not 
likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, seeks info1mation that would invade the 
attorney client privilege and the Defendant's representation of clients in other cases, and seeks 
information that is not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving 
these objections, see Response to Request for Production No. 13. 
Request for Production No. 15: Produce any and all documents, written statements, reports or 
memoranda containing all cmespondence between you and the Plaintiff during tlie _perioo you represented the 
Plaintiff or thereafter. 
Response: See Response to Request for Production No. 13. 
Request for Production No. 16: Produce any and all photographs, video recordings, audio recordings, 
drawings, charts, diagrams, emails, facsimile, texts, or other, containing communication that 
transpired between you and attorney's Gaty Amendola, Douglas Mar.fice, and John Riseborough ·jn regard to 
the Plaintiff. 
Response: See Response to Request for Production No. 13. 
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Request for ProductionNo.17: Produce any and all photographs, video recordings, audio recordings, 
drawings, charts, diagrams, emails, facsimile, texts, or other, containing communication that 
transpired between you and the State Prosecuting Attomey(s), in regard to the Plaintiff's criminal 
proceedings. 
Response: See Response to Request for Production No. 13. 
Request for Production No. 18: Produce any and all documents, ,vritten statements, reports or 
memoranda containing all of your re_p<nted and / or documented hours that were charged to the Plaintiff on 
both the criminal and civil proceedings for which you represented and/ or defended the Plaintiff, including 
all payments made on behalf of the Plaintiff toward said services. 
Response: See Response to Request for Production.No. 13. 
Request for Pl'oduction No. 19: Describe your personal and / or professional relationship with 
Pamela Rilliet Wallace. 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34. Without waiving this objection, I have no personal relationship with 
Pamela Wallace. I represented Pamela Wallace in a legal matter. 
Request for Production No. 20: Produce any and all video recordings, audio recordings, drawings, 
chmts, diagrams, emails, facsimile, texts, or other, containing communication that transpired between you and 
the Idaho State Bar Association in regaid to the Plaintiff and/ or Pamela Rilliet Wallace. 
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Response: See attached redacted email. 
Request for Production No. 21: Produce any and all dates that you were not available during the 
period from Sept.ember 2010 through Ap1il 2012, due to absences, vacations, and/ or out of town excursions 
while you were representing the Plaintiff. · 
Response: Defendant objects that this request is not properly the basis of a "Request for 
Production" under IRCP 34. Without waiving this objection, Request for Production No. 21 is 
vague and ambiguous as the words "available", "absences" and "out of town excursions", 
because these terms are not defined. Without waiving said objection, typically, I do not 
communicate with Clients before 9:00 a.in. and after 5:00 p.m., on weekends and national 
holidays. If I am in preparing for trial, drafting a brief, in court, in a deposition, or otherwise 
involved in a task requiring my full attention on a client's matter, typically, I do not 
communicate with clients during these business hours. If I am out of the office during the 
work week, typically, I communicate with clients by telephone, email or through my assistant. 
During my representation of the Plaintiff, I am certain that one or more of the above 
circumstances occurred although it is impossible for me to detail every date or time that such 
may have occurred. Moreover, I am certain that I did take vacation during that time and I am 
usually able to communicate with my office and> occasionally with clients, by telephone, email 
or facsimile. 1 don't recall not having the ability to communicate with the Plaintiff during the 
period of time in question. 
Request for Production No. 22: Produce any and all of your business phone records that refer to 
telephone munber (208) 765-4050, during the pe1iod fium September 2010 through April 2012, or thereafter, 
including conve1sations between opposing counsel, prosecutors, and yourself and/ or Julie Vetter, your former 
paralegal, in regard to phone conversations involving the Plaintiff 
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Response: Defendant objects that this request is overbroad, vague and burdensome. 
Moreover, the Defendant asserts that the phone records are not likely to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence as any phone call with "opposing counsel", "prosecutors" or "Juhe Vetter" 
during this time could be related to another client and I would have no way of determining that 
fact. Without waiving these objections, the Defendant will attempt to obtain these records from 
his archives and, if necessary, from his phone carrier. 
CERTIFICATION 
THE UNDERSIGNED ATTOR.l'\:!EY forplaintiffhas read the foregoing Answers to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents in compliance with ffi..CP 26(±). 
DATED thls#<flta.y ofFebruary, 2015. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
KEITH D. BROWN, ISB #3635" 
DAVID A. KULISCH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IAN D. SMITH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: I am the person 
answering the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET gE--R:EQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS; I have read the same, 7ents :/,, , and beli~v~ the same to be true, 
- Ian D. S 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendants, 
CASE NO. CV-2014-8801 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Summary Judgment Motion of Defendant Ian D. Smith ("Defendant") came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer on September 1, 2015. Christina J. Greenfield 
("Plaintiff') appeared pro se and Defendant was represented by Troy Nelson of RANDALL 
DANSKIN, P.S. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
Defendant represented Plaintiff in a criminal matter and a civil matter both arising out of 
the same set of facts. Modified Complaint ("Complaint") at 1-2. The criminal charges were 
dismissed with prejudice on October 4, 2011. Kootenai County Case No. CR 10-10624; 
Defendant's Answer and Affirmative Defenses ("Answer") at 2. Plaintiff also filed a civil case 
against her neighbors on September 15, 2010. Kootenai County Case No. CV 10-8209; 
Complaint at 2. Defendant represented Plaintiff in these proceedings up until February 14, 2012 
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when he filed a Motion to Withdraw. Answer at 3. The motion was granted by Judge Haynes on 
March 9, 2012. Id. Defendant refunded the entire $10,000 flat-fee he had charged Plaintiff for 
the representation in the civil matter. Answer at 6. 
Plaintiff appeared pro se in the civil matter and ultimately lost the case with judgment 
entered against her on November 30, 2012. Kootenai County Case No. CV 10-8209. Plaintiff 
was ordered to pay the defendants in the civil case in excess of $168,000. Id. Plaintiff appealed 
and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the verdict and awarded attorney fees to the opposing 
party on appeal. Greenfield v. Wurmlinger, 158 Idaho 591, 349 P.3d 1182 (2015). 
Plaintiff filed this suit on December 1, 2014 alleging legal malpractice. Complaint at 3. 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's negligent representation resulted in damages to her in both the 
civil and criminal matters. Id. Among scores of other allegations, Plaintiff alleges Defendant 
failed to prepare for trial, failed to meet pre-trial filing deadlines regarding motions for summary 
judgment and disclosure of expert witnesses, failed to depose witnesses, and negligently 
withdrew from the case prior to trial causing her to lose the case. Complaint at 3-15. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's allegations are barred by the relevant statute of 
limitations under Idaho Code § 5-219, that Plaintiff's claim of negligence regarding her criminal 
case should be dismissed because she prevailed in the case, and that Plaintiff has failed to 
establish a prima facie case of malpractice. Answer at 3-8. 
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 30, 2015, arguing that the 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations and that the Plaintiff has failed to 
establish a prima facie claim of malpractice. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-7. 
Defendant points out that Plaintiff failed to file an expert opinion regarding Defendant's 
representation, and that absent an expert opinion, Plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action for 
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malpractice. Id. 
Plaintiff filed a response arguing that her relationship with the Defendant should be 
considered a contract and therefore the statute of limitations should be five years under Idaho 
Code 5-216, rather than two years under Idaho Code 5-219(4). Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Response"). Further, Plaintiff claims 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) determines that the statute does not begin to run until the day 
after the judgment is entered. Id. Plaintiff included a Motion for Summary Judgment in her 
response. Id. Fourteen (14) days after oral argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment Plaintiff filed a Motion in Further Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and an affidavit in support of Plaintiff's Motion. These documents are untimely and 
they will not be considered. 
II. Discussion 
A. Summary Judgment Standard 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(c). "Once the movant has established a prima facie case that, on the basis ofuncontroverted 
facts, the movant is entitled to judgment, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial and cannot merely rest on the pleadings." Mc Vicker v. City 
of Lewiston, 134 Idaho 34, 37,995 P.2d 804, 807 (2000) (citing Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(e); Theriault v. A.H Robins Co. Inv., 108 Idaho 303, 306, 698 P.2d 365 (1985)). 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's 
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response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against the party. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e ). 
"In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must 'make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which 
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."' Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 259-60, 245 
P.3d 1009, 1011-12 (2011) (quoting Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 
(1988)). Where there are no disputed facts with regard to the accrual of a cause of action, it is a 
question of law as to when the cause of action accrued. Reis v. Cox, l 04 Idaho 434, 660 P .2d 46 
(1983). 
B. Plaintiff's Claim for Malpractice is Time Barred by the Statute of Limitations under 
Idaho Code § 5-219. 
An action to recover damages for "professional malpractice" must be commenced within 
two years after the cause of action has accrued. Idaho Code§§ 5-201, 5-219. "An action to 
recover damages for 'professional malpractice' must be commenced within two years after the 
cause of action has accrued under Idaho Code§ 5-219." City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 
656,659,201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009) (quoting Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d 
396, 400 (2002)). Malpractice accrues "as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission 
complained of' although there must be some damage in order for the cause of action to accrue. 
Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d 396,400 (2002) (quoting Idaho Code§ 5-219). 
The plaintiff must prove that she has suffered some damage, or in the alternative, that she 
is entitled to at least nominal damages. Id. "The limitation period is not extended by reason of 
any continuing consequences or damages resulting from the malpractice or any continuing 
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professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer." 
Idaho Code§ 5-219. For purposes oflegal malpractice the time period begins to run when the 
aggrieved party suffers some damage. Rice v. Litster, 132 Idaho 897, 900-01, 980 P.2d 561, 563-
64 (1999) (overruled on other grounds by Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,272 P.3d 1247 
(2012)). The time period is not tolled by the appeals process. Id. (finding that some damage 
occurred at the dismissal of a claim regardless whether an appeal is pending). 
The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has incurred some damage and 
the time for bringing a cause of action expires two years later. Id. In Tingley v. Harrison, 125 
Idaho 86, 867 P.2d 960 (1994), the Idaho Supreme Court held that where the underlying case was 
dismissed on November 16, 1983, that day was the date of damage for statute oflimitations 
purposes. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 89-90, 867 P .2d at 963-64. The Court then added: "[T]he LC. § 
5-219(4) limitation period applicable to this malpractice action expired November 16, 1985." Id. 
at 90, 867 P.2d at 964; see also Figueroa v. Merrick, 128 Idaho 840, 919 P.2d 1041 (1996) 
(finding that statute of limitation began on entry of judgment in December of 1988 and expired 
exactly two years later in December of 1990); Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 51 P.2d 396 
(2002) (holding that plaintiff had two years exactly from the date of damage to file a claim or it 
would be barred by the statute of limitations). 
Plaintiff argues that the attorney-client relationship lies in contract and is therefore 
governed by Idaho Code§ 5-216 which allows for a five (5) year statute oflimitations. Response 
at 7. Defendant argues that the relevant statute of limitations is governed by Idaho Code § 5-219 
and the proper statute of limitations is two years. Summary Judgment at 6. The determination of 
whether the attorney-client relationship is governed by the law of contracts has previously been 
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
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[U]nless an attorney foolhardily contracts with his client 
guaranteeing a specific outcome in the litigation or provides for a 
higher standard of care in the contract, he is held to the standard of 
care expected of an attorney. Breach of that duty is a tort. 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,620,272 P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012); Stewart, 137 Idaho at 589, 51 
P.3d at 403 (finding Idaho Code§ 5-219 is the applicable statute oflimitations where attorney 
malpractice is alleged). Thus, Plaintiff's argument that relationship was based in contract is 
incorrect. 
Plaintiff argues in the alternative that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 6( a) applies to her 
claim and, therefore, the statute oflirnitations did not expire until December 1, 2014. If the 
Court were to apply Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) in the manner proposed by the Plaintiff 
the result would allow the two-year limitations period to be extended by a day. The Plaintiff 
argues that the day of the event is not to be considered for computing the statute of limitations. 
The Court is not persuaded. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 6( a) does not govern statutes of 
limitation. Further, Plaintiffs proposal runs counter to established case law demonstrating the 
proper method for computing statutes of limitation in legal malpractice cases. See Tingley, 125 
Idaho at 89-90, 867 P .2d at 963-64. 
In the present case there is no evidence before the Court suggesting the Defendant 
guaranteed a specific outcome or that the Defendant contracted to provide a standard of care 
other than that normally expected of an attorney. Deposition I. Smith at 57-58. Therefore, 
Plaintiff's cause of action is governed by Idaho Code§ 5-219, and Plaintiffs claim is subject to a 
two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed the complaint in this case on December 1, 2014. 
Therefore, in order for this case to continue the Plaintiffs claims must have accrued on or after 
December 1, 2012. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-6 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 673 of 710
Defendant was granted his motion to withdraw on March 9, 2012. Plaintiff's Statement 
of Facts in Support of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Statement") at 11. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered damage 
over the next several weeks as a result of Defendant's withdrawal. Id. at 10-12. The final 
decision in Plaintiff's civil case was entered on November 30, 2012. Even though Plaintiff 
appealed the decision, the damage necessary for the statute of limitations to begin running 
occurred at the earliest on March 9, 2012, when she alleges she was prejudiced by Defendant's 
withdrawal. Id. However, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court 
finds that the latest the Plaintiff may have suffered some damage was on November 30, 2012, the 
date judgment was entered against her in the civil case. 
Further, although the Plaintiff alleged malpractice in Defendant's conduct in her criminal 
case, the Court determines that the Plaintiff prevailed in that case and cannot show the damage 
necessary to sustain a cause of action as a matter of law. Even if the Plaintiff could show 
damage, Plaintiff's criminal case was dismissed with prejudice on October, 13, 2011. Id. at 6. 
The statute of limitations for any malpractice regarding the criminal case would have lapsed at 
the latest on October 13, 2013. Idaho Code§ 5-219; Tingley, 125 Idaho at 89-90, 867 P.2d at 
963-64. 
The Court determines that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the statute of 
limitations has run on Plaintiff's claims as a matter of law. For these reasons Defendant's 
Motion for Summary judgment is granted. For the same reasons Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is denied. 
Even though the Court finds that the Plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of 
limitations the Court will proceed to evaluate aspects of Plaintiff's malpractice claim. 
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C. Plaintiff has failed to establish the Elements Necessary for a Claim of Legal 
Malpractice. 
In order to establish a claim for legal malpractice the complaining party must show: "(a) 
the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the 
lawyer; ( c) failure to perform the duty; and ( d) the negligence of the lawyer must have been a 
proximate cause of the damage to the client." Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620,272 P.3d at 1251 
(quoting Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash. App. 433,628 P.2d 1336 (1981)). Ultimately, in_order to 
"establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of a civil action, the plaintiff must show 
that the attorney's negligence proximately caused the plaintiff to lose the right to recover in the 
underlying case." Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88-89, 996 
P.2d 303, 307-08 (2000). Further, the Court has held that expert testimony is normally required 
to overcome a motion for summary judgment filed by an attorney-defendant in a malpractice 
case: 
A plaintiff must normally produce evidence of negligence 
and causation of damages to establish a prima facie case of legal 
malpractice. Where a defendant attorney moves for summary 
judgment in a malpractice case, the plaintiff must ordinarily 
provide affidavits of expert witnesses to resist the motion. The 
reason for these requirements, as in malpractice actions against 
other professionals, is that the factors involved ordinarily are not 
within the knowledge or experience of laymen composing the jury. 
Expert testimony is unnecessary, however, where the attorney's 
alleged breach of duty of care is so obvious that it is within the 
ordinary knowledge and experience of laymen, such as when an 
attorney allows a statute oflimitations to run on a client's claim for 
relief. 
Samuel, 134 Idaho at 89, 996 P.2d at 308 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, in 
a legal malpractice claim the plaintiff must establish that she would have had some chance of 
prevailing in the underlying action in order to recover from the defendant-attorney. Lamb v. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-8 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 675 of 710
Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269, 272, 923 P.2d 976, 979 (1996). "Where a defendant attorney moves 
for summary judgment in a malpractice case, the plaintiff must ordinarily provide affidavits of 
expert witnesses to resist the motion." Samuel, 134 Idaho at 89, 996 P.2d at 308. 
In the present case the parties do not dispute the presence of an attorney-client 
relationship, nor do they dispute the existence of a duty on the part of Defendant. However, there 
is a dispute regarding whether the Defendant breached his duty to the Plaintiff, whether the 
Defendant's performance was the proximate cause of Plaintiff losing the civil case, and whether 
Plaintiff had any chance of prevailing in her claim. The Defendant's expert has submitted a 
report stating that "in my opinion, Mr. Smith met and exceeded the applicable standard of care in 
representing Ms. Greenfield in both the Criminal and Civil Cases." Affidavit P. Erbland at 12. 
The Plaintiff has not provided any expert opinion regarding the standard of representation 
provided by the Defendant. Plaintiff argued that although she is not an expert "I am testifying as 
rationally based on what my perception of what happened." Oral Argument September 1, 2015 
at 3:15. However, the case law is clear, when a defendant-attorney moves for summary judgment 
the plaintiff must ordinarily provide an expert to resist the motion. Samuel, 134 Idaho at 89, 996 
P.2d at 308. In essence, the burden has shifted to the Plaintiff to set forth admissible evidence by 
affidavit or otherwise to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. 
The Plaintiff makes several conclusory statements regarding things that the Defendant did 
and did not do, but she does not provide any evidence to support her contention that these acts 
and omissions fell below the standard of care, or that the acts and omissions were the proximate 
cause of her losing her case. The Defendant properly filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and 
that motion was granted by Judge Lansing Haynes on March 9, 2012. Affidavit C. Greenfield at 
5; Affidavit I. Smith Ex. 1. Plaintiff was refunded the entire fee she had paid the Defendant for 
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her representation. Report of P. Erbland at 10. The case was stayed for twenty (20) days to 
allow the Plaintiff to find new counsel. Plaintiffs Statement at 11. Plaintiff had five weeks 
within which to secure counsel prior to the next hearing in the civil case. Id. The Plaintiffs civil 
case was subsequently continued and was eventually heard in November of 2012, more than 
eight months after Defendant withdrew from representation. Id. Plaintiff chose to proceed pro se 
following the withdrawal of Defendant. Id. 
Plaintiff submits a litany of alleged misdeeds in a conclusory fashion: 
Defendant's failure to follow Plaintiffs instructions, failure to 
meet filing deadlines, failure to file legal motions, failure to 
acquire evidence through discovery, inconsistent statements of fact, 
failure to investigate, failure to notify Plaintiff of modifications, 
failure to follow Court orders, failure to respond to motions, failure 
to give sufficient notice of withdrawal from representation in a 
civil case, failure to follow-up on key issues during the litigation 
process, failure to sue within the statute of limitations, failure to 
perform a conflicts check, failure to apply the law correctly to 
Defendants [sic] bogus counter-claims, abuse of a client's trust 
account, all undermined both of Plaintiffs civil and criminal cases. 
The general rule requiring expert testimony to overcome a motion for summary judgment 
by an attorney-defendant in a legal malpractice case is predicated on the understanding that an 
attorney's performance generally lies outside the experience and knowledge of a layperson. 
Samuel, 134 Idaho at 89, 996 P.2d at 308. There are exceptions to this general rule for instances 
of misconduct that are obvious, such as .when an attorney fails to file a claim and that claim is 
then barred by the statute of limitations. Id. 
The Court determines that the alleged misdeeds in this case are not so obvious to take the 
matter out of the general rule. The decisions made by the Defendant are supported in the report 
of the Defendant's expert: 
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I have reviewed the files and records in the Civil Case in 
light of the claims made by Ms. Greenfield against Mr. Smith. In 
my opinion, Ms. Greenfield's claims that Mr. Smith Breached [sic] 
the applicable standard of care in representing her in the Civil Case 
are also without merit. In my opinion, Mr. Smith's representation 
of Ms. Greenfield in the Civil Case was well within the applicable 
standard of care and he provided excellent representation. 
Highlights of that representation are as follows: [l] Shortly after 
being retained, Mr. Smith filed a comprehensive and thorough 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and for Damages. 
He then immediately began pursuing discovery depositions of the 
plaintiffs. [2] When Mr. Smith did not receive adequate or 
thorough responses to written discovery, he vigorously fought to 
compel thorough responses and successfully obtained orders 
compelling those responses along with sanctions for 
noncompliance. [3] Mr. Smith obtained and disclosed expert 
witnesses to provide testimony on all aspects of Ms. Greenfield's 
claims and defenses. 
Report of P. Er bland at 10-11. In order to raise an issue of fact concerning the opinion of the 
Defendant's expert, Plaintiff needed to have submitted expert testimony to the contrary. Plaintiff 
argues repeatedly that the Defendant failed to timely disclose experts and file a Summary 
Judgment motion, but the Plaintiff filed, argued, and lost her Motion for Summary Judgment, 
was allowed to utilize expert witnesses during trial, and when a jury was presented with the 
evidence proffered by the Plaintiff in her civil case they returned a verdict against her. Kootenai 
County Civil Case No. CV 10-8209. In Plaintiffs appeal of the civil case the Idaho Supreme 
Court upheld the jury verdict and awarded opposing party costs and fees. Greenfield v. 
Wurmlinger, 158 Idaho 591, 349 P.3d 1182 (2015). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that these 
outcomes would have been different but for the negligence of the Defendant. The Court cannot 
reconcile Plaintiff's claims that the Defendant was negligent during his representation of her 
causing her to lose her case, with Plaintiffs argument that had the Defendant not withdrawn she 
likely would have prevailed. 
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Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, there is no genuine 
issue of material fact where the burden has been shifted to the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff has 
provided no evidence to meet that burden. The only evidence before the Court are the conclusory 
statements of the Plaintiff and Defendant's expert's opinions regarding the standard of care. 
This Court determines that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of 
malpractice. In the absence of any expert testimony to substantiate the Plaintiff's claims that the 
Defendant breached a duty to the Plaintiff, that the Defendant's negligent acts or omissions were 
the proximate cause of Plaintiff losing her civil case, or that Plaintiff would have had some 
chance of prevailing in her case, there is no evidence to support her complaint. Plaintiff's 
conclusory allegations that the Defendant missed a deadline for filing a summary judgment 
motion, was on vacation, and was not prepared, are not supported in the record. 
Further, trial strategy is often a complicated matter that is beyond the experience and 
knowledge of a layperson. A scheduling order deadline for filing a motion for summary 
judgment does not mean that one must file such a motion, but that if a party intends to file a 
summary judgment motion, it must be filed by a certain date. The Plaintiff has offered no 
evidence that such a motion would have been favorable to her cause. There is simply no 
evidence before this Court that demonstrates there is an issue of fact as to whether the Defendant 
provided legal services in accord with the standard required in such cases. Further, once 
Defendant presented expert testimony that Defendant's conduct was well within the standard of 
care, it was incumbent upon Plaintiff to present expert testimony to the contrary in order to avoid 
summary judgment. 
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D. Plaintiff's Fraud Claim must be Dismissed Because it has Not Been Pied with 
Particularity. 
Fraud claims must be pled with particularity as required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b). The alleging party must specify what factual circumstances constituted the fraud Id.; Glaze 
v. Deffenbaugh, 144 Idaho 823, 833, 172 P.3d 1104, 1108 (2007). In Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 
165, 722 P.2d 474 (1986), the Idaho Supreme Court considered the adequacy of allegations of 
fraud by a party opposing summary judgment. The Court set forth the nine elements of a cause 
of action for fraud: "(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; ( 4) the speaker's 
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted on by the 
person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his 
reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his consequent and proximate injury." 
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Webster, 119 Idaho 262,267,805 P.2d468, 473 (1991). 
In the present case the Plaintiff alleges the Defendant committed fraud "when he 
knowingly failed to disclose the fabricated FBI NCIC report to Greenfield during the criminal 
proceedings." Modified Complaint at 96. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant committed 
fraud "when he deceptively failed to disclose his professional relationship with Pamela Wallace. 
Smith refused to report crimes that Ms. Wallace had committed on Wurmlinger property for 
which Greenfield had been accused. Said alleged crimes were utilized as Trial Exhibits to 
disparage Greenfield during civil proceedings." Id. at 97. 
Plaintiff has failed to set forth the nine elements of fraud required in a pleading as 
outlined by the Idaho Supreme Court. The first allegation of fraud relates to the Plaintiffs 
criminal case, a case in which, with Defendant as counsel, the Plaintiff prevailed. The second 
allegation regards a former client of the Defendant. Defendant stated that he had contacted the 
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Idaho State Bar and discussed with them his obligations in regard to the former client. 
Deposition I. Smith at 13. Plaintiff argues that Pamela Wallace had made admissions to her 
regarding vandalism of a neighboring property and Plaintiff had relayed this information to 
Defendant. Modified Complaint at 97. Defendant asserts that he had no obligation to report a 
crime that he had no knowledge of other than what he was told by the Plaintiff and he was 
concerned about a conflict based on his past representation of Ms. Wallace. Deposition of I. 
Smith at 13. 
The Court determines that Plaintiffs cause of action for fraud has not been pled with 
particularity. The nine elements required have not been pled in the complaint, the modified 
complaint, nor are they supported in Plaintiffs affidavit. The Plaintiffs claim for fraud should 
be, and is, dismissed. 
E. Plaintiffs Remaining Tort Claims are Barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
Plaintiff included claims of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Idaho Code § 5-219 provides a two year statute of limitations for these kinds of personal 
and business torts. Here, Defendant ceased his representation of Plaintiff on March 9, 2012, at 
the latest. If Defendant's acts while actively representing Plaintiff constitute the basis for 
Plaintiff's remaining tort claims, the Plaintiff would be required to file her claim on or before 
March 9, 2014. Even if Plaintiff could show that these causes of action accrued at the terminus 
of her civil case on November 30, 2012, the Plaintiff would have had to file her claim on or 
before November 30, 2014. These claims were filed on December 1, 2014, and are barred by the 
statute of limitations under Idaho Code§ 5-219. 
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Where there are no disputed facts with regard to the running of a statute of limitation, it is 
a question oflaw as to when the limitation period began. Reis v. Cox, 104 Idaho 434,660 P.2d 
46 (1983 ). The Court determines that the relevant statute of limitation governing Plaintiff's tort 
claims began running, at the latest, on November 30, 2014; therefore, Plaintiffs remaining tort 
claims are barred by the statute of limitations and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court determines 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Defendant is entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendant is requested to 
prepare a final judgment conforming to the Idaho Supreme Court standards for final judgments. 
DATEDthis~ofOctober, 2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _l__ day of October, 2015, I caused, to be served, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document as addressed to: 
David A. Kulisch 
Keith D. Brown 
Troy Y. Nelson 
RANDALL DANSKIN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Fax (509)624-2528 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
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IN THE 0ISTR1CT COURT OF THE FIRST JlJDIClAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
No. CV-14-8801 
ORDER GRANTING MO'.flON FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
BEHALF OF DEFENDANT lAN 
SMITH 
The Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of defendant Ian Smith was heard 
before the Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer, District Judge, on September i, 2015 at the 
Kootenai County Courthouse. Christina J. Greenfield appeared for and argued on her 
own behalf (pro se). Appearing for and arguing on behalf of defendant Ian Smith was 
Troy Nelson of Randall I Danskin. P.S. 






Defendant's Motion for Summary Juogmem; 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Affidavit of Tan Smith; 
Affidavit of Peter Erbland; 
Affidavit of Troy Nelson; 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BEHALF 
OF DEFENDANT IAN SMITH - 1 




































Stateme.lll of Undi~puted Facts; 
Plaimiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's MotiQn for 
Summary Judgment; 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgmem; 
Affi<lavit of Christina J. Green field in Support of Plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts and Merno1'andum in Opposition to Dcfcndam 's Molion for 
Summary Judgment; 
Objection to Greenfield Affidavit and Motion to Strike; and 
Defendant's Reply Brief. 
The Court also having heard and considered the arguments of counsel and Ms. 
Greenfield and the undersigned being fully informed; and having issued a Memorandum 
Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, stating the 
reasons therefore; hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
The Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf nf defendant Ian Smith is granted. 
All of plaintiff's claims against defendant Ian Smith are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED this 20 n-day of Ov(Z) he,,,y-
Presented by: 
Troy \'. Nelson, ISB #5851 
Attorneys for Defendant 
OijDER GRANTING MOTTON F.OR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BEHALF 
OF DEFENDANT IAN SMITH' - ~ 
, 2015. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO,. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
All of plain tiff's claims for relief asserted against defendant Jan Smith are 
21 dismissed with prejudice. 
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Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83 854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
. STATE OF IOAHO ) 
COUNTY OF KOOTErUd r SS 
FILED: 
2015 OCT 29 PH 3: 55 
CLERK DiSTRICT COURT 
Uke~.L 
DEPLff Y /,LA{ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIELD, CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
vs. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE 
HONORABLE JUDGE CYNTHIA 
K.C. MEYER PER I.R.C.P. 40( d)(2) 
AND I.R.C.P. 40( d)(S) AND 
Defendant. ACCOMPANYING AFFIDAVIT 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, Christina J. Greenfield, hereby moves the Court to 
recuse the Honorable Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer from this case. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant this Motion per I.R.C.P. 40 
(d)(l) and I.R.C.P. (40(d)(5). 
DATED this 29th day of October, 2015. 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE 
HONORABLE JUDGE CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER 
PER I.R.C.P. 40 (d)(2) AND I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5) 
1 
./ / 
/ I ,/ ._,.,-j 
/(G<,.rd / / f~/7,j j 
Christina Greenfield / 
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Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
STATE C:f l0~~9 1 1 S:, 
<:omnY OF \'\001 C.i'IA1; 
' FILED: 
2015 OCT 29 PM 3: 55 
CLERK, c,;"1RICT COURT 
ic--f- . 1 L--~--
v n E P T Y \,U\\ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA JUNE GREENFIELD, CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE 
JUDGE CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER PER 
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) AND I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5) 
Defendant. AND ACCOMPANYING AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai) 
I, CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, being duly sworn under oath do state the following: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter. All statements contained herein are based upon 
my personal knowledge. 
2. I filed a Complaint against the Defendant on December 1, 2014, wherein Smith was the attorney 
of record in Case #2010-8209. 
3. The Defendant and I have been in the discovery phase since February 2015. 
4. On September 1, 2015, a hearing was held for "Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment." 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE 
JUDGE CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER 
PER I.R.C.P. 40 (d)(2) AND I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5) 
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5. On October 2, 2015, I submitted my "Motion To Compel Response To Discovery." 
6. On October 6, 2015, Judge Meyer submitted her "Memorandum Decision And Order Re: 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment." 
7. On October 22, 2015, Judge Meyer submitted her "Order Granting Motion For Summary 
Judgment On Behalf Of Defendant Ian Smith." In said Memorandum, Judge Meyer misstates 
several actual facts regarding my complaint against the Defendant. 
8. Judge Meyer is biased against me because I am a Pro Se Litigant. 
9. Under the U.S. Constitution, self-representation in a civil case is a fundamental right which 
Judge Meyers is violating by not allowing me to proceed with my case as she claims I am a "Lay 
Person" incapable of determining obvious violations of Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, etc. 
10. Judge Meyers is stating that I need an "expert witness" to point out obvious violations to which I 
disagree. Under the "common sense exception" obvious violations are identifiable to "lay 
persons." 
11. I have been litigating three (3) cases for the past three and a half years. I have filed numerous 
Motions, Pleadings, Affidavits and the like. I am very familiar with the Rules of Civil Procedure 
and obvious violations of said rules, especially if they are "sufficiently apparent" "egregious and 
obvious" "obvious and gross want of care" "grossly apparent" "clear and obvious" and / or 
"clear and palpable, all terms utilized (referring to lay persons) in standing case law and 
authorities. 
12. Judge Meyers does not have all of the facts in this case as discovery was not complete prior to 
her hasty decision to dismiss this case. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE 
JUDGE CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER 
PER I.R.C.P. 40 (d)(2) AND I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5) 
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13. Judge Meyers is mistaken on when the actual date damages were assessed against Greenfield in 
·· her civil proceedings to which the Defendant Smith was the attorney of record during said 
proceedings. 
14. On March 26, 2013, the "Final Judgment" in the above-mentioned case was submitted in favor 
of the Defendants (Case# 2010-8209) for $103,000.00. 
15. On July 8, 2013, an "Amended Final Judgement Order Or Decree Entered" in the above-
mentioned case was entered against me in favor of the Defendants for approximately 
$168,000.00. 
16. I timely appealed the above-mentioned case and an "Amended Final Judgment" was entered on 
September 30, 2015, in favor of the Defendants for approximately $199,000.00, wherein I have 
suffered extreme loss due to said damages. 
1 7. I filed my complaint against Smith well within the two year statute of limitations period and 
therefore should be allowed to move forward with my case. 
Therefore due to obvious judicial bias and violations of the Idaho Rules of Procedure, and lack 
of discretion, I am requesting a new Judge that will address my pending court motions, objections, etc., 
in a timely responsive unbiased manner so I may continue with my legal proceedings. 
DATED this 29th day of October, 2015. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE 
JUDGE CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER 
PER I.R.C.P. 40 (d)(2) AND I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 





CASE NO. CV 2014-8801 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
This Court heard oral argument on Defendant's Motion for SUllllllary Judgment and 
Plaintiffs cross-motion for SUllllllary Judgment on September 1, 2015. This Court issued a 
decision on October 6, 2015. After this Court granted SUllllllary judgment in favor of Defendant, 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify and an affidavit under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40( d)(2) 
on October 29, 2015. 
This Court having reviewed the record before it perceives the issue of disqualification as 
discretionary, intends to act within the bounds of such discretion and apply the correct legal 
standards, and reaches this decision through an exercise of reason. 
Plaintiff has failed to present facts that a reasonable observer could consider in determining 
that disqualification is appropriate. Plaintiffs affidavit takes issue with the decision rendered by 
this Court on Defendant's Motion for SUllllllary Judgment. Plaintiff merely speculates that Judge 
..... ·-- -··--· ..... --- -·-- --··-· .... . ............. ,. ······- ··- ..... --··- -·· . '"'" - ----· - . ·······---· ··-- ····-- . "···--·---··-·-··· ., .... ·-···- ............. '"··-· -···· 
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Meyer has a prejudice and bias against pro se litigants based, apparently, on the adverse ruling. 
"Judicial rulings, standing alone, do not constitute a valid basis for a claim of bias or partiality." 
Greenfield v. Wurmlinger, 158 Idaho 591, 349 P .3d 1182, 1196 (2015) ( quoting State v. Hairston, 
133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999)). "If the moving party does not request oral argument upon 
the motion, and does not file a brief within fourteen ( 14) days, the court may deny such motion 
without notice if the court deems the motion has no merit." Lamm v. State, 143 Idaho 763, 766, 
152 P.3d 634,637 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(D)). 
Based on the foregoing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Disqualify is denied. 
DATED this /01fay of November, 2015. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 2. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / l day of November, 2015, I caused, to be served, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document as addressed to: 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Park Wood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
David Kulisch 
Keith D. Brown 
Troy Y. Nelson 
RANDALL DANSKIN, P.S. 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201-0653 
Fax: (509) 624-2528 




Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 695 of 710
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
Plaintiff/ Appellant Pro Se 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
NOTICE OF APPEAL vs. 
IAND. SMITH 
Defendants / Respondent. 
COMES NOW, the above-named Appellant CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD (hereafter: 
"Greenfield"), hereby provides notice to the above-named Respondent, IAN D. SMITH, 
(hereafter: "Smith") and his attorney of record David Kulisch (hereafter: -"Kulisch") and the 
Clerk of the above entitled Court and hereby submits her Notice of Appeal. 
1. The above named Appellant, Christina J. Greenfield, appeals her case against the above 
named Respondent, Ian D. Smith, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the following 
decision and Order entered in the above-referenced action from the Honorable Judge 
Cynthia Meyers presiding, after she dismissed the case and issued a Judgment dated 
October 22, 2015, and sent to Plaintiff by United States Postal Service on October 23, 
2015. 
---- ----------------------------------·-NoricE--ofAPPE-:iv::---------------- -- -------- --- -- -- - -------------- --------- ------------- ------------------------ --1------·---·-·---------------- -------- --·--------------------------------------- ---------------------------~-----------·----··----····----·--- ------------·----- -------- _.-t ____ ,e_ _______ ----- ------· 
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2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment described 
in paragraph one (1) above is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Appellant Rule 
ll(a) (1). 
3. Appellant provides the following preliminary statements on appeal, which the Appellant 
intends to assert in the appeal. This preliminary statement, however, provides only 
preliminary issues and shall in no way prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues 
on appeal. The preliminary issues on appeal are: 
a. Did the Honorable Judge Cynthia Meyers abuse her judicial discretionary duty and 
allow a manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal 
arguments which were presented by the Plaintiff to the Court before such Order for 
dismissal? 
b. Did the District Court err in its finding that the Plaintiff, a Pro-Se Litigant, 1s 
incapable of presenting her case without the assistance of an "expert" witness? 
c. Did the District Court err when it dismissed the Plaintiff's civil case, wherein the 
District Court Judge Cynthia Meyers directive barring Pro-Se litigants from self-
representation is a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment? 
d. Did the District Court err in its finding that the Plaintiff is not within the Statute of 
Limitations timelines pursuant to Idaho Code §5-216 regarding the Defendants 
obvious "breach" of his contractual agreement to protect the Plaintiff from harm? 
e. Did the District Court err in its finding that the Plaintiff failed to set forth "elements" 
of her 'Fraud' claim against the Defendant? 
f. Did the District Court err in its finding that the Plaintiff is not within the Statute of 
Limitations timelines on remaining claims under Idaho Code §5-219? 
- NOTICEOFAPPEAL- 2 
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g. Did the District Court Judge Cynthia Meyers prejudicial actions place Plaintiff on an 
unequal footing with her opponent in the court litigation process? 
h. Did the District Court Judge Cynthia Meyers utilize alleged factual findings of 
another court in Plaintiff's prior actions to dismiss Plaintiff's case, wherein such 
findings do not constitute facts and are "not subject to reasonable dispute" within the 
meaning ofldaho Rules of Evidence 201? 
1. Did the District Court Judge Cynthia Meyers failure to recuse herself based on her 
own personal bias against "Pro Se" litigants harm the Plaintiff? 
J. Did the District Court Judge Cynthia Meyers materially mis-state and / or misquote 
statements and / or allegations made by the Defendant, which constituted obstruction 
of justice? 
4. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's standard 
record, in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellant Rule 28: 
a. Plaintiff's Modified Complaint dated December 8, 2014. 
b. Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents dated January 21, 2015. 
c. Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Production dated 
February 23, 2015. 
d. Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's First Set of Requests for Production dated April 
10, 2015. 
e. Deposition oflan D. Smith dated May 6, 2015. 
f. Plaintiffs Second Response to Defendants Request for Production dated July 7, 2015. 
g. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 30, 2015. 
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h. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 
30, 2015. 
1. Affidavit of Peter Erbland dated July 30, 2015 
J. Affidavit oflan Smith dated July 30, 2015. 
k. Affidavit of Troy Y Nelson dated July 30, 2015. 
1. Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts dated July 30, 2015. 
m. Affidavit of Christina J Greenfield in Support of Plaintiffs Statement of Facts and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dated 
August 18, 2015. 
n. Plaintiffs Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 18, 2015. 
o. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
dated August 18, 2015. 
p. Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure dated August 20, 2015. 
q. Defendant's Objection to Greenfield Affidavit and Motion to Strike August 24, 2015. 
r. Defendant's Reply Brief dated August 24, 2015. 
s. Motion and Affidavit of Christina Greenfield in Further Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to IRCP 56(f) dated September 15, 2015. 
t. Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion and Affidavit in Further Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Objection to Exhibits 1-10, And 
Motion to Strike dated September 17, 2015. 
u. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Response to Discovery dated October 02, 2015 . 
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v. Judge Cynthia Meyers Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated October 6, 2015. 
w. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment On Behalf Of Defendant Ian Smith 
dated October 22, 2015. 
x. Judgment dated October 22, 2015. Sent to Plaintiff by United States Postal Service 
on October 23, 2015. 
y. Plaintiff's Motion and Affidavit in Support of Motion to Disqualify the Honorable 
Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer per IRCP 40(d)(2) and IRCP 40(d)(5) and Accompanying 
Affidavit dated October 29, 2015. 
z. Order Denying Motion to Disqualify dated November 12, 2015. 
aa. All exhibits and evidence presented on the record. 
5. I certify: 
a. That I am an indigent person; 
b. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served upon the Court Reporter, at the 
address set forth in the certificate of service attached; 
c. That the Clerk of the District Court has received an affidavit requesting for waiver of 
fees for preparation of the court reporter's transcript, district clerk's record and any 
additional documents; 
d. That the Appellate has requested that the Court waive the filing fee; 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho 
Appellant Rule 20. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2015. 
-
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Appellant Pro Se 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of December, 2015, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
David Kulisch 
Attorney at Law 
1500 Bank of America Financial Center 
601 West Riverside Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0626 
Diane Bolan 
Court Reporter to Cynthia Meyers 
324 W. Garden Ave 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 6 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[X] Hand Delivered 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
PROSE 
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Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
Plaintiff/ Appellant Pro Se 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL VS. 
IAND. SMITH 
Defendants / Respondent. 
COMES NOW, the above-named Appellant CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD (hereafter: 
"Greenfield"), hereby provides notice to the above-named Respondent, IAN D. SMITH, 
(hereafter: "Smith") and his attorney of record David Kulisch (hereafter: "Kulisch") and the 
Clerk of the above entitled Court and hereby submits her Amended Notice of Appeal. 
1. The above named Appellant, Christina J. Greenfield, appeals her case against the above 
named Respondent, Ian D. Smith, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the following 
decision and Order entered in the above-referenced action from the Honorable Judge 
Cynthia Meyers presiding, after she dismissed the case and issued a Judgment dated 
October 22, 2015, and sent to Plaintiff by United States Postal Service on October 23, 
2015. 
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2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment described 
in paragraph one (1) above is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Appellant Rule 
1 l(a) (1). 
3. Appellant provides the following preliminary statements on appeal, which the Appellant 
intends to assert in the appeal. This preliminary statement, however, provides only 
preliminary issues and shall in no way prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues 
on appeal. The preliminary issues on appeal are: 
A. Did the District Court err in granting Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment? 
B. Did the district court err in prematurely dismissing the Plaintiff's case prior to the 
close of discovery? 
C. Did the district court err in holding that Greenfield's claims were barred by the statute 
of limitations? 
D. Did the District Court Judge, Cynthia Meyers, abuse her discretion and refuse to 
consider Plaintiff's material facts or dispositive legal arguments, which were 
presented by the Plaintiff to the Court before such Order for dismissal? 
E. Did the District Court err in its finding that the Plaintiff, a Pro-Se Litigant, cannot 
pursue and / or litigate her case without the assistance of an "expert" witness? 
F. Did the District Court err when it dismissed the Plaintiff's civil case, including a 
directive barring Pro-Se litigants from self-representation, which is a due process 
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment? 
G. Did the District Court Judge Cynthia Meyers utilize alleged factual findings of 
another court in Plaintiff's prior actions to dismiss Plaintiff's present case, wherein 
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such findings do not constitute facts and are "not subject to reasonable dispute" 
within the meaning of Idaho Rules of Evidence 201? 
H. Did the District Court Judge Cynthia Meyers consider unsubstantiated statements and 
I or allegations made by the Defendant and / or Defendants untimely disclosed expert 
witnesses, which constituted obstruction of justice? 
4. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's standard 
record, in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellant Rule 28: 
a. Plaintiff's Modified Complaint dated December 5, 2014. 
b. Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Production of Documents dated January 21, 2015. 
c. Defendant's Responses To Plaintiffs First Set Of Requests For Production February 
23, 2015. 
d. Transcript oflan D. Smith Deposition dated May 22, 2015. 
e. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 29, 2015. 
f. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 
29, 2015. 
g. Affidavit of Peter Erbland including ALL EXHIBITS dated July 29, 2015 
h. Affidavit of Ian Smith dated July 29, 2015. 
1. Affidavit of Troy YNelson including EXHIBITS dated July 29, 2015. 
J. Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts dated July 29, 2015. 
k. Affidavit of Christina J Greenfield in Support of Plaintiffs Statement of Facts and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with ALL 
EXHIBITS dated August 18, 2015. 
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1. Plaintiffs Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 18, 2015. 
m. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
dated August 18, 2015. 
n. Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure dated August 20, 2015. 
o. Defendant's Objection to Greenfield Affidavit and Motion to Strike August 24, 2015. 
p. Defendant's Reply Brief dated August 24, 2015. 
q. Transcript from hearing for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on September 
1, 2015. Court Reporter: Diane Bolan. 
r. Motion and Affidavit including ALL EXHIBITS of Christina Greenfield in Further 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to IRCP 56(f) 
dated September 15, 2015. 
s. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Response to Discovery dated October 02, 2015. 
t. Judge Cynthia Meyers Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated October 6, 2015. 
u. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment On Behalf Of Defendant Ian Smith 
dated October 22, 2015. 
v. Judgment dated October 22, 2015. Sent to Plaintiff by United States Postal Service 
on October 23, 2015. 
w. Plaintiff's Motion and Affidavit in Support of Motion to Disqualify the Honorable 
Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer per IRCP 40(d)(2) and IRCP 40(d)(5) and Accompanying 
Affidavit dated October 29, 2015. 
x. Order Denying Motion to Disqualify dated November 12, 2015. 
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y. All exhibits and evidence presented on the record. 
5. I certify: 
a. That I am an indigent person; I am unable to pay for appellate costs and fees; 
b. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served upon the Court Reporter, at the 
address set forth in the certificate of service attached; 
c. That the Clerk of the District Court has received an affidavit requesting for waiver of 
fees for preparation of the court reporter's transcripts, district clerk's record and any 
additional documents; 
d. That the Appellate has requested that the Court waive the filing fee; 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho 
Appellant Rule 20. 
f. On December 10, 2015, Plaintiff was granted said waiver for fees for clerk's record 
and transcripts on appeal. 
DATED this 27111 day of January, 2016. 
IELD 
Appellant Pro Se 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 27111 day of January, 2016, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
David Kulisch 
Attorney at Law 
1500 Bank of America Financial Center 
601 West Riverside Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0626 
Diane Bolan 
Court Reporter to Cynthia Meyers 
324 W. Garden Ave 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[X] Hand Delivered 
CHRISTINA J. GR~EJ>T IELD 
PRO SE '-..-/ 
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TO: Clerk of the Courts 
Diane M~ Bolan 
OFFICIAL CouRT REPORTER - ID CSR No. 4 7 3 
324 West Garden Aven~'T~rncii1iBW,900© l N-eomi V rr U:~·,i;\, t ,_--, Coeur d'Alerle nta c>'8 o\J ~f'lMI I' ~ 
Phone: (208) 481-2009 • Fa (fb" 46-1188 
Email: realtimererrter@hotmail.com 
20 6 FEB 12 AM IO: 0 I 
Idaho Supreme Court Building 
Email: sctfilings@idcourts.net 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
S.C. NO. 43831 
CASE NO. CV-14-8801 
vs. 
IAN D. SMITH, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGING 
Notice is hereby given that on Februar 12, 2016, I 
lodged an Original Transcript, totaling 33 pages, and three 
Certified Copies, entitled: 
Motion for Summary Judgment, held September 1, 2015 
for the above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of 
the County of Kootenai in the First Judicial District. 
Diane M. Bolan, Official Court Reporter, 
Dated February 12, 2016 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 












DOCKET NO. 43831 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the attached list of exhibits is a 
true and accurate copy of the exhibits being forwarded to the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
I further certify that no exhibits were offered. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai 
County, Idaho this 12th day of February, 2016. 
Jim Brannon 
Clerk of the District Court 
I-Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 
Christina J. Greenfield vs Ian D. Smith Docket No. 43831 709 of 710
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 












DOCKET NO. 43831 
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the 
County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause was 
compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I further certify that no exhibits were offered in this case. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the Clerk's Record was 
complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, the copies were mailed by U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid on the \ ;;t_-\.l:\ day of \--\-Q ~ f\.~U-t,.;:::?t:> \ \,.:, 
I 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
V. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the 
Attorneys of record in this cause as follows: 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
21 0 S Parkwood Place 
Coeur D'Alene, ID 83814 
TROY Y. NELSON 
601 W Riverside Ave, Ste 1500 
Spokane, WA 99201 
IN WITNESS WHEREQF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this \~;)'\,\_ day of ~~\~(Ul,L,c 2.t)l\o. 
